We prove that for generic network-formation games where players incur a strictly positive cost to propose links the number of Nash equilibria is finite. Furthermore all Nash equilibria are regular and, therefore, stable sets.
Titolo: | Costly Network Formation and Regular Equilibria |
Autori: | |
Data di pubblicazione: | 2010 |
Rivista: | |
Abstract: | We prove that for generic network-formation games where players incur a strictly positive cost to propose links the number of Nash equilibria is finite. Furthermore all Nash equilibria are regular and, therefore, stable sets. |
Handle: | http://hdl.handle.net/11562/339537 |
Appare nelle tipologie: | 01.01 Articolo in Rivista |
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