We develop a new notion of security against timing attacks where the attacker is able to simultaneously observe the execution time of a program and the probability of the values of low variables. We then propose an algorithm which computes an estimate of the security of a program with respect to this notion in terms of timing leakage and show how to use this estimate for cost optimization.
Probabilistic Timing Covert Channels: To Close or not to Close?
DI PIERRO, ALESSANDRA;
2011-01-01
Abstract
We develop a new notion of security against timing attacks where the attacker is able to simultaneously observe the execution time of a program and the probability of the values of low variables. We then propose an algorithm which computes an estimate of the security of a program with respect to this notion in terms of timing leakage and show how to use this estimate for cost optimization.
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