In this paper we propose a model in which there are ideological and strategic voters who vote under proportional rule. We prove that the behavior of ideological voters matters for the determination of the outcome. We show that a subset of strategic voters partially counteracts the votes of the ideological voters.

The effect of ideology on policy outcomes in proportional representation systems

Francesco, De Sinopoli;
2011-01-01

Abstract

In this paper we propose a model in which there are ideological and strategic voters who vote under proportional rule. We prove that the behavior of ideological voters matters for the determination of the outcome. We show that a subset of strategic voters partially counteracts the votes of the ideological voters.
2011
Strategic voting; Game Theory; proportional representation
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11562/386780
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