In my discussion of Adriano Fabris’ Etica e ambiguit Ethics and Ambiguity ], I will consider three main objections. 1) First ly I will discuss Fabris’ attempt to criticize and reshape the Aristotelian ἔλεγχος, as it appears in the fourth book of Metaphysics , from a performative perspective , showing that it already falls within and is substantially invalidated by, the semantic domain of Aristotle’s distinction between contradiction and “self contradict ing”ing”. 2) Secondly, since Fabris invokes a reform of Western philosophy’s general attitude towards action a nd relation, I will show how classic ontology (notably Plato’s notions of being, as opposed to Parmenides’, and dialectics) already provides a robust example of a deeply relational (though admittedly not performative in the sense highlighted by Fabris) not ion of being. 3) Thirdly, I criticize Fabris’ notion of relation, because it indifferently refers both to ontology and ethics, wh ereas a proper ethical consideration of it, while necessarily i nvolving ontology, should be treated as distinct from the former
L'esistere preso sul serio. Riflessioni su "Etica e ambiguità" di Adriano Fabris
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2021-01-01
Abstract
In my discussion of Adriano Fabris’ Etica e ambiguit Ethics and Ambiguity ], I will consider three main objections. 1) First ly I will discuss Fabris’ attempt to criticize and reshape the Aristotelian ἔλεγχος, as it appears in the fourth book of Metaphysics , from a performative perspective , showing that it already falls within and is substantially invalidated by, the semantic domain of Aristotle’s distinction between contradiction and “self contradict ing”ing”. 2) Secondly, since Fabris invokes a reform of Western philosophy’s general attitude towards action a nd relation, I will show how classic ontology (notably Plato’s notions of being, as opposed to Parmenides’, and dialectics) already provides a robust example of a deeply relational (though admittedly not performative in the sense highlighted by Fabris) not ion of being. 3) Thirdly, I criticize Fabris’ notion of relation, because it indifferently refers both to ontology and ethics, wh ereas a proper ethical consideration of it, while necessarily i nvolving ontology, should be treated as distinct from the formerFile | Dimensione | Formato | |
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A36. Etica e ambiguità Fabris.pdf
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