La ἰσχύς della conoscenza e il governo dei piaceri nel Protagora

Towards the end of the Protagoras, several pages are devoted to pleasure (351b3-359a1). Here Plato discusses the concept of κρείττω ἑαυτοῦ, i.e., “being stronger than oneself”, and connects it to wisdom. He claims that knowledge is strong (ἰσχυρόν), and therefore able to dominate over pleasures (Prt. 352b4). As Gerasimos Santas has aptly pointed out, Plato uses here a “language of strength” to define knowledge (352a1-355d5), then he defines this very knowledge as a measuring art without hinting at its strength (355d6-357c1); finally, he reverts to the language of strength and claims that knowledge qua measuring art is stronger than pleasure (357c1-358c3). This suggests that the Protagoras is far from being “intellectualistic,” as many have claimed. It is not a dialogue about knowledge, but about a special kind of it: the strong knowledge, which is the only remedy against akrasia. This calls to mind Antisthenes, who claims that virtue acquired through wisdom yields happiness, but needs Socratic strength (ἰσχύς). This peculiar kind of strength cannot be learned, since it is unique to Socrates. In this chapter, I claim that it is only thanks to such Socratic iskhus that the knowledge of the Protagoras is able to rule over, and not be ruled by, passions.