Gorman’s thesis, according to which the philosophy of history must learn what history is from the selfunderstanding of historians, is in keeping with his holistic pragmatism. However, holistic pragmatism is a philosophical position. Hence Gorman takes a philosophical stance to “state the need for the philosophers of history to learn what history is from the historians” (II). Paul challenges Gorman’s judgment, according to which among the self-descriptions that historians make of their own discipline a certain consensus emerges. Yet if Paul’s theory is true, also the image opposed by him of the ‘lack of consensus’ is one of “mythical origins”. It is merely another image, one also impure, situated and ‘ideal’, just like Gorman’s (III). When ‘one speaks of history’, philosophy is indispensable. Not as a coherent system of propositions complete with its own method and object, as a system that may be defined once and for all, but rather as a vital stance. Philosophy’s gaze is turned to the disciplines, but it is free from the method of the discipline that it interprets. From its reflective position, it “crosses the boundaries between languages and discourses” and creates a play of concepts (IV). For this reason, the philosophy of history is not bound to the historical method and the self-understanding of historians. If however, the philosophical position is of a historicist and pragmatist nature, as in Gorman’s case, then the self-image of historians is necessary (V).

Is There Still Room for the Philosophy of History?

BONDÌ D
2011

Abstract

Gorman’s thesis, according to which the philosophy of history must learn what history is from the selfunderstanding of historians, is in keeping with his holistic pragmatism. However, holistic pragmatism is a philosophical position. Hence Gorman takes a philosophical stance to “state the need for the philosophers of history to learn what history is from the historians” (II). Paul challenges Gorman’s judgment, according to which among the self-descriptions that historians make of their own discipline a certain consensus emerges. Yet if Paul’s theory is true, also the image opposed by him of the ‘lack of consensus’ is one of “mythical origins”. It is merely another image, one also impure, situated and ‘ideal’, just like Gorman’s (III). When ‘one speaks of history’, philosophy is indispensable. Not as a coherent system of propositions complete with its own method and object, as a system that may be defined once and for all, but rather as a vital stance. Philosophy’s gaze is turned to the disciplines, but it is free from the method of the discipline that it interprets. From its reflective position, it “crosses the boundaries between languages and discourses” and creates a play of concepts (IV). For this reason, the philosophy of history is not bound to the historical method and the self-understanding of historians. If however, the philosophical position is of a historicist and pragmatist nature, as in Gorman’s case, then the self-image of historians is necessary (V).
historical understanding
philosophical stance
Gorman
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: http://hdl.handle.net/11562/1052053
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