In the context of a three-person ultimatum game featuring a proposer and two responders, this paper aims to investigate whether there are differences in bargainers’ behavior engendered by the use of the play and the strategy methods and to shed light on the role of emotions in explaining these differences. Although proposers correctly expect responders facing the play and the strategy methods to feel different emotions, our results reveal that they offer the same amount to both responders, on average. The two response methods also yield quantitatively similar acceptance rates. We thus provide further evidence that the play and the strategy methods do not significantly bias the behavior of bargainers.
|Titolo:||Play Versus Strategy Method: Behavior and the Role of Emotions in the Ultimatum Game|
Nardi, Chiara (Corresponding)
|Data di pubblicazione:||2018|
|Appare nelle tipologie:||01.01 Articolo in Rivista|