n this paper we lay the semantic basis for a quantitative security analysis of probabilistic systems by introducing notions of approximate confinement based on various process equivalences. We re-cast the operational semantics classically expressed via probabilistic transition systems (PTS) in terms of linear operators and we present a technique for defining approximate semantics as probabilistic abstract interpretations of the PTS semantics. An operator norm is then used to quantify this approximation. This provides a quantitative measure epsilon of the indistinguishability of two processes and therefore of their confinement. In this security setting a statistical interpretation is then given of the quantity epsilon which relates it to the number of tests needed to breach the security of the system.
Measuring the Confinement of Probabilistic Systems
DI PIERRO, ALESSANDRA;
2005-01-01
Abstract
n this paper we lay the semantic basis for a quantitative security analysis of probabilistic systems by introducing notions of approximate confinement based on various process equivalences. We re-cast the operational semantics classically expressed via probabilistic transition systems (PTS) in terms of linear operators and we present a technique for defining approximate semantics as probabilistic abstract interpretations of the PTS semantics. An operator norm is then used to quantify this approximation. This provides a quantitative measure epsilon of the indistinguishability of two processes and therefore of their confinement. In this security setting a statistical interpretation is then given of the quantity epsilon which relates it to the number of tests needed to breach the security of the system.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.