Immunity to Error through Misidentification and (Direct and Indirect) Experience Reports

Inthiscontribution,weaddresstheissuesconcerningthesemanticvalue 5 of Wittgenstein’s subject “I”, as in (i) “I have a toothache”, resulting from the use 6 of predicates that involve first-person knowledge of the mental states to which they 7 refer. As is well-known, these contexts give rise to the phenomenon of ‘immunity 8 to error through misidentification’ (IEM): the utterer of (i) cannot be mistaken as 9 to whether he is the person having a toothache. We provide a series of arguments 10 in favor of a principled distinction between a de facto IEM, grounded in perceptual 11 and proprioceptive judgments, and a de iure IEM, grounded in experience reports 12 whereby the experience wears the experiencer on its sleeve. From this perspective, 13 the no-referent account of subject “I” advocated by Wittgenstein/Anscombe is 14 correct.Infact,weshowhowthisanalysiscanbemadecompatiblewithaKaplanian 15 account of first-person indexicals, by identifying the speaker in the context of 16 utterance with the person who has access to the reported private experience