The socratic dialogue as a ritual of emotional purification

Abstract In the present paper, the role that emotions play in Socratic self-care, as it can be reconstructed from Plato's dialogues, is investigated and explored. In highlighting the fundamental role that emotions play in such a care, which is not mere repair of a fault (reparative care), but an active and constant attending to self- and others' improvement, it is emphasized how the Socratic care that is enacted in the Selected Dialogues exhibits marked religious qualities, which make Socrates a kind of priestly and demonic figure, as the reader can infer in particular from the two chapters devoted to the Critique and the Apology, respectively. The intent underlying this focus on the religious and especially initiatory aspects of Socratic care in the Platonic dialogues is, as explained at the beginning of the introduction to this work, to deepen the link between the emotional aspect of self-care, explored in depth by Professor L. Napolitano, and my personal interest in the relationship between philosophy and religion. In the present work this link has been found in the theme of 'aporia; this is interpreted in the introduction and in the following chapters as ritual death, that is, as an 'experience in which the initiate (in this case Socrates' interlocutor) witnesses his own death, that is, the disappearance of the firm attachment to his unreflective opinions. It follows that 'aporia is a positive element of self-care, since this ritual death makes it possible, if it is accepted and not rejected, to get rid of those obstacles from within that prevent one from looking forward to one's own improvement and the pursuit of happiness. Aporia is not only a logical impasse, but also an emotionally very dense moment; it therefore holds together the two fundamental components of this work, the focus on emotions in the Socratic dialogue and the focus on the initiatory aspects with which Plato cloaks this dialogue. Plato alludes to these initiatory aspects from time to time in the selected dialogues by appropriating now from Coribantism (Euthydemus), now from Orphism (Phaedo), now even from the rituals of transition from one age to another (the ephebia, as in the case of the Alcibiades); all these disparate experiences have in common the idea of a ritual death, a liminal phase between one life (the one about to leave) and the new one (about to embark on). In the Socratic dialogue enacted in Plato's works, precisely this initiatory death (the aporia) is II achieved; if the interlocutor accepts it, he or she will progress on the path of self care; if he or she is afraid or annoyed by it, he or she will derive no benefit. The introduction outlines the assumptions on which the following analysis are based: the first is the ritual and initiatory nature of refutation and the characterization of aporia as an emotionally connoted moment; the second, based on the analysis of the first book of the Republic, is the relational nature of caring and thus of the good that caring/caretaking pursues; therefore, one who cares for others necessarily also cares for himself. The intertwining of the ritual and emotional aspects, as well as the communal and relational nature of the good pursued by Socratic caring, is explored throughout the introduction and, more importantly, eight chapters, devoted to Euthydemus, Charmides, Alcibiades I, Lysis, Euthyphro, Apology, Critique, and Phaedo, respectively. In the introduction to the thesis, the reason for the choice of these dialogues is explained and what are the relationships between them in this work. In the conclusion, the scientific and especially moral reasons for the importance of emphasizing the role of emotions in Plato's Socrates and the ritual aspects of it are made clear