We develop a new notion of security against timing attacks where the attacker is able to simultaneously observe the execution time of a program and the probability of the values of low variables. We then show how to measure the security of a program with respect to this notion via a computable estimate of the timing leakage and use this estimate for cost optimisation.
Titolo: | Quantifying Timing Leaks and Cost Optimisation |
Autori: | |
Data di pubblicazione: | 2008 |
Abstract: | We develop a new notion of security against timing attacks where the attacker is able to simultaneously observe the execution time of a program and the probability of the values of low variables. We then show how to measure the security of a program with respect to this notion via a computable estimate of the timing leakage and use this estimate for cost optimisation. |
Handle: | http://hdl.handle.net/11562/321326 |
Appare nelle tipologie: | 04.01 Contributo in atti di convegno |
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