In a series of one-shot linear public goods game, we ask subjects to reporttheir contributions, their contribution plans for the next period, and their first-order beliefs about their present and future partner. We estimate subjects' preferences from plan data by a finite mixture approach andcompare the results with those obtained from contribution data.Controlling for beliefs, which incorporate the information about the others' decisions, we are able to show that plans convey accurate information about subjects' preferences and, consequently, are good predictors of their future behavior.
Use of data on planned contributions and stated beliefs in the measurement of social preferences
Levati, Maria Vittoria
2014-01-01
Abstract
In a series of one-shot linear public goods game, we ask subjects to reporttheir contributions, their contribution plans for the next period, and their first-order beliefs about their present and future partner. We estimate subjects' preferences from plan data by a finite mixture approach andcompare the results with those obtained from contribution data.Controlling for beliefs, which incorporate the information about the others' decisions, we are able to show that plans convey accurate information about subjects' preferences and, consequently, are good predictors of their future behavior.
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