Principio di sistema o intralcio al decisore: l’asimmetria territoriale alla prova dell’emergenza

A few significant conclusions can be drawn from the comparative analysis of how asymmetry played out in the way federal/regional systems tackled the pandemic. First, while overall a strong coordination took place across the board, the degree of potential (and often also of practical) asymmetry was not limited. Second, the possibility to adopt different rules when facing different issues is innate in federal systems, including in structurally symmetric ones. Third, asymmetry and federal culture more generally are stabilizing rather than destabilizing factors in dealing with emergencies, as the analysis of the use of emergency powers to combat Covid-19 reveals. Fourth, asymmetry has to be seen in context, meaning that on one hand it cannot be confined to differentiated legislative powers only, and on the other hand that the territorial structure is not among the driving factors for a more or less efficient response to emergencies.