Being beyond Motion: An Interpretation of Aristotle's Confrontation with the Megarians in Metaphysics Θ

This dissertation presents an interpretation of Aristotle’s doctrine of δύναμις and ἐνέργεια from the perspective of his confrontation with the Megarians. The first part of the thesis provides a detailed analysis of the extant sources of the Megarians. It also connects these sources to some crucial passages from Plato’s Euthydemus and Sophist which function as important precedents of Aristotle’s distinction between δύναμις and ἐνέργεια. The examination of the connection between the Megarians and the early stages of the δύναμις-ἐνέργεια distinction shows that Aristotle’s confrontation with the Megarians is not limited to Metaphysics Θ 3. On the contrary, this latter passage is part of a wider discussion that involves the Megarians, Plato, and Aristotle, and concerns fundamental ontological issues, such as the question of the unity of being and the relation between being and becoming. The second part of the thesis presents a close reading of the most significant passages of book Θ of the Metaphysics, which is dedicated to the elucidation of the concepts of δύναμις and ἐνέργεια. Particular attention is paid to chapter 3 of book Θ, the site of Aristotle’s famous anti-Megarian polemic. My interpretation of the chapter will be based largely on the work done in the first part of the dissertation. I will show that this crucial chapter plays a pivotal role in the internal structure of the treatise, connecting the initial analysis of the motion sense of δύναμις, carried out in chapters 1–2 and 5 of book Θ, with the later analysis of the senses of δύναμις and ἐνέργεια that extend beyond motion, which takes place in chapters 6–9. My reading of Aristotle’s confrontation with the Megarians will prove useful interpreting of some of the most obscure and contentious passages of Met. Θ 6 and 8. Above all, it will help us reject the common tendency to conflate the notions of motion and activity in the context of Aristotle’s wider argument in Met. Θ. This will also allow us to reject the dominant reading of Θ, which contends that the treatise carries out a transition from a capacity-activity sense of δύναμις and ἐνέργεια towards the modal notions of potentiality and actuality. I will claim that the most crucial contribution of Met. Θ is the introduction of the concept of motionless activity. This notion allows Aristotle to break the rigid ontological dichotomy upheld by his Megarian opponents and to secure the existence of an ultimate active cause of all that is. In other words, by way of the concept of motionless activity, Aristotle can uphold the self-sustaining and determinate character of being without sacrificing its active character: that is, without severing its connection with motion, generation, and physical reality.