The paper examines Kant’s view on moral exceptions by analyzing key passages from "On a Supposed Right to Lie", the "Metaphysics of Morals", and "On the Old Saw", focusing on the right of necessity. It then turns to Hegel’s theory of action in the Philosophy of Right, highlighting his attention to context and consequences in addressing responsibility in exceptional cases. The comparison reveals two distinct approaches to grounding responsibility, both still relevant today.
Grounding Responsibility. Kant’s And Hegel’s Approach in Light of the Right to Lie and the State of Necessity
Giulia Battistoni
2024-01-01
Abstract
The paper examines Kant’s view on moral exceptions by analyzing key passages from "On a Supposed Right to Lie", the "Metaphysics of Morals", and "On the Old Saw", focusing on the right of necessity. It then turns to Hegel’s theory of action in the Philosophy of Right, highlighting his attention to context and consequences in addressing responsibility in exceptional cases. The comparison reveals two distinct approaches to grounding responsibility, both still relevant today.File in questo prodotto:
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