This paper aims to address a highly debated topic, i.e., Schiller's attitude towards emotions in moral life, with a view to vindicating its consistency. As a matter of fact, Schiller's endorsement of Kant's purity thesis does not prevent him from stressing the importance feelings play in ethics from a perspective which is anything but incompatible with criticism. For Schiller is committed to assessing both the limits and the usefulness of emotions without damaging the motivational role of "respect" ("Achtung"), which makes his reflections relevant not only for historians of philosophy but also for contemporary ethical theorists interested in finding a connection between duty and nature.
Schiller on Emotions. Problems of (In)Consistency in His Ethics
Laura Anna Macor
2018-01-01
Abstract
This paper aims to address a highly debated topic, i.e., Schiller's attitude towards emotions in moral life, with a view to vindicating its consistency. As a matter of fact, Schiller's endorsement of Kant's purity thesis does not prevent him from stressing the importance feelings play in ethics from a perspective which is anything but incompatible with criticism. For Schiller is committed to assessing both the limits and the usefulness of emotions without damaging the motivational role of "respect" ("Achtung"), which makes his reflections relevant not only for historians of philosophy but also for contemporary ethical theorists interested in finding a connection between duty and nature.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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