Market mechanisms are increasingly being used as a tool for allocating somewhat scarce but unpriced rights and resources, and the European Emission Trading Scheme is an example. By means of dynamic optimization in the contest of firms covered by such environmental regulations, this paper generates endogenously the price dynamics of emission permits under asymmetric information, allowing inter-temporal banking and borrowing. In the market there are a finite number of firms and each firm’s pollution emission follows an exogenously given stochastic process. We prove the discounted permit price is a martingale with respect to the relevant filtration. The model is solved numerically. Finally, a closed-form pricing formula for European-style options is derived.

The Endogenous Price Dynamics of Emission Allowances and an Application to CO2Option Pricing

TASCHINI, LUCA
2012-01-01

Abstract

Market mechanisms are increasingly being used as a tool for allocating somewhat scarce but unpriced rights and resources, and the European Emission Trading Scheme is an example. By means of dynamic optimization in the contest of firms covered by such environmental regulations, this paper generates endogenously the price dynamics of emission permits under asymmetric information, allowing inter-temporal banking and borrowing. In the market there are a finite number of firms and each firm’s pollution emission follows an exogenously given stochastic process. We prove the discounted permit price is a martingale with respect to the relevant filtration. The model is solved numerically. Finally, a closed-form pricing formula for European-style options is derived.
2012
Asymmetric Information, Environmental Finance, European Emission Trading, Scheme, Trading Decisions
File in questo prodotto:
File Dimensione Formato  
Chesney_Taschini_Dec_2007.pdf

solo utenti autorizzati

Tipologia: Documento in Pre-print
Licenza: Dominio pubblico
Dimensione 3.45 MB
Formato Adobe PDF
3.45 MB Adobe PDF   Visualizza/Apri   Richiedi una copia

I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.

Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11562/955207
Citazioni
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.pmc??? ND
  • Scopus 53
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.isi??? ND
social impact