Experimental evidence indicates that free riders and strongly reciprocal papers coexist in the public goods game framework. By means of an evolutionary analysis, we provide an endogenization of this behavioral regularity

Free Riders and Strong Reciprocators Coexist in Public Goods Experiments: Evolutionary Foundations

ZARRI, Luca
2010-01-01

Abstract

Experimental evidence indicates that free riders and strongly reciprocal papers coexist in the public goods game framework. By means of an evolutionary analysis, we provide an endogenization of this behavioral regularity
Evolutionary Game Theory; Cooperation; Free Riding; Strong Reciprocity
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11562/340811
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