Il principio di proporzionalità dell'Unione europea e la ripartizione dei compiti normativi e di vigilanza in materia bancaria

This paper deals with the proportionality of the banking rule-making and financial supervisory powers in the EU system. In particular, the focus will be on the proportionality assessment of: a) the legislative division between EU harmonization and national regulatory autonomy; b) the establishment and attribution by the EU legislator of the tasks of financial regulation to the European Banking Authority and of banking supervision to the ECB within the framework of the Single Supervisory Mechanism; and finally c) the administrative allocation of supervisory tasks to the competent national authorities by the ECB, within the framework of the SSM. The cost/benefit analysis will concern the vertical relation between the EU and the Member States (given the increasing degree of centralization of powers at EU level to the detriment of the powers of the individual Member States, both legislative and regulatory), and horizontally the EU institutional level (in which the Commission sees itself deprived of margins of decision-making freedom to the benefit of the EBA).