I will argue that Nietzsche elaborated a new concept of subjectivity which marked a radical break with the metaphysical tradition: the concept of the body as an endless set of instincts to be experimented with. It also argues that, in doing so, Nietzsche may have been inspired by Emerson. For metaphysics, the true essence of the human being is his eternal soul, an immaterial and unchangeable substance whose main task is to domesticate the instincts that constitute the body. As this immortal substance, its destiny has already been determined for all eternity. In opposition to metaphysics, Nietzsche maintains that the human being, far from having fixed characteristics once and for all, is subject to becoming. Rejecting the metaphysical opposition body/soul, Nietzsche affirms that the human being is its body, which is an endless set of instincts. Every instinct represents a different “soul,” i.e. a different possibility of being one has the power to develop. By choosing from time to time which instinct to experiment with, one comes to build one’s personality and become master of one’s own destiny. Similarly, Emerson also strongly affirms the human being’s freedom to decide his fate and develop its personality. He argues that fate, rather than being a mysterious force determining one’s destiny for all eternity, is something the human being has the power to direct. In turn, this power involves the freedom to experiment with the various instincts that constitute his body. In doing so, the human being will build his character and thus his own destiny. This essay shows how Nietzsche, by adopting Emerson’s conception of fate, as well as his view of the body as a set of instincts, develops a new conception of subjectivity alternative to that of metaphysics.

Subjectivity as Experimentation of Instincts in Nietzsche and Emerson

Laura Langone
2021-01-01

Abstract

I will argue that Nietzsche elaborated a new concept of subjectivity which marked a radical break with the metaphysical tradition: the concept of the body as an endless set of instincts to be experimented with. It also argues that, in doing so, Nietzsche may have been inspired by Emerson. For metaphysics, the true essence of the human being is his eternal soul, an immaterial and unchangeable substance whose main task is to domesticate the instincts that constitute the body. As this immortal substance, its destiny has already been determined for all eternity. In opposition to metaphysics, Nietzsche maintains that the human being, far from having fixed characteristics once and for all, is subject to becoming. Rejecting the metaphysical opposition body/soul, Nietzsche affirms that the human being is its body, which is an endless set of instincts. Every instinct represents a different “soul,” i.e. a different possibility of being one has the power to develop. By choosing from time to time which instinct to experiment with, one comes to build one’s personality and become master of one’s own destiny. Similarly, Emerson also strongly affirms the human being’s freedom to decide his fate and develop its personality. He argues that fate, rather than being a mysterious force determining one’s destiny for all eternity, is something the human being has the power to direct. In turn, this power involves the freedom to experiment with the various instincts that constitute his body. In doing so, the human being will build his character and thus his own destiny. This essay shows how Nietzsche, by adopting Emerson’s conception of fate, as well as his view of the body as a set of instincts, develops a new conception of subjectivity alternative to that of metaphysics.
2021
1-5275-7235-8
instinct
body
soul
fate
freedom
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11562/1128486
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