Aporia o definizione? Il ti esti negli scritti socratici di Senofonte

This paper deals with a much-discussed issue among Socratic scholars, Socrates’s quest for “what is” (ti esti). So far, ti esti has been tackled by taking into account almost exclusively Plato’s testimony, or authors that depend on that testimony (especially Aristotle, at Met. 987b1-11, 1078b17-32, and 1086b3-7). This led to a series of difficulties, since in Plato the issue of ti esti is closely linked to the theory of ideas, which in itself poses a series of logical problems. Robinson (1953), Vlastos (1973), Benson (2000) and other scholars have shown that Socratic ti esti and Platonic metaphysics should in fact be considered as mutually interconnected issues. This paper attempts to deal with the Socratic ti esti on a basis other than Plato, i.e. by looking at Xenophon. In fact, since Xenophon does not depend on Plato’s theory of ideas (the term idea is never used by Xenophon, while eidos occurs only twice in his Socratic works with the traditional meaning of “exterior appearance”), it appears that his account of ti esti provides a completely different picture than that given by Plato and Aristotle. A close reading of Memorabilia 1.1.16 and 4.6 shows that the Socratic ti esti aims not at reaching a conclusive “definition” (horismos, as in Plato and Aristotle), but at establishing the premises (hupotheseis) of every possible research (episkepsis): according to Xenophon, the ti esti does not provide a result, but a method, of dialogic inquiry.