The idea that contrariety is one of the components of mirror images is, in one sense or another, the starting point of all the literature which has evolved in the field of psychology under the umbrella of the “mirror question”: why do mirrors reverse left and right but not up and down?. This has been in the main stream of discussion concerning mirror reflections in Cognitive Sciences from the nineteen seventies to the very beginning of the present century (Bennet, 1970; Corballis & Beale, 1976; Ittelson, 1993; Ittelson, Mowafy & Magid, 1991; Gardner, 1964; Haig, 1993; Tabata & Okuda, 2000; Corballis, 2000; Morris, 1993; Navon, 1987, 2001; Takano, 1998; Gregory, 1987, 1996). From that time on, naïve optics emerged as a new chapter in naïve physics, and researchers started to direct their attention towards a new sample of questions concerning what people know about mirrors and the behavior of reflections: 1. is the optical law of reflection (i.e. that reflected rays are at the same angle as incident rays) generally known by naïve adult subjects? − see Croucher, Bertamini & Hecht, 2002); 2. when approaching a mirror walking parallel to it, at what point would people expect to see themselves appear in the mirror? Would they expect to appear at the nearest or farthest edge of the mirror? (See Bertamini, Hecht & Spooner, 2003; Croucher, et al. 2002; Hecht, Bertamini & Gamer, 2005; Lawson & Bertamini, 2006; Jones & Bertamini, submitted).

Contrariety in plane mirror reflections

BIANCHI, Ivana;SAVARDI, Ugo
2009-01-01

Abstract

The idea that contrariety is one of the components of mirror images is, in one sense or another, the starting point of all the literature which has evolved in the field of psychology under the umbrella of the “mirror question”: why do mirrors reverse left and right but not up and down?. This has been in the main stream of discussion concerning mirror reflections in Cognitive Sciences from the nineteen seventies to the very beginning of the present century (Bennet, 1970; Corballis & Beale, 1976; Ittelson, 1993; Ittelson, Mowafy & Magid, 1991; Gardner, 1964; Haig, 1993; Tabata & Okuda, 2000; Corballis, 2000; Morris, 1993; Navon, 1987, 2001; Takano, 1998; Gregory, 1987, 1996). From that time on, naïve optics emerged as a new chapter in naïve physics, and researchers started to direct their attention towards a new sample of questions concerning what people know about mirrors and the behavior of reflections: 1. is the optical law of reflection (i.e. that reflected rays are at the same angle as incident rays) generally known by naïve adult subjects? − see Croucher, Bertamini & Hecht, 2002); 2. when approaching a mirror walking parallel to it, at what point would people expect to see themselves appear in the mirror? Would they expect to appear at the nearest or farthest edge of the mirror? (See Bertamini, Hecht & Spooner, 2003; Croucher, et al. 2002; Hecht, Bertamini & Gamer, 2005; Lawson & Bertamini, 2006; Jones & Bertamini, submitted).
9788838672262
Perception; Cognition; Mirror; Experimental Phenomenology; Contrary; Opposition
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11562/342927
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