We find evidence that before elections Italian mayors issue fewer traffic tickets and collect a lower proportion of issued fines. This is first-hand evidence that tax collection – other than tax setting – can be strategically used to affect electoral results.

A fine collection: The political budget cycle of traffic enforcement

Bracco, Emanuele
2018

Abstract

We find evidence that before elections Italian mayors issue fewer traffic tickets and collect a lower proportion of issued fines. This is first-hand evidence that tax collection – other than tax setting – can be strategically used to affect electoral results.
political budget cycle
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: http://hdl.handle.net/11562/978440
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