L’ephesis al tribunale popolare in diritto processuale ateniese: ‘impugnazione’, ‘rimessione’ o «tertium datur»?

What is the origin of the Solonian procedural remedy called ἔφεσις εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον? What is its legal nature and its political impact? What are its consequences under legal procedure, as well as under criminal, civil and administrative law (if I am allowed to make modern distinctions)? Both historians of political institutions and legal historians have proposed many different interpretations. On the one side, the communis opinio at the moment interprets the Solonian ἔφεσις εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον in terms of a ‘right of appeal’; on the other side, a few scholars have maintained – albeit with some doubts – that from its introduction at the end of the sixth century, ἔφεσις was a mandatory ‘transfer’ of a case from the authority of a magistrate to the popular court. A third view has received less attention in studies published in recent years. This view denies that one can characterize ἔφεσις as either a right of appeal or a transfer of jurisdiction. The present contribution tries to give some new support to this neglected view in order to demonstrate the negative effects produced by the Solonian ἔφεσις.