Primo paper: costruzione ottimale di un meccanismo di offerta economicamente più vantaggiosa dove due qualità sono importanti. Secondo paper: analisi empirica su offerta economicamente più vantaggiosa e favoritismo. Terzo paper: analisi non parametrica sull'efficacia dei prezzi di riferimento in ambito sanitario in Italia. Si veda l'abstract in inglese.

Abstract paper 1. Moving from Che (1993), I investigate the optimal design of a scoring rule awarding mechanism where qualities of 2 items are included, along with price. I use independently distributed bi-dimensional private information across suppliers. Using a quadratic cost function for bidders, I derive the optimal scoring rule and I prove that provision of the most important quality is below its optimal level, while provision of the other quality may be above or below, depending on its relative importance with respect to the other one. Some simulations validate the main results and two extensions are proposed. Abstract paper 2. We built an original dataset of 307 auctions aimed at awarding canteen services in Italy; it contains the scoring rules, first price, and average bid mechanisms. We exploit this dataset to test the degree of competitiveness and the presence of favoritism by the public contracting authority (CA) towards a possibly predetermined bidder. We start with a working hypothesis: a presumption of which auctions were competitive; we then run an econometric test and construct a variable that individuates possible non-competitive behaviors. Our results highlight that scoring rules can be distorted to favor a bidder, and the victory of the incumbent is associated with lower competition, which is a sign of favoritism. Abstract paper 3. Reference price (RP) in the health market is a threshold for unitary prices usually set on classes of functionally homogeneous products to be adopted by public contracting authorities (CAs) in buying such products. Aim of this paper is to test whether the introduction of RPs reduces procurement inefficiencies - how much the observed price paid by hospitals departs from an estimated optimal one. We use Italian data on simple and standardized medical devices. We adopt non-parametric techniques to calculate unobserved marginal costs. Then we exploit the exogenous discontinuity originated by the competent Adminis- trative Tribunalís decision which terminates the RPi's adoption. Considering the CA inefficiency as a random variable, we find that inefficiency without RP first order stochastically dominates inefficiency with RP.

Auction and contract design in public procurement: theoretical and empirical investigations

CAMBONI MARCHI ADANI, RICCARDO
2016-01-01

Abstract

Abstract paper 1. Moving from Che (1993), I investigate the optimal design of a scoring rule awarding mechanism where qualities of 2 items are included, along with price. I use independently distributed bi-dimensional private information across suppliers. Using a quadratic cost function for bidders, I derive the optimal scoring rule and I prove that provision of the most important quality is below its optimal level, while provision of the other quality may be above or below, depending on its relative importance with respect to the other one. Some simulations validate the main results and two extensions are proposed. Abstract paper 2. We built an original dataset of 307 auctions aimed at awarding canteen services in Italy; it contains the scoring rules, first price, and average bid mechanisms. We exploit this dataset to test the degree of competitiveness and the presence of favoritism by the public contracting authority (CA) towards a possibly predetermined bidder. We start with a working hypothesis: a presumption of which auctions were competitive; we then run an econometric test and construct a variable that individuates possible non-competitive behaviors. Our results highlight that scoring rules can be distorted to favor a bidder, and the victory of the incumbent is associated with lower competition, which is a sign of favoritism. Abstract paper 3. Reference price (RP) in the health market is a threshold for unitary prices usually set on classes of functionally homogeneous products to be adopted by public contracting authorities (CAs) in buying such products. Aim of this paper is to test whether the introduction of RPs reduces procurement inefficiencies - how much the observed price paid by hospitals departs from an estimated optimal one. We use Italian data on simple and standardized medical devices. We adopt non-parametric techniques to calculate unobserved marginal costs. Then we exploit the exogenous discontinuity originated by the competent Adminis- trative Tribunalís decision which terminates the RPi's adoption. Considering the CA inefficiency as a random variable, we find that inefficiency without RP first order stochastically dominates inefficiency with RP.
2016
Public procurement, auction, non-parametric estimation
Primo paper: costruzione ottimale di un meccanismo di offerta economicamente più vantaggiosa dove due qualità sono importanti. Secondo paper: analisi empirica su offerta economicamente più vantaggiosa e favoritismo. Terzo paper: analisi non parametrica sull'efficacia dei prezzi di riferimento in ambito sanitario in Italia. Si veda l'abstract in inglese.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11562/938324
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