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REVITALIZING THE UNITED NATIONS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT

AM17
JOHN W. HOLMES MEMORIAL LECTURE
Margaret P. Karns
View her full biography at acuns.org

THURSDAY – SATURDAY > JUNE 15–17, 2017
Sookmyung Women’s University, Seoul, Korea
Hosted by
Waves of change: documenting current insights in order to navigate the way forward

Dr. Alistair Edgar, ACUNS

This Newsletter’s editorial note is being written as I wait in the Air Canada international lounge for an evening flight to Vienna, for the 2017 ACUNS Vienna UN conference organized by our tremendous Vienna Liaison Office volunteer team. This will be the eighth major conference for ACUNS in Vienna, beginning with the 2010 Annual Meeting and then a ‘Vienna UN’ conference each January. Led by Michael Platzer and now by Max Edelbacher, the Vienna group has steadily built its profile with UNOV, national Missions, and the Austrian government, and has become a major NGO—if not the major NGO—in the UNOV orbit.

Thinking about significant numbers—members may know that this year marks ACUNS’ thirtieth anniversary, and we are planning several activities to celebrate this milestone. We will, of course, have a special panel at the 2017 Annual Meeting at Sookmyung Women’s University in Seoul, to reflect on why the Council was established, what it has achieved in relation to its purposes, and to talk about where it, and the field of scholarship it supports, is—or should be—going over the next decade. The 2017 John W. Holmes Memorial Lecture will be delivered by Professor Margaret Karns, who was a founding member of the Council and currently serves on the Board; Peggy will bring an intimate, direct and always deeply engaged perspective to the Lecture. We will have a series of articles in the Newsletter, and a series of podcasts (in all three of our ‘streams’). Other activities are under consideration, and we always welcome suggestions and proposals from members.

This year also marks the final full calendar year of service by your current ACUNS Secretariat, as our unprecedented lengthy three term run will end in June 2018. When we finish, we will have had the privilege, the challenge and the fun of working for ACUNS’ members for fifteen years, plus one year as the ‘shadow’ secretariat in 2002–2003. It really does feel like just a year or two ago that we were taking on this role as “the new team” at Wilfrid Laurier University and took on the challenge of developing the ACUNS mandate and infrastructure in a rapidly evolving digital age.

You can be assured that the Forward Planning Committee is working hard in connection with the transition of the Secretariat, and also in supporting the transition in 2018 of the Global Governance editorial team. Thanks to the efforts of Editor-in-Chief Ramesh Thakur, Editors Diana Tussie, Monica Serrano, and Brian Job, the tireless work of Managing Editor Roberta Spivak, Chief Book Review Editor Erica Chenoweth, and the invaluable support of One Earth Future Foundation since 2013–14, GG has risen steadily in global rankings, in reach and influence, and today is a “top thirty” scholarly journal of international studies.

In this issue of the Newsletter we feature three articles: The Uncertain Future of the International Criminal Court by Annalisa Ciampi; Women, Peace, and Security in the Arab Region: Un-Muting the Voices of Reason by Raidan Abdulaziz Al-Saqqaf; Understanding the Diplomacy and External Relations of the Eastern Orthodox Church by Nicolas Badaoui and Laurent Cleenewerck. We normally seek to include articles with a common, if unspoken, “thread” in each Newsletter, and this issue is no exception. Although featuring quite different topics, the three articles all speak to how people are represented in the shifting tides of contemporary global governance.

Brenda, Gwenith, and I all look forward to pressing on in our work for the Board and our membership over the next eighteen months, continuing to support your efforts to promote advanced scholarship about the UN and global governance, and deepening the level of dialogue between scholar and practitioner communities—just as the Council was established to do, 30 years ago.
HOLDING COURT OR HONOURING ACCOUNTABILITY?

THE UNCERTAIN FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT


THE ICC IS THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL PERMANENT INSTITUTION established to prosecute genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.1 Its jurisdiction may be triggered by a State party (State referral), the Security Council (Security Council referral) or the Prosecutor initiating investigations proprio motu. Except in cases of Security Council referral, the Court may exercise its jurisdiction only in relation to crimes committed in the territory or by the nationals of a State party. At the time of writing, the Rome Statute, which entered into force on 1 July 2002, counts 124 parties. Of these parties 34 are African States, 19 are Asia-Pacific States, 18 are from Eastern Europe, 27 are from Latin American and Caribbean States, and 25 are from Western European and other States. Although this is a remarkable figure, participation is far from universal. Among the countries that are not parties are the US, China, Israel, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Libya, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Yemen, and Syria, to name but a few.

AFRICAN STATES FORM THE LARGEST REGIONAL BLOC OF MEMBER STATES. THEY HAVE ALSO BEEN AMONG THE FIRST SUPPORTERS OF THE COURT. WHAT THEN HAS TURNED THESE STATES AWAY FROM THE COURT?

* Following the election of Adama Barrow in December 2016, Gambia has cancelled the withdrawal from the ICC. See postscript following this article.

1 The fourth crime falling within the ICC’s jurisdiction is the crime of aggression. The definition of this crime was adopted through amending the Rome Statute at the first Review Conference of the Statute in Kampala, Uganda, in 2010. For these amendments to enter into force, they must be ratified by at least 30 States and then voted upon by States Parties in 2017.
In its first 15 years of existence, the ICC intervened almost exclusively in African states. It opened investigations in ten situations: Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Uganda, Central African Republic (I) and (II), Darfur (Sudan), Kenya, Libya, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, and Georgia. Apart from the last example, they are all located in Africa; and it took 14 years for the ICC to investigate a situation outside the African continent. The Court has come under criticism from African nations, saying that it only targets African leaders for crimes committed in Africa, and not crimes committed elsewhere—particularly by western states—including, for example, Afghanistan, Iraq, Sri Lanka or Israel.

At face value this critique seems hard to dismiss. Perceptions of anti-African bias, however, do not correspond to reality.

The majority of the African situations under ICC investigation, including all the initial cases, were referred to the Court by the African states themselves. Some governments, such as Uganda and the DRC, have even benefited from the ICC’s having targeted their political adversaries. The situations of Sudan (Darfur) and Libya—both non-party States—were referred to the Court by a resolution of the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter that requires the concurring vote (or abstention) of all permanent members. Moreover, all cases involved alleged international crimes of sufficient gravity for which there were no prospects of domestic accountability. The jurisdiction of the ICC is complementary to national courts’ jurisdiction: a case is inadmissible before the Court unless national courts are unable and/or unwilling to genuinely carry out the investigation or prosecution.

Yet, the Prosecutor’s investigations so far have only resulted in 23 cases and a series of approximately 20 arrest warrants, most of which are still outstanding: six individuals are in the Court’s custody, while 13 remain at large. Only five cases closed: four with a conviction and one with an acquittal. Proceedings are pending in 18 cases: nine in the pre-trial phase, five at the trial phase, one under appeal, and three at the reparations stage. The ICC is like “a giant without arms and legs”, which “needs artificial limbs to walk and work”. It relies on international cooperation, mostly from States Parties, in all its activities; in particular, for collecting evidence and arresting suspects, and cooperation has been lacking. Perhaps the most paradoxical result thereof is the withdrawal of charges against Kenyatta, the sitting President of Kenya, due to insufficient evidence—evidence that the Prosecutor had requested Kenya provide. In relation to Sudan President, Omar Al Bashir—the first sitting Head of State to be indicted by the ICC—not only the Government of Sudan, but most African states have refused to cooperate with the Court, stating that cooperating with the ICC would be synonymous with relinquishing their national sovereignty. The arrest warrant was also criticised by a number of regional organisations—the League of Arab States, the AU, the Conference of Islamic States and the Non-Aligned Movement (with the notable exception of the EU). During a visit of Al Bashir to South Africa for the AU Summit Meeting in June 2015, the South Africa government allowed Al Bashir to escape from the country, offering head-of-state immunity and regional peace as justifications. This is at the origin of South Africa’s withdrawal.

South Africa—one of the first countries to have signed, ratified and implemented the Rome Statute (ICC Act of 2002), is not at risk of being targeted by the ICC investigations. Its withdrawal therefore will have no impact on the Court’s jurisdiction. It sends, however, the strong message that the Court does not enjoy the support of this African democratic State and that the latter will not cooperate in the execution of its arrest warrants. Gambia’s withdrawal goes also to the heart of the Court’s legitimacy: its current chief prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, is Gambian and served as an adviser and later justice minister to Gambian President Yahya Jammeh, after he seized power in a coup in 1994.

Burundi moved to leave the Court after it became the subject of a preliminary examination in 2016, in line with the attitude of most non-party States.

US President Clinton voted against the adoption of the Rome Statute mainly for fear of politically motivated prosecutions against its military personnel abroad, but unexpectedly signed the treaty on 31 December 2000. On 6 May 2002, however, the Bush administration informed the UN Secretary General that the US no longer intended to become a state party. The US is thus no longer “obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of the treaty”, in accordance with the general obligation arising from the signature of a treaty subject to ratification and prior to its entry into force (Article 18 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the law of treaties). A similar step was taken immediately by Israel (2002), later by Sudan (2008), and most recently by Russia. Russia decided to “unsign” the Statute on 30 November 2016, after the ICC opened a preliminary investigation of alleged crimes committed by Russian and Georgian forces during the 2008 war and published a report labelling the Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea as an occupation. The Prosecutor may also seek authorization to open an investigation into war crimes committed by US military forces and the CIA in Afghanistan, a State party to the Statute.

The expression comes from Cassese, who so famously defined the ICTY, but can be equally applied to the ICC. See Cassese, ‘On the Current Trends towards Criminal Prosecution and Punishment of Breaches of International Humanitarian Law’ (1998) 9 European Journal of Int. Law 2 at 13.
Why supporting remedial measures to facilitate female participation in negotiated peace processes is a vital and productive means to achieving sustainable peace

WOMEN, PEACE, AND SECURITY IN THE ARAB REGION

UNMUTING THE VOICES OF REASON

THE VIEWS EXPRESSED HEREIN ARE THOSE OF THE AUTHOR AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REFLECT THE VIEWS OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

Last November, the UN’s Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (UN-ESCWA) hosted women peace builders from Libya, Syria, and Yemen to discuss their experiences in their respective UN-brokered peace processes. The goal of the meeting was to explore how the right of women to participate in these processes was fulfilled, and the depth and quality of this participation. This was used as a proxy for the implementation of the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) Agenda, rooted in Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) and other International Human Rights Instruments of relevance. The outcomes of the meeting were particularly insightful in understanding measures to include women’s perspectives in resolving the conflicts in these countries.

The Arab Region Today is in extraordinary distress, shaken by unprecedented conflicts and instability. The region is home to 5 per cent of the world’s population, but is also home to one third of the UN’s political and peacekeeping missions. Arab States such as Syria, Libya, Sudan, Palestine, Iraq, and Yemen are often on the docket of the Security Council, while the increasing humanitarian toll remains a bleeding stain on the conscience of humanity.

This is a grave situation, particularly for the millions of women and girls who are affected by it. The horrors of this situation are repeatedly recounted by survivors, women activists, humanitarian workers, civil society leaders, and other women and girls who are in dire need of the international community’s attention and support. They also remind us of the centrality of the Women, Peace, and Security Agenda (WPS), and the protection and empowerment promises that continue to go unfulfilled, especially for those who need it the most.

The WPS agenda mandates UN Member States, UN entities, and other actors to undertake a number of actions to prevent violent conflict; protect women and girls from this violence; and to target them with relief and recovery support, and ensure that they have voice and representation across the board. In conflict settings, having a voice in political settlements and peace processes is central to the fulfillment of the WPS agenda for many reasons, including countering the underrepresentation of women’s participation as a result of such turmoil and collapse of peaceful politics.

Evidence of the positive impact of women’s participation in peace processes on the quality and durability of peace agreements is well documented and uncontested, and is collated in UN Women’s Global Study on the Implementation of SCR1325. The study cites that women’s participation in the peace processes contributes to improving their durability over 15 years by 35%, with a range of key benefits that include increasing legitimacy and representation of these peace processes, and increasing popular support for them. Other confirmed benefits of women’s participation are ensuring the inclusiveness of these processes, addressing issues, priorities, and aspirations that are more representative of popular voices; as well as making important contributions to the coherence of the processes and outcomes of negotiated political settlements.

Despite these proven benefits, women’s participation in the peace processes in Libya, Syria, and Yemen remains dismal. For instance, 16 of the 16 rounds of negotiations that led to the Skhirat Libyan Peace Agreement in December 2015 did not include any women, and the other two included only one woman as an observer. Men also overwhelmingly dominate the delegations of various negotiating parties in Syria and in Yemen, thereby manifesting the heavily gendered and male-dominated politics of the region.

Given the prevailing exclusion of women in the formal peace talks of these three countries, UN envoys have supported the creation of remedial measures to facilitate their participation. These measures include parallel peace talks known as the Women Tracks, consultations with women groups, engaging women in shuttle diplomacy, and advocating with parties to the conflict to include women as mediators, negotiators, and advisers in their respective delegations. Nonetheless, the outcomes of these efforts remain limited. For instance, an August 2015 meeting of Libyan women activists took place in Tunisia to discuss the draft Libyan Political Agreement. The activists expressed dismay over many issues in the draft agreement, including on gender issues, and made 70 recommendations illustrated in the meeting’s outcome document. However, few of these recommendations made it to the final agreement signed in Skhirat.

Similar frustration is experienced in Syria, where the Syrian Women Advisory Board convened by the UN Envoy to Syria is reported to be lacking in transparency and inclusiveness. This risks not only jeopardizing the contributions of the advisory board to the peace process, but also makes their cause vulnerable to political exploitation.

But there is a glimmer of hope; in Yemen, women represented 30% of all political delegations taking part in the 2013 National Dialogue Conference. This participation was unprecedented in the history of the country with the world’s largest gender gap, and allowed for the rare opportunity to form a women’s political block that lobbied with other groups to adopt a minimum age of marriage in the draft constitution. This is a remarkable feat given the opposition of conservatives and fundamentalists to that effort. However, the representation of women retracted in the political talks which started in mid-2015, when the delegations of peace negotiators initially did not include any women; it increased to 3 women out of 26 negotiators following diligent advocacy and pressure by the UNSG’s Envoy to Yemen.

Continued on page 9 >
UN Peacebuilding Architecture: The first 10 years
Cedric de Coning and Eli Stamnes (eds.) | Routledge, 2016

Since its establishment, the UN’s Peacebuilding Architecture (PBA) has been involved in peacebuilding processes in more than 20 countries. This edited volume takes stock of the overall impact of the PBA during its first decade in existence, and generates innovative recommendations for how the architecture can be modified and utilized to create more synergy and fusion between the UN’s peace and development work.

The volume is based on commissioned research and independent evaluations as well as informed opinions of several key decision-makers closely engaged in shaping the UN’s peacebuilding agenda. It seeks to find a balance between identifying the reality and constraints of the UN’s multilateral framework, while being bold in exploring new and innovative ways in which the UN can enhance the results of its peace and development work through the PBA.

The research and writing of each chapter has been guided by four objectives:

- to assess the overall impact of the PBA;
- to generate innovative ideas for how the PBA can be made more effective post-2015;
- to analyze the PBA’s role at the nexus of the UN’s peace and development work;
- to consider what would be required for the PBA to increase and improve its impact in future.

It will be of interest to diplomats, UN officials, the policy community and scholars engaged in the debate following the 2015 review and the implementation of its recommendations, and will be an essential resource for UN and peacebuilding scholars.

A Most Canadian Odyssey: Education Diplomacy and Federalism, 1844–1984
John Allison, (Althouse Press / Western University, 2016)

Contemporary Canadian education provides a critical lens for how we see ourselves as a civilization. Education diplomacy in current times broadens this vision, speaking to how we see ourselves on the global stage. Organizations such as the Alliance Française, the Fulbright Program, and the Confucius Institute speak volumes about the significant role Education Diplomacy plays in projecting countries’ education systems, languages, and cultures into the global arena. It is much more than that; it also comprises educational exchanges, conferences on educational issues, learning a language, or the signing of treaties and conventions that further education. Despite the fact that educational diplomacy is a critical aspect of diplomacy around the world, Canadians know very little about it and Canada has a poor record in the field. In fact, Canada’s presence internationally in this area is close to non-existent.

Drawing on historical research, John Allison documents the history and development of Educational Diplomacy in Canada. In setting the stage, he looks at its early development via the voyages of Egerton Ryerson, the importance of education at Confederation, and developments in the early twentieth century leading up to the 1960s. The principal focus of the book, however, takes the reader through the 1960s, the rise of the Council of Ministers of Education, Canada (CMEC), the activities of Paul Gerin-Lajoie to extend Quebec’s jurisdiction in this area, and the federal response. With the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Country Education Review in 1975-1976, Canada faced new challenges in this field. In his examination of the latter part of the 1970s, Allison analyzes the ongoing debates and discussions concerning who oversaw education diplomacy: Ottawa and the Department of Foreign Affairs (now Global Affairs Canada) or the provinces and CMEC. In the early 1980s, a Memorandum of Understanding between the provinces (as represented by CMEC) and the federal government was signed. Rather than addressing it in a dynamic fashion, this had the effect of mumming the question. Canadian education diplomacy is a field in which all governments could do far better. With the history of this question in hand, leaders, governments, and Canadian educators can more effectively look anew at this issue and search for innovative and better approaches to Canadian-style education diplomacy.
The Roman Catholic Church has well-defined diplomatic status and action by virtue of existing also as a sovereign state (the Holy See). This article discusses the diplomatic action of the Orthodox Churches in light of current global issues.

By contrast with the Roman Catholic Church, which is a highly centralized organization with a universally recognized leader (the Pope), the Orthodox Church is a fairly loose federation of fourteen self-governing Churches. Among them, the Moscow Patriarchate is by far the largest in terms of membership and geographical size. However, and for historical reasons, the primacy of honor among the heads of these autocephalous Churches is attached to the Patriarch of Constantinople, based in the city now known as Istanbul, Turkey, and who holds the title of “Ecumenical Patriarch.” There are three other ancient Patriarchates with geopolitical significance: Alexandria (Egypt), which must be distinguished from the Coptic Orthodox Church and who represents a dwindling Greek community; Antioch (actually based in Damascus, Syria) which is struggling for its survival; and Jerusalem, another cultural and diplomatic extension of Hellenic Orthodoxy.

The polymorphous name of the Christian communion known as “the Orthodox Church” is telling: officially, it still calls itself the “Catholic Church” or “Orthodox Catholic Church.” Scholars generally refer to it as the “Eastern Orthodox Church” to distinguish it from the “Oriental Orthodox Churches.” Usually, reference is made not to the whole but to a particular entity within the larger communion, either a territory (as in Patriarchate of Romania which is the more accurate term) or a national identity (as in Romanian Orthodox Church).
GREEK ORTHODOX DIPLOMACY: ORTHODOXY AND HELLENISM

Looking at one of the major geopolitical hotspots, the “Patriarchate of Antioch and all the East” is still called “Greek Orthodox” even though its hierarchy is now Arab-speaking.

There is, in effect, a sub-group within the Orthodox family that can be described as ‘Greek Orthodox’ (Greek-speaking) and for which Hellenism and Orthodoxy are essentially joined at the hip. The Patriarchates of Alexandria (with oversight over all of Africa) and Jerusalem, as well as the Churches of Greece and Cyprus, are examples of this cultural and diplomatic alignment. In New York for example, Greek Orthodox religious events are often attended by diplomats of majority Greek Orthodox countries such as Greece and Cyprus. The Orthodox patriarchate responsible for Africa is specifically called “Greek Orthodox” and supported by the Greek government, whereas the Coptic Orthodox Church represents the indigenous Christian community that separated from the government-backed Chalcedonian (now called Greek Orthodox) community in the fifth century.

Greek Orthodox diplomacy, however, is only reluctantly supported by the Greek government which is not only facing budget cuts but also now led by the secular party Syriza. In 2010, the Greek government halted funding of the Ecumenical Patriarchate’s center near Geneva, Switzerland.

RUSSIAN ORTHODOX DIPLOMACY

From a global geopolitical perspective, it is the Russian Orthodox Church (also known as the Moscow Patriarchate) that has become a diplomatic powerhouse closely associated with the current Russian government. When Patriarch Kirill of Moscow met Pope Francis in Cuba in 2016, he was travelling on the same impressive government aircraft used by President Putin, an Ilyushin Il-86.

The recently inaugurated Russian Cultural Center in Paris, fully financed by the Russian government, is also an Orthodox church which features the traditional domes, making the Quay Branli in Paris look a bit like Moscow. The inability of President Putin to attend its inauguration due to a diplomatic row with France is significant. This situation prompted the Economist to post an article on “Ecclesiastical diplomacy.” There is no question that the current Russian government views Orthodox Christianity as inseparable from Russian identity, at a time when it is precisely trying to strengthen this identity in the vacuum left by an openly atheistic USSR which never quite managed to rid the country of its ancestral faith.

‘MULTILATERAL ORTHODOXY’

In Brussels, both the Moscow Patriarchate and Ecumenical Patriarchate maintain a representation to the European Union. In fact, the Cypriot, Greek, Bulgarian, and Romanian Churches also maintain their own representations, but cooperate under an umbrella organization called the Committee of the Representatives of the Orthodox Churches of the European Union (CROCEU).

At the United Nations, the Catholic Church has the distinct and controversial advantage of being recognized as a sovereign entity (through the territory of the Vatican City State) and holds Permanent Observer status at the General Assembly under the name Holy See. The Catholic Church can also count on another UNGA Permanent Observer, the Order of Malta, for diplomatic support. By comparison, the Orthodox Churches must depend on their respective national governments to obtain high-level access and diplomatic influence. The Catholic and Orthodox agendas tend to overlap, and while Orthodoxy is less strict on the issue of birth control it is equally committed to traditional values and concerned with the persecution of Christian minorities.

Among the 14 autocephalous Churches which make up the worldwide Orthodox Church, not all have the same level of diplomatic importance: Greece does not have a separation of Church and State (priests are even paid by the government and teach religion in public schools) but the recent Greek government has been at odds with the Church hierarchy on a number of issues. The Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople has a well-accepted prerogative of leadership, but being based in Istanbul and not being recognized by the Turkish government as an international institution has proven very problematic. The diplomatic power of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople actually comes from the enduring of successful Greek Orthodox businessmen and politicians, many of whom belong to the exclusive Order of Saint Andrew and bear the title of Archon.

THE UKRAINIAN CRISIS

The Ukrainian crisis remains a major geopolitical and diplomatic challenge, and one with significant religious dimensions, even though most Ukrainians profess no religious affiliation. The Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (part of the Roman Catholic Church), mostly represented in the West of the country, has long been competing for influence with the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate and two other Orthodox groups2 which are not recognized by the rest of the Orthodox world. The Ukrainian government has been trying to obtain recognition for these independent groups from the Patriarchate of Constantinople, but without success. A Washington Post article by Mara Kozelsky entitled “Don’t underestimate importance of religion for understanding Russia’s actions in Crimea” offers good advice for all students and practitioners of global affairs not only in the case of Crimea but in general. As Germany’s Home Secretary, Thomas de Maizière, similarly summarized, “We have underestimated the role of religion.”3

Continued on next page >
THE UNCERTAIN FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT

Continued from page 4

Although there are currently a much greater number of African nationals before the ICC than other states, the Prosecutor is currently carrying out investigations in a number of countries, such as Colombia and Honduras, and it has begun to challenge major powers. Moreover, a mass exodus does not appear imminent and most African and European countries continue to support the Court.

The real concern therefore should not be the Court's anti-Africa bias or that it could pave the way for other African States Parties to withdraw from the Statute. But the

WOMEN, PEACE, AND SECURITY IN THE ARAB REGION: UNMUTING THE VOICES OF REASON

Continued from page 5

Nonetheless, women peace builders across the region go to great lengths to voice their demands and make meaningful contributions to peace and security, including within the periphery of formal peace talks. Numerous women-led local initiatives continue to save lives, provide services, and carve peace out of conflict, at a time when they are often the targets of violence or the ones most affected by the absence of peace. This work stands at the core of the WPS agenda, and these women repeatedly show the greatest resilience and ingenuity at the face of adversity, and bring the promise of peace once they take their rightful space at the negotiations table, and in turn influence the negotiations towards durable peace.

ESCWA continues to support the efforts of these women and other partners to advance the implementation of the WPS initiatives across the Arab region. ESCWA’s work includes undertaking research to fill the knowledge gaps and provide in-depth understanding of the situation, as well as using the results of this research to inform its advisory services and technical support to national counterparts including National Women Machinerys and civil society organizations.

ESCWA also engages heavily with its stakeholders to support the development and implementation of national strategies and action plans on WPS, complemented by tailor made capacity development initiatives to strengthen women’s effective participation. This important work is met with great appreciation and excitement; however it is only indicative of the long road ahead towards the goals of the WPS agenda.

* Raidan Abdulaziz Al-Saqqaf was a participant in the 2016 ACUNS Workshop at O.P. Jindal Global University.

telling and undeniable fact that whenever the Court attempts to reach out to leaders in power or members of their apparatus—whether dictators or democratically elected—States will take whatever step is needed to shy away from its jurisdiction and/or withhold cooperation with its investigations and prosecutions.

* Annalisa Ciampi studied law (LLB and PhD) in Italy (Florence and Rome) and at Harvard Law School (LLM). She is currently a full professor of International Law at Verona University (Italy) and a visiting professor of European Human Rights Law at Monash University's School of Law.

ACUNS/ASIL WORKSHOP ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION STUDIES

CALL FOR APPLICATIONS

Reforming Multilateral Institutions, Delivering Improved Governance

August 4 - 13, 2017

Global Foundation for Democracy and Development, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic

ONLINE APPLICATIONS

Visit: http://acuns.org/workshop17/

Applications must be submitted by:
Saturday, April 15, 2017 | UN Secretariat Staff
Monday, April 24, 2017 | All Other Applicants

Questions? Please email admin@acuns.org or call (1) 226.772.3121

ACUNS SECRETARIAT > Wilfrid Laurier University, 75 University Avenue West, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada N2L 3C5

UNDERSTANDING THE DIPLOMACY AND EXTERNAL RELATIONS OF THE EASTERN ORTHODOX CHURCH

Continued from previous page

A MULTIPOLAR AND MULTI-MODEL GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT

The global environment presents us with competing and at times incompatible models of relationships between civil society and religious convictions. Europe and North America have progressively embraced a secular model, at times forcefully so, for which the sharpest contrast are the theocratic systems exemplified by Iran or Saudi Arabia. As a State, the Vatican is also classified as a theocratic monarchy, but its form of government is no longer presented as a universal model. However, there are many variations along this spectrum, including the re-emergence of the Byzantine model of Church-State symphonia which has been gaining momentum in the Russian Federation since 2000. If Islam (in part through the Organization of Islamic Cooperation) and Catholicism (through the Holy See) are well known global actors, the Eastern Orthodox Church, in part due to its national organization, remains little-known and often underestimated. Barring unexpected political changes in Russia, there is no doubt that the Russian Orthodox Church will continue to play a significant role in global affairs for the foreseeable future.

* Dr. Nicolas Badaoui, a resident of Lebanon, is the author of a EUCLID doctoral thesis on the External relations of the Orthodox Churches from the Byzantine Empire to modern times.

* The V. Rev. Pr. Laurent Geenenwerck is on the faculty at several institutions of higher learning including Humboldt State University, Ukrainian Catholic University and EUCLID University. He was ordained in the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople and now serves in the Orthodox Church in America.
2017 will see a new UN Secretary-General taking office on the 38th Floor at UN Headquarters, following the end of Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon’s second term. The new SG will be faced with a number of ongoing global, regional and other challenges, and will be confronted with new issues that will arise over time. The SG also will have the job of continuing to build on the momentum of recent milestone agreements, including the Sustainable Development Goals, the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, and the Commitments to Action from the World Humanitarian Summit.

While the transition in the leadership of the United Nations is likely to be a central interest for many ACUNS members, the 2017 Annual Meeting notably also marks the 30th anniversary of the founding of the Academic Council. This year’s meeting, therefore, will offer a relatively rare opportunity for members—that is, a moment to reflect on the achievements of one Secretary-General and to consider the agenda of the new leader of the global body, while connecting those reflections to discussions of the role of ACUNS and its members in promoting innovative scholarship and greater understanding of the UN system and its place in meeting global governance.

The full text of the Call for Papers is available at acuns.org/am2017

APPLICATION PROCEDURE

Submissions: To submit an individual proposal or a full panel proposal, you will be required to upload full contact information, the paper/panel title(s), abstract(s) of no more than 200 words, biographical note(s) of no more than 200 words, and biographical notes of no more than 250 words.

Proposals: Proposals will be accepted and evaluated, and panel spaces will be allotted, on a first-come rolling basis subsequent to the issuance of this Call. Once all panel spaces have been filled, a waiting list will be established for any subsequent proposals that are received.

Registration: Once your proposal is accepted you are required to register for the 2017 Annual Meeting at acuns.org/am2017

Registration Fees are available online at acuns.org
This ... will be an essential reference work for all those who are concerned with the future of a new United Nations.

Boutros Boutros-Ghali, 6th Secretary-General of the UN

... lucidly and intelligently presents a sweeping series of new, innovative ideas designed to reform the United Nations' structure and performance. A rich mother lode to change and challenge current thinking ... [it] is a rare compendium of forward-looking ideas. ..."

Thomas Pickering, former US Ambassador to the UN and former Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs

Most proposals regarding reform of the United Nations system are overly concerned about what is feasible, at the expense of what is ideal. [This] formidable work corrects that bias, and shuttles between the feasible and the ideal with elegance and rigor.

Hakan Altinay, Global Ethics Fellow, Carnegie Council

"No one has thought longer or harder than Joe Schwartzberg about the challenges of designing a fairer and better world order. This book is an essential contribution to a long overdue conversation."


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