An Ethics for Plato's Dialectic?

This paper examines assumptions and repercussions of dialectic in a moral setting. Dialectic is a cardinal procedure of Plato’s philosophical research, already studied and clarified in its methodical traits. In the ‘Timaeus’ (29b-c) a kinship (‘synghèneia’) is pointed out between discourse and their objects, so that the former are as much irrefutable as the latter are stable in being. Also the ‘Phaedo’ (115e) outlines a relationship between discourse and speaker: the former’s incorrectness has harmful effects on the speaker’s soul and her conduct. This relationship also become bijective when the very state of the soul and her conduct affect the state of her discourses. In the pre-Platonic culture – from archaic poetry to sophists, from tragedy to the rhetorical and argumentative procedures of political language – the Greeks acknowledge an original moral implication in the very use of the word. Aristotle studies it in the ‘Politics’ (1253a 9-18) and there is no reason of leaving this feature out of Plato’s dialogues. The qualities he ascribes to the dialectic in the ‘Republic’ (487a) include being sociable, urban and courteous (‘hèmeros’). Thanks to a lexical research, this trait is often specified in other passages as ‘praòtes’, ‘philìa’, ‘èunoia’ or ‘eumèneia’. Far from being a merely outward prerequisite, tied to a formal idea of good manners, this trait actually has a methodically precise characterisation, identified from passages in the ‘Protagoras’ (337a-c) and in the ‘Meno’ (75d). A benevolent, not aggressive trait in discussions – brought about by the Socratic awareness of one’s ignorance and by the consequent lack of desire to prevail in debates – is fundamental for their success. This is also pedagogically true, both for people assisting as spectators eager to learn, and for the speakers themselves, with regard to their heuristic opportunities. A famous passage in the ‘Seventh Letter’ (344b), pivoting on the absence of ‘envy’ (‘phthònos’) on the dialectician part and on his need to use a “benevolent confutation” (‘eumenès èlenchos’) for establishing truth, helps to clarify it beyond doubt. The very ‘weakness’ or ‘indistinctiveness’ of ‘èunoia’ – a virtue necessary to the dialectician – implies being filled with meaning at every stage of the discussion, and time after time translates into a dialectically efficient move. Benevolence advocates research and rejects the yearning for victory in a discussion. It prompts truthful questions and answers. It causes and accepts hypothetical answers. It pushes for a correct use and acceptance of confutation. It grants the agreement between the interlocutors at every step of the discussion and at its end. Therefore, there is no cognitively fruitful dialectic discussion without this moral trait of benevolence. All this shows the complexity, which cannot be relegated to an utter opposition or rigid hierarchy, of the relationship Plato outlines between intellectual and emotional aspects of human behaviour. This trait also seems to possess a modern-day flavour, as such is the duty often ascribed to ethics today, a simple research of a methodology for solving conflicts alternative to the use of force.