Several of the most pressing environmental problems involve transboundary is- sues and can only be solved through international cooperation. Hence, success- ful policy response requires a good understanding of international environmental agreements — our primary tool for international cooperation. What motivates par- ticipation in environmental agreements? How can participation in environmental agreements be increased? How to design more effective agreements? These ques- tions have been addressed in economic research, mostly using game-theoretical ap- proaches, in models that predict the optimal emission abatement and participation levels. Our survey focuses on a contiguous body of work: the empirical literature on environmental treaty participation. The scope of this paper is to compile the first detailed survey of the empirical literature on participation in environmental agreements, summarise its findings and enable better comparison with theoretical predictions.
|Titolo:||The joining dilemma: A survey of the empirical literature on environmental treaty participation|
|Data di pubblicazione:||Being printed|
|Appare nelle tipologie:||01.01 Articolo in Rivista|