Qualitative and quantitative methods are often presented in scientific research as complementary modes of investigation. One of the reasons for this complementariness is that qualitative methods are often considered as just the first step towards the discovery of previously unseen phenomena and these methods only sometimes facilitate development of quantifications and measurements, which are traditionally regarded as a guarantee of good science (Loos, 1995). Qualitative investigations do not, therefore, necessarily lead to quantifications in the field of research psychology either: qualitative methods often remain the “best science possible” (Polanyi, 1958). If one wanted to eliminate, or at least reduce, the amount of this aforementioned complementariness, it would be necessary to try and respond to the following queries (Kuiken & Miall, 2001): 1. is there a form of quantification which we normally call the “qualitative method”? 2. What role does this quantification play in inductive analysis, the very focus of qualitative thinking? 3. Is it possible to operationalize and transform a “quality” into algorithms? Experimental phenomenology appears to be a suitable place in which to find the answers.
Measuring in experimental phenomenology and carrying out phenomenological psychophysics: the case of contrary properties
BURRO, Roberto
2009-01-01
Abstract
Qualitative and quantitative methods are often presented in scientific research as complementary modes of investigation. One of the reasons for this complementariness is that qualitative methods are often considered as just the first step towards the discovery of previously unseen phenomena and these methods only sometimes facilitate development of quantifications and measurements, which are traditionally regarded as a guarantee of good science (Loos, 1995). Qualitative investigations do not, therefore, necessarily lead to quantifications in the field of research psychology either: qualitative methods often remain the “best science possible” (Polanyi, 1958). If one wanted to eliminate, or at least reduce, the amount of this aforementioned complementariness, it would be necessary to try and respond to the following queries (Kuiken & Miall, 2001): 1. is there a form of quantification which we normally call the “qualitative method”? 2. What role does this quantification play in inductive analysis, the very focus of qualitative thinking? 3. Is it possible to operationalize and transform a “quality” into algorithms? Experimental phenomenology appears to be a suitable place in which to find the answers.
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