In particolare nel corso degli ultimi anni, il fenomeno delle ordinanze sindacali ha assunto un rilievo notevole nella determinazione delle politiche prossimali di sicurezza all’interno dei centri urbani. Ciò è avvenuto in conseguenza della centralità assunta dai Sindaci nell’ambito delle Amministrazioni comunali, a seguito della legge n. 81 del 1993 che ne ha introdotto l’elezione diretta e che li ha trasformati in destinatari privilegiati dei bisogni, delle istanze e delle paure delle comunità locali. Essi sono così stati progressivamente chiamati “dal basso” e con forza a fronteggiare il problema dell’insicurezza urbana; una questione dai contorni difficili da perimetrare, che non riguarda solo l’ordine pubblico, ma comprende un quadro complessivo di paure e incertezze di varia natura. Nel presente lavoro, dopo una premessa sociologica dedicata all’evoluzione della domanda di sicurezza - la quale, da richiesta di tutela nei confronti dei fenomeni criminali, si è progressivamente trasformata in richiesta di “vivibilità della città” e di “qualità della vita” – si è ritenuto opportuno ripercorrere le tappe dello sviluppo delle politiche sicuritarie italiane: dalla fase della “sensibilizzazione” - coincidente con la prima metà degli anni ’90 - alla c.d. stagione dei protocolli, fino all’affermarsi di un’“emergenza stabilizzata” e, con essa, di un potere di ordinanza perdurante nel tempo, degno di essere monitorato, perché sempre più rilevante nel sistema delle fonti. Dopo aver inquadrato - in una prospettiva costituzionalistica - le problematiche questioni della natura, dei presupposti di adozione e dei limiti, elaborati dalla dottrina e dalla giurisprudenza costituzionale e amministrativa, con riferimento al delicato tema delle ordinanze contingibili e urgenti, l’analisi si è concentrata sul testo dell’art. 54 c. 4 T.u.e.l. - come novellato dalla legge 125 del 24 luglio 2008 di conversione del d.l. n. 92/2008 – ai sensi del quale le ordinanze sindacali sembrano aver assunto caratteri del tutto nuovi, dal momento che - secondo la vigente formulazione della disposizione citata - il Sindaco, quale ufficiale di governo, risulta titolare del potere di adottare provvedimenti anche contingibili e urgenti, al fine di prevenire ed eliminare gravi pericoli che minaccino l’incolumità pubblica e la sicurezza urbana. Alla luce del mutato quadro normativo, sono state esaminate le problematiche ripercussioni che la previsione di un uso “ordinario” del potere sindacale di ordinanza - nonchè la scelta del legislatore di affidare a un decreto del Ministro dell’Interno la definizione dei confini di esso - hanno prodotto in tema di correttezza istituzionale e di rispetto della gerarchia delle fonti, non tralasciando i dubbi di legittimità costituzionale suscitati dall’adozione delle ordinanze stesse, considerata l’incidenza della maggior parte di esse su materie coperte da riserve di legge assolute o relative, nonchè sull’esercizio di libertà costituzionalmente garantite. Nel ripercorrere i principali ambiti di intervento dei Sindaci - prostituzione, mendicità, consumo di alcool e di sostanze stupefacenti, decoro urbano, abusivismo commerciale, solo per ricordare i principali – e nell’analizzare a campione alcuni tra i provvedimenti più significativi si è posto in rilievo il mancato rispetto, da parte di essi, dei limiti formulati da dottrina e giurisprudenza per rendere compatibile con il quadro costituzionale il potere di ordinanza extra ordinem, ravvisabili nella straordinarietà dello specifico evento da affrontare e nell’urgenza di provvedere di fronte a un pericolo o a un danno imminente, nel rispetto dei principi generali dell’ordinamento, dei principi costituzionali e delle riserve di legge, nel carattere necessariamente provvisorio delle ordinanze, nel requisito della strumentalità - intesa come proporzione tra gli interventi e il contesto emergenziale - nell’adeguata motivazione dell’atto. Il segnalato abuso nel ricorso a tali strumenti ha consentito di evidenziare come l’intervento sindacale rischi spesso di sostituirsi alle fonti di disciplina competenti: da un lato, infatti, dovrebbe spettare al legislatore statale - soprattutto qualora si incida sull’ambito di operatività di libertà e diritti civili - il compito di predisporre la regolamentazione più idonea, tale da indirizzare la disciplina locale conseguente, al fine anche di evitare, all’interno del territorio nazionale, inaccettabili differenziazioni, contrastanti con i valori unitari sottesi all’ordine pubblico e alla sicurezza; dall’altro, il potere sindacale non dovrebbe travalicare i propri limiti, svuotando la sfera di operatività del potere normativo locale, affidata innanzitutto alla fonte regolamentare. Alla luce di tale quadro, si è segnalato come, in un’ottica più ampia, il rafforzamento dei poteri dei Sindaci in materia di sicurezza urbana possa essere letto quale frutto di una generale e diffusa sfiducia nei confronti dell’attività degli organi rappresentativi - sia locali che nazionali - e come sintomo dello spostamento del “baricentro politico-amministrativo” del Comune dal Consiglio comunale ad una sorta di “Sindaco-sceriffo” che, per assecondare umori e volontà dell’elettorato, adotta iniziative-spettacolo, destinate a minare la sicurezza giuridica, intesa come certezza del diritto. Gli effetti della riforma del potere sindacale di ordinanza rivelano, cioè, il prodursi di una rischiosa regressione dei livelli della democrazia comunale: lo slittamento di funzioni dagli organi collegiali all’organo monocratico segna, infatti, un processo che, benchè giustificato dal richiamo all’investitura diretta del Sindaco - garantita dal meccanismo elettorale - determina una modificazione profonda del significato stesso della rappresentanza politica. Di fronte a un quadro così complesso e preoccupante, in cui sembrano messi in discussione, a colpi di ordinanze, i principi-cardine dell’ordinamento costituzionale, è parsa insufficiente la “capacità reattiva” delle pronunce del giudice amministrativo, con le quali si è provveduto ad annullare o a sospendere cautelarmente singoli provvedimenti. Per questo si guarda con speranza all’esito del giudizio di legittimità costituzionale dell’art. 54 c. 4 T.u.e.l. “nella parte in cui ha inserito la congiunzione "anche" prima delle parole contingibili ed urgenti" – per violazione degli artt. 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 13, 16, 17, 18, 21, 23, 24, 41, 49, 70, 76, 77, 97, 113, 117 e 118 della Costituzione - promosso dal TAR Veneto a mezzo dell’ordinanza 22 marzo 2010 n. 40, con cui il giudice amministrativo ha peraltro escluso la possibilità di fornire una lettura costituzionalmente orientata della disposizione citata. In attesa della pronuncia della Consulta, è appena il caso di rilevare come i futuri sviluppi della vicenda siano evidentemente di grande interesse, dal momento che, qualora la Corte costituzionale dovesse affermare la fondatezza della questione sollevata, le ordinanze sindacali ex art. 54 c. 4 T.u.e.l., prive dei requisiti di contingibilità e urgenza, risulterebbero illegittime e verrebbero ridefiniti, in senso limitativo, l’ambito e le modalità di esercizio del potere sindacale di ordinanza, che tornerebbe a dover rispettare i tradizionali canoni già individuati dalla giurisprudenza amministrativa e costituzionale. Si segnala che il presente lavoro è stato concluso anteriormente alla pronuncia, da parte della Corte costituzionale, della sentenza n. 115/2011.
In the last five years mayoral ordinances have gained relevant prominence in determining security policies within urban areas. This was the result of the importance gained by mayors within the City Council framework, following law nr. 81 of 1993, which has introduced the direct election of mayors and has transformed them into the main receivers of all the needs, of all the instances and fears of the local communities. They have thus been called “from below”, and with urgency, to face the problem of urban insecurity. This is an issue which has blurred boundaries and which does not only refer to public order, but also includes an overall set of fears and incertitudes of different nature. In the present work, after a sociological introduction describing the evolution of the demand for security – which has gradually developed from a request for protection against criminal acts into a request for “livability of towns” and “quality of life” – it has been thought appropriate to go over the stages of development of Italian social security policies. These policies range from the “awareness campaigns”, coinciding with the first half of the 1990s, to the so called season of protocols followed by the establishing of a “stabilised emergency” and, with it, of a power of ordinance which can persist in time, worthy of being monitored, because it is always more relevant in the system of the sources of rights. After having framed within a constitutionalist prospect the issues of the nature, of the presuppositions of adoption and of the limits drafted by legal doctrine and by constitutional and administrative decisions, with reference to the delicate theme of contingent and urgent ordinances, the analysis has focused on article 54 paragraph 4 T.u.e.l. (Local Government Unified Code) as amended by law 125, dated 24th July 2008, according to which mayoral ordinances seem to have acquired completely new characteristics. As a matter of fact mayors, in their capacity as government officials, now have the power to adopt also contingent and urgent measures aiming at averting major dangers which may threaten public safety. In the light of the changed legal framework it has been decided to examine the problematic consequences produced by the prevision of a “regular” use of mayoral power of ordinance followed by the choice of the Lawmaker to entrust to a decree of the Home Secretary the task to define the boundaries of this new power. Furthermore, this work also examines the doubts about the constitutional legitimacy caused by the enforcement of the ordinances, considering the incidence of most of them on issues already covered by statutory reserves as well as the incidence on constitutional rights. Going over the main fields of intervention of mayors (e.g.: prostitution, begging, alcohol and drug consumption, urban cleanliness, unlicensed trading...) and making a sample test of some of the most significant ordinances adopted, it has been highlighted their non compliance with the limits given by legal doctrine and by constitutional and administrative decisions to make the “extra ordinem” ordinance power consistent with the constitutional framework. The aforementioned limits consist in: the extraordinariness of the event faced; the urgency to make provisions when having to deal with an impending danger or damage; the respect for the constitutional and legal principles and for statutory reserves; the provisional character of ordinances; the proportion between the exercise of power and the emergency context. The incorrect resort to such measures has highlighted how the intervention of mayors can often run the risk of taking the place of the competent acts. On the one hand it should be the task of Parliament – especially when civil rights are involved – to predispose the most suitable regulation, so that it may direct the ensueing local acts, avoiding thus unacceptable differentiations within the national territory, which contrast with the value of unity of public order and security. On the other hand the power of mayors should not cross its boundaries, depriving thus the sphere of action of the City Councils. In the light of this situation it has been pointed out how, within a wider scope, the strengthening of the powers of mayors in matters of urban security can be considered as the result of a general and widespread lack of confidence towards the activity of both local and national representative bodies. It can also be considered as the symptom of the shifting of the “political-administrative” centre of gravity from the City Council to a sort of “sheriff-like mayor” whom, in order to comply with the wishes and moods of the electorate, adopts some unprecedented measures fated to undermine civil rights. The effects of the reform of mayoral ordinance powers thus reveal a dangerous regression of the levels of local democracy. The sliding of functions from the City Council to the Mayor witnesses a process which, even if it is justified by the direct election of mayors, is also the cause of a deep change in the meaning itself of political representation. In front of such a complex and worrying picture, where the fundamental principles of the constitutional framework seem to be put into question by the adoption of ordinances, the “reactive capacity” of administrative decisions, through which some single measures have been cancelled or temporarily suspended, appears to be insufficient. For this reason the outcome of the judgement of constitutional legitimacy - concerning article 54 paragraph 4 T.u.e.l. for the violation of articles 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 13, 16, 17, 18, 21, 23, 24, 41, 49, 70, 76, 77, 97, 113, 117 and 118 of the Constitution - is awaited with hope. While expecting the final decision of the Constitutional Court it is just the case to point out how the future developments of this outcome are of great interest, considering that, in case the Constitutional Court should assert the validity of the question raised, then the mayoral ordinances, according to article 54, paragraph 4 T.u.e.l., bereft of the requirements of contingency and urgency, would be considered unlawful. The exercise of mayoral power of ordinance would thus be redifined in a restrictive way and it would also have to comply once again with the traditional limits of administrative and constitutional decisions. We inform readers that the present work was finished before the decision of the Constitutional Court nr. 115/2011.
Le implicazioni costituzionali del potere sindacale di ordinanza
PARMIGIANI, Francesca
2011-01-01
Abstract
In the last five years mayoral ordinances have gained relevant prominence in determining security policies within urban areas. This was the result of the importance gained by mayors within the City Council framework, following law nr. 81 of 1993, which has introduced the direct election of mayors and has transformed them into the main receivers of all the needs, of all the instances and fears of the local communities. They have thus been called “from below”, and with urgency, to face the problem of urban insecurity. This is an issue which has blurred boundaries and which does not only refer to public order, but also includes an overall set of fears and incertitudes of different nature. In the present work, after a sociological introduction describing the evolution of the demand for security – which has gradually developed from a request for protection against criminal acts into a request for “livability of towns” and “quality of life” – it has been thought appropriate to go over the stages of development of Italian social security policies. These policies range from the “awareness campaigns”, coinciding with the first half of the 1990s, to the so called season of protocols followed by the establishing of a “stabilised emergency” and, with it, of a power of ordinance which can persist in time, worthy of being monitored, because it is always more relevant in the system of the sources of rights. After having framed within a constitutionalist prospect the issues of the nature, of the presuppositions of adoption and of the limits drafted by legal doctrine and by constitutional and administrative decisions, with reference to the delicate theme of contingent and urgent ordinances, the analysis has focused on article 54 paragraph 4 T.u.e.l. (Local Government Unified Code) as amended by law 125, dated 24th July 2008, according to which mayoral ordinances seem to have acquired completely new characteristics. As a matter of fact mayors, in their capacity as government officials, now have the power to adopt also contingent and urgent measures aiming at averting major dangers which may threaten public safety. In the light of the changed legal framework it has been decided to examine the problematic consequences produced by the prevision of a “regular” use of mayoral power of ordinance followed by the choice of the Lawmaker to entrust to a decree of the Home Secretary the task to define the boundaries of this new power. Furthermore, this work also examines the doubts about the constitutional legitimacy caused by the enforcement of the ordinances, considering the incidence of most of them on issues already covered by statutory reserves as well as the incidence on constitutional rights. Going over the main fields of intervention of mayors (e.g.: prostitution, begging, alcohol and drug consumption, urban cleanliness, unlicensed trading...) and making a sample test of some of the most significant ordinances adopted, it has been highlighted their non compliance with the limits given by legal doctrine and by constitutional and administrative decisions to make the “extra ordinem” ordinance power consistent with the constitutional framework. The aforementioned limits consist in: the extraordinariness of the event faced; the urgency to make provisions when having to deal with an impending danger or damage; the respect for the constitutional and legal principles and for statutory reserves; the provisional character of ordinances; the proportion between the exercise of power and the emergency context. The incorrect resort to such measures has highlighted how the intervention of mayors can often run the risk of taking the place of the competent acts. On the one hand it should be the task of Parliament – especially when civil rights are involved – to predispose the most suitable regulation, so that it may direct the ensueing local acts, avoiding thus unacceptable differentiations within the national territory, which contrast with the value of unity of public order and security. On the other hand the power of mayors should not cross its boundaries, depriving thus the sphere of action of the City Councils. In the light of this situation it has been pointed out how, within a wider scope, the strengthening of the powers of mayors in matters of urban security can be considered as the result of a general and widespread lack of confidence towards the activity of both local and national representative bodies. It can also be considered as the symptom of the shifting of the “political-administrative” centre of gravity from the City Council to a sort of “sheriff-like mayor” whom, in order to comply with the wishes and moods of the electorate, adopts some unprecedented measures fated to undermine civil rights. The effects of the reform of mayoral ordinance powers thus reveal a dangerous regression of the levels of local democracy. The sliding of functions from the City Council to the Mayor witnesses a process which, even if it is justified by the direct election of mayors, is also the cause of a deep change in the meaning itself of political representation. In front of such a complex and worrying picture, where the fundamental principles of the constitutional framework seem to be put into question by the adoption of ordinances, the “reactive capacity” of administrative decisions, through which some single measures have been cancelled or temporarily suspended, appears to be insufficient. For this reason the outcome of the judgement of constitutional legitimacy - concerning article 54 paragraph 4 T.u.e.l. for the violation of articles 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 13, 16, 17, 18, 21, 23, 24, 41, 49, 70, 76, 77, 97, 113, 117 and 118 of the Constitution - is awaited with hope. While expecting the final decision of the Constitutional Court it is just the case to point out how the future developments of this outcome are of great interest, considering that, in case the Constitutional Court should assert the validity of the question raised, then the mayoral ordinances, according to article 54, paragraph 4 T.u.e.l., bereft of the requirements of contingency and urgency, would be considered unlawful. The exercise of mayoral power of ordinance would thus be redifined in a restrictive way and it would also have to comply once again with the traditional limits of administrative and constitutional decisions. We inform readers that the present work was finished before the decision of the Constitutional Court nr. 115/2011.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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