


University of Verona (Italy)
38th PhD cycle
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Language Policies and Language Situation in Higher Education in Ukraine


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
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ABSTRACT

Language is one of the key markers of identity at both the individual and state levels. Language policies, designed to regulate the use of languages in society and prevent conflicts, have a significant impact on the linguistic landscape of a region. Language policies played a particularly important role in multinational empires, of which Ukraine was a part at various times (the Russian Empire, Austria-Hungary). In modern Ukraine, the language issue has remained politicised and problematic since independence. Moreover, in a democratic state, language policies are transforming from a colonial instrument of influence into a mechanism for responding to society's demands or socio-political needs.

In both contexts – colonial and democratic – the educational sphere, particularly higher education, is one of the most institutionalised environments for the implementation of language policies. This is because the choice of language of instruction directly influences (1) the formation of a student's identity, (2) their future professional language practices, and (3) the formation of language prestige and language attitudes. It is precisely the instability of language policies and the dynamics of language attitudes in the context of contemporary socio-political upheavals in Ukraine that make this study **relevant**. The dissertation fills a significant gap in Ukrainian sociolinguistics: although language policies in Ukraine are actively researched, the sphere of higher education still lacks a comprehensive interregional analysis of their implementation, both at the formal and informal levels.

The **aim** of this study is to provide a comprehensive analysis of the conditions of language policies and the peculiarities of their implementation in Ukraine's higher education system. Achieving this goal involves the implementation of the following **research objectives**:

- reviewing the historical processes of language policy (LP) formation in the territories of modern Ukraine;
- conducting a detailed analysis of current language policies at the state level and at the level of the institutions under study;

- studying the experience of the practical application of these policies in the university environment;
- research into the dynamics of changes in language attitudes among representatives of the academic community in response to socio-political changes.

Thus, the **research questions** are formulated as follows:

RQ1. What are the historical factors contributing to the development of LP in Ukraine?

RQ2. Which LPs are related to the sphere of education?

RQ3. What is the reality of the implementation of LP in academia?

RQ4. What are the factors motivating people to change their language choice?

The **subject** of the study is the application of language policies in higher education institutions in the four largest unoccupied cities of Ukraine, representing different geographical regions: Kyiv, Kharkiv, Odesa, and Lviv. The **object** of the study is language practices and language attitudes in the academic environment.

The **research data** covers:

- (1) documents that defined language policy in the territories of modern Ukraine from the end of the 17th century to 2025;
- (2) online questionnaire of students and teachers in selected regions (with both quantitative and qualitative data for the period 1991–2023);
- (3) individual semi-structured interviews conducted online;
- (4) additional materials, including archive materials, demographic statistics, and secondary sociolinguistic literature.

The study uses a **mixed-methods research approach**, which includes:

- (1) descriptive analysis of legislative acts of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Russian Empire, the Ukrainian People's Republic, the Second Hetmanate, the Soviet Union, and independent Ukraine aimed at regulating language policy in education;
- (2) quantitative analysis of changes in language behaviour in the academic domain (formal and informal) based on the results of an online questionnaire;

(3) thematic analysis of questionnaire and interview data concerning language practices, visions of future language policy in education, motives for language choice in the academic domain, and reasons for changes in these under the influence of socio-political upheavals.

The **novelty** of the work lies in filling a significant gap: despite a considerable number of studies on language policies in Ukraine, the academic sphere remains insufficiently comprehensively described, both synchronically and diachronically, at both formal and informal levels, in a comparative regional dimension. Additionally, the application of the linguistic autobiography methodology is proposed outside the context of physical migration. It follows the idea of Tsar (2024) but applied to research ‘identity migration’ in the context of education.

Limitations of the study and prospects for further research:

(1) the study does not cover the analysis of the language policies of the Ottoman Empire and the language management policies during the occupation of Ukraine by the Third Reich and Second Polish Republic;

(2) A promising direction is to conduct a similar comprehensive study of language policies in the secondary education system, since it is this level that shapes the basic language practices and attitudes that subsequently influence the academic environment.

(3) It is advisable to further develop comparative regional studies, including territories that were or are under temporary occupation.

The study consists of an abstract, an introduction, five chapters, a conclusion, references list, supporting data and eight appendices. The main concept of the thesis is outlined on 385 pages without appendices.

The **key findings** include: Ukrainian language in higher education in Ukraine functions as an academic lingua franca, but the degree of its dominance varies significantly depending on the regional context, historical heritage and communicative environment. Lviv stands out as having the highest level of Ukrainian language use. In Kyiv, Ukrainian is also quite widespread, and moreover, the use of Russian is gradually being replaced by English in academic contexts. Odesa and Kharkiv lag significantly behind in terms of Ukrainian language use. Mixed language practices prevail there,

especially in informal contexts. At the same time, the general trend of the spread of Ukrainian language use continues in all four regions, both in formal and informal domains. This indicates a gradual shift from post-colonial models of language behaviour to national-state norms.

The change in language behaviour is mainly socially and politically motivated, rather than being the result of direct normative pressure. For a significant part of the academic (and not only) community, the Revolution of Dignity (2014) and Russia's full-scale invasion (2022) contributed to a reassessment of language practices and a multiple increase in the prestige of Ukrainian as a language of security, resistance and a symbolic border with the aggressor. Additionally, the English language has also assumed a significant role. Its function in Ukraine is integrative, as it is associated with future EU accession, professional mobility and European integration, which leads to expectations of further expansion of English-language educational programmes.

There is also a significant gap between declared institutional policies and actual practices. On the one hand, macro- and meso-level LPs support Ukrainian language and multilingualism. However, the reality is that most universities do not have educational programmes in languages other than Ukrainian and English. In addition, Russian is sometimes used for communication in the educational process. Actual language practices depend more on local historical conditions, the individual habits of teachers and students, and the overall level of language competence in the region. Legislative mechanisms, again, play a secondary role: language-choice change mostly unfolds as a bottom-up process, which is subsequently enshrined in political decisions, rather than the other way around. In conclusion, the contemporary Ukrainian academic space appears as a dynamic sphere in which language policy and language behaviour interact in the context of decolonisation, war, and European integration processes, forming a new language norm and renewed approaches to academic multilingualism.

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Thanks to the bravery of each Ukrainian soldier, my family, friends, and I are still alive. Thanks to the devotion of each Ukrainian soldier, my family, friends, and I were not raped, injured, or killed by Russians. So, I am immensely grateful to the Armed Forces of Ukraine for having my home free and independent, and I hope that soon every Ukrainian will have their home liberated.

To all the deceased Ukrainians, victims of years of forced resettlement, oppression, Holodomors, assimilation, genocides, and other forms of brutal violence:

This thesis encompasses a broad range of situations that reflect imperial crimes against Ukraine and the Ukrainian struggle to make their own decisions. Being alive today, I owe an opportunity to learn to all those who laid down their lives for the restoration of the Ukrainian state, both in the battle or in everyday life.

While I can study, work, and breathe, not everyone has this opportunity. Hence, I dedicate this thesis to those Ukrainian children and adults who, unfortunately, were deprived of the opportunity to study, discover new things, and seek new experiences.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ELP – Educational language policy

EU – European Union

HEI – Higher Education Institution

KhNU – V. N. Karazin Kharkiv National University

KhPI – National Technical University “Kharkiv Polytechnic Institute”

KNU – Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv

KPI – National Technical University of Ukraine “Igor Sikorsky Kyiv Polytechnic Institute”

LNU – Ivan Franko National University of Lviv

LP – Language Policy

MON – Ministry of Education and Science

NAQA – National Agency for Quality Assurance in Higher Education

NASU – National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine

NGO – Non-governmental Organisation

NKVD – People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs

ONU – Odesa I. I. Mechnykov National University

RQ – Research Question

RSFSR – The Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic

SSS – Shevchenko Scientific Society

UCU – The Ukrainian Catholic University

UNR – Ukrainian People’s Republic

ZUNR – Western Ukrainian People’s Republic

INTRODUCTION

Policies are a set of rules or a specific plan of action that the government, business, educational institution, etc., have established to organise certain aspects of its functioning. From a legal perspective, language policies (LP) are a set of rules aimed at avoiding miscommunications within a country, state, institution, etc. Some countries have no official language (Australia, Mexico, the United Kingdom, etc) while LP is a priority for the others (Ukraine, Latvia, etc). The importance of LP for a country might be determined by factors far from linguistics. Multilingualism, unfriendly neighbouring countries, requirements from allies, or economic issues are all possible factors that influence LP development.

Language Policy is one of the key instruments of state-building and identity formation in multilingual and post-colonial countries. This is the case in contemporary Ukraine. In addition, the language issue is highly politicised and closely linked to historical experiences of imperial domination (the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Russian Empire), Soviet russification, and current political pressures and military aggression from Russia.

Research within the field of LP covers theoretical approaches to the discipline, as well as studies on LP implementation in different contexts (see, among others Azhniuk, Bilaniuk, Blommaert, Cooper, Danylenko, García, Pavlenko, Plotnytska, Rabanus, Ricento, Shohamy, Spolsky, Tollefson). Studies on LP are traditionally multidisciplinary, as the objective of LP cannot be limited to a single area of linguistics, but rather requires insights from a range of disciplines, including ethnology, political science, social anthropology, sociology, and others. Dann (2006) claims that the popularity of ethnogenesis in the 2nd half of the 18th century led to a new way of creating political identity. After that, since national languages began to play an important role in state-building, scientific interest in LP has been growing.

Groups of speakers of different languages live in the same territories, and governments are required to provide effective instruments of communication, which necessitates the development of LP. Over the time, the understanding of LP itself has

evolved beyond a mere corpus of laws adopted by the state. García (2015, p.353) claims that

“Originally scholars referred to the field as *language planning*, focusing on what could be done by the state to systematically promote linguistic change (Cooper, 1989; Fishman et al., 1968; Fishman, 1971; Haugen, 1959, 1966; Kaplan and Baldauf, 1997). [...] Post-structuralist and critical scholarship has challenged the idea that a community’s way of speaking could be planned and changed by authoritative agencies. There are beliefs, practices, and even regulations that impact the ways in which people use language. Thus, the naming of the field itself has shifted to *language policy*.”

García, 2015, p.353

Such processes determine the relevance of LP research in the modern world.

As for this study, its **relevance** is determined by several factors:

- (1) Modern Ukraine is a relatively recent political entity that must shape its LP in the context of addressing the legacy of the Soviet Union’s LP. This legacy is characterised by a strong dominance of the Russian language, especially in the field of education, where it was the only prestigious language.
- (2) Ukraine is inhabited by a multilingual population. The titular language is Ukrainian. Three indigenous languages include Crimean Tatar, Karait, and Krymchak. The 2001 Census¹ lists over 25 languages spoken by national minorities (see State Statistics Service of Ukraine, 2001). However, the most common L1/L2 is Russian, which is explained by historical reasons. The level of bilingualism remains high.
- (3) Since Ukraine gained independence, the language issue has consistently occupied a central place in social and political discourse, often becoming a source of controversy and manipulation not only within the country but also by external actors.
- (4) The linguistic context in Ukraine has also been marked by the ‘weaponisation of language’, as Ukrainian language policy has been (successfully) exploited by Russian propaganda narratives to justify military aggression since 2014.

¹ In this thesis, “2001 Census” always refers to the reference list item: State Statistics Service of Ukraine. (2001). All-Ukrainian Population Census. Retrieved from: <https://2001.ukrcensus.gov.ua/eng/results/general/>

The **aim** of the study is to perform comprehensive research into the conditions of LP formation and the application of LP in Ukraine in the system of higher education (henceforth HE). To reach the aim, we have outlined the following **research objectives**:

- outlining the historical factors of LP development in Ukraine;
- studying the current LP in Ukraine, paying attention to those connected to the sphere of (higher) education;
- conducting a study of LP management in higher education institutions;
- comparing official LP to the real situation based on the testimonies of the participants of the educational process;
- highlighting the motivations of the HE participants to change their language behaviours;
- providing suggestions for the improvement of LP in Ukraine.

Thus, the **research questions** are formulated as follows:

- RQ1. What are the historical factors contributing to the development of LP in Ukraine?
- RQ2. Which LPs are related to the sphere of education?
- RQ3. What is the reality of the implementation of LP in academia?
- RQ4. What are the factors motivating people to change their language choice?

The **subject** of the research is the LP application at the best-ranked universities in Ukraine. In addition, these universities are located in Ukraine's four major cities, each in a distinct geographical area (centre, east, south, west), i.e., Kyiv, Kharkiv, Odesa, and Lviv. The study does not consider the currently occupied cities. The **object** of the research is the language practices and attitudes in Ukrainian academia.

The data of the research includes:

- (1) Document corpora: Ukrainian constitutional provisions, language laws, education acts, internal regulations from the highest-ranked Ukrainian higher education institutions, and national censuses and public opinion surveys conducted by major Ukrainian research agencies (such as the Rating Group and KIIS).

- (2) Questionnaire data: the responses from 230 informants reporting their student experience, 66 of which were also reporting their teaching experience from Kyiv, Kharkiv, Odesa, and Lviv, which provided us with both quantitative and qualitative data from diverse geographic regions, academic disciplines, and L1 backgrounds.
- (3) Qualitative interviews: in-depth interviews with teachers and students helped to research into both language practices and language attitudes of people with heterogeneous linguistic and academic backgrounds.

Additional materials include historical documents, demographic statistics, and secondary sociolinguistic literature. The dataset captures attitudes and behaviours from 1991 to 2024. Special attention is paid to the wartime acceleration of the Ukrainian language consolidation and the expansion of English alongside Ukrainian as the medium of instruction.

In this study, we adopted a mixed-methods research approach, combining document analysis and thematic analysis of data obtained from questionnaires and individual semi-structured interviews. Legislative acts, ministerial directives, and university language strategies were examined in order to shape the policy framework and institutional ideologies. With the help of the questionnaire, we collected demographic information, language practices, language attitudes, and perceptions of the effects of social and political events in Ukraine. Semi-structured interviews with teachers and students of the chosen academic institutions provided us with deeper insight into the real situation. Interviews based on the approach of linguistic autobiography, together with open-ended questionnaire items, gave us an opportunity to track the factors that motivate language shift in the Ukrainian academic society. The use of these methods ensured research validity and enabled nuanced interpretation of the phenomena at different levels (macrolevel for legal document analysis, mesolevel for tracking the local institutional regulations and the obedience to these regulations by the participants of the educational process, and microlevel for individual language choices).

Higher education institutions (henceforth: HEIs) have long played the role of a critical arena for discussions of national self-determination, language ideology,

European integration imperatives, and individual multilingual practices. The complex sociolinguistic environment in Ukrainian HEIs required comprehensive scholarly attention. Despite the substantial body of research on Ukrainian LP, systematic empirical investigation of LP implementation in HEIs remains limited. Previous studies tend to focus rather on the legal framework, historical narratives, or general patterns. Differently, institutional strategies, local practices, and attitudes of academic communities do not get enough attention. The **novelty** of this study lies in addressing this gap by the mixed-methods examination of LP in Ukrainian HE under conditions of political transformation, war-driven sociolinguistic shifts, and accelerating integration into the EU. The thesis integrates theoretical paradigms of critical LP, language management theory, and multilingual research to reveal the contradictions between the declared language regulations and real practices, identify drivers of language shifts in academia, and conceptualise the language situation in modern academia in Ukraine. Methodologically, the study innovatively applies the model typically used for the investigation of physical migration to the investigation of 'identity migration'. This approach enhances the understanding of LP in transitional, post-colonial higher education systems and expands knowledge on multilingualism under conflict-induced sociolinguistic change. Empirically, it documents how language functions as a mechanism of identity, resistance, and institutional transformation in contemporary Ukraine.

In addition, the necessity to achieve the defined RQs within the chosen methodology renders a conditional division of this work into three parts. In the first part (Chapter 1), the theoretical basis for studying LP and its peculiarities in the Ukrainian scientific context is presented. The second part (Chapter 2) of this study aims to provide a detailed historical analysis of the factors that have shaped the current situation with LP in Ukraine. Despite Ukraine only regaining its independence in 1991, its language policy did not arise in a vacuum; rather, it is the result of many years of influences, including those from other state unities ruling over this territory. The third part of the study (Chapters 3, 4, 5) reviews the state of language policies in Ukrainian higher education, both on paper and in reality.

This research adopts a human-centred approach, focusing on how individuals respond to and engage with the state's language planning initiatives, and the role they play in shaping LP themselves. Given that the population's reaction to certain legal documents is not always immediate or explicit, but sometimes lasts for centuries, it is essential to provide a detailed overview of the historical context. In order to describe the (dis)continuity of the LP on the territories of modern Ukraine, it is also necessary to explore the sociolinguistic concepts, so that the meaning of our statements is clear to any reader. Finally, research into the actual state of the art is required to shed light on the real implementation of LP. The study consists of an abstract, an introduction, five chapters, a conclusion, a reference list, supporting data and eight appendices. The main concept of the thesis is outlined on 385 pages, not including the appendices.

CHAPTER I. LANGUAGE POLICIES IN EDUCATION: THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS

1.1. LP Approaches to Language Policies

LP is commonly periodised into four stages: premodern, early modern, modern, and postmodern (see Blommaert, 1996; Jernudd, 1996). *The premodern period* reaches back to such institutions as the *Académie française*, the *Fruchtbringende Gesellschaft*, or the *Accademia della Crusca*. The need for the emergence of such institutions was determined by the fact that vernacular languages started substituting Latin in many domains. Therefore, they needed to be studied, structured, and, in a way, unified (see Jernudd, 1996).

The early modern period developed after European national movements were activated. Nations mainly governed by multilingual and multicultural empires or included in more significant state entities saw language as a part of culture and self-determination.

The modern period is characterised by a certain neglect of linguistic variations in the search for standards (see Rubin, 1977). The Prague School of Linguistics, with its functionalist approach, significantly contributed to the development of this period. Scholars of that period believed that guiding language development could raise the interests of various social groups within a specific socio-political context (see Neustupný, 2006, p. 2216). Many analysts now argue that the strategy of language planning in the modern period, or so-called ‘classic language planning’, was unsuccessful. The main issue is that LP is often involved in politics, which leads to social change and, consequently, contributes to social inequality (see Blommaert, 1996; Cooper, 1989; Tollefson, 2002). Another reason for receding from the modern type of language planning was that many languages began to die out due to this approach.

The postmodern period bases its approaches on the concept of ‘ecology of languages’, which is understood as a metaphorical framework for understanding how languages (co-)exist and survive within changing social, cultural, and political contexts

(see Ricento, 2000, pp.206-209). In this period, language pluralism is welcomed, and multilingualism is respected. Linguistic needs and rights of human beings are being recognised. Scientists agree that since communication is a social activity, language planning cannot be isolated from politics, economy, and other spheres of life.

In the territories that now comprise modern Ukraine, the LP development was hindered by social and political factors. No such institution as *Accademia della Crusca* was formed until the early 20th century due to foreign rule and the low prestige of the Ukrainian language. However, some attempts to codify the then-current form of Ukrainian had occurred before, but only on an individual initiative level (see Nimchuk & Puriayeva, 2004). The first institution similar to those mentioned earlier was the Institute of Ukrainian Scientific Language, founded in 1921 within the Ukrainian Scientific Society, founded in 1907. It was reformed by the Soviet Regime in 1930 into the Potebnia Institute of Linguistics, which was under Soviet control (see more on Soviet LP in Chapter II). Since 1991, the NASU Institute of Ukrainian Language has been functioning based on the works of the Institute of Ukrainian Scientific Language and the Potebnia Institute of Linguistics (see Azhniuk, 2004). Only as late as 2019, the National Commission on State Language Standards was established (see Postanova № 911, Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, 2019).

The shift in perspective in the postmodern period of LP paved the way for the development of language management theory as a discipline within linguistics worldwide (see Neustupný & Nekvapil, 2003; Nekvapil, 2009). This theory encompasses two approaches to language management. First, *simple management* or discourse-based management happens independently of official institutions. After a speaker notices a deviation, they automatically decide whether the utterance needs corrections or not. Secondly, *organised management* (also directed) consists of language laws, reforms, choice of language in education, and meta-management of discourse. The need for LP is obvious, considering that linguistic homogeneity is hardly possible in our globalised world. LP can exist in any context where more than two languages coexist within a single political environment, and Ukraine is a glaring example of such coexistence of 2 or more languages. Primarily, we talk about Ukrainian and Russian. Although Ukrainians are the dominant ethnic group, it does not

mean Ukrainian is the L1 for all of them. Firstly, the majority are bilingual in various possible senses. Secondly, Russian has become L1 for many during the period of the Soviet Union (see Chapter II). Last but not least, the language issue has been one of the most debated since Ukraine regained its independence (see Ruda, 2012).

Focusing on languages other than Ukrainian or Russian, Ukraine has also been home to more than a dozen national minorities listed in the 2001 Census; however, there is no official list of recognised minorities (see Abramova, 2019). Furthermore, the government's attitude to these minorities and their languages has undergone changes from 1991 to 2025. These changes in attitudes were reflected in the state's LP in education as described in Chapter III. These days, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine sets the establishment of the Ukrainian language as one of the main signs of the identity of the people through the official LP as its priority (see Postanova № 1322, 2023, December 15). The functioning of the Ukrainian language has faced numerous challenges, and to understand the peculiarities of LP in modern Ukraine, it is worthwhile to take a historical perspective on the country's linguistic past, as evident in Chapters II and III.

1.1.1. Theories and Basic Concepts

Due to globalisation, migration, and government regionalisation, scientific, legal, and social interest in languages, their connections and coexistence have been growing. For instance, Norway is well-known for being one of the first countries to implement a LP after its separation from Denmark. The Parliament of Norway passed the first orthographical reform in 1862 (see Haugen, 1969).

Contemporary sociolinguistics studies language policies not only in the context of describing linguistic behaviour, but also actively employs methods aimed at studying the impact of LP on the formation of the social structure of society and the distribution of power. LP is the only institutional means for the state to regulate linguistic diversity within a single state. The study of LP in an educational context is particularly significant, as school is the primary institution of socialisation outside the family. That is why educational LP is a key means of language planning at the micro

level. The language of instruction together with the languages studied shape attitudes towards different languages in the future, influence professional prospects and the formation of students' personalities. LP can both promote positive, inclusive language attitudes and spread discriminatory narratives (see Cooper, 1989).

Research into LP in the context of higher education is becoming increasingly important due to globalisation processes around the world. LP in higher education influences the future development of science, the transfer of knowledge and the international status of a country. Firstly, LP is one of the regulatory instruments of academic mobility and internationalisation of education. This, in turn, has consequences for the economy, because the more open the higher education system is to foreign students, the more money the university can earn and reinvest in the development of science. Moreover, LP in higher education also indirectly affects the labour market. Among other individual influences, LP shapes language attitudes, which over time can gradually change public opinion and ideas (see Koroliova, 2013).

It is worth noting that only since the 1960s and 1970s has LP been considered not only as a set of legislative norms, but also as a complex social phenomenon closely related to issues of identity, power, and social mobility. For this research, the key ideas for understanding how LP functions encompass:

- (1) The concept of *reversing language shift* created by Fishman (1991).
- (2) The model of the interaction of language ideology, practice, and management developed by Spolsky (2004).
- (3) The investigation of emphasising the hidden mechanisms of LP in education as described by Shohamy (2006).
- (4) The critical approach to analysing the relationship between LP and ideology and nation-building elaborated by Ricento (2000, 2006).

These approaches form a theoretical basis that allows us to understand both official documents and informal practices of universities, and therefore, are necessary for analysing the Ukrainian educational context. Therefore, we will briefly consider their contribution to the study of language policies.

When working with post-colonial language communities, the focus on the preservation and revival of endangered languages is important. In the case of Ukraine,

the Ukrainian language did not get endangered, but the Crimean Tatar, Karait, and Krymchak languages did. However, real work with indigenous languages is possible only when a state language is not threatened. In his *Reversing Language Shift: Theoretical and Empirical Foundations of Assistance to Threatened Languages*, Fishman (1991) expresses the idea of restoring linguistic communities. He argues that “language is a resource at the level of social integration and social identification” (Fishman, 1991, p. 7). The author explains the necessity of creating an integrated programme of language support that would involve not only the formal use of the language (e.g., in governmental institutions) but also deeper sociocultural factors, such as language practice within the family and immediate social contacts, as well as language practices during cultural or religious ceremonies. In this regard, Fishman (1991) sees intergenerational transmission of a language as one of the key instruments in preserving languages. The reason for such a statement is that political boundaries do not always correspond to the boundaries of linguistic communities. Fishman claims that, as for

the institutional arenas are not good measures of RLS progress for languages in which the intergenerational transmission system is still in need of the most serious attention [=intergenerational transmission of minority (or subnational) languages].

Fishman, 1991, p. 356

In a broader context, the concept of reversing language shift has become the basis for numerous studies of LP in multilingual societies, particularly those that have experienced colonial or imperial domination. Thus, this idea was particularly relevant in Ukraine, given its status as one of the Soviet republics.

Studying Ukraine’s experience in the context of postcolonial studies has not always been straightforward. Initially, research into cultural and political processes within the humanities and social sciences contributed to the creation of a new paradigm, namely the so-called ‘post-Soviet’ studies. However, this term has been criticised because it refers to a geographical area that has more distinctive than common cultural or political features (see Bonnell & Breslauer, 1998; Spivak, 1999, 2006; Moore, 2001; Von Hagen, 2014; Holland & Derrick, 2016; Minakov, 2019; Puleri, 2021).

With the development of studies in the countries of the former Soviet Union, a certain ‘hybrid methodology’ emerged, comparing postcolonial approaches with post-Soviet ones. First, the Soviet Union was not a ‘classical’ empire and not all methods within post-colonial studies were applicable to the realities of ‘post-Soviet’ studies (see Spivak, Ram & Chernetsky, 2006). For instance, Said himself questioned the applicability of his theory to ‘post-Soviet’ realities. Secondly, many of the representatives of the so-called post-Soviet studies were scholars who had studied the Soviet Union before its collapse. Their approaches can also be questioned since their knowledge was rooted in the Russian way of representing Soviet life. But political and social changes required a reorientation of methods, categories, and research approaches that could deconstruct post-Soviet reality (Holland & Derrick, 2016; Puleri, 2021). Unfortunately, in some cases, this reorientation has not yet taken place. This is because science requires funding, and the newly emerged countries that emerged from the ruins of the Soviet Union did not have the capacity to invest in such research. Accordingly, research on Russia often predominates in so-called Eastern European Studies, Post-Soviet Studies, etc. The example of the analyses of traces of Russian influence in the world’s culture, politics and science is provided by OSINT experts from Telebachennia Toronto (2025).

Thus, research on Ukraine in a postcolonial context (see Shkandrij, 2001; Velychenko, 2002; Chernetsky, 2003; Khomyakov, 2020; Mokryk, 2025) is usually based on postcommunist studies, transitology, and comparative studies of Eastern Europe and Eurasia (see Minakov, 2019, 2021; Puleri, 2021; Mokryk, 2025; Naiem, 2025). In addition, some scholars propose to consider Ukraine’s contemporary experience within the framework of decolonial theory (see Tlostanova, 2018). Tlostanova (2018) points out that, since the Soviet Union was not a classic colonial empire, the approach to studying it is more complex and comprehensive, referring to it as ‘second-level colonialism’. However, this study does not specialise in postcolonial approach, though the data of the study can be addressed within this approach in further studies.

As we will see later, the mass-russification of Ukrainian territories has impeded the intergenerational transmission of Ukrainian, Crimean Tatar, and other minority

languages. At the same time, education, according to Fishman, plays a supporting but critical role in maintaining and revitalising languages. He emphasises that educational institutions should act not only as institutions for the transmission of knowledge, but also as spaces for the reproduction of linguistic identity and cultural values. This involves developing curricula that integrate the language of the community, training bilingual teachers, and creating conditions for a positive symbolic status of this language among young people (see Fishman, 1991, p. 410).

Spolsky (2004; 2009) proposed a three-level model in the approach to studying LP. He believes that the real study of LP is taking into account the trinity of *language ideology + language management + language practice*, because a dry description of official documents and regulations will not provide an understanding of real language practices in society. Therefore, according to his works, the analysis of formal documents aimed at regulating the use of languages can reveal language ideology. In this case, ideology refers to the values and guidelines of society regarding the status of a particular language, laid down by lawmakers (see Spolsky, 2004). In the Ukrainian context, we can say that language ideology was changing depending on the leadership of the state, which included Ukrainian territories (as better described in Chapters 2 and 3). This gives grounds to link the modern language ideology of Ukraine with the postcolonial experience and the need to establish the Ukrainian language as a symbol of statehood and national identity.

The second level, i.e. language management, covers formalised actions and institutional decisions aimed at regulating language use (see Spolsky, 2009). As for Ukraine, the implementation of the position of a language ombudsman (state level) or internal regulation reflected in the statutes, internal regulations and other regulatory documents of educational (or other) institutions can be considered examples of such management. Usually, in Ukrainian universities, such documents define the Ukrainian language as the main language of the educational process and, at the same time, open up space for the use of English and other languages in scientific and educational activities. The examples of such policies can be found in Chapter III.

According to Spolsky (2004; 2009), the third level is language practice. It is vital because it demonstrates how official regulations correspond to reality. Taking into

account the modern Ukrainian context, we can note that the coexistence of the normative dominance of the Ukrainian language and actual bilingualism (Ukrainian and Russian, sometimes Surzhyk) is characteristic. Russian and Surzhyk still often remain the languages of everyday communication (see Danylenko, 2016). English often functions as a language of academic or business prestige.

The previous scientific theories are continued by the work of Shohamy (2006), which deepens the understanding of LP in the educational environment. Her concept of hidden LP focuses on those mechanisms of language regulation that operate outside official documents and formal norms. In fact, Shohamy says that

mechanisms are overt and covert (i.e., hidden) devices used as means of affecting, creating and perpetuating language practices, hence, de facto LPs. As was noted earlier, it is via these different mechanisms that ideology is meant to affect practice. [...] through these very mechanisms that violations of democratic principles and personal rights occur. Yet, it is also through these mechanisms that practice can affect ideology and that different language policies can be resisted, as practice can also influence ideology. Unfortunately, in most situations, those in authority have better access to power and can use the mechanisms more powerfully. It is through the consequences of the different mechanisms in practices that real/de facto LP can be observed and studied. In fact, all mechanisms are forms of marketing language ideologies.

Shohamy, 2006, p. 57

This concept is perhaps best suited to the analysis of language policies in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, where the methods employed consist of indirect influence, as described in Chapter II. Such mechanisms actually regulate language prestige in multilingual societies and also create certain ways of social control. For example, deviation from normative language expectations leads to social condemnation. Special attention is dedicated to education as the sphere of realisation of the hidden LP. Curriculum and materials, tests and assessments, and the behaviour and attitudes of teachers themselves are key elements of Language Education Policy (abbreviated as LEP; see Shohamy, 2006). The impact of LEP on youth and, thus, future views of society is crucial in centralised educational systems (as in Ukraine). This statement is supported by the author:

LEP is considered a powerful tool as it can create and impose language behavior in a system which is compulsory for all children to participate in. It can further determine criteria for language correctness, oblige people to adopt certain ways of speaking and writing, create

definitions about language and especially determine the priority of certain languages in society and how these languages should be used, taught and learned.

Shohamy, 2006, p.78

The revelation of hidden intentions behind LP and other LP biases was the factor that fostered the appearance of the Critical Language Policy (abbreviated as CLP) movement (see Ricento, 2000). CLP views LP as an arena for the struggle of interests of various social groups and, to some extent, opposes the classical approaches of Fishman and Spolsky. Moreover, even the widely accepted notions of sociolinguistics are criticised by representatives of CLP as described in the following quotation:

cherished notions such as ‘native speaker’, ‘mother tongue’, and ‘linguistic competence’ were called into question, problematized (Fasold 1992), and even abandoned (see, for example, *The Native Speaker is Dead*, Paikeday 1985).

Ricento, 2000, p. 201

In fact, in modern linguistics, these notions are problematized since traditional approaches viewed them as idealised and fixed notions. Such an attitude failed to reflect the fluidity of language use, multilingual realities, and the new social dimensions of linguistic competence (i.e. knowing the languages does not mean mastering the grammar and vocabulary items but being able to use them in various social contexts). Linguistic behaviour is seen as a part of the wider social behaviour of an individual, and, thus, we can claim it is influenced by changes in the economy and politics. This approach states that any LPs are connected with issues of national identity, ideas about the boundaries between “us” and “them”, as well as with specific ideologies that prevail in society, especially in the period from the mid-1980s to the present day. Thus, language becomes more than just a means of communication; it is also a symbol of belonging, power, and social status. Ricento (2000) also briefly describes the situation, which is also relevant in the context of Ukraine:

The dominant global events during this period include massive population migrations, the re-emergence of national ethnic identities (and languages) coinciding with the breakup of the Soviet Union and the repatriation of former colonies [...], movements to forge new regional coalitions, such as the European Union, in which local and regional languages must compete with supranational languages, such as English, French, and German (in the case of Europe). Operating along with geographical and political changes are forces associated with the globalization of capitalism, such as the domination of the media by a handful of multinationals (Said 1993). Some scholars find this centralization in the control and dissemination of culture

worldwide to be a greater threat to independence than was colonialism itself [...] These developments – devolution of the Soviet Union, evolution of national (and supranational) identities in Eastern and Western Europe, penetration of Western [...] culture and technology in the developing world have had consequences for the status (and in some cases, it has been argued, the viability) of languages, large and small.

Ricento 2000, p. 203

Therefore, in the Ukrainian context, it was precisely from 1991 onwards that Ukraine experienced a ‘boom’ in the revival of the Ukrainian language and culture, attempting to formulate (primarily for itself) its national identity after decades of russification and Sovietisation. In fact, the Ukrainian language has been granted official status, and they have managed to overcome the dominance of Russian in some areas. However, since Ukraine’s integration into the EU has become its strategic goal, the question arises of the coexistence of the Ukrainian language with English, German, and French in the fields of international communication, education, and science, in parallel with the state policy of establishing the Ukrainian language. It is obvious that it is currently losing this battle. In fact, Russian has also remained a challenge for Ukrainian LP for a long time, as Russian-language products dominated the Ukrainian market until 2014.

These approaches to studying language policies are relevant to our research because (1) the Ukrainian situation combines a history of language shifts and the dominance of Russian, which makes Fishman’s concept of RLS and the intergenerational transmission gap extremely relevant; (2) Spolsky’s model allows us to trace the gap between normative documents, declared steps and their practical implementation; (3) Shohamy’s approach helps to show that LP exists not only in official statutes, but also in the everyday practices of teachers and students, who can support or undermine state language norms; (4) Ricento’s ideas allow us to interpret university LP in a broader context – as part of the process of nation building, European integration and resistance to colonial narratives.

Language planning is often used by governments as a deliberate effort to change the linguistic situation within a particular community (Holmes & Wilson, 2017, p.107). Cooper (1989, p.45) defined language planning as “deliberate efforts to influence the behaviour of others with respect to the acquisition, structure, or functional

allocations of their language codes”. This idea was supported by many of his colleagues, such as Fishman, Haugen, Kaplan and Baldauf. However, the poststructuralist and critical approaches question this idea. In fact, they agree that authorities can shape the way people speak, but cannot plan these changes completely. García (2015, p.353) highlights that scholars used to see *language planning* as a set of practices that answer the question “what could be done by the state to systematically promote linguistic change”, but now especially in sociolinguistics

the naming of the field itself has shifted to language policy, as it recognizes the multiple forces that influence behavior toward language (LP) (Ricento, 2006; Shohamy, 2006; Spolsky, 2004, 2012). Some scholars, however, have preferred to speak about language policy and planning (LPP) (Hornberger & Ricento, 1996; Hornberger, 2006) or language policy and language planning (LPLP) (Wright, 2004)”. Thus, she concludes that “depending on the ecological relationship between the social, historical, and political context and language, language policies act differently.

(García, 2015, p.359).

To sum up, when the terms “language policy” and “language planning” refer to the encouragement of certain languages to be used in specific domains, they might be used interchangeably. In terms of linguistics, LP is a contemporary branch of sociolinguistics, but, in fact, this notion is now seen as broader. It extends beyond linguistics into other disciplines as it is concerned with politics, laws, their administration, and wider linguistic behaviour. Ideally, LP is aimed at improving the *language landscape* so that it better corresponds to the needs and aims of society (see Matskevych, 2000), which makes it a socio-political notion.

1.1.2. LP in Ukraine

Therefore, after reviewing the key concepts of sociolinguistics relevant to our study, we focused on the analysis of Ukrainian scientific publications on language planning in Ukraine and examined the extent to which the proposed approaches take into account contextual and sociocultural factors.

The first term we have to pay attention to is “*рідномовні обов’язки*²/*ridnomovni oboviazky*”³. It was first mentioned in the essay “The Science of Native⁴ Language Responsibilities” by Ohiyenko (1936). It is one of the first attempts to prescribe certain language attitudes in the territories of Ukraine. The text was not a regulatory document or a law, so it was of a recommendatory nature. Taking into consideration the year of publication and the circumstances of the national liberation struggle of those times, it is no wonder that this idea had a rather nationalistic perspective. So, in this essay, Ohiyenko (1936) claims that “*без окремої мови нема самостійного народу*⁵”. Although his claim views LP from a nationalistic perspective, which was later proven to be inaccurate, it reveals that the linguistic issue was debated at the time in the Ukrainian SSR.

As mentioned earlier, LP is a tickling issue in modern Ukraine. The questions of LP grow into different spheres of internal and external politics in non-monolingual countries. For Ukraine, it has become one of the most important issues as reflected in the Danylevska’s approach (2009, p.33):

у дво- або багатомовному соціумі мовна політика – це передусім частина міжнаціональних відносин, відтак вона є найважливішим напрямом внутрішньої політики держави⁶

Danylevska, 2009, p.33

Thus, state authorities, government institutions, associations, non-state, public and scientific organisations that implement LP and have an influence on its nature are all considered elements of the LP structure (see Danylevska, 2009).

Kulyk (2021) draws the line between LP and language planning similarly to García (2015). He states that a person’s language behaviour might not correspond to their ideas about the role and prestige of the languages. Instead, such a behaviour

² Native* language responsibilities

³ In this study, the translations of the quotes are done by Khrystyna Yordan unless it is stated differently.

⁴ I use the word “native” here since it is one of the most used collocations in English when talking about such a phenomenon. However, I think the meaning of the adjective *рідна* (*ridna*) here conveys a broader meaning, and thus requires further explanation. So, the collocation ‘*рідна мова*’ (*ridna mova*) is emotionally and culturally charged; it is used to refer to the language of ancestors in the wider meaning, e.g. one’s family could be of Ukrainian origin, but the mother was russified and the child was using Ukrainian only with grandparents. In this case, ‘*рідна мова*’ might be neither mother tongue nor L1, but still the speaker perceives it as native. Kulyk (2011, p.635) explains it in a similar way “their understanding of it [=native language, *рідна мова*] as the language of one’s ‘kin’ [*rodu*], country or even state”.

⁵ Without a separate language, there is no independent people/nation.

⁶ In a bilingual or multilingual society, language policy is primarily a part of interethnic relations, therefore it is the most important direction of the state's internal policy.

reflects the dominant narrative of the society. This way, it still influences the language attitudes and behaviour of those observing. Thus, LP is a wider notion than language planning or language management (see Kulyk, 2021, pp.7-9). Kulyk (2021, p. 10) defines LP as *“сукупність рішень щодо функцій і форм уживаних у суспільстві мовних різновидів та уявлень, на які ці рішення спираються”⁷*.

LP, as a system of measures aimed at solving the problem of language development in society, has been functioning from somewhat different perspectives in the territories of modern Ukraine compared to those of the EU. Firstly, because Ukraine has had less time for its nation-building than the majority of European countries historically (in general, but also specifically in the sense of establishing the state institutions that would work on language standardisation, etc). Secondly, due to the different roles in the colonial period of Ukraine and the major EU states.

Another important difference in the perception of language policies in Ukraine is that, historically, the state LP in Ukraine has not promoted the development of the Ukrainian language. At the same time, religious, cultural, and educational organisations, as well as international institutions, have often acted as influential actors in shaping LP through a network of relationships and connections. Such policies could protect national values at the domestic and international levels or, in some cases, defend the interests of foreign states. This historical context demonstrates that language policy in Ukraine has always been multi-level and included the influence of various social and cultural actors (see Abramova, 2019; Azhniuk, 2019)

These days, as Ukraine moves toward joining the EU, LP remains the area requiring reforms (especially in the field of managing national minority languages). However, the modern context (in particular, the Russian aggression against Ukraine) reshapes the perception of LP from both the simple and organised language management perspectives. Hence, LP in Europe is viewed as a set of state measures that ensure the language and communication rights of all citizens of the state, including national minorities that differ from the indigenous population in terms of language, culture, and other characteristics. In Ukraine, however, LP still acts as an identity-

⁷ a set of decisions regarding the functions and forms of linguistic varieties used in society and the ideas on which these decisions are based

building and security-providing element. It is a component of a national policy that has the ability to consolidate not only the privileges of the dominant language but also to contribute to the regulation of national conflicts by supporting national minorities (see Plotnytska, 2007).

However, in parallel with the fact that such additional functions of LP are recognised by statesmen, there might be a lack of the provisions that would provide punishment of political subjects for failure to comply with the law of communication in the state language on the territory of the state (this is often true for regions with the high degree of multilingualism), ignoring the state language during the exercise of official powers, in record keeping, etc. What is more, special attention should be paid to political actors during the elections. After all, according to Marakhovska (2012), the characteristic features of politicians are bureaucracy, maximum impersonality, and ambiguity, which are manifested in a particular intonation, behaviour and other methods of influencing the consciousness of the electorate and opponents, and, thus, it is often easy to use the LP issue to manipulate the electorate (see Ruda, 2012).

1.1.3. LP Approaches Realisation: The Cases of Canada and Latvia

Having presented scientific theories and approaches used in the study of language policies, we will consider examples of their implementation in various socio-political contexts. The choice of Canada is motivated by its reputation for being a bilingual nation and its being one of the first examples that Ukrainians used to mention in discussions over bilingualism, together with Switzerland (see Kulyk, 2021). The choice of Latvia, instead, is explained by the similarities of historic processes on its lands. Such a brief comparison will allow us to track how status planning, corpus planning, and acquisition planning (Cooper, 1989; Spolsky, 2004, 2009) are implemented in multilingual societies.

We are limiting our examples just to these two cases as such comparisons exist in the literature (see Landau & Kellner-Heinkele, 2001; Grin, 2003; Kymlicka & Patten, 2023;). The fullest example of such analysis, with a focus on the Ukrainian context, is Kulyk's (2021) book "Language policy in multilingual countries:

international experience and its suitability for Ukraine”, The author analyses the LP trajectories in 17 multilingual countries. What is more, he systematically assesses their applicability in the Ukrainian context. His previous research, together with this book, shows that Ukraine’s sociolinguistic configuration, marked by the long-term asymmetry between Ukrainian and Russian, renders such a comparison highly problematic. In this respect, Ukraine is seen as a post-imperial space where LP is tightly connected to the issues of statehood (just as it is stated in the 2019 Language Law) and identity consolidation. Thus, ‘borrowing’ policy models that proved effective in countries such as Sweden, India, or Italy is unlikely to yield the same outcomes as in the source countries.

In his speech at the meeting of the Shevchenko Scientific Society in the U.S. (Shevchenko Scientific Society in the U.S., 2021), he notes that policy transfer typically presupposes structural similarity, i.e. a country seeks similar results by implementing similar policies. In the case of Ukraine, the goals so far include symbolic decolonisation, the reversal of historical russification, and the strengthening of the state language. This means that relevant parallels can be found among states that became independent after the Soviet Union collapsed, such as Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia.

Canada is one of the most frequently cited examples of a multilingual society by Ukrainians, although, in our opinion, its status as a “classic” example is debatable. The Official Languages Act (OLA) of 1969 (revised in 1988, 2005, and overhauled in 2023) proclaims both English and French as the official languages, ensuring equality in status and rights (see Legislative Services Branch, 1985). Cartwright and Williams (1982) highlight that the original text of the Act did not protect the French communities outside specific designated bilingual areas. What is more, according to McIvor and Ball (2019), indigenous languages have been marginalised for centuries. Subsequent amendments to the Act improved the situation, providing more rights to francophone communities of Quebec, Ontario, etc. Canada is also working on its corpus planning as both English and French have undergone the processes of standardisation and modernisation (hence, we know these language varieties as Canadian English and Canadian French, see Darnell, 1983). The policy of language acquisition is embodied through (1) French immersion programmes across Anglophone provinces (see

Statistics Canada, 2024); (2) language-minority (intending English in Francophone provinces or vice versa) schools (see section 23 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 1982). The points of Canadian policy that it is often criticised for are the neglect of indigenous languages and the languages of migrant communities. In fact, even though the 2021 Canadian Census confirms the use of more than 70 Indigenous languages, most of them have the status of endangered. What is more, it was only in 2019 that the Indigenous Languages Act was adopted. And yet it is rather symbolic than practical (see De Costa, 2021), which proves the dominance of French and English. Immigrant and heritage languages are also out of the scope of the official LP. Heritage language education is often relegated to community-based weekend schools (e.g. Ukrainian weekend schools), with limited integration into mainstream curricula. To sum up, the Canadian system has developed a rather effective environment for the coexistence of English and French (even though in many cases the speakers are unilingual, see Spolsky, 2012, p.196). Simultaneously, other languages, though being strongly present in the linguistic landscape, are often framed as supplementary, symbolic, or private and rarely enter the official educational LP.

While Canada aims at establishing bilingualism, Latvia is an example of restorative LP. The main idea of such a policy is to revitalise the status of the Latvian language after decades of russification. Pavlenko (2008) and Spolsky (2012) highlight that this idea is deeply intertwined with the question of sovereignty. Latvian is the state language of Latvia since 1988 (the law of the Latvian SSR). In 1992, amendments to the 1988 law strengthened the position of the Latvian language (see Constitutional Assembly of Latvia, 1992). The 1999 Language Law, in Article 4 lists Livonian/Liv as an indigenous language, while Article 5 defines all other languages as recognised as foreign, including Russian. Minority languages are not mentioned at all (see The Official Language Law, The Parliament of the Republic of Latvia, 1999). What is more, Latvia is one of the countries that includes language command as one of the key conditions to obtain citizenship (see Arshynnikova & Dotsenko, 2023, p.131). The Constitution of Latvia (1992) mentions that “114. Persons belonging to ethnic minorities have the right to preserve and develop their language and their ethnic and cultural identity”, but it does not provide any official tools or state support to ethnic

minorities. Thus, the dominance of Latvian is clear. In Latvia, acquisition planning has evolved over the years, with the dominance of the Latvian language as the language of instruction intensifying and the role of Russian weakening. As for corpus planning, the Latvian language had to go through modernisation and standardisation since during Soviet times, terminology, especially in science, technology, and public administration, was developed to ‘fit the needs of intercomprehension’ between Soviet republics. After regaining its independence, the country chose the model of

етнонаціонального самозахисту, суть якої полягає у забезпеченні привілейованого становища титульного етносу через вибіркові умови набуття громадянства, мовну політику [5=Van Parijs, 2008], зорієнтовану на посилення обмежень на використання інших мов та вимоги щодо обов'язкового знання державної мови⁸.

Arshynnikova & Dotsenko, 2023; p.132

These steps are usually referred to as linguistic decolonisation. Critics of this approach, e.g. Agarin (2010), argue that it creates privileges for an ethnolinguistically homogeneous population and limits the development of linguistic pluralism, thereby resulting in social divisions. Such a policy has also faced criticism from the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities. Kulyk (2021) highlights that such an approach deepens linguistic and ethnic fragmentation of the population, thereby reinforcing estrangement between ethnic groups. However, sociolinguists (Pavlenko, 2008, 2011a; Spolsky, 2009, 2012) generally agree that in the Latvian context, the protection of the Latvian language is deeply intertwined with state-building, national security and sovereignty.

To sum up, the global practice contains more examples of LP implementation. Even though Canada is perceived as a classical example of dealing with bilingualism, the reality is that many problematic issues still remain unsolved. The Latvian case, on the other hand, shows the connection of LP with the issues of integration, minority rights, and geopolitical pressure. The Latvian experience is far more relevant to the situation in Ukraine than the Canadian one for its post-colonial character with aspiration to state-building and self-identification (especially if we compare the

⁸ethno-national self-defence, the essence of which is to ensure the privileged position of the titular ethnic group through selective conditions for acquiring citizenship, a language policy [5] aimed at strengthening restrictions on the use of other languages, and requirements for mandatory knowledge of the state language

Latvian Language Law (1999) and the Law of Ukraine (2019) On Ensuring the Functioning of Ukrainian as the State Language). Even so, the history of LP in Ukraine differs from both, as explained better in Chapter II.

1.2. Educational Language Policy within Sociolinguistics Framework

Educational language policy (ELP) is one of the domains of LP. Its significance is explained by its influence on language transmission, the creation of linguistic hierarchies, and enabling members of society to communicate with each other. Education is the field in which LP is usually formulated and implemented in the most systematic way. The research of Fishman (1965), Tollefson (2002), Tollefson and Tsui (2004), Shohamy, 2006; Bilaniuk and Melnyk (2008), Krumm (2013), Lanvers and Lunyova (2023) confirms that language of instruction, curriculum design, and teachers' language choice help shape linguistic practices in society, distribute social ideas and determine (linguistic) values of the society. ELP promote the use of a particular language, legitimises its standard variant as the official register, and, simultaneously, marginalises other language variants or languages (see Shohamy, 2006). Thus, the formative nature of education makes ELP (even when intended as a neutral administrative choice) one of the key instruments of identity- and state-building in post-colonial countries like Ukraine.

Spolsky (2004, 2009) highlights the active and unstable relationship between the official policy of a state, the practices cherished by institutions, and the factor of individual choices. In essence, what people actually do locally can contradict what institutional regulations imply. What is more, their perceptions, beliefs, or expectations might contradict their acts. The educational field exemplifies this idea best since the state might define language A as the language of instruction, but then the idea of the institution might differ, and they might suggest the equal use of language A and language B, while the teachers' and/or students' command of these languages might make them use language C as the working language. The studies by Bilaniuk and Melnyk (2008), and Pavlenko (2008) show that even though Ukrainian has become an

official language of instruction, Russian has dominated in many educational institutions in the east of Ukraine, and Hungarian has remained the working language in many schools in the Transcarpathian region. To sum up, institutional intentions might clash with local context or resource availability, which might threaten the implementation of ELP.

Apart from the possible inconsistency of macro-, meso-, and micro-levels of ELP implementation, the globalisation of (higher) education reshapes the traditional ELP in many countries. The need to have a satisfactory command of English as an academic lingua franca changes the way ELPs are being designed, which might lead to tensions between academia and national language promoters. Joining the Bologna Declaration (1999) sped up this process for Ukraine. However, English is valued and takes a special place in Ukrainian law (see *Pro zastosuvannya anhliiskoyi movy v Ukrayini*, Verkhovna Rada Ukrainy, 2023).

Therefore, studying educational LP is complicated by the fact that this area of language policy exists at the intersection of politics, institutional policies, and the personal preferences of individuals. Moreover, education often becomes a tool for introducing or discussing certain ideas, ideologies, and principles not only regarding language, but also regarding identity, politics, or historical vision on an extraordinary scale. The study of ELP itself requires in-depth knowledge of contexts and history, as well as attentiveness in identifying preconceived ideologies, since it is often education that shapes the future of language practice in society.

1.3. Methods of Researching Language Policies in HEI

In Ukraine, the language issue is highly politicised, and LP has become one of the core issues of state-building, which is reflected in Article 1 of the Law of Ukraine On ensuring the functioning of the Ukrainian language as the state language (2019) “статус української мови як єдиної державної мови зумовлений державотворчим самовизначенням української нації⁹” (see *Pro zabezpechennia funktsionuvannia*

⁹ The status of the Ukrainian language as the sole state language is determined by the state-forming self-determination of the Ukrainian nation.

ukrayinskoyi movy yak derzhavnoyi, Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, 2019). Numerous academic studies and publications have been devoted to this issue in Ukraine. Especially since the spring of 2014, when Russia occupied Crimea and launched a military invasion of mainland Ukraine under the stated pretext of protecting Russian-speaking populations, research on Ukrainian LP has intensified. However, there is no sufficient work that contains a comprehensive analysis of modern scientific methods of LP research.

The official LPs in the university environment cover a wide range of aspects, including the linguistic landscape, the use of language in the curriculum, provisions for language equality, and support for language culture and multilingualism. Both internal and external factors, such as the language needs of students, staff and international relations should be taken into account (see Shohamy, 2006; Mykhalchuk, 2018).

One of the key aspects of LP is to provide incentives for language learning and use. This may include language training programmes, support for language clubs and cultural exchange initiatives. Language policies also define standards of language competence for students and teachers, and how they are assessed and supported.

The impact of language policies on access to education for different language groups should also be considered. This means providing opportunities for learning and research in different languages and supporting linguistic equality and inclusion.

The LP of higher education institutions can be implemented in different ways, taking into account the needs and characteristics of a particular institution. A *monolingual* policy, in which only one language is used for teaching and communication, may be selected for the purpose of ensuring a unified learning environment and simplifying administrative procedures. A *bilingual* policy, in which two languages are used, can prove an effective solution for educational institutions with multilingual populations or international connections.

A *multilingual* policy, which encourages the use of multiple languages for learning and communication, may be selected to advance multilingualism and cultural diversity within the university setting. The determination of an optimal LP is contingent upon a multitude of factors, including the linguistic and cultural diversity

of students and personnel, the objectives of the educational programme, and the resources allocated for language learning and assistance.

The implementation of LP in higher education institutions may necessitate the implementation of a variety of measures, including the adoption of pertinent legislation, the development of administrative regulations and the implementation of specialised educational programmes and projects. Such an all-encompassing approach will guarantee the efficacy and flexibility of the LP, taking into account the specific needs and characteristics of each HEI. The implementation of LP mechanisms is of paramount importance in ensuring the effective utilisation of language resources and the identification of shared strategies for the advancement of language proficiency. The range of such mechanisms is considerable and diverse, encompassing a variety of tools and approaches designed to ensure the implementation of language strategies and the goals of HEIs.

Following the analysis of the literature by Mykhalchuk (2018) and Beregszászi, Gazdag, Csernicskó (2020), we can delineate the following mechanisms that form the language policy of the university:

1. In terms of legislative measures,
 - This encompasses the enactment of legislation or the formulation of regulatory frameworks that codify the legal status of language in the educational process, e.g. Verkhovna Rada Ukrainy. (2017). Zakon Ukrainy “Pro osvitu”; Verkhovna Rada Ukrainy. (2014). Zakon Ukrainy “Pro vyshchu osvitu”; Law of the Ukrainian State. (1918). On compulsory teaching of the Ukrainian language and literature, as well as the history and geography of Ukraine in secondary schools.
 - Such measures may define the language rights and obligations of students and teachers in higher education, for example, defining the obligatory language(s) of instruction.
2. In terms of administrative regulations,
 - These are the organisational steps that are taken within the institution with the objective of ensuring the implementation of the LP.

- Such measures may entail the constitution of dedicated committees or departments with a mandate to oversee the implementation of LP and to ensure its compliance.
3. In terms of educational programmes and projects:
 - These comprise the development and implementation of specialised educational programmes that support the chosen LP.
 - As for the projects, they may be designed to enhance the language proficiency of students and educators through a range of training, seminars and course activities.
 4. In terms of monitoring and evaluation:
 - This is the process of systematically observing the implementation of LP and its impact on the learning process.
 - This includes assessing the effectiveness of LP implementation mechanisms and possible adjustments to strategies based on the results.

In the process of studying language policy, scholars use methods from various scientific fields, such as sociolinguistics, history, jurisprudence, political science and discourse analysis. Such an interdisciplinary approach is important because it allows researchers to conduct a more complete and objective analysis of LP, taking into account its various aspects and impact on society (see Beregszászi, Gazdag, Csernicskó, 2020). A multidisciplinary approach to LP research helps to enrich the understanding of its nature and impact on the language situation in a country or region.

When conducting research on language policy, it is important to use a variety of information sources, such as census data, education statistics, archival materials, press publications, and others. These sources provide a broad overview of the language situation and the dynamics of changes in language policy.

However, it is important to note that the choice of a particular research method always depends on the researcher: there is no one ideal and universal method, and each researcher should choose the path that best suits his or her specific topic and research goal. The variety of methodologies allows for a comprehensive analysis and objective results, which help to better understand the essence of LP and its impact on society.

The implementation of LP in HEIs can be studied using different research methods. One of these methods is *quantitative* research, which involves the collection and analysis of numerical data related to the implementation of language policies, such as the number of students enrolled in language courses, the number of students with high levels of language proficiency and other statistical data. Another method is *qualitative* research, which involves collecting and analysing non-numerical data, such as interviews and observations, to understand the context and dynamics of LP implementation and a *mixed* method of research that combines the two. In fact, the current research consists of two parts, one of which combines quantitative and qualitative approaches, and the other is qualitative. Thus, we can claim that the mixed method of research is used.

In addition, the use of philosophical research methods, which include an analysis of the values and principles underlying language policies, such as social justice and equality, allows us to find out how these policies correspond to the overall goals of the educational system (see Beregszászi, Gazdag, Csernicskó, 2020).

1. *Quantitative* research methods such as surveys and statistical analysis can provide a more objective and generalised understanding of LP implementation, allowing data to be collected from a large sample size. With the help of quantitative research methods, scientists can identify patterns and trends in the implementation of LP in various educational institutions and regions, which will help in formulating effective strategies for the management of the language sphere in higher education.
2. *Qualitative* research has the potential to provide a deeper understanding of the experiences and perspectives of various participants involved in the research of LP implementation in HEIs. These might include students, teachers, and administrators. Examining the attitudes, beliefs, and behaviours of these individuals can help scholars understand how effectively language policies are functioning and what aspects need improvement. Taking into account the opinions and impressions of various participants in the educational process, researchers can determine strategies

to optimise LP and create a more favourable language environment for all participants.

3. *Mixed* methods research, combining both qualitative and quantitative approaches, has become increasingly popular in the study of LP in universities. This strategy allows scholars to gain a comprehensive understanding of LP implementation, as they can analyse both the subjective experience of process participants and objective data on policy outcomes. Such an approach allows researchers to find out both the strengths and weaknesses of the current policy and direct efforts to the development of more effective LP implementation strategies that will contribute to the improvement of the language situation in HEIs.

Using these research methods, scientists can gain a better understanding of the effectiveness of LP implementation in higher education institutions, as well as identify directions for improvement and further research.

In Ukraine, LP is usually considered a sensitive and politicised topic, which makes it difficult to obtain complete and reliable information. This can make it difficult to conduct in-depth analysis and draw important conclusions about its effectiveness. An additional problem is the variability of language policies in different universities, which makes it difficult to generalise the results. Thus, Beregszászi, Gazdag, Csernicskó (2020) highlight the importance of a careful check of the availability and reliability of data for researchers in order to ensure the adequacy of their conclusions and recommendations.

The study of LP in higher education institutions faces another challenge. Namely, the complexity of research of the declared LP versus its implementation. Given that LP can involve many stakeholders, such as teachers, administrators, students, and government officials, each has their own perspectives and interests. This can make policy implementation difficult, especially in the context of the need to coordinate resources and efforts between different stakeholders. Undoubtedly, difficulties and resistance may arise on the way to implementing LP, especially from certain groups, which can complicate the implementation process (see Beregszászi, Gazdag, Csernicskó, 2020). In this regard, researchers must carefully consider these

complex social and political dynamics when they are engaged in the study of LP implementation in order to understand and appreciate all aspects of this process.

Last but not least are the ethical aspects. They are important to consider in the study of LP in HEIs. Language policy can have a significant impact on the social and political landscape, especially where language is linked to identity and power. Investigating LP and its implementation as well as presenting the results of the study must take into account the possible ‘side effects’. Beregszászi, Gazdag, Csernicskó (2020) state that researchers must be alert to potential ethical issues and ensure that their research does not contribute to the perpetuation of harmful stereotypes or the maintenance of existing power imbalances. In addition, it is important to obtain informed consent from research participants and adhere to ethical standards and guidelines. By listening to these ethical considerations, researchers can carry out their work in the study of LP in higher education with a high degree of responsibility and rigour.

Since a *mixed* methodological approach envisages the use of both quantitative and qualitative methods, it is useful to consider a number of examples of its application. This, in turn, will allow us to determine the methodology that will best meet the objectives and needs of our study. The quantitative methods of research include:

1. Surveys and Questionnaires

These research methods are used to collect data that can be later processed by statistical tools. They typically include closed-ended questions, such as multiple-choice or Likert-scale items, which allow for statistical analysis. The use of these methods is widespread in the research focused on multilingualism, language prestige, language variations, dialects, etc. Data from surveys are often analysed using statistical software, like SPSS or R, to find correlations and frequencies across social variables. However, open-ended questions can also constitute a part of the survey or questionnaire and be processed later in terms of qualitative analysis (see Mallinson, Childs & Van Herk, 2013).

2. Sociolinguistic Interviews and Quantitative Coding

The data can be quantitatively analysed by coding specific linguistic features. For example, the use of intrusive ‘r’ in British English can be numerically coded and then analysed for its frequency among different social groups. This type of research exemplifies the possible combination of qualitative and quantitative methods. The most famous example of research using this method was conducted by William Labov. He interviewed the New Yorkers and elicited their pronunciation of the post-vocalic ‘r’, so later he could analyse its use across socioeconomic classes (see Labov, 1964). However, there also exists another type of interview, called “expert interviews” (see more in Von Soest, 2023), that aims at collecting expertise from people working on a certain issue rather than eliciting a target structure, as in the case of Labov.

3. Corpus Linguistics

This method is used to track the frequency or distribution of linguistic features in massive datasets. Usually, the researchers can use existing datasets such as COCA (Corpus of Contemporary American English) and BNC (British National Corpus) or create their own ones that would serve the needs of their research (for instance, the corpus of publicist texts focused on the topic of climate change for the word frequency or syntactic structure analysis). The use of corpora is widely spread among linguistic research, and the tools used within this method are actively developing (see Gries, 2014). As for the LP research, corpus studies might be useful for tracing ideologies in policy texts or conducting historical and diachronic research of shifts in policies over time.

4. Controlled Experiments

Since experimental data are often numeric, this method fits well into the framework of quantitative methods. The use of these methods in sociolinguistics might envisage the investigation of the impact of accents on listeners’ perception or attitude towards code-switching, etc. The design might include the participants listening to recordings or talking to another person who will stick to a pre-determined scenario of

linguistic behaviour. After that the participants are asked to rate speakers on perceived attitudes, e.g. intelligence, hostility, etc. (see Gries, 2017).

5. Variationist Analysis

This method was also pioneered by Labov. The analysis examines how language variation correlates with social variables and uses statistical models to determine which factors are most influential (see Labov, 2008). An example of such a study might be the investigation of non-standard verb forms across social classes to determine if the feature is associated with a particular socioeconomic group.

6. Social Network Analysis

This method is used in order to determine the influence of social connection on linguistic behaviour. The study by Hammer (2017) on the use of L2 during informal conversations with other L1 speakers at work is a good illustration of the application of social network analysis in linguistics. More examples of the application of the SNA method can be found in the review by Li, Li, and Gao (2024).

Generally, the use of quantitative methods in sociolinguistics facilitates getting robust data on language, its variation, or peculiarities across various social dimensions. In order to define the appropriate methods for this research, we will look through the most common methods used in sociolinguistics.

The use of *qualitative* case studies is a well-established approach in linguistics as well. Especially when it comes to sociolinguistics, since these methods help explore contextual and cultural dimensions of language use. Qualitative methods facilitate the exploration of language attitudes, social meanings, and language variation. This encompasses methods such as:

1. Linguistic Ethnography

Linguistic Ethnography is a theoretical and analytical framework that adopts an epistemological stance generally aligned with social constructivist and post-

structuralist perspectives, challenging essentialist views of social life (Creese, Bhatt, Bhojani & Martin 2008; Rampton, 2007). Linguistic Ethnography is an immersive approach that includes long-term observation of the language use in a social context and its further interpretations. The scientist themselves makes field notes, conducts informal conversations with the community members, or even lives within the community for a certain period of time. The value of this method lies in the possibility of studying language practices, norms, and ideologies within cultural and social frameworks. The glaring examples of the application of this method are the studies of bi-/multilingual communities, dialect preservation, or code-switching.

2. Discourse Analysis

Discourse analysis is applied in order to define the way in which language use shapes meaning, relationships, social identities, or ideologies. Baxter (2010) outlines four main approaches within this methodology. They are Conversation Analysis, Discourse Analysis, Critical Discourse Analysis, and Feminist Post-structuralist Discourse Analysis. She further argues that a crucial aspect of this methodology is the careful balancing of micro- and macro-analytical approaches. This micro-macro dichotomy is instrumental in generating nuanced insights within linguistic research (Heller, 2014). The primary focus of these methods is on examining the structures and patterns of language within interactions, with particular attention to how these elements convey social power, ideologies, and group identity. The most common fields of this method's application are the studies of language and power, media discourse, language ideologies, and identity.

3. Narrative Analysis

This approach sets its focus on the narrative as an array of social processes in its own context of production and context of consumption rather than exclusively as a text (Gimenez, 2010). Narrative analysis examines how individuals share stories about their lives, experiences, and identities. Within sociolinguistics, this approach investigates how people construct and express social identities through personal narratives, highlighting the ways they make sense of their social worlds. By focusing

on storytelling, narrative analysis provides insights into the linguistic strategies people use to communicate who they are and how they relate to others, revealing the role of language in identity formation and social interaction. Narrative analysis is frequently applied in research with immigrant and minority communities to investigate topics related to linguistic heritage, migration, and adaptation. One of the methods within this approach is the method of linguistic biography. Krumm (2013) claims that this method “is necessary to find out how languages do support or endanger the development of self-concepts” (p.165).

4. Individual Interviews

The use of the interview method in terms of sociolinguistic research might perform various functions and is gaining wider application. Edley and Litosseliti (2010) claim that “over the course of the last few decades, their [interviews] employment ... has increased significantly, partly as a consequence of a more general shift from quantitative towards qualitative methods”. The capacity to communicate with a person and offer insight into their thoughts is the main factor contributing to the rising popularity of this method. However, there are also some concerns about the use of this method. The major ones are the neutrality of the moderator, the ambiguity of question formulation, and the mode of its delivery. As the interview becomes less structured, the risks of distorted results grow, but also the “window” to the interviewee’s mind widens. The studies of language choice, variation, or change, multilingualism, or investigating language use in social contexts are typical examples of the employment of this method.

5. Focus Groups

Focus Group is a method related to the method of interviewing, with the only difference that lies in the number of participants. The interview method involves the conversation between a moderator and a single interviewee, while the focus group method typically involves a moderator and a small group of participants. This approach enables researchers to explore attitudes, perceptions, and experiences in depth, fostering rich, interactive discussions that can reveal nuanced insights within the

interaction between the participants. A key advantage of focus groups is their ability to uncover collective views and the dynamics of group interactions. As a result, a researcher can probe beyond individual responses, identifying trends and shared opinions. The limitations of this method include groupthink or dominant voices' bias. What is more, focus group research faces more logistical challenges, such as recruitment and scheduling. In sociolinguistics, focus groups usually become a platform for sharing and discussing participants' personal linguistic practices, language attitudes, perceptions of dialects.

6. Linguistic Landscape Analysis

Linguistic Landscape Analysis examines the visibility and presence of written language in public spaces, such as signs, advertisements, and graffiti. The method unites the geographical, social, and cultural contexts in order to get insights about LP, identity, and social dynamics within a community located in a specific geographical area. The key advantage of the method is the use of empirical evidence, which makes it a real-world study. What is more, it captures the whole spectrum of influences of language choice, starting from language policies to bottom-up individual practices within a community. Simultaneously, being based on written texts, this method lacks the vivacity of everyday conversations in the chosen community. It can distort the impression, especially if the state control of the linguistic landscape prevails and is different from people's choices. The method is usually applied in urban and/or tourist areas to explore the public reflection of certain linguistic policies.

After analysing the existing research methods, we decided to focus on questionnaires and interviews. The details of these methods and their relevance to this research are presented in Chapter IV.

1.4. Terminology

To ensure clarity and consistency of the presentation, we consider it necessary to define the content of the key concepts used in this study. This subsection presents our interpretations of the basic concepts, taking into account the research tradition in the field. In cases where there are several options for definitions in the literature, we indicate which one was chosen and why, or offer our own working definition.

Therefore, as mentioned earlier, within the framework of LP research, several concepts have definitions that are often still debated. Language policy often determines the *official language* of a country. The official language is the one used in the country's administration and has a specific legal status. Typically, it aligns with the state language, which is the official language of the state administration. However, the reality is often different from what is stated in laws. Since its formation in 1776 till 2025, in the United States, for example, there was no state language, though the *de facto* official language was English, and the states had the right to determine regional official languages. In the Republic of Ireland, Irish is the state language and first official language, and English is the second official language (see Constitution of Ireland, 1937), whereas according to the Central Statistics Office (2023, December 19), only about 40% of the population has sufficient linguistic competence in Irish. It often happened that the state languages of colonies were English, French, Spanish, or Portuguese, even if the wider population did not have a command of the standard variation of those languages. On the other hand, now the state language of ex-colonies could be different from the coloniser's language, even though the majority of the population does speak it. This is also the case of the Russian language in Ukraine if we look at it from the perspective of colonial legacy.

According to Pavlenko (2008), in the context of former Soviet republics, the notion of *titular language* is used when referring to the ethnic group after which a former Soviet republic or administrative unit is named. The notion of *lingua franca* is used to describe the language that people who do not share a common language use in order to understand each other. The differences between these terms might be shown in the following examples. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, in countries such as Latvia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan, the titular languages were Latvian, Ukrainian, and

Kazakh, respectively. However, Russian remained *lingua franca*. Pavlenko highlights this problem, saying that

by 1989 more than 73 million Soviet citizens lived outside of ‘their own’ national territory (Brubaker 1996). The greatest problem involved 36.5 million of L1 Russian speakers residing in titular republics. This population did not fit the traditional understanding of linguistic minority.

Pavlenko, 2011a, p.42

LP often deals with such a category of language as *prestige*. The prestige or social status of a given language, or its variety, is dynamic over time. This can be illustrated briefly by the status of the standard German pronunciation. At the end of the 18th century, Saxon variation was considered the most prestigious, which is explained by the strong influence of Saxon artists and scientists on German culture. Later, the pronunciation characteristics of northern Germany became prevailing (see Schmidt, Berner, Wolf & Langner, 1970). Returning to the examples of the post-Soviet era, the situation in Ukraine warrants mention. When Ukraine was part of the Soviet Union, all other languages used to have lower prestige than Russian in the Ukrainian SSR. In fact, any person speaking their own language except for Russian was considered a country bumpkin. Teachers of Russian received a higher payment than their colleagues teaching other languages. However, after Ukraine gained its independence, the situation started to change. In the first years of independence, bilingual accommodation was the model used in both public and private domains. *Bilingual accommodation* is a language use model that presumes the response of an interactant in a language different from the language used by the initiator of a speech act (see Sachdev, Giles & Pauwels, 2012, p.392). After the Russian full-scale invasion, the Ukrainian language prevails in public domains, while bilingual accommodation remains the approach people use in private communication.

The concepts of *native language* and *native speaker* are other problematic issues in this context. Firstly, as the number of multilingual environments is growing in the world, defining a single, clear-cut linguistic identity can be problematic (see Davies, 2003). Ukraine is a glaring example of it: since the majority of the population is bilingual, it might be difficult for a person to decide what their native language is. Many Ukrainians participating in the 2001 Census hesitated over which language to

indicate as ‘native language’, especially since it did not always coincide with their ethnical background (prof. J. Dickinson, personal communication, July 2023¹⁰). Secondly, a native speaker is often perceived as a person with full linguistic competence, which, in reality, is not static in terms of a single individual, but also in terms of linguistic communities. Ukraine, again, is a case in point. Thirdly, the concepts of *native language* and *native speaker* are often used manipulatively in order to create hierarchies. Rampton (1990, p.97) gives the example of “the English of the ethnic Anglos” in contrast to world Englishes. Modern scholars (Davies, 2003; Phillipson, 1992, 2018; Pavlenko, 2008, 2011a, 2023) distinguish a number of other terms to refer to the language used by a person instead of the concept of native language. They are first language (L1), heritage language (see Cummins & Danesi, 1990), dominant language (see Phillipson, 1992), etc. The concept of native speaker is usually substituted by proficient speaker, heritage speaker, competent user, or multicompetent language user. However, the concepts of *native language* and *native speaker* are important in our study for the Ukrainian context. Russia actually uses the manipulation of the language issue to achieve political and military goals. In this discourse, they define free Russian-speaking (i.e. Russian as a mother tongue / native language) as automatically belonging to the Russian people.

This brings us to one problematic, but interesting concept – *language ownership*. This concept reflects a socially conditioned notion, a vision of the use of a certain language (see Mustajoki, Protassova, & Yelenevskaya, 2020). Wee (2002, p.283) claims that language ownership is a “specific relationship between the speakers of a language and that language itself”. The notion was created in the context of debates around English ownership stemming from British colonialism. Thus, the concept of language ownership reflects the right not only to use the language, but also to define what is correct within its framework and what relationship speakers have to the language in social, political and personal dimensions. Language ownership is not limited to legal or political definition; it also includes social and cultural aspects. As Speas (2013) points out, a language is “owned” not so much formally as through

¹⁰ Prof. Jennifer Dickinson explained this point in a private conversation following her presentation at the 18th International Pragmatics Conference, Brussels (personal communication, July 2023).

respect and relationships in a community, especially in cases of language revival or the protection of minority languages. In this context, claims to exclusive ownership of a language can lead to conflicts and disputes over who has the right to use, broadcast and standardise it. The issue of language ownership arises in certain social contexts, most often in multilingual and/or post-colonial communities. Pavlenko (2008) shows that, since Russian has always functioned as a *lingua franca*, the issue of its ownership remains problematic after the collapse of the USSR. Moreover, the very fact that the Russian Federation does not recognise the diversity of ‘*world Russians*’ but claims the status of the only correct user of this language further complicates the situation. Additionally, the Russian Federation often claims cultural and political legitimacy over the entire Russian-speaking space. In this context, legitimacy refers to the perceived right to represent and define the identity and interests of Russian-speaking communities beyond the actual borders of the Russian Federation. For Ukraine, this situation creates a multi-level conflict in the field of language (see Pavlenko, 2008, 2011a). On the one hand, the Russian language is part of the linguistic experience of a significant part of the population. On the other hand, such an approach by Russia creates tension around the issue of linguistic autonomy of Ukraine. Thus, ownership of the language becomes not just a linguistic concept but an instrument of political and cultural power.

What is more, the concept of language ownership contradicts the notion of *polycentric languages* (see Mustajoki, Protassova, & Yelenevskaya, 2020). This notion is linked to the concept of *language variety*, one of the cornerstones of sociolinguistics. Language variety often depends on the social and/or cultural conditions of the speakers. For instance, it could be region (dialectal variety), social status (sociolect), or social situation (formal or informal register), etc. (see Fishman, 1965; Coseriu, 1970). Halliday (1978, p.2) says, “variations in language are in a quite direct sense the expression of fundamental attributes of the social system”. The author highlights the fact that education usually facilitates the acquisition of the ‘standard dialect’ (to which we refer as *standard language*, meaning a codified and institutionally legitimised variety) and that speakers tend to lose command of their non-standard varieties in the process of education. So, as far as the context of our studies is concerned, since Ukraine

was under the occupation of the Russian state in one form or another for a long time, a regional variety of the Russian language appeared in Ukraine (with certain lexical, grammatical, and phonetic features). However, since the Russian Federation tends towards linguistic purism and recognises only its right to the Russian language, the Ukrainian variation of Russian was considered marginalised. In addition, the concept of *surzhyk* (a mixed Ukrainian-Russian speech practice, see Bilaniuk, 2004; Masenko, 2010) emerged, which has become one of the most salient features of everyday communication, reflecting both historical russification and contemporary processes of identity negotiation (Bilaniuk, 2005, 2010).

So, when talking about multilingualism in Ukraine, we should also pay attention to the Communication Accommodation Theory. According to this theory, Giles and Coupland (1991) claim that speakers often tend to accommodate their speech to the interlocutor's needs (style, register, tone, etc). He particularly mentions communicating with L2 speakers, immigrants, patients, or children (see Giles & Coupland, 1991, pp. 60-80). This theory is built on the idea that if a bilingual person gets a request in one language, there are at least three scenarios for the answer. They include (1) answering using the same language as the request, (2) answering using a different language from the request, or (3) answering using a combination of both languages (see Sachdev & Giles, 2006, p.353). There are two main strategies within this framework: strategies of convergence and divergence. Sachdev and Giles define the convergence strategy as

a strategy whereby individuals adapt their communicative behaviors in terms of a wide range of linguistic [...], paralinguistic [...], and nonverbal features [...] in such a way that they become more similar to their interlocutor's behavior

Sachdev and Giles, 2006, p.355

and the divergence strategy as one that “leads to an accentuation of language (and cultural) differences” (Sachdev & Giles, 2006, p.356). The scholars claim that in reality, there exist a number of types of convergent and divergent strategies and the motivation behind their use is not always based on being accepted in a group or showing one's exclusion. What is more, Sachdev and Giles (2006, p.359) describe “a strategy that is neither full convergence nor divergence” as *code-switching*. In the

Ukrainian case, accommodating strategies are being used in everyday communication, both formal and informal (and these data are confirmed by our research). We refer to this as accommodational bilingualism. At the same time, Bilaniuk (2010, p.105, p.117) claims that *non-accommodational bilingualism* also exists in Ukraine (which is also confirmed by our data):

The practice of speaking one's preferred language, Ukrainian or Russian, regardless of the language spoken by one's interlocutor has become widespread in media and public life in Ukraine since independence. I refer to this practice as "non-accommodating bilingualism", since for communication to occur the participating individuals are necessarily bilingual to some degree, but neither accommodates by switching to the language spoken by the other.

Bilaniuk (2010, p.105)

Bilaniuk (2008, p.359) also explains the *linguistic domains* (= "the major clusters of interaction situations that occur in particular multilingual settings", Fishman, 1965, p.73) in which these strategies are used:

On one level, nonaccommodating bilingualism eases linguistic tensions, but on another level, the politics of language choice are still being played out. Non-accommodation appears to be most common in public contexts where people who do not know each other are interacting [...] non-accommodating bilingualism has allowed for more choice.

Bilaniuk (2008, p.359)

Therefore, we will also use the term *non-accommodational bilingualism* in relation to the Ukrainian context, but we will talk in more detail about the reasons for this situation in the next chapter.

Therefore, the diversity of language varieties, the contextual features of language domains, as well as various forms of multilingualism necessitate the individual to make a certain language choice, which occurs each time in a specific communicative situation. This leads us to a logical question: what is language choice? Fishman (1965; 1991) claimed that the language code that is being used for a particular function in a specific contextual verbal interaction is a *language choice*. In the author's opinion, language choice is an action itself. This action is always motivated by a wide range of factors, including social context, psychological state of the speaker, and individual perception of the interlocutor. Language choice in societies like Ukrainian (post-colonial, with vague identity markers) becomes a politicised issue (see Matskevych, 2000; Bilaniuk, 2005, 2010; Pavlenko, 2008, 2011a, 2023; Kulyk, 2011,

2021; Ruda, 2012; Marusyk, 2015; Hentschel & Palinska, 2022; Kraliuk, 2023). As we can see from the years of publications of the relevant studies, the issue has been topical for at least the last 25 years. Analysing these studies and the data presented in them, we can say that the issue of language choice in Ukraine is becoming increasingly closely linked to issues of identity and security.

And since our research focuses on language policies in academia, it is important to clarify the use of a few more terms. This study necessitates us to establish the differences between *language of instruction*, i.e., the language that is used in teaching and learning, sometimes also called medium of instruction, *official language* in educational context, the language that is recognised by the law and other regulatory documents, e.g. the University Statute, and *working language*, the language that is really used in everyday communication by the participants of educational process. Some scholars, like Tollefson and Tsui (2004), insist on using the term *medium of instruction* instead of *language of instruction* in LP analysis since this term renders the idea of language as a tool of ideology, identity, and power better. However, as this terminology is marginal in the literature, we will stick to the more frequent phrase *language of instruction*.

CHAPTER II. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF LP ON THE TERRITORIES OF MODERN UKRAINE

2.1. Introduction

Research into the contrast between language policies and language practices in Ukraine requires deep contextualisation. The fact that state unities on the territory of Ukraine changed one another and quite often fell under the occupation of neighbouring states only contributed to the confusion of language policies and language practices. Of course, our focus is on language policies themselves, but a brief overview of the general context will be useful for a broader understanding of the research topic.

First, it is important to clarify some terminology. The ancient medieval state of Rus, from which the history of the state of Ukraine actually begins, is often referred to by historians as Kyivan Rus to avoid confusion with the new name of Muscovy¹¹ – Russia. We will use the term ‘Kyivan Rus’ in this work. The basic principles of Ukrainian law-making go back to Old Rus Law (see Hrushevskyi, 1967). A legal system in Kyivan Rus formed the basis for the later Laws in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and in the Duchy of Moscow. The next set of rules and regulations adopted on the territory of modern Ukraine is the Constitution of Pylyp Orlyk (1710) (see Pritsak, 1998). Language was not much prioritised by any of the aforementioned lawmakers because of two reasons: (1) in the Medieval Age, Latin and Church Slavonic were the official languages of state-building (see Pritsak & Reshetar, 1963); (2) Orlyk’s constitution was more of an administrative and regulatory document for the state’s structure, provided that it was freed from Moscow’s subjugation, rather than focusing on language and culture-related issues (see Hrushevskyi, 1967; Pritsak, 1998).

When we use the term ‘modern Ukraine’, we mean, first and foremost, the territory of the modern state as recognised by the Constitution of Ukraine (1996) at the national level, as well as by the following international agreements:

¹¹ A common name for the Tsardom of Moscow or the Principality of Moscow (1263-1721), an ancestor of modern Russia, that was used before the Russian Empire was founded.

- Agreement on the Creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States¹² (also known as the Belovezh Agreement of 8 December 1991);
- Alma-Ata Declaration¹³ (21 December 1991);
- Helsinki Final Act of the CSCE¹⁴ (1975), confirmed by Ukraine after 1991;
- Treaty on the State Border between Ukraine and Russia of 2003¹⁵.

It is also important to outline the territorial limitations regarding the description of certain past events. To this end, we will record the following list of names of state entities, which historians (Hrushevskyi, 1967; Pritsak & Reshetar, 1963; Pritsak, 1977; Snyder, 2004; Danylenko, 2010) consider to be the predecessors of modern Ukraine (i.e., these were the names of the entities that either Ukraine was part of, or belonged to at that time, the more detailed maps of these state formations can be found in Appendix B):

(1) Kyivan Rus (882-1132)

(2) Galicia¹⁶-Volhynia Principality (1199-1349)

(3) Grand Duchy of Lithuania, Ruthenia and Samogitia¹⁷ (1325-1569), i.e. the territory of Ukraine is considered to be the Grand Duchy of Ruthenia¹⁸.

¹² Verkhovna Rada Ukrainy. (1991). Postanova Pro ratyfikatsiyu Uhody pro stvorennia Spivdruzhnosti Nezaleznykh Derzhav No.1958-XII vid 10 hrudnia 1991 roku. <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1958-12#Text>

¹³ Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. (1991). Alma-Ata Declaration: Declaration; CIS, December 21, 1991. https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/997_189#Text

¹⁴ Helsinki Final Act: Act; UN, August 1, 1975. (1975). Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/994_055#Text

¹⁵ Treaty between Ukraine and the Russian Federation on the Ukrainian-Russian State Border: Treaty; Ukraine and Russian Federation, January 28, 2003 (entered into force April 23, 2004). Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/643_157#Text

¹⁶ According to the correct Ukrainian transliteration, it should be 'Halychyna' but for the reasons of intercomprehension, we decided to use the internationally accepted option, the same for Zakarpattia (Transcarpattia).

¹⁷ Lithuanian: Lietuvos Didžioji Kunigaikštystė; Church Slavonic: Великое князство Литовское, Руское, Жомойтское и иных; Latin: Magnus Ducatus Lithvaniae, Rusiae.

¹⁸ The name 'Ruthenia' and the adjective 'Ruthenian' come from the Latinized version of Rus (Kyivan Rus). This term was also preserved during the period of its belonging to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, Ruthenia, and Samogitia, where Ruthenian was the official language (1236-1569). The parallel terms 'Ruthenians/Rusyns' and "Ruthenian/Rusyn language" were used for ethnic and linguistic self-identification by Ukrainians of Bukovyna, Galicia, and Transcarpathia until the beginning of the 20th century, despite the appropriation of the name Rus by the Moscow Principality (see Snyder, 2004; Bilaniuk & Melnyk, 2008). Today, the term "Ruthenian/Rusyn" is used to denote the Carpatho-Rusyn Eastern Slavic variety, which has the status of a separate language in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Serbia and Slovakia, but is considered a dialect in Ukraine. We will use it as a synonym for Ukrainian.

(4) Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth¹⁹ (1569-1795), namely the states of the Zaporozhian Host²⁰ and the Hetmanate²¹ (1648/1654–1734/1775), which existed in parallel with an almost identical system of government, but the former was under the control of the King of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, while the latter was an independent state with the right to elect its leaders. Khmelnytsky's uprising allowed these two Ukrainian territories to be united for a short time, but Khmelnytsky's subsequent alliance with Muscovy and its occupation of the Left Bank²² led to territorial division and, accordingly, the separate development of these territories, especially after the formation of the Russian Empire in 1721. The Right Bank,²³ together with Galicia, remained part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and after its partition in 1772, it became part of Austria and later the Austro-Hungarian Empire (until 1918) (see Pritsak & Reshetar, 1963; Snyder, 2004). At that time, Bukovyna belonged to the Ottoman Empire, and Transcarpathia was a part of Hungarian Kingdom.

(5) Sloboda Ukraine²⁴ shapes modern territories of Kharkiv region, parts of Sumy, Luhansk, and Donetsk regions, but also the territories that formed the Ukrainian State in the 20th century, but after their defeat by communists became part of Russia, i.e. parts of modern Bilhorod/Belgorod, Voronizh/Voronež, and Kursk regions.

We should not forget about southern Ukraine. Let's start with Crimea or the Rus Kahanate, as Golden (1982) refers to it. To be more precise, the so-called

¹⁹ Polish: Rzeczpospolita Obojga Narodów; Lithuanian: Lenkijos ir Lietuvos sandrauga; Church Slavonic: Рѣчь Посполита;

²⁰ The name can refer to the following state unities: (1) a military-political organization centred in the Zaporozhian Sich; (2) a state entity that emerged during Bohdan Khmelnytsky's liberation war in the mid-17th century in the Middle Dnieper region, Polissya, Bratslavshchyna and Zaporizhzhia; (3) Registered Cossacks, comprised special Cossack units of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth army in the 16th and 17th centuries with limited political autonomy. In this work, we use the term 'Zaporozhian Host' to refer to Registered Cossacks.

²¹ The Hemanate is an unofficial name for a state entity that emerged during Bohdan Khmelnytsky's liberation war in the mid-17th century in the Middle Dnieper region, Polissya, Bratslavshchyna and Zaporizhzhia. Not to be confused with 'The Ukrainian State (or 'The Second Hetmanate'), a state unity that existed on most of the modern territory of Ukraine (except for Western Ukraine) from 29 April to 14 December 1918 governed by Pavlo Skoropadskyi.

²² In Ukrainian: Лівобережжя/Лівобережна Україна. Left Bank is a historic name for the part of Ukraine under Russian rule that comprises modern-day regions of Chernihiv, Sumy, Poltava, and parts of the Kyiv and Cherkasy regions. It bordered with the Hetmanate to the south, Sloboda Ukraine to the east, and the Right Bank to the west.

²³ In Ukrainian: Правобережжя/Правобережна Україна. The Right Bank is a historic name for the part of Ukraine under Polish rule that comprises modern regions of Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Kirovohrad, and some parts of the Kyiv and Cherkasy regions.

²⁴ Sloboda Ukraine is a historical region where Cossacks were settling after unsuccessful uprisings against the Polish nobility in the beginning of 17th century. After the creation of the Russian Empire, the region gained more rights than the Left Bank, but was gradually russified and joined the empire by the end of the 18th century.

Tmutarakan Principality – a formation on the territory of modern Crimea that was subordinate to Kyivan Rus (see Hrushevskiy, 1967; Danylenko, 2010) and later belonged to various states. As Yevdokimova notes:

After, the Greek and Roman empires incorporated the region into their realms. Among the peninsula's occupiers were Goths, Huns, Bulgars, Khazars, Kyivan Rus', the Byzantine Empire, the Kipchaks, and the Golden Horde. In the 13th century CE, Crimean harbors were controlled by the Republic of Venice and Genoa.

Yevdokimova, 2021, p. 31

After the establishment (6) of the Crimean Khanate²⁵ (1441–1783), a relatively independent period of development began for the indigenous population of Crimea, although they were vassals of the Ottoman Empire (from 1478). In fact, this state formation was not limited to the peninsula itself. It also included the southern territories of modern Ukraine, Kuban, and other lands. This period lasted until the Russian Empire seized Crimea in 1783. It is essential to note the complex relationships between the Ukrainian population and the Ottoman Empire, but without historical expertise, we will not attempt to examine them in more detail. The scope of our research also does not require a deep analysis of this relation.

As noted before, having failed to obtain independence in the 17th century, the territories of modern Ukraine were divided between the (7) Austrian Empire, the Kingdom of Hungary (later the Austro-Hungarian Empire), and (8) the Russian Empire. To better understand the dynamics of territorial changes, take a look at Table 1. Dynamics of Territorial Changes (created after Kubaichuk, 2020) and Maps in Appendix B, where the main territorial changes are depicted.

²⁵ A Crimean Tatar state, the successor of the Golden Horde and Desht-i-Kipchak. Islam was the primary religion here, unlike the other state unities previously described, which were predominantly Christian.

	Left Bank	Right Bank		Galicia	Bukovyna	Transcarpathia
before 1648	Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth (PL)				Ottoman Empire (TR)	Kingdom of Hungary (HU)
1648-1654	Hetmanate	uprising, but formally PL		PL		
1654-1686	Tsardom of Moscow (RU)	PL				
1672-1699		PL	TR			
1699-1772	RU (Russian Empire after 1721)	PL		Austria (AT)	AT	
1772-1793						
1793-1867				AT	AT	
1867-1914		RU		AT (Austrian part of Austro-Hungary)	AT	HU (Hungarian part of Austro-Hungary)

Table 1. Dynamics of Territorial Changes

In the context of emerging national liberation movements, imperial language policy functioned not only as an administrative tool, but also as a key mechanism for creating and controlling cultural hierarchies. Language became a means by which imperial power was normalised, epistemic authority was consolidated and marginalised voices were silenced. From a postcolonial perspective, imperial language regimes can be understood as governance technologies that shaped communicative practices, subjectivities, forms of belonging and the boundaries of political legitimacy (see Spivak, 1999; Naiem, 2025).

In the Ukrainian context, however, these cultural and linguistic struggles have not remained confined to the past. Instead, they persist as an ongoing arena of contestation in which language continues to mediate sovereignty, memory, and geopolitical alignment. Debates over language policy operate at both the level of state governance and in the discursive interventions of neighbouring states, revealing how linguistic hierarchies are embedded in broader struggles over representation, recognition and symbolic power. Therefore, language in Ukraine should be analysed not only as a means of communication, but also as a historically layered site of colonial entanglement, emotional investment, and political mobilisation.

In this Chapter, we will provide a brief overview of the language policies that were in effect in the territory of modern Ukraine (1) under the rule of Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires, (2) during the period of national liberation struggle (1917-1922), (3) during the Soviet occupation, and (4) after Ukraine regained its

Independence in 1991. We will examine how linguistic imperialism worked. We will explore the language ideologies that have been in force in modern Ukraine over the last two centuries and their impact on state-building. We focus primarily on language policies in education, while also considering contextually important social and political events. Printing and religion are also important components of the analysis, since (1) printing was closely linked to the dissemination of knowledge, and (2) religion played a significant role in the life of that time. This overview will enable us to provide a broad outline of the context surrounding the introduction of modern language policies in Ukraine following its independence. Key legal acts and state regulations, organised by period, are listed in Table 17 (Appendix A).

2.2. Imperial Period: Language Policy under Russian and Austro-Hungarian Rule (late 17th – early 20th centuries)

When discussing empires, it is important not only to describe the language laws and practices implemented by imperial authorities in the territories of Ukraine, but also to outline the consequences of such practices for the local population. To this end, we will refer to the concept of linguistic imperialism, first proposed by Phillipson (1992), who discussed this phenomenon in the context of English language learning around the world. His primary comment is on the fact that the majority of terms in colonial studies of language are ideologically loaded. He mentioned the concepts of ‘tribe’ and ‘dialect’ (and the Ukrainian language has always been referred to as a dialect in the Russian Empire, see below) as key to this framework (Phillipson, 1992, p.38). However, the author also touches on the problem of the definition of ‘dialect’ here. He refers to Calvet’s (1974) ideas of using the terms ‘dominant language’ and ‘dominated language’ in the colonial context. In this research, this differentiation is not necessary since we talk about (1) Ukrainian, Russian and a variety of Russian in Ukraine, (2) Ukrainian (=Ruthenian, see Bilaniuk & Melnyk, 2008), German, Polish, Hungarian, etc.

However, this concept needs to be somewhat restructured for the Ukrainian context, since (1) it is not racism that plays the key role here, (2) Ukrainian literary

tradition was well-established before Russian colonisation. When defining the English linguistic imperialism, Phillipson (1992, p.47) states that it is “*a sub-type of linguisticism*”, which he defines as:

ideologies, structures, and practices, which are used to legitimate, effectuate, and reproduce an unequal division of power and resources (both material and immaterial) between groups which are defined on the basis of language.

Phillipson, 1992, p.47

Thus, our task in this Chapter is to (1) show how the Empires ruling over Ukrainian territories were using linguisticism, (2) trace the tradition of language practices that were formed as a consequence of imperial policies rather than looking at the complex system of imperial policies and the (de)colonisation process and its influence on Ukraine as a whole. Discussing the imperial experience in plural from a broader social, cultural, and political perspectives offers promising direction for further research.

2.2.1. Ukrainian Lands under Russian Rule (LP and education)

When discussing empires today, scholars often work within the framework of colonial studies. However, they mostly refer to typical Western empires, such as the British Empire. Let us begin by noting that the Russian Empire was not a “classical” empire; for example, it had no overseas territories. When discussing its expansion to the east, we can still observe a certain exoticisation of the local population (see Said, 1977). After all, the people who lived there had a different religion, their languages belonged to different language families, and their way of life was fundamentally different. When discussing the conquest of lands west of the Tsardom of Moscow, it becomes more challenging to trace colonial policies (see Chernetsky, 2003; Khomyakov, 2020). Indeed, Slavic tribes shared common features *a priori*, which is why the Russian Empire was (and still is) able to promote the myth of ‘a single nation’ (Ruda, 2012).

This is confirmed, at least, by the fact that, for example, Etkind (2001, pp. 64-65) does not see the relations between the Russian Empire and Poland, Finland or the

Caucasus as entirely colonial. His opinion is a continuation of the ideas of Klyuchevsky (1908, p.24), who wrote that “the history of Russia is a history of the country colonising itself.²⁶”. Soloviev (1898, p.12) made a similar statement:

the main phenomenon of Russian history was that the state, when it expanded its dominions, occupied vast empty spaces and populated them; the area of the state was expanding for the most part via colonization; the dominating people – the Slavic one – sent their settlements further and further in the depth of the Orient. All European tribes are destined by the history to send the settlements to the other parts of the world to disseminate Christianity and civility. The Western European tribes were to do it via the sea, while the Eastern tribe – the Slavic one – was destined to do it via dry land²⁷

Soloviev, 1898, p.12

The spread of this idea might come from as far as the secret instructions from Catherine II:

Малая Россія, Лифляндія и Финляндія суть провинціи, которыя правятся подтвержденными имъ привилегіями, нарушить оныя отрѣшеніемъ всѣхъ вдругъ весьма непристойно бѣ было, однакожъ и называть ихъ чужестранными и обходиться съ ними на такомъ же основаніи есть больше, нежели ошибка, а можно назвать съ достовѣрностію глупостію. Сіи провинціи, также и смоленскую, надлежитъ легчайшими способами привести къ тому, чтобъ онѣ обрусѣли и перестали бы глядѣть какъ волки къ лѣсу. Къ тому приступъ весьма легкій, естли разумные люди избраны будутъ начальниками въ тѣхъ провинціяхъ; когда же въ Малороссіи гетмана не будетъ, то должно стараться, чтобъ вѣкъ и имя гетмановъ исчезло, не токмо бѣ персона какая была произведена въ оное достоинство²⁸.

Hrot, 1874, p.348-349

The idea of Catherine II about the ‘sameness’ of the people of the Left Bank, Livonia, and Finland is deeply rooted in the worldview of many people around the world. The data clearly suggest that this opinion has been prevalent among Russian scholars for over a hundred years. For example, Holubenko (1987, p.154) notes this trend in Russian scientific thought of the 20th century:

Наскільки є необ’єктивною й тенденційною російська наука і культура – найкращим показником є погляди кн. Н. Трубецького на українську проблему. В ім’я єдності російської імперії і величі російської культури має зникнути українська культура – такий висновок з усіх російських теорій. Такою є логіка і найвизначніших науковців, опанованих російським імперіалізмом.²⁹

²⁶ The translation is quoted from Khomyakov (2020)

²⁷ The translation is quoted from Khomyakov (2020)

²⁸ “Little Russia, Livonia, and Finland are provinces governed by confirmed privileges; to violate them by suddenly abdicating them all would be highly improper. However, to call them foreign and treat them on the same basis is more than a mistake; it can truly be called stupidity. These provinces, including Smolensk, must be brought to the point by the easiest means of russification and to cease looking like wolves to the forest. This is an easy task, if sensible people are elected as leaders in those provinces; When there is no hetman in Little Russia, then we must try to ensure that the age and the name of the hetmans disappear, not only that some person is promoted to this dignity.”

²⁹ “The views of Prince N. Trubetskoy on the Ukrainian issue are the best indicator of how biased and tendentious Russian science and culture are. In the name of the unity of the Russian Empire and the greatness of Russian culture, Ukrainian

Dziuba (1968, p.79) is one of the first researchers to notice the features of colonialism in Russian rhetoric towards Ukraine.

колоніалізм може виявлятися не тільки в формі прямої дискримінації, а й у формі “братерства”, і це останнє дуже характерне для російського колоніалізму³⁰

Dziuba, 1968, p. 79

Notably, Dziuba addresses the policies of the Soviet Union with this quote, but we can draw a clear line between the rhetoric of both the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union, and the Russian Federation regarding Ukraine within this framework of ‘brotherhood’.

Narrowing back to the issue of the Russian Empire, upon closer analysis (Kasianov, 1995; Shkandrij, 2001; Velychenko, 2002; Chernetsky, 2003; Tompson, 2006; Pavlenko, 2011b; Mokryk, 2016; Khomyakov, 2020; Kubaichuk, 2020), it becomes clear that Holubenko (1987) is right, and this is exactly what these relations were like. Again, since our study is not aimed at defining colonial relations between Russia and Ukraine, we will focus primarily on education and language issues that are relevant to explaining these relations. However, mentioning it is important for giving the context.

Trying to present the legal framework of the Russian Empire might be impossible for us due to (1) the lack of a defined LP, (2) the time span of the empire’s activity, (3) the number of colonised peoples and the peculiarities of linguistic situations in different regions. Although we will use specific examples to draw parallels, if necessary, more detailed information about these processes can be found in Olcott (1985), Epsztein (1998), Dowler (2001), Pavlenko (2011b), and Krouglov (2021). However, it is worth recalling a few key details. First, the emperor was the key figure in the empire, so any of his decrees on LP had absolute force. Second, the role of the church should not be underestimated, since at the time, it was a powerful political

culture must disappear – this is the conclusion drawn from all Russian theories. Such is the logic of even the most prominent scholars, who have been influenced by Russian imperialism.”

³⁰ “Colonialism can manifest itself not only in the form of direct discrimination, but also in the form of ‘brotherhood’, and the latter is very characteristic of Russian colonialism.”

instrument and educational centre. Thus, all the documents and decrees issued by patriarchs or high-ranking priests played a significant role. Other possible regulatory documents could include legal codes issued during those years. With the passage of time and the creation of proto-governmental organisations, the number of documents regulating LP increased. So, let's take a closer look at the history of their implementation.

The foundation of any empire is the unshakeable power of the emperor. That is why we will examine the status of the Ukrainian language in the context of the policies of the most important Russian rulers.

It is important to note that the colonial policy of the then Tsardom of Moscow began with proper names. The inhabitants of the Left Bank were called 'Little Russians'³¹ rather than 'Rusyns/Ruthenians'. This diminished their distinctiveness and created an illusory connection between the two peoples, and the myth of the "older brother" lives on to this day. We see that even state representatives, such as Pope Francis (Sobenko, 2024) or President Macron (Bakhtiev, 2022), and educated people sometimes make this mistake³², calling the Ukrainian and Russian peoples – brothers. Similarly, the language of the inhabitants of the Left Bank at that time began to be called 'Little Russian'. In general, several languages (Danylenko & Naienko, 2018, p.22) (or rather, language varieties) coexisted on the territory of the Left Bank at that time:

1. Church Slavonic of the Ukrainian recension (языкъ славоноросскій 'the Slavono-Rusyn language'), called conventionally Meletian Church Slavonic (after Meletij Smotryc'kyj who codified the language in 1619) (Danylenko 2006b, pp. 103–104, 2008a, pp. 85–87);
2. Ruthenian (prostaja mova 'the plain language'), a vernacular standard employed in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and later in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth as one of the

³¹ 'Little Russians' is a geographical and historical term used to describe the territory governed by 'the patriarch of Kyiv and Rus' as Kohut (1986, p.563) mentions. The origin of its roots in Greek tradition to call Greek colonies as 'Magna Graecia' (=Great Greece), and the 'original' Greek lands as Minor Greece (Ohiyenko, 1922). Hence, the territories of Kyivan Rus became 'Little Russia' (= now Ukraine), and the territories conquered by Rus – 'Great Russia' (= the Tsardom of Moscow -> Russian Empire -> Soviet Union -> the Russian Federation). The adjectives formed from these names were used extensively.

³² The existence of this myth basically confirms the (post)colonial relations between Russia and Ukraine, because it is precisely through the support of such myths that the metropolis does not agree with the right of its former colony to independence. In such situations, it is essential to emphasise that before Russia's annexation of Ukraine in the 18th century, the histories of the two nations were not only different but also directly opposed in terms of their civilizational affiliation. Incidentally, at that time in Europe, Rus was often referred to as the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, but Lithuania does not claim the title of "Great Ukraine" or call Ukraine "little Lithuania". Supporting such markers of colonial relationships does not help decolonisation.

official languages (Dini 1997, pp. 281–283); it was still used in the administration of the Cossack Hetmanate (Danylenko 2006c, pp. 85–91);²

3. A new vernacular-based language which was ushered in after the publication of Ivan Kotljarevs'kyj's *Enejida*, a travesty of Virgil's *Aeneid* in which the Trojan heroes were recast in a Cossack cultural setting (Danylenko 2008b); by the end of the nineteenth century the language acquired the status of a literary language.³

Danylenko & Naienko, 2018, p.22

This coexistence of the 'Ukrainian languages'³³ was determined by the socio-political and religious realities of the world at that time.

Therefore, despite the Russian Empire's official establishment at the beginning of the 18th century, it is essential to examine the changes that preceded its future imperial LP. First, it was the closure of the Ostroh Academy in 1636 (one of the key educational and cultural centres of Ukraine) (see Kubaichuk, 2020). Second, isolated orders on censorship or the prohibition of printing Ukrainian books, for example, the 1677 order of Patriarch Joachim to remove 'pages that differed from Moscow books' from Ukrainian books, or the 1693 letter from the Moscow Patriarch to the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra prohibiting any books in Ukrainian (see Ohiyenko, 1922, 1950; Hryshevskyi, 1967; Subtelny, 2009; Snyder, 2004; Plokyh, 2006; Kubaichuk, 2020). An example of how this ban worked was the imposition of a thousand-ruble fine on the archimandrite of the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra for printing the church book "Triodion", which was "не совсем с великороссийским сходная"³⁴ (Ohiyenko, 1922, pp. 382-383; Kubaichuk, 2020). Danylenko and Naienko (2018, p.25) provide us with a similar example:

As attested by the discussion of Kyryl Trankvillion-Stavrovec'kyj's Didactic Gospel (published in 1619 in Rachmaniv, Polish Rachmanów) in Moscow in 1627, the conflict between the Kyivans in the imperial service and defenders of the old Muscovite folkways was long in the making: the gospel was decreed heretical and 60 copies of it were publicly burned in Moscow on 4 December 1627 partly because of the Ukrainianisms found in Kyryl's Church Slavonic, which the Muscovites regarded as a distortion not just of the biblical text.

Danylenko & Naienko (2018, p.25)

³³ In this Chapter, I refer to the three variations of Ukrainian listed by Danylenko & Naienko (2018) as the 'Ukrainian languages'. This is done only to simplify the description and means mostly the languages that the inhabitants of the territories of modern Ukraine were using.

³⁴ not entirely consistent with Great Russian [traditions]

In the period from 1627 to 1720 (Danylenko & Naienko, 2018), publishing houses were closed or relocated to Moscow (e.g. the Chernihiv publishing house (Kubaichuk, 2020)). However, not only was the printing of new books in the Ukrainian Church Slavonic language banned, but existing books were also heavily censored and revised to conform not only to Moscow's ideology but also to the 'Great Russian' grammar (Ohiyenko, 1950; Danylenko & Naienko, 2018). Plokyh (2006) states that these changes were accepted by the clergy, in part, due to fear of being charged with heresy. A striking example of such censorship is provided by Danylenko and Naienko (2018, p.26) when discussing Zyzanij's Catechism:

The attitudes of the Muscovite censors toward Zyzanij seem to have been shaped by a certain amount of ignorance and a few cultural stereotypes. The ignorance began, as Frick (1992, p. 75) noted, and rightly so, at the linguistic level. Zyzanij wrote his Catechism in Ruthenian, apparently under the assumption that his interlocutors would at least be capable of understanding it. But [...] the Muscovites claimed not to be able to understand 'Lithuanian' or 'Polish' expressions (Prënie, n.d., pp. 81, 87).

Danylenko & Naienko, 2018, p.26

In general, the list of burnt, banned or censored books is difficult to establish, but there is plenty of evidence of this happening in the territories of both the Left Bank and Sloboda Ukraine (Hryshevskyi, 1967; Ohiyenko, 1950; Subtelny, 2009). The Russian Holy Synod (see below) and the Russian tsar (and later emperor) were releasing decree after decree (Pavlenko, 2011b; Danylenko & Naienko, 2018; Kubaichuk, 2020), intensifying the oppression of the Ukrainian Church Slavonic. These policies turned especially aggressive after the defeat of Ivan Mazepa³⁵ with the Swedish army in 1709. After that, there were a few arson attacks on big publishing houses in Ukraine, but the Russian administration did not figure out why.

In 1709, Tsar Peter I reduced the number of students at the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy from 2,000 to 161. He also ordered the most professional teachers to move to Moscow to work. Among them were Ioannikiy Galyatovsky, Lazar Baranovich, and Feofan Prokopovich (Hryshevskyi, 1967; Ohiyenko, 1922, 1950; Subtelny, 2009; Snyder, 2004; Plokyh, 2006; Kubaichuk, 2020). This decision contributed to the so-

³⁵ Ivan Mazepa is the hetman known for its immense contributions to charities, culture, religion, and printing. During the Russian-Swedish War, the hetman sided with the Swedes after the Russian tsar imposed new restrictions on the autonomy of the Hetmanate (the Kolomak Articles). The Russian tsar perceived this as treason and sought revenge.

called ‘Ruthenisation’ of Russia (Ohiyenko, 1922; Holubenko, 1987; Torke, 1996, p.104-105, 108-116 in Danylenko & Naienko, 2018; Shalashna, 2013). When discussing the tradition of writing, Ohiyenko (1922, pp.18-20) highlights:

в давні часи Україна витворила свою власну форму письма. [...] наш скоропис був своєрідним, окремим, і його ви ніколи не змішаєте ні з яким другим письмом [...] Щоб переконатись у цьому, досить тільки глянути на письмо наше і московське, скажемо, хоча б XVII віку. [...] Та то й не дивно: по всій Росії за XVIII вік учителями по школах були майже самі українці і вони-той поклали свої ознаки на теперішнє письмо.³⁶

Ohiyenko, 1922, pp.18-20

This quote only supports the statement that Ukrainian scientists laid the basis for empirical education in Russia (see Holubenko, 1987, pp.147-148). Luchanin (2011), Shalashna (2013), and Plokhly (2017) argue that the emergence of the Russian Empire in 1721 was a direct result of the ideological work of Feofan Prokopovich and Peter I’s state-building efforts. These facts only strengthen the claims about Ukrainian/Ruthenian influence on the Empire in the 18th century. Shalashna (2013) proves that at that time, two concepts of ‘new Russia’ were discussed:

- (1) the idea of Yavorsky that ‘new Russia’ is the state with humanistic ideas rooted in the so-called Ukrainian baroque, where the human is morally responsible to God only and the state performs the administrative functions,
- (2) Prokopovych’s idea claiming that in the state, the supreme power should belong to secular institutions and, above all, to the autocrat, while ecclesiastical power is obliged to play a subordinate role and concern itself only with a limited sphere of purely religious matters (see Samaryn, 1880).

Shalashna (2013) also states that the Holy Synod (the collective governing church body) was introduced in order to avoid any competition for power between the clergy and the emperor.

During the reign of Peter I, in 1720, a Senate decree was issued (Danylenko, 2008b) banning the Kyiv and Chernihiv publishing houses from printing anything except the canonical (i.e., censored) church books. It aimed not only to establish

³⁶ “In ancient times, Ukraine developed its own form of writing. [...] Our cursive script was unique and distinct, and you would never confuse it with any other script [...] To see this for yourself, you need only compare our writing with that of Moscow, say, from the 17th century. [...] And this is not surprising: throughout Russia in the 18th century, almost all school teachers were Ukrainians, and they left their mark on the current writing system.”

censorship for religious books but also to gradually replace the ‘Ukrainian languages’ with Russian, since not only the Ukrainian Church Slavonic, but also Ruthenian was banned. Hence, since the impact of this order was to be even wider-reaching than just liturgical books, we can speak of a greater wave of russification starting from this point. The number of similar decrees issued by either the Holy Synod or the emperor is impossible for us to count, but we can quote here Danylenko and Naienko (2018, pp.27-29) describing a period of 35 years after the creation of the Russian Empire:

it is worth mentioning several decrees, taken randomly, in order to illustrate the spread of prohibitive actions aimed against the Ukrainian recension of Church Slavonic during the eighteenth century [...] 1722 [...]1724 [...]1726 [...]1726 [...] 1727, 1728, 1730, 1735, 1742, 1750, 1752, 1753 and other years

Danylenko & Naienko, 2018, pp.27-29

Not taking into account any decrees not mentioned by these scholars, we see that every 2.5 years there was a decree aimed at limiting the use of the Ukrainian Church Slavonic. Ohiyenko (1922, p.162-163) states that the number of these decrees is impossible to list. He mentions the fact that we have a small sample of books in the Ukrainian Church Slavonic printed in the 18th century, but a big one of those in manuscripts with these constant bans. This makes it right to agree with Danylenko and Naienko (2018, p.29) in their claim on a consistent russification of the Ukrainian clergy and Cossack nobility. What is more, the empire also started attacking the use of Ruthenian, thereby destroying the language system of the Left Bank, as Danylenko (2008a) notes.

However, internal turmoil and the struggle for power after Peter I’s death diverted attention from the “Little Russian question,” and the imperial authorities did not address it systematically. The important point to mention is that the ‘Grammar’ of Meletii Smotrytskyi published in 1619 (a first codification of Ukrainian Church Slavonic) kept its position in many churches (and the schools were usually organised at church premises at that time), and played an important role in preserving the Ukrainian Church Slavonic as the language of instruction, even despite the prohibitions due to the in the absence of an alternative (see Nimchuk & Puriaieva, 2004). Ohiyenko (1922) mentions that the libraries of such schools were full of books, including

European ones, and it was impossible to substitute this number of books with those printed in Russia.

When Elizabeth Petrovna came to power, on the one hand, she continued Peter I's reforms. On the other hand, Oleksii Rozumovsky³⁷ became her favourite, and this explains why the Hetmanate experienced a period of relative economic and political improvement. Moreover, Oleksii's brother Kyrylo became hetman. The empress took an interest in education, appointing Kyrylo Rozumovsky as president of the Imperial Academy of Sciences in 1746, and later, with his help, founding Moscow University in 1755 (see Hryshevskyi, 1967; Ohiyenko, 1922, 1950; Subtelny, 2009; Snyder, 2004; Plokyh, 2006; Sukhykh & Vovk, 2008; Salahub, 2019). His activities as hetman also included the establishment of obligatory education for Cossacks' children in all polks³⁸. That was an important step, as Tretiachenko (2020) notes, since only the children of the ruling class had access to education, and the majority of peasants were illiterate. What is more, in 1760, Rozumovsky ordered to develop a project to create a University in his capital, Baturyn. The idea was motivated by the 'aspiration of the Ukrainian population to science, as proved by foreign degrees of the Ukrainians' (see Holubenko, 1987, p.162). But the Imperial government rejected this idea. Later, the idea of creating a university in Kyiv got approved, but it was not realised until 1834.

However, before moving on to the field of education, we must mention the philological ideas about the Ukrainian language that circulated among imperial scholars. To cut a long story short, the 'Ukrainian languages' were believed to be 'a spoiled version of Russian. In particular, Lomonosov, one of the most prominent grammarians of the time, insisted on the similarity between the Russian and Ukrainian languages and believed that Russian is one of the Slavic languages, and it can be divided into three dialects: 1) Moscovite, 2) Pomeranian [=Belarussian], 3) Little Russian. Lomonosov (1952a, p. 608) believed that the third one is the most distinct and mixed with Polish. He articulated the idea of 'spoiled dialect' as follows:

хотя сей диалект [=малороссийское наречие] с нашим очень сходен, однако его ударение, произношение и окончание речений от соседства с поляками и от

³⁷ Name at birth Oleksii Rozum, but in order to get the position at the court had to russify his surname.

³⁸ A polk is an administrative unit in Hetmanate, the Left Bank, and the Second Hetmanate.

договременной бытности под их властью много отменилось или, прямо сказать, попортилось³⁹

Lomonosov, 1952b, p. 83

In the “*Sravnitel'nye slovari vseh jazykov i narečij, sobrannye desniceju vsevysočajšej osoby*” of 1787⁴⁰” of 1787, we find basically the same comparison:

Малороссийское наречие мало отлично и само по себе часто есть не что иное, как российское на польский образец премененное, которое и в употреблении токмо в Украине и малой России⁴¹

Sravnitel'nye slovari vseh jazykov i narečij, sobrannye desniceju vsevysočajšej osoby, 1787, p. 8

As demonstrated by the quotes, the Russian linguistic thought of the second half of the 18th century forms the idea that there is one Great Russian language, which in turn is divided into Russian, Ukrainian and Belarusian (dialects). Moreover, the Ukrainian language itself is perceived as Russian, but with an influence and borrowings from the Polish language. Obviously, this statement is rather ideological than scientific. And there exists a scientific justification, such as reconstruction of historical sound changes in Old Slavic and descendant languages, in Yurii Shevelov's work “A Prehistory of Slavic. The Historical Phonology of Common Slavic” (Shevelov, 1965).

With Catherine II's accession to power, the situation only worsened. First, in 1764, Catherine II ordered the hetman to renounce power and abolished the hetmanate system on the Left Bank as such (see Sukhykh & Vovk, 2008; Salahub, 2019). In 1775, she also abolished the Zaporozhian Host (see Osadchyi, 2020). In 1783, she captured Crimea, and in 1794, the empress issued an order to establish the city of Odesa on the site of Khadzhybei (see Krasnozhon, 2018). It was during her reign that most of the Ukrainian lands were annexed to the Russian Empire (including the partitions of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth) (see Hryshevskyi, 1967; Ohienko, 1922, 1950; Subtelny, 2009; Snyder, 2004; Plokh, 2006). It was during her rule that most Ukrainian cities lost their Magdeburg rights.

³⁹ although this dialect [=“Little Russian”] is very similar to ours, however, its stress, pronunciation, and sentence endings have changed considerably, or, to put it bluntly, have been corrupted, due to its proximity to the Poles and its long period of subjugation under their rule.

⁴⁰ Comparative dictionaries of all languages and idioms, collected by the right hand of the highest person

⁴¹ The Little Russian idiom has little distinction and in itself is often nothing but a Russian idiom transformed into a Polish model, which is also used only in Ukraine and Little Russia

Having reviewed the general political dynamics in the Russian Empire regarding Ukraine in the 18th century, let us take a closer look at the educational sphere during this period.

With the creation of the empire, Peter I tried to modernise it to reach European standards. However, for several reasons, this did not occur (see Horokhov, 2014), primarily due to a shortage of qualified personnel. It was precisely because of this problem that the state turned its attention to education as a tool for achieving its goals. The first thing to note is that education was class-based, i.e. military or naval affairs for the nobility and manufacturing professions for people from other free classes. As Vladymyrskyi-Budanov (2013) notes, from 1714 onwards, so-called “number schools” began to open, with a main focus on the study of algebra and geometry. Municipal primary schools also began to open under the supervision of magistrates, but they were not successful because there were not enough people willing to study. The lack of primary education also affected higher education. Horokhov notes on this subject:

Окремо слід згадати про створення Академії Наук, відкритої у 1726 р. На думку Петра I, цей заклад мав увібрати у себе відразу три напрямки: гімназія, університет та власне сама Академія, тобто середня освіта, вища та науковий центр. Як довела практика, це було не тільки не потрібно, але й неможливо. Так, академічна гімназія приймала учнів шляхом штучного набору державних стипендіатів, а університет взагалі існував лише номінально.⁴²

Horokhov, 2014, p.165

Therefore, we can see that the creation of the educational system was more nominal than real. This was partly due to the government’s lack of interest in education as such. At that time, no state body had been created to centrally manage the development of science, and all issues were decided by the Senate. However, the key task at this stage was, of course, to lay the foundations for secular education in the state. These reforms fulfilled this function. It was not until 1763 that a special department for education was created (see Leshkov, 1877). In 1768, a special government body was established – the Commission of Schools, whose members

⁴² Special mention should be made of the establishment of the Academy of Sciences, which opened in 1726. According to Peter I, this institution was to combine three areas: a gymnasium, a university and the Academy itself, i.e. secondary education, higher education and a scientific centre. As practice showed, this was not only unnecessary but also impossible. Thus, the academic gymnasium accepted students through artificial recruitment of state scholarship holders, and the university existed only nominally.

developed a draft system of educational institutions. Under this system, education remained partly ecclesiastical and partly secular, as the heads of such schools were both secular rectors and archbishops. Teachers also consisted of both secular and clergy (see Horokhov, 2014).

As for LP in education, the decrees of 1721 (on harmonising all Ukrainian publications with Russian ones) and 1731 (on removing old Ukrainian books and replacing them with Russian ones) indirectly impacted education. According to Huslysty, Slavin and Yastrebov (1942, p. 94), in the mid-18th century, there were more than a thousand schools in the ten left-bank polks, but due to the *enslavement* of peasants by Catherine II in 1780, the educational sphere began to decline. Ohiyenko (1922, pp.169-170) compares the number of schools in the Left Bank in the 1740s (143 schools for 142 villages in Chernihiv polk) to that in 1768 (134 (around 748 students in each) schools in Chernihiv, Horodenka, and Sosnitsky *povits*⁴³) to 1875 (52 schools in the same territory, around 6730 students for each school). He concludes that the growth in the number of potential students and the decline in the number of schools had only worsened the situation with education.

According to the 1734 census, the majority of the urban population remained Ukrainian-speaking (see Hyrych, 2014, p.140). For example, in 1769, the Kyiv-Pechersk Printing House submitted a request to print primers for the local population in their native language. The Holy Synod rejected this request and instead introduced Russian as the only language of instruction at the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy (see Polishchuk, 2015; Danylenko & Naienko, 2018; Kubaichuk, 2020). In this regard, Danylenko & Naienko (2018, pp.29-30) also mention the prescription to introduce instruction in Russian (based on Lomonosov's work) into the curriculum of the Kharkiv College. The scholars emphasise that the language change in education in Kharkiv was faster since the tradition lasted less than in Kyiv. In addition, Vakulenko (2004, p.550) claims that the multilingual approach of the Kyiv school (where students came from different parts of the Russian Empire as well as from abroad) facilitated the

⁴³ Povit is an administrative unit under the Russian Empire.

longer preservation of Ukrainian Church Slavonic in this institution (see Danylenko & Naienko, 2018, p.30).

Although the educational tradition sometimes preserved Ukrainian Church Slavonic, the nobility and clergy were forced to learn Russian. The services were to be conducted in Russian (although the believers were praying in the Ukrainian Church Slavonic). The Ukrainian language was not relevant to the power structures as well. Knowledge of the Russian language gave access to the civil service. This was not only due to coercion, but also because after 1721, there was a constant shift towards keeping all documentation in Russian. Therefore, Russian was studied, at least for career reasons (see Shandra, 2013).

During the Catherine period, any use of the ‘Ukrainian languages’ in administration ceased. After she suspended its autonomous status, the Left Bank was transformed into a common Russian province, where Russian became the official language, including in education. This caused problems similar to those Moscow faced when it brought Ukrainian teachers into its schools – students and teachers could speak different languages and not understand each other at all. The closure of ‘deacon schools’, which had previously been funded by parents, and the opening of Russian primary schools contributed to a significant deterioration in the quality of education (Huslysty, Slavin & Yastrebov, 1942; Hryshevskyi, 1967; Subtelny, 2009; Polishchuk, 2015). Apart from Russian, French and German were often studied by students of nobility (see Siropolko, 2001).

As for higher education, the Cossack gentry asked for permission to turn the Kyiv Mohyla Academy into a University with 4 faculties. This request was followed by a similar one from Baturyn – the then-time factual hetman capital. Both requests were declined, so the Ruthenian students had to go to Europe or Moscow to get higher education (see Ohiyenko, 1922). Ohiyenko (1922, p. 172) refers to 1782 as the year marking the widespread russification of Ukrainian schools and the Kyiv Mohyla Academy. Special attention was dedicated to the pronunciation of the students, since a puristic approach was in action.

Therefore, by the end of the 18th century, just as the Ukrainian Church Slavonic (written language) had been displaced from use in documents by Russian, so too was

the Ruthenian language (spoken language) subjected to disappearance from the public sphere. Danylenko and Naienko (2018, p.33) claim:

russification of the aforementioned two languages, spurred by complex of cultural inferiority gradually transforming into Ukrainophobia amongst the Russians, was consistent, conscious, and long-lasting.

Danylenko & Naienko, 2018, p.33

The russification of education in the Left Bank led to the situation where, at the end of the 18th century, the Ukrainian educated elite was divided into two types:

- The first was focused on the complete merging of so-called “Little Russia” with “Great Russia” and the domination of the Russian elite;
- The second strove to restore the “rights and freedoms” obtained by the Cossack foreman during the time of Bohdan Khmelnytskyi (see Kohut, 1996).

It was the second type of population that had initiated the birth of the Ukrainophile movement, which, in its turn, began the struggle for the Ukrainian language. This led to the creation of a ‘new Ukrainian literary language’, which manifested itself in numerous literary texts⁴⁴ written at that time, the most significant of which Ohiyenko (1922) and Subtelny (2009) call Kotliarevsky’s (1798) ‘Eneida’. In fact, it was a language based on local dialects, especially those of Sloboda Ukraine. After almost a hundred years of russification and the suppression of the Ukrainian language from public use, writers often used both Ukrainian and Russian for their literary needs.

After the death of Catherine II, Paul I of Russia became the emperor. His educational policy was rather inertial and continued the tradition of Catherine II. That is, the Ukrainian language practically fell out of use in science (it could be used as an auxiliary language in primary education, but rarely). And in general, his reign was rather short (1796-1801).

His successor, Alexander I, launched massive educational reforms, though these were more administrative than language-related. In 1804, the “Statute of Universities” and the “Statute of Educational Institutions Subordinate to Universities”

⁴⁴ Among others Borovykovskyi, Metlinskyi, Lobysevych, Afanasiev-Chuzhbynskyi, Zabala, Petrenko, Hulak-Artemovskiy, Hrebinka, Kvitka-Osnov’ia-nenko are quite famous.

were adopted (see Mokliak, 2017; Tkachenko, 2025). In this context, we must mention Karazin, a native of Sloboda Ukraine, who in 1802 sent Alexander I a letter calling for changes in the political, social and educational spheres. After that, he was appointed to the position of head of the Main School Administration in the Ministry of Public Education. The request to establish a university in Kharkiv was initially rejected. However, in 1805, the University was finally established, as the idea had been endorsed by Skovoroda, Palitsyn, and other prominent figures of the time (see Siropolko, 2001). Holubenko (1987) points out that the establishment of Kharkiv University was due to the Ukrainian intelligentsia's idea and the Ukrainian nobility's money.

In meanwhile, it was Karazin who developed the basic provisions that formed the basis of the statutes of Vilnius, Moscow, Kazan, Kharkiv and other Russian universities. (see Pyrozhenko, 2014). The Statutes regulated the structure and principles of public education in the empire, and thus had a direct impact on Ukrainian schooling. Under this reform, the country was divided into educational districts, each of which was regulated by the relevant university. As for the Ukrainian territories, the Kharkiv district included the territories of the Left Bank and Sloboda Ukraine, while the Kyiv district (created later) included the Right Bank (which became part of the Russian Empire as a result of the partitions of Poland), Podillia, and Volhynia (see Shcherbak, 2005; Mokliak, 2017).

Karazin also cared about school education. Sliusarskyi (1955, p.46) notes that Karazin's serfs' children could gain their freedom for exceptional academic achievements, provided that they eventually reimbursed him for the cost of 2,000 working days (a kind of student loan of the time). Karazin (1839, p.597) also believed that the key to raising an educated child is an educated mother, and, thus, the education of women played an important role in his vision.

Although it is clear that Karazin was not the one who revolutionised the entire educational process in the empire (or even in the Kharkiv region), his vision was significant in Sloboda Ukraine (see Danylevska, 2009; Pyrozhenko, 2014; Mokliak, 2017). However, it is challenging to discuss the rise of Ukrainian culture at that time. For example, in 1903, a monument to Kotliarevsky (the so-called creator of the new Ukrainian literary language, see Subtelny, 2009) was unveiled in Sumy, but speeches

and greetings in Ukrainian were prohibited (Ohiyenko, 1922, p.221). Another example is directly linked to Kharkiv University. The first rector of the university, Ryzhsky (a professor of Russian literature), wrote a proposal to the Imperial Academy of Sciences on publishing the chronicle

що стосується стародавніх справ цього краю і писані мовою, яка давніше тут уживалася, а в останніх роках сильно змінюється і великими кроками наближується до великоросійської. [...] Виводячи з цього, що мова та піде в повне забуття я гадав, чи не корисно було б зберегти її, як відмінну від “русского” слова, виданням котрогось із згаданих літописів⁴⁵

Cited from Savchenko, 1930a, p. 3-5

Siropolko (2001) notes that the proposal was left unanswered. Moreover, this letter is evidence not of the rector's pro-Ukrainian stance, but rather of genuine interest. We can draw this conclusion from the fact that it was Ryzhsky who insisted on inviting Russian teachers to schools in the Kharkiv district, motivating this by the need for students to get used to correct pronunciation (see Danylevskyi, 1866, p.307).

Even though the Russian language was a dominant language there, it was still considered the centre of development for the Ukrainian historical tradition, language, literature, journalism, and philosophy (see Snyder, 2004, p.121). Students and teachers at the university founded scientific societies in various fields. For example, Karazin initiated the creation of the University Society of Sciences in 1812, and in 1817, they released the first issue of their research collection.

A unique role in the revival of Ukrainian culture was played by Ukrainian journals printed in the university printing house. They are “Ukrainskyi Vestnyk”⁴⁶ (1816-1819), “Ukrainian Journal” (1824-1825), “Ukrainian Almanakh” (1831), “Malorossiyskaya Starina”⁴⁷ (1824), “Snip” (1841) and others (see Ohiyenko, 1922; Hrushevsky, 1967; Holubenko, 1987; Siropolko, 2001; Polishchuk, 2015; Kubaichuk, 2020). Holubenko (1987) suggests this marked a starting point for Ukrainian

⁴⁵ concerning the ancient affairs of this region and written in a language that was formerly used here, but in recent years has changed significantly and is rapidly approaching Great Russian. [...] Concluding from this that the language would fall into complete oblivion, I wondered whether it would be useful to preserve it, as distinct from the Russian language, by publishing one of the aforementioned chronicles.

⁴⁶ Printed in Russian generally, but Hulak-Artemovsky's realistic satiric fable “Pan i Sobaka” was printed in one of the issues. The value of this fact lies in its being a sharp social commentary, which exposes the arbitrariness of landowners and expresses sympathy for the disenfranchised serfs, as well as in its use of folk language and colour.

⁴⁷ The magazine where historical documents were printed, e.g. Universals of Khmelnytsky, Mazepa, and Skoropadsky or some Cossack letters.

journalism. In 1819, the tsar introduced new censorship rules, according to which control over the publishing business was entrusted to special censorship committees. “Ukrainian Vestnyk” immediately received remarks and warnings from the censors, and at the beginning of 1820, its publication was stopped altogether (see Ohiyenko, 1922; Hrushevsky, 1967; Bushkovitch, 1991; Siropolko, 2001; Kubaichuk, 2020). However, despite all the bans, the Ukrainian language and literature continue to revive and develop underground.

Danylenko and Naienko (2018, p.33) refer to Bushkovitch (1991, pp. 348–349), stating that:

the years up to 1830 showed a fairly distinct pattern in Russian views of Ukraine. It was largely a Rousseauistic world characterized by patriotic, virtuous, and enlightened noblemen and an industrious and virtuous peasantry. The historic past was conceived as a component of an all-Russian patriotism, and the bygone days of the Kyiv Mohyla Academy found approval among educated Russians. Anti-Ukrainian views were extremely hard to find, the most that existed was a certain skepticism.

Bushkovitch, 1991, pp. 348–349 cited from Danylenko and Naienko, 2018, p.33

This confirms our statement regarding a certain flourishing of Ukrainian culture in the first quarter of the 19th century. This was due to the autonomy of universities in the development of public education in their districts. This autonomy was granted not least thanks to Karazin. Therefore, the emergence of a new Ukrainian language in the literary works of contemporary writers was initially received with interest (see Magocsi 1997, p.368), and the universities were the spaces that helped popularise them.

The ideas of Romanticism, in particular the nationalist component, began to cause concern in the tsarist regime. Siropolko (2001, p. 239) argues that the Decembrist uprising (1825) ultimately altered the views of the tsar and the government regarding education. They believed that such an uprising was the result of the ‘false direction of the school system’. Therefore, in 1826, the new tsar, Nicholas I, ordered the creation of a new school system project. The new university Statute was adopted in 1835, putting an end to academic freedom. The Minister of Public Education, Uvarov, proclaimed that education should be based on “православие, самодержавие, народность⁴⁸” (Siropolko, 2001, p. 239; Levytska, 2011, p.2; Polishchuk, 2015,

⁴⁸ Orthodox Christianity, autocracy, nationalism [meaning imperialistic, Great Russian nationalism]

pp.225-226). Oppression also took place directly on the ground. First, corporal punishment (which had been abolished by Rozumovsky) was reinstated. Second, Kostomarov's⁴⁹ dissertation, for example, was ordered to be destroyed because he criticised certain patriarchs in it. And in 1847, the right of free listeners to attend lectures was abolished. Levytska (2011) also states that the bourgeois revolutions in Europe increased the attention of authorities to the behaviour of the university students and forced them to eliminate subjects of public law in European countries and philosophy from the curriculum in 1849.

At the same time, changes also took place in Kyiv. Fearing the sentiments of the elites, who were rather suspicious of the authorities and sympathised with the Polish uprising of 1830–1831, the authorities set themselves the goal of russifying the Kyiv intelligentsia. The Polish uprising was followed by rebellions among peasants in the Kharkiv, Kherson and Chernihiv regions. In Podillia, Ustym Karmaliuk (1812-1835) led rebellions for 20 years (despite the authorities sending him to Siberia, he returned many times). As the Huslysty, Slavin and Yastrebov (1942, p. 107) write:

з селянських виступів, що покотилися по всій Росії, від 25 до 50 процентів припадало в різні роки на Україну. Багато селянських виступів завершувалось втручанням військової сили.⁵⁰

Huslysty, Slavin & Yastrebov, 1942, p. 107

And the reaction arrived. First, a massive influx of Russian to the cities started. As Pavlenko (2008, p. 141) mentions, “the city’s population swelled from 19,000 residents in 1797 to 50,137 in 1845”, the major part of which were workers brought from the north. This meant that the language landscape of the city had changed drastically, and speaking Russian was needed inside educational institutions, in state bodies, and on the streets.

Second, all Polish-language schools on the Right Bank were closed in 1831 (see Kubaichuk, 2020). Instead, Russian-language schools were opened. And in 1832, Russian was declared the only language allowed in all schools and courts (see Huslysty, Slavin & Yastrebov, 1942, p.105). As for higher education, Vilnius

⁴⁹ A Ukrainian historian

⁵⁰ “of the peasant uprisings that swept across Russia, 25 to 50 per cent occurred in Ukraine in various years. Many peasant uprisings ended with the intervention of military force.”

University and Kremenets Collegium were closed. Thus, it was decided to establish a university in Kyiv for this district in 1833. The library, laboratories, and thematic scientific collections were transported to Kyiv from these scientific institutions. The teachers were also brought to Kyiv. In 1834, the institution was solemnly opened, and all lectures were conducted in Russian (see Hryshevsky, 1967; Siropolko, 2001; Levytska, 2011). However, surprisingly, the Ukrainian language and culture developed relatively freely during the first years of university work in many regards, thanks to Maksymovych, its first rector. Yet, the other freedoms were limited. In 1835, Kyiv lost its Magdeburg right (as the cities of the Left Bank did during Catherine II's rule) (see Kubaichuk, 2020). Also, the Empire cancelled the Statutes of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and introduced imperial laws in the territories of Kyiv, Podillia, and Volyn. At this point in time, most of modern Ukraine was under Russian rule.

However, over the years, the use of the new Ukrainian literary language spread, particularly through university journals. The texts became bestsellers of their time. In 1819, the first attempt to codify the Ukrainian language appeared (if we disregard the grammar of Smotrytsky on the Ukrainian Church Slavonic) by Pavlovsky in his Grammar⁵¹ (see Nimchuk & Puriaieva, 2004). In 1827, Maksymovych proposed his own system of Ukrainian spelling based on etymological principles, in particular on the historical-etymological orthography of Kotliarevsky (see Nimchuk & Puriaieva, 2004). However, it was practically not used on the Left Bank. Their work (in parallel with the works of Kvitka-Osnovianenko, Hulak-Artemovsky, and others) claimed a status of a separate language for the new literary Ukrainian rather than a dialect of Russian. The imperial authorities could not agree to that (see Huslysty, Slavin & Yastrebov, 1942; Babych, 1993). Part of the Russian elite began to treat such an attitude with caution (see Danylenko & Naienko, 2018). Ivanova (2010, p.50) notes that Belinsky, Pogodin, Minde, Grech, Dobroliubov, and Katkov stated categorically that 'Little Russian' language is just a dialect spoiled by Polish and Scandinavian influences. Polishchuk (2015, p.227) adds that there were some representatives of the

⁵¹ In Russian: Грамматика малороссійскаго нарѣчія, full name: Грамматическое показаніе существеннѣйшихъ отличій, отдалившихъ Малороссійское нарѣчіе отъ чистаго Россійскаго языка, сопровождаемое разными по сему предмету замѣчаніями и сочиненіями; In modern Ukrainian: Правопис Павловського.

Russian elite who supported the ‘independence and autochthony’ of the new literary Ukrainian. They were Sreznevsky, Samarin, and Lavrovsky. While these discussions (see Holubenko, 1987; Shcherbak, 2005) were going on, the language was evolving, and the number of linguistic and literary works on this issue was growing.

Approaching the mid-19th century, it is worth mentioning Shevchenko’s influence. Although he was developing as an artist and engraver, his literary activity also attracted considerable interest. During those years, he lived in St. Petersburg, honing his artistic talents. However, his poems and verses were published in Ukrainian and became immensely popular in Ukraine. His literary work reflects the state of Ukrainian literature at that time (see Dziuba, 2005). Although Ukrainian was his main language of writing, he also wrote in Russian, albeit to a much lesser extent (see Shevchenko, 2001). In 1840, his first ‘*Kobzar*’ was published (see Kubaichuk, 2020). Its immense popularity helped establish the new literary Ukrainian. Raiska and Yanko (2014, p.3) say:

Таким чином, І. Котляревський започаткував нову українську літературну мову, використавши загальнонародні багатства української національної мови з високою майстерністю. [...] І. Котляревський, П. Гулак-Артемівський, Г. Квітка-Основ’яненко та інші письменники багато зробили для розвитку української літературної мови, її лексико-граматичної будови. А Т. Шевченко «вивів» українську мову «на шлях ширшого літературного розвою» (І. Огієнко), синтезував загальнонародні лексичні, фонетичні, граматичні особливості. [...] У мові Шевченка (у фонетиці, лексиці, наголосі, морфології, синтаксисі) майже відсутні діалектизми (навіть рідної йому Звенигородщини), селянське просторіччя. Якщо в «Енеїді» І. Котляревського ще не цілком унормована лексика [...], не відбита чітко фонетична система з її різноманітними змінами голосних і приголосних (радість і радість, [...]), не унормовані граматичні форми (милої і милої; [...]), то у творах Т. Шевченка простежується тенденція до унормування української літературної мови.⁵²

Raiska & Yanko, 2014, p.3

Thus, we can see that his practical contribution to the new literary Ukrainian language was immense. What is more, as Ohienko (1922) highlights that the use of

⁵² “Thus, I. Kotlyarevsky initiated a new Ukrainian literary language, using the rich heritage of the Ukrainian national language with great skill. [...] I. Kotlyarevsky, P. Hulak-Artemovsky, H. Kvitka-Osnovyanenko and other writers contributed greatly to the development of the Ukrainian literary language and its lexical and grammatical structure. And T. Shevchenko ‘led’ the Ukrainian language ‘on the path of broader literary development’ (I. Ohienko), synthesising the lexical, phonetic and grammatical features of the common people. [...] Shevchenko’s language (in phonetics, vocabulary, stress, morphology, and syntax) is almost devoid of dialectisms (even those of his native Zvenyhorod region) and peasant colloquialisms. While in I. Kotlyarevsky’s ‘Eneida’ the vocabulary is not yet fully standardised [...], the phonetic system with its various vowel and consonant changes (радість and радість, [...]) is not clearly reflected, and the grammatical forms (милої and милої; [...]), then in T. Shevchenko’s works there is a tendency towards the standardisation of the Ukrainian literary language.”

the name ‘Ukraine’ and the adjective ‘Ukrainian’ were finally established after this. Soviet researchers (see Huslysty, Slavin & Yastrebov, 1942) saw Shevchenko as an anti-monarchist who cared about the fate of “brotherly peoples”, but later studies show that Shevchenko’s poems, in keeping with the spirit of the times, were anti-imperialist and pro-nation-building. He raised the issue of separation from imperial Russia, emphasised the distinctiveness of the Ukrainian people and rejected the myth of “brotherly nations” (see Shkliar, 2013; Ivanyshyn, 2024; Tkachuk & Tkachuk, 2024).

From 1845, Ukrainian universities (in Kyiv and Kharkiv) were directly subordinate to the governors-general. As a result, formalism prevailed in the organisation of education, barracks-style rules were introduced and any initiative was suppressed (see Levytska, 2011). The creation of the Cyril and Methodius Society (i.e., the first Ukrainian secret political organisation) was a form of resistance to such reforms and attitudes towards the Ukrainian language and culture in general. This organisation was based on the traditions of the Ukrainian liberation and autonomy movement. Its members were graduates and teachers at Ukrainian universities: Vasyl Bilozersky, Mykola Hulak, Mykola Kostomarov, Panteleimon Kulish, and Opanas Markovich. Later, Heorhii Andruzkyi, Oleksandr Navrotskyi, Dmytro Pylchykiv, Ivan Posyada, Mykola Savych, Oleksandr Tulub, and Taras Shevchenko also joined the society (see Klymiuk, 1992; Butych, 2004).

The key activity of the society was the creation of program documents (see Butych, 2004) for political changes in the territory of modern Ukraine. Some members were enthusiastic about Pan-Slavism and were open to the creation of a confederation that would include people living in the modern territories of Poland, Lithuania, the Czech Republic, and Russia. Others had no doubt that only a popular uprising could abolish serfdom and overthrow the emperor. Kostomarov, for example, considered it quite possible to form a monarchical federation consisting of Ukraine and Russia (with elements of a republican system based on Cossack principles). In addition to lively discussions on political topics, members of the society were also engaged in educational activities. They raised funds for the opening of public schools, writing and publishing new books. For example, Kulish’s textbook on the history of Ukraine, “The Tale of the Ukrainian People” (1846) (see Klymiuk, 1992; Butych, 2004). After a

denunciation in early 1847 (see Klymiuk, 1992), members of the society were arrested. After the arrests and trials, it was also ordered to remove from sale the texts of the society's members, including Shevchenko's *'Kobzar'*. Actually, the greatest significance of this society, according to Subtelny (2009), lay not so much in the practical results of its work, but in the fact that it was the first attempt of the Ukrainian intelligentsia to resort to a political struggle for the national idea, thus becoming an example for future national liberation movements.

There was no trial of the society's members. They were punished by the emperor's personal decree. The case was hushed up, but information about the activation of the Ukrainian movement in 1845-1847 appeared in government institutions. St. Petersburg could not ignore this; therefore, on May 29, 1847, the Minister of Public Education Uvarov ordered the teachers of Kyiv University "to give priority to the Russian language, literature, and history in teaching and research." According to the minister, this was necessary in order to teach students:

"to think and feel in Russian, because in this way future members of society will form one big family with the same thoughts, with the same will, with the same feelings"

Boriak, 2013, p. 3-7.

In the same year, a "supreme commandment" appeared, which ordered that "writers reason very carefully where the nationality or language of Little Russia is concerned" (see Miller, 2013, p.70). Ohiyenko (1922, p.207) notes in this regard:

скоро цензорам було крепко наказано, аби вони пильно стежили за українською літературою, "не давая перевѣса любви къ родинѣ надъ любовью къ отечеству". І цензура почала викреслювати навіть з історичних пам'яток місця, де побачила "пристрастіє къ малороссійской народности"... Скажемо, так р. 1853 зовсім покалічила видання літопису Грбянки⁵³

Ohiyenko, 1922, p.207

He highlights the special attention of censors to the details concerning the 'Little Ukrainian' population. Furthermore, Ohiyenko (1922) highlights the essence of the falsification of historical documents, noting that historical documents were also subject to editing by censors.

⁵³ "Soon the censors were firmly ordered to closely monitor Ukrainian literature, «not allowing love for the family to prevail over love for the fatherland» And the censorship even began to erase from historical monuments places where it saw «passion for the Little Russian people»... Let's say, in 1853 it completely crippled the publication of the chronicle of Hrabianka"

But it is not only education that is undergoing even greater russification. The church sphere is also undergoing changes. Polishchuk (2015, p.228) notes that Archimandrite Anthony forbade the publication of sermons in Ukrainian, because

мова, якою написані ці проповіді, сама груба, провінційна, базарна, на якій не лише друкувати, а й говорити церковні повчання... не слід, щоб під виглядом всенародності, фальшивої простоти не спотворювати російську мову...⁵⁴

Cited from Polishchuk (2015, p.228)

Such a contemptuous attitude towards the Ukrainian language, even its perception as something shameful, contributed to the policy of the empire. In the postcolonial discourse, shame is important to trace the relations between the coloniser and the colonised. Naiem (2025) says that feeling shame makes a person feel lonely, and, thus, a lonely person fits best for being enslaved (turned into serfs in this case).

In fact, allowing the use of the Ukrainian language would have threatened the more independent development of the Ukrainian church, which was also threatening for the leaders of the Russian church. All printed non-religious press was also subject to censorship. Concluding on these changes, Polishchuk (2015, p.228) states that language was becoming politicised. This attitude towards the new literary Ukrainian was reflected in works of Russian scholars of the time. For instance, Pohodin (1856) in his article contends that ‘Little Ukrainians’ come from Turks. This statement does not stand up to any criticism. However, at that time, a lengthy debate ensued between Pogodin and Maksymovych.

Therefore, during the reign of Nicholas I, the situation with the Ukrainian language did not improve. It should be noted that political pressure eased somewhat during these years. However, this easing did not apply to language issues. The positive development of the Ukrainian language and culture took place rather despite than thanks to the state policy. The opening of universities (especially Kharkiv University) undoubtedly gave a temporary boost to the development of the new Ukrainian literary language, contributing to its development in every way. However, the central imperial authorities did not approve of this. According to existing legislation, Ukrainian was

⁵⁴ “the language in which these sermons are written is the most rude, provincial, and market-like, in which not only to print, but also to speak church teachings... one should not distort the Russian language under the guise of universality, false simplicity...”

excluded from formal education, and in cultural life, it was on the periphery. Attempts by some intellectuals to preserve the Ukrainian language were carried out primarily through informal educational initiatives and were often conducted secretly.

In the 1850s, a new wave of national revival took place essentially outside the borders of modern Ukraine, as Kulish, Kostomarov, and Shevchenko, who had previously been exiled for their participation in the Cyril and Methodius Society, were actively engaged in cultural and educational activities. For example, in 1856, Kulish established the spelling and grammar rules⁵⁵ for the new Ukrainian literary language (see Kubaichuk, 2020). We have already mentioned previous attempts to codify one or another version of the Ukrainian language. However, all subsequent Ukrainian spelling and grammar rules are based on *kulishivka*. The most progressive part of his spelling rules is the establishment of the use of the letters ‘i’ and ‘u’. What is more, *kulishivka* has become the layout for the similar spelling and grammar rules developed in the Ukrainian lands under Austria (see Ohienko, 1922; Nimchuk & Puriaieva, 2004, pp.73-74). Danylenko and Naienko (2018, p.34) reveal that

only several years later the Russian authorities began treating the latter phonetic orthography as a ‘graphic conspiracy’ aimed at extending the gap between the ‘all-Russian’ language and the ‘Little Russian dialect’ (see Miller and Ostapčuk 2006, pp. 32-36)

Danylenko & Naienko 2018, p.34

As outlined earlier, the language becomes a means of division between ‘Little Russians’ and ‘Great Russians’. The statements like that only confirm the politicised role of the language in the Russian Empire.

In 1855, Alexander II came to power. It was he who implemented many reforms to modernise the Russian Empire (some of which had been prepared under the previous tsar). These reforms were controversial in nature because, on the one hand, they stimulated the socio-economic development of the empire, but on the other hand, they further russified the Ukrainian population. The most famous reform of that time was the abolition of serfdom in 1861. However, as far as Ukraine was concerned, conditions were worse than in Russian lands, so most peasants either fell into debt or remained dependent on landowners (see Zhukovskyi & Subtelnyi, 1991; Shevchenko, 2013b).

⁵⁵ It was called *kulishivka* (named after the author’s surname)

The *zemstvo* reform of 1864, on the contrary, was positive for Ukraine, as it increased the role of the local intelligentsia (in the territories where it was implemented, see Burdin, 2015).

Alexander II's reforms in education were controversial. They combined elements of liberalisation aimed at modernising the education system and expanding access to education with a consistent policy of centralisation and russification (see Zhukovskiy & Subtelnyi, 1991; Serhiienko, 2010; Shevchenko, 2013b). Ohiyenko (1922, p.207-208) illustrates this period as:

З другої половини 50-х років скрізь повіяло вільним духом, почали голосно балакати про скасування кріпацтва. [...] Пішла велика культурна продукція українська. Книжки виходили одна за одною [...]. В Києві засновано тоді було “воскресні” школи, надруковано було багато українських підручників [...] Українське слово жваво йшло до народа, особливо р. 1861-1862, і вже 1862 року Петроградський комітет грамотности клопотався, аби дозволити вести освіту на Вкраїні рідною мовою [...] А р. 1862 школи “хлопоманам” позачиняли, обвинувачуючи їх в сепаратизмі⁵⁶

Ohiyenko, 1922, p.207-208, 214

Overall, the observations reveal that imperial politicians either introduced a relaxation of pressure and Ukrainianism, or, on the contrary, strengthened it. The practical realisation of these dynamics can be seen through the fact that a significant part of pro-Ukrainian work was done outside the territories of Ukraine. The examples are the activities of ex-members of Cyril and Methodius Society, or the influx of Ukrainian-language printing in Moscow and St. Petersburg. Polishchuk (2015, p.232) states:

на початку 1862 р. у С.-Петербурзі і Москві можна було вільно купити шість українських букварів різних авторів [...] Проте таке “багатство” не було характерне для власне українських теренів. Понад те, місцева влада чинила перепони на шляху поширення тут українського друкованого слова.⁵⁷

Polishchuk, 2015, p.232

Thus, the supply of Ukrainian books was great in Russia, but there was no demand while in the territory of Ukraine the demand was high, but there was no supply.

⁵⁶ “From the second half of the 1850s, a free spirit was everywhere, people began to talk loudly about the abolition of serfdom. [...] A great deal of Ukrainian cultural production followed. Books were published one after another [...]. “Sunday” schools were founded in Kyiv at that time, many Ukrainian textbooks were printed [...] The Ukrainian word was spreading rapidly among the people, especially in 1861-1862, and already in 1862 the Petrograd Literacy Committee was thinking to allow education in Ukraine in the native language. [...]

But in 1862, the schools of “peasant-philos” were closed, accusing them of separatism.”

⁵⁷ At the beginning of 1862, six Ukrainian primers by different authors could be freely purchased in St. Petersburg and Moscow [...]. However, such “wealth” was not typical for the Ukrainian territories themselves. Moreover, the local authorities created obstacles to the spread of the Ukrainian printed word there.

Trying to overcome this gap, Ukrainophiles from Kharkiv decided to send 6000 Ukrainian primers to Kyiv's popular schools, as Borodin (1969, p.75) describes. Metropolitan Arsenius requested clarification from the chief prosecutor of the Synod, Tolstoy, on this matter. This request reached the Minister of Education, Putyatin. He initiated consideration of this matter by the Main Censorship Department, and Metropolitan Arsenius was "recommended to reject the request to transfer Little Russian primers" Borodin (1969, p.154-155). This was explained by the fact that the revival of the 'Little Ukrainian' language and literature had a separatist nature and could be dangerous.

This dynamic, characteristic of the imperial language and education policy towards Ukrainian territories, reflected a cyclical model of 'opening and restriction', in which periods of moderate reforms were followed by phases of increased control over the linguistic and cultural spheres in order to reduce the risk of national mobilisation. What is more, the facts show that the empire was afraid of spreading the new literary Ukrainian, particularly in the territories of Ukraine. Another example of this is the publishing of 'Osnova' journal in St. Petersburg, where approximately 20 scientific papers by Ukrainian writers, scholars, public activists, and representatives of arts were published within 1861-1862 (see Ivanova, 2008, p.59).

On June 20, 1863, the order of the Minister of Internal Affairs of the Russian Empire, Pyotr Valuev, to ban the publication of books written in the 'Little Russian language' was published (see Ohienko, 1922; Subtelny, 2009; Snyder, 2004; Danylenko, 2010; Kubaichuk, 2020). In the text, Valuev speculates:

малороссийского языка не было, нет и быть не может, и что наречие их, употребляемое простонародием, есть тот же русский язык, только испорченный влиянием на него Польши [...] относительно печатания книг на малороссийском языке, сделать по цензурному ведомству распоряжение, чтобы к печати дозволялись только такие произведения на этом языке, которые принадлежат к области изящной литературы; пропуск же книг на малороссийском языке как духовного содержания, так учебных и вообще назначаемых для первоначального чтения народа, приостановит⁵⁸

Valuev, 1863

⁵⁸ There was no Little Russian language, there is none, and there cannot be one, and that their dialect, used by the common people, is the same as the Russian language, only corrupted by the influence of Poland [...] with regard to the printing of books in the Little Russian language, to issue an order through the censorship department that only works in this language belonging to the field of belles-lettres be allowed to be printed; the publication of books in the Little Russian language, whether of a spiritual nature, educational, or generally intended for the initial reading of the people, shall be suspended.

It is evident from the quote that the Ukrainian language was seen as inferior and corrupted. In fact, the permission to print fine literature proves that the authorities did not want to recognise the Ukrainian language as suitable for the realm of serious literature. The fact that the Minister of Internal Affairs issued an order on censorship and the suspension of the publication of religious and educational literature in Ukrainian indicates that such works were actively being written. This is proved by Danylenko (2010, p.10) saying “the year 1863 proved particularly rich in homiletic Ukrainian-language publications”. Moreover, we can argue that such prohibitions concerned the ‘Ukrainian question’ rather than imperial policy in general. Danylenko (2010, pp.9-10) reports that the Imperial Russian Bible Society was founded in 1812. As a result, the Bible was translated into more than 26 languages within the Russian Empire. Polishchuk (2015, p. 236) asserts that the Ukrainian language issue became crucial for St. Petersburg in the 1860s, as it entailed questions of identity and, thus, the political self-determination of Ukrainians.

As for education during this period, Tretiachenko (2020) tells that Ukrainian was banned, even as a supporting language, in primary schools. In the event that a teacher was caught using it, they could face fines, termination, or imprisonment. Students were told that ‘Little Russian’ is ‘ungrammatical’ and belongs to peasants only. Mokliak (2017) argues that at the beginning of Alexander II’s rule, universities felt more autonomous. Saying that he meant levelling the limits on the number of students, the permissions for international mobility, the possibility of importing books from abroad, and the reintroduction of public law and philosophy to the curriculum. However, the draft of the new rules was deemed harmful, and in 1863, a compromise version was adopted. On the one hand, freedoms for liberal university movements were preserved, but on the other hand, the St. Petersburg chancelleries still controlled educational processes (see Levytska, 2011; Mokliak, 2017). What is more, the autonomy did not concern the language issue, and Russian remained the main language of education. In 1865, the Imperial Novorossiysk University was founded in Odesa. Essentially, the new university faced the same problems as the Kharkiv and Kyiv universities (see Siropolko, 2001).

It was not only Valuyev's Circular that played a role in the russification of Ukraine. Incentives also played a role. For example, in 1869 (and again in 1886), the tsarist administration issued decrees granting additional payments to officials for their success in russifying Ukraine (see Ohiyenko, 1922, p. 212). In fact, these additional payments were not available to Little Russians.

The Valuyev Circular is one of the most well-known prohibitions of the Ukrainian language, but it is far from the first or the last. It was precisely because of this that the Ukrainian intelligentsia, as Ohiyenko (1922, p. 214) writes, “хитко оговтався і в такій скруті⁵⁹”. Siropolko (2001) mentions numerous student riots in the period between 1863 and the 1900s throughout the Empire. The essence of these riots was not a pro-Ukrainian position, but rather a demand for improved conditions for universities. As a result, censorship restrictions were somewhat relaxed in the early 1870s. The Ukrainian intelligentsia successfully capitalised on this opportunity.

Once again, Kharkiv University played an important role here. Its scholars' significant achievements in folklore studies and philology, especially their research into Ukrainian issues since the 1830s, laid the foundation for the work of the Kharkiv branch of the Hromada⁶⁰ movement and the Kharkiv Historical and Philological Society. The most prominent members of Kharkiv Hromada were Potebnia, Sumtsov, and Bahalii. They were trying to preserve the Ukrainian language and culture, extensively worked in the fields of ethnography, and published and spread books (see Hryshchuk, 1967; Ohiyenko, 1922, 1950; Subtelny, 2009). Potebnia worked in the framework of the contemporary Russian linguistics, but he also believed:

якщо не спасе нас ідея національності, що одна лише здатна пробудити як любов до науки і мистецтва, так і громадські поривання, то університет засуджений на довгочасну нікчемність. [...] Чи є тепер потреба в сполученні з великоруським народом? Якщо є, то які умови? Що говорять Москві спроби відділення України після Хмельницького? [...] Наші батьки і діди були тверді в своїй народності мимохіть; не будучи національно свідомі, вони могли ще залишатися українцями, але ми можемо бути міцні тільки свідомістю своєї відрубності⁶¹.

Cited from Siropolko, 2001, p.244

⁵⁹ quickly recovered from such hardship

⁶⁰ The Movement of Hromadas were societies that were created by ex-members of Cyril and Methodius Society, who lived in exile in St. Petersburg. The first Hromada was founded in St. Petersburg in 1859. It functioned as a cultural and educational organisation of the Ukrainian intelligentsia.

⁶¹ «If we are not saved by the idea of nationality, which alone is capable of awakening both a love of science and art and civic aspirations, then the university is doomed to long-term insignificance. [...] Is there now a need for union with the Great Russian people? If so, under what conditions? What do Moscow's attempts to separate Ukraine after Khmelnytsky

This quote proves that Potebnia had a clear understanding of the separateness of the Ukrainian people from the Russian people. In his research, he was interested not only in the everyday life of the past, but also in the political and social activities of previous generations. Also, the issue of academia as a centre of nation-building is evident in his texts.

The Kharkiv Historical and Philological Society was a scientific society in Kharkiv, created to promote, coordinate and popularise research in history, philology, ethnography and folklore, cultural studies and philosophy. Officially, it was part of the university, but in fact it became a platform for the implementation and development of Ukrainian studies in the broader context of censorship. Although officially the society operated within the framework of ‘Russian philology’, its members supported the Ukrainian scientific tradition and formed a terminological base that became the foundation for future Ukrainian studies (see Ohiyenko, 1922, 1950; Savchenko, 1930b; Hryshevskyi, 1967; Holubenko, 1987; Subtelny, 2009).

But it was not only Kharkiv that contributed to the development of the Ukrainian language and culture. In 1873, the South-Western Branch of the Russian Geographical Society was established in Kyiv (see Kubaichuk, 2020). This organisation was formally part of the Imperial Geographical Society. Its founders were representatives of the Kyiv Hromada (such as Antonovich, Vovk, Dragomanov, and others). The actual goal of the society was to study the ethnography, folklore, history, and language of the Ukrainian people. Its representatives conducted ethnographic expeditions, collected folklore, and even published their scientific works in the Ukrainian language. In 1876, after the adoption of the Ems Decree (see below), the society was declared a ‘nationalist centre’ and shut down (see Ohiyenko, 1922, 1950; Savchenko, 1929, 1930b; Hryshevskyi, 1967; Holubenko, 1987). Furthermore, it was forbidden for Dragomanov and Chubynsky to live in the territories of Ukraine according to the aforementioned decree.

Constant student unrest and all-European movements of national awakening unsettled the tsarist regime. Thus, riding the wave of enthusiasm for the ‘peasant-

say? [...] Our fathers and grandfathers were unwavering in their nationality without even trying; without being nationally conscious, they could still remain Ukrainians, but we can only be strong through our awareness of our separateness.»

loving' movement in Kyiv, the Ems Decree was issued (see the full text in Appendix C). Savchenko (1930b) reports that all these limitations were implemented as a reaction to Ukrainian national awakening movements. The Decree is divided into three parts, corresponding to the governing bodies to which it was addressed. The first part is directed to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. According to the decree, no books could be printed in the 'Little Russian dialect', even those belonging to entertainment literature. In addition, any translations into the 'Little Russian dialect' were also prohibited. Historical documents were allowed to be reprinted, bringing them into line with "common Russian spelling" (cited from Savchenko, 1930b, p.381), i.e. Kulish's spelling was prohibited. However, these historical documents could only include folklore. Since, at the time of the Valuev Circular, some literature was semi-legally imported from abroad (i.e. Galicia), the import of printed publications in the 'Little Russian dialect' also became illegal. The Ems Decree also banned the printing of the newspaper "Kyivsky Telegraph" ("in view of the harmful influence of the newspaper", cited from Savchenko, 1930b, p.382), but provided funding for the pro-Russian newspaper "Slovo", which was published in Austrian-ruled Ukraine.

The second part was directed to the Ministry of Public Education, ordering to:

Усилить надзор со стороны местного учебного начальства, чтобы не допускать в первоначальных училищах преподавания каких бы то ни было предметов на малорусском наречии⁶²

cited from Savchenko, 1930b, p.382

The idea of stronger control over primary schools' language of instruction was elaborated in the following points. Firstly, orders were given to compile lists of all teachers in the educational districts (Kharkiv, Kyiv, Odesa) with a note on the reliability of each in relation to Ukrainian nationalist tendencies. Those who were marked as *unreliable* had to be transferred to work in other, i.e. Great Russian, districts. A footnote to the decree states that

Признавалось бы полезным принять за общее правило, чтобы в учебные заведения округов: Харьковского. Киевского и Одесского назначить преподавателей

⁶² "Strengthen supervision by local educational authorities to prevent the teaching of any subjects in the Little Russian dialect in primary schools."

преимущественно великоруссов, а малоруссов распределить по учебным заведениям С.-Петербургского, Казанского и Оренбургского округов.⁶³

cited from Savchenko, 1930b, p.382

This once again confirms that a planned mixing of the population was taking place for the purpose of its further russification. Moreover, in this case, the target group was not the general public, but the intelligentsia. Last but not least, the libraries should be cleaned of all the existing books with historical materials written in ‘Little Ukrainian’ dialect and standing out of line with ‘common Russian spelling’. The Ministry also had to close the Kyiv Branch of the Imperial Geographical Society.

The third part of the decree was directed to “the department of his imperial majesty’s own chancellery” (cited from Savchenko, 1930b, p.383) in order to expel Dragomanov and Chubinsky.

Looking at this decree, one can see how the empire works both to destroy and prevent the emergence of conditions for public education in the native language. This marginalises Ukrainian and reduces it to domestic use only. We also observe an increasingly narrow access to genres published in Ukrainian. In fact, the only texts that could be published in Ukrainian were songs, fairy tales, and proverbs. And even these genres had to pass through a censorship committee. Therefore, with few exceptions, Ukrainians did not have access to any literature (entertainment, scientific, or practical) in their native language. The artificial relocation of teaching staff was also intended to promote the assimilation of Russians and Ukrainians. After all, although it is impossible to control the use of Ukrainian in the classroom 100%, it becomes unnecessary when the teacher does not understand Ukrainian a priori. Given the political activity of public, cultural and ethnographic societies in Ukraine (see Savchenko, 1929), this ban was a direct response and a way to restrict any cultural activity in Ukraine.

In 1881, certain changes were made to the Ems Decree, allowing performances to be staged in Ukrainian, provided that (1) the same performance was also staged in

⁶³ “It would be useful to adopt as a general rule that educational institutions in the districts of Kharkiv, Kyiv, and Odesa should appoint teachers who are predominantly Great Russians, while Little Russians should be distributed among educational institutions in the districts of St. Petersburg, Kazan, and Orenburg’. Kyiv, and Odesa districts to appoint teachers who are predominantly Great Russians, and to distribute Little Russians among educational institutions in the districts of St. Petersburg, Kazan, and Orenburg.”

Russian, and (2) it was approved by the local authorities (see Magocsi, 1997, p.376). It is also worth noting that Ukrainian theatre and drama flourished during this period (see Huslysty, Slavin & Yastrebov, 1942, p. 125). Ohienko (1922, p.223) points out that plays featuring intellectuals as characters were banned from being performed in Ukrainian “аби не вийшло, що “мужичою” мовою може балакати і освічена людина⁶⁴” but as this does not particularly fit into the theme of our study, we will not dwell on it in detail.

Danylenko and Naienko (2018, p.35) confirm our conclusion when commenting on these prohibitive law acts:

What was common about the regulations of 1863, 1876, and 1881 is that they were all aimed at the elimination of the Ukrainian language from public use, something that ultimately halted the whole nation-building process in Russian-controlled Ukraine.

Danylenko & Naienko, 2018, p.35

An extremely thorough study in this area was conducted by Makar (2014). The researcher analysed a corpus of published archival materials of the Russian Empire concerning discrimination against the Ukrainian language in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. She systematised these documents according to thematic and chronological criteria and analysed the content and forms of prohibitions. Accordingly, Makar (2014, p. 51) concludes

з 1876 по 1917 рр., тобто тільки за 40 років, у Російській імперії з’явилося понад 400 документів заборонного характеру по відношенню до української мови й українського національно-визвольного руху. Вони включають не 400, а значно більше заборонних актів, оскільки переважна більшість документів містить по кілька заборон, що спрямовані на різні об’єкти. Ці матеріали слугують яскравим підтвердженням виразної антиукраїнської національно-мовної політики царської Росії, спрямованої на нівеляцію української ідентичності.⁶⁵

Makar, 2014, p.51

During the reigns of Alexander II, Alexander III, and Nicholas II, the general vector of LP towards Ukraine remained consistent (see Hryshevskyi, 1967; Ohienko, 1922, 1950; Subtelny, 2009), namely, russification and restrictions on the Ukrainian

⁶⁴ so that it would not appear that educated people could speak the “peasant” language

⁶⁵ “From 1876 to 1917, i.e. in just 40 years, more than 400 prohibitive documents relating to the Ukrainian language and the Ukrainian national liberation movement appeared in the Russian Empire. They include not 400, but significantly more prohibitive acts, since the vast majority of documents contain several prohibitions aimed at different objects. These materials serve as vivid confirmation of the pronounced anti-Ukrainian national and linguistic policy of tsarist Russia, aimed at levelling Ukrainian identity.”

language in education, administration, printing, and public life. The difference between their approaches lay in the degree of severity, the mechanisms of implementation, and the context in which the policy was applied. Siropolko (2001) states that ‘nothing interesting’ happened in school education policies in the last decade of the 19th century.

Nicholas II is known for his reforms, but the reality is that he was forced to relax his policy after the 1905 revolution. For example, in 1895, the Main Directorate for Press Affairs issued a special decree prohibiting the publication of children’s books in Ukrainian.

The famous Stolypin reforms partially weakened censorship (for example, allowing Ukrainian newspapers and magazines to be printed) and also permitted the activities of Prosvita⁶⁶ (see Hryshevskyi, 1967; Ohiyenko, 1922, 1950; Subtelny, 2009; Snyder, 2004; Plokyh, 2006). Ukrainian schools could be opened as private or Sunday schools, although the Ems Decree was not officially abolished. In the judicial and administrative spheres, the Ukrainian language remained completely banned (see Ohiyenko, 1922).

However, the changes were temporary. Russian Minister of Internal Affairs Stolypin issued a circular instructing governors not to permit the establishment of “инородческие⁶⁷” societies, including those of Ukrainian and Jewish origin, regardless of their objectives. After that, practically all Prosvita societies, except those in the Katerynoslav⁶⁸ Governorate, were closed (see Shevelov, 1987, p.54). It is also worth noting, however, that there were some attempts to create Ukrainian-Russian dictionaries during this period, despite Russian attempts to lower the prestige of the Ukrainian language (see Demianiuk, 2006, pp. 18-19).

With the outbreak of World War I, the government became increasingly frightened by Ukrainian independence movements. In the summer of 1914, all Ukrainian newspapers and magazines were shut down in the Russian Empire. Regional centres and Ukrainian publishing houses were also closed, and printing anything in the

⁶⁶ See more on what Prosvita is in Chapter 2.2.2.

⁶⁷ “foreign” [pejorative]

⁶⁸ Today: Dnipropetrovsk region

Ukrainian language was prohibited. Many Ukrainian activists were exiled from Ukraine (see Yefremov, 1991, pp.125-126). To prove this, we incorporate the table from Danylenko (2017, p.63):

Province	Periodicals	
	Russian	Ukrainian
Xarkiv	340	14
Katerynoslav (now Dnipropetrovsk)	267	10
Poltava	198	30
Podillja	113	3
Volhyn	107	3
Černihiv	90	3
Tavrija (Crimea)	350	0

Table 2. Numbers of periodicals printed in Ukraine, 1914

As offensive operations progressed, Russian imperial troops occupied Galicia and Bukovyna, where they immediately banned the printing of books, newspapers, and magazines in the Ukrainian language. They also banned the activities of the “Prosvita” society, destroyed its materials, closed all Ukrainian schools, and began to oppress the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church. Similar Polish institutions were not affected by the ban (see Doroshenko, 1932, pp.6-10).

One of the first steps regarding the field of education was active training for Russian-speaking teachers in various cities of Galicia. Shevelov (1987) claims that such a policy indicates Russia’s attempt to influence the linguistic environment of the region through education and increase its cultural influence. From the beginning of the occupation, measures to russify school education were taking place. In September 1914, Russian occupiers began to introduce teaching in the Russian language in primary and secondary schools. The Russian language had to be taught for at least 5 hours every week in each class; teaching in the Ukrainian language was prohibited. Hrushevskyi (1967) describes the situation witnessed in Galicia:

Галичина під час окупації опинила ся в руках всякої поліцейської й чиновничої наволочи, котру посилено сюди на посади, а вона, користуючи з воєнного стану, робила, що хотіла: не тільки буквально грабила дома і людей, знушала ся з людности, української й жидівської, але й від себе додавала жару руйнуванню українського життя, її культурних сил. Місцями напр. поголовно висилано українських священиків, або всю інтелігенцію, ціли маси свідовіших селян і міщан. Все се самим нелюдським

способом хапали в чім застали, арештували, волочили по вязницях і етапами висилали в Сибір, без ріжниць, жінок, дітей, старців, хорих і калік.⁶⁹

Hrushevskyi, 1967, p.539 (original spelling preserved)

This quote describes the contemptuous attitude of the Russian Empire not only towards the Ukrainian language as such, but also towards the entire population of Ukraine. Thus, we can state that russification was of strategic importance for the Russian Empire, as it was aimed at the assimilation of the Galician population into Russian culture (see Shcherbak, 2005; Boriak, 2013), demonstrating Russia's political and cultural approach to linguistic hegemony in the region.

To summarise imperial policies towards Ukraine, we decided to consider the approaches of other scholars. Pavlenko (2011b, p.335) distinguishes four periods of imperial language management as follows:

- (1) linguistic autonomy (1721–1830),
- (2) selective russification (1830–1863),
- (3) expanding russification (1863–1905), and
- (4) retrenchment of russification (1905–1917)

Pavlenko, 2011b, p.335

She also concludes that:

turning everyone into Russians was never a goal of Russian nationality and language policies, nor was language the main criterion for Russianness: it was habitually trumpeted by social class and religion.

Pavlenko, 2011b, p.348

Indeed, some scholars support the view that there was no consistent policy of russification in the Russian Empire. For example,

the prerevolutionary Russian government had neither the means nor even the desire to extirpate all non-Russian languages

Weeks, 2001, p.96

However, the number of prohibitions aimed at suppressing the 'Ukrainian languages', their multi-vector nature (social, religious, and scientific), and duration

⁶⁹ During the occupation, Galicia found itself in the hands of all sorts of police and bureaucratic scum who had been sent here to take up positions, and they, taking advantage of the martial law, did whatever they wanted: not only did they literally rob houses and people, mocking the Ukrainian and Jewish populations, but they also added fuel to the destruction of Ukrainian life and its cultural forces. In some places, for example, Ukrainian priests were deported en masse, or the entire intelligentsia, whole masses of the more conscious peasants and townspeople. All this was done in the most inhuman way: they grabbed people wherever they found them, arrested them, dragged them to prisons and sent them to Siberia in stages, without distinction of women, children, the elderly, the sick and the disabled.

over time make us doubt such conclusions. Here, it is important to pay attention to the periodisation proposed by Danylenko and Naienko (2018, p.24, 37), where scholars clearly outline the periods of the Russian Empire's russification LP. They actually operate with the imperial policy towards Ukrainian Church Slavonic (1627–1720–1790s), Ruthenian (1720–1790s), and new literary Ukrainian (1800–1914) (Danylenko & Naienko, 2018, p.24, 37).

Conclusions and Comments:

In our analysis, we proceed from the different levels of colonisation: (1) pre-imperial (before 1721), (2) imperial up to the October Revolution (1917).

Thus, to briefly summarise the pre-imperial period, we must state that russification was not comprehensive, as it primarily focused on the religious field. However, this scale can also be explained by the relatively autonomous political (and thus secular) position of the Left Bank at the time. Thus, we can state that the comparatively small scale of russification was due to a lack of means rather than a lack of intention.

Undoubtedly, the least favourable periods for the development of the Ukrainian language were the reigns of Catherine II and Alexander II. Although Catherine II did not introduce direct language bans similar to the later Ems Decree, it was during her reign that the institutional foundations for the systematic russification of Ukraine were laid. On her initiative, the remnants of Ukrainian political autonomy were eliminated. In particular, the Hetmanate was abolished in 1764, and the Zaporizhzhia Host was destroyed in 1775. The educational reforms of the 1780s led to the decline of the traditions of the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy and the integration of the Ukrainian education system into the imperial space. At the same time, Catherine II actively promoted the concept of 'Great Russians', within which Ukrainians were to be assimilated as 'Little Russians'. The subordination of the church to St. Petersburg and the liquidation of the Ukrainian army eliminated potential centres of cultural and military resistance, thereby strengthening imperial control in the linguistic and ideological spheres.

It should be noted that the oppression of the Ukrainian Church Slavonic led to the emergence of a new Ukrainian literary language at the end of the 18th century.

Thanks to the productive work of Ukrainian authors of that time and the popularity of texts written in new literary Ukrainian, at some point, when it became clear that this vernacular was no longer perceived as a dialect of Russian, but rather as a separate language.

Although Alexander II's reign is often characterised as an era of 'great reforms' and a certain liberalisation, it was during this period that the imperial LP towards Ukraine was institutionalised. After a brief upswing in the Ukrainian cultural movement in the 1860s, linked to the activities of communities and the publication of the magazine "Osnova", the government perceived the growth of Ukrainian national consciousness as a threat to state unity. In this context, the Valuev Circular of 1863 was issued, restricting the printing of religious, educational and popular literature in the Ukrainian language, officially denying the very existence of a separate Ukrainian language. Despite the emperor's reformist image, this policy effectively initiated systematic censorship and laid the ideological foundation for further prohibitions at the end of the 19th century. The Ems Decree consolidated previous steps towards the formalisation of the russification discourse, which combined administrative control with the denial of the linguistic identity of Ukrainians within the concept of a 'united Russian nation'.

In addition, having analysed the historical timeline, we can prove that the Russian Empire was treating Ukrainian as a regional variety of Russian not only in theory, but in practice. Ferguson (1959) refers to a situation where variants of the same language have different prestige as diglossia (applicable also in a postcolonial perspective, usually talking about creoles). According to this theory, there is a distinction between the "high variant" (=H) and the "low variant" (=L). Ferguson (1959, p.227) notes that Classical Arabic or classical French is H, and the Egyptian variant of Arabic or French Creole is L. Even though Ukrainian and Russian are not varieties of the same language. Testing Ferguson's theory on the role of the Ukrainian language in the Russian Empire, we have to present the main differences between H and L that were applied to Russian and Ukrainian in the Empire:

(1) Function: Ferguson (1959, p. 328-329) argues that the contexts in which a particular language variant is used determine whether it belongs to H or L. Adapting

his approach to modern realities, we can say that H includes those language variants used in religious ceremonies, speeches by government officials, education, news broadcasts, and certain types of literature. L is used in communication with service personnel, as well as in informal settings with colleagues, friends, family, and through cartoons and entertainment media content. Thus, in fact, Ukrainian was banned from use in religious contexts, official communications were held in Russian, education in Ukrainian was limited and then banned, and the genres of ‘high’ literature were to be written in Russian.

(2) Prestige: The linguistic prestige of H is much higher than that of L. Ferguson (1959, p. 330) also states that sometimes “H alone is regarded as real and L is reported ‘not to exist’.” The proof of such an attitude is reflected in the statements of the local officials (e.g., Catherine II), the local experts (e.g., Lomonosov), and perceived by the population (as described by Siropolko, Danylenko in their quotes).

(3) Literary heritage: it is believed that for a language to be considered H, “a sizable body of written literature” should not only exist, but also be recognised by members of the community. In reality, the literary heritage of Ukrainian existed and was recognised by members of the community, but the Russian Empire was working on changing this situation in two ways. First, constant bans on printing in Ukrainian aimed to prevent the appearance of new literary works in Ukrainian. Secondly, the existing literary works were appropriated by the Empire (e.g., samples of Ukrainian baroque literature).

(4) Acquisition: L is often spoken in informal domains; thus, children acquire it naturally in the context, while H is taught through educational institutions. This parameter perfectly reflects the situation. As we have seen from Siropolko’s research, students often struggled to understand their teachers, especially in primary school. Russian was acquired in institutional settings. The only environment where Ukrainian could have been acquired was at home.

(5) Standardisation: The level of standardisation is high for H. Little or no variation is allowed in orthography, pronunciation, etc. Simultaneously, the normative studies of L may be slight in quantity or non-existent altogether. The Russian language standard was studied and promoted in schools and via printed means. Normative

studies of Ukrainian were conducted only on a volunteer basis. The implementation of the results of these studies was not encouraged (e.g., *kulishivka*).

(6) Stability: Ferguson (1959, p.332) states that “Diglossia typically persists at least several centuries”. The oppression of the Ukrainian language and attempts to turn it into L of Russian started in the second half of the 17th century and lasted till the Empire fell apart (at the beginning of the 20th century).

Ferguson (1959) also provides us with some other characteristics of this notion, but the listed ones are sufficient for our research. So, when it comes to the Russian imperial context and the Ukrainian language, this scheme can only be applied partially. The most important point is that, since the Ukrainian language was not recognised as separate and was considered to be a dialect of the Russian language, the empirical language policies worked on changing the status of the ‘Ukrainian languages’ to L of Russian.

Generally, imperial reforms in education demonstrate the ambivalence characteristic of imperial policies between modernisation aspirations and the instrumentalisation of education as a means of linguistic control. Formally aimed at improving literacy and modernising educational institutions, these reforms also laid the groundwork for mechanisms to strengthen russification, which were intended to ensure the cultural and linguistic integration of the Ukrainian population into the imperial space. From a sociolinguistic perspective, such a policy can be seen as a manifestation of ‘cyclical stabilisation’ – alternating periods of liberalisation and repressive regulation designed to reduce the risks of forming an autonomous linguistic identity. Thus, educational reform not only reflected the internal contradictions of the empire’s modernisation project but also became an instrument of symbolic domination through language as a vehicle of power.

2.2.2. Ukrainian Lands under Austrian Rule (LP and education)

Galicia

Before Austria took control, Galicia had been part of Poland for a long time. However, the Polish nobility began to wield more power than the Ukrainian nobility. And when it came to Galicia, language was closely tied to religion. The Polish authorities and the Polish nobility tried in every way to ‘*polonise*’ the Ruthenians⁷⁰ population. In 1596, part of the Ukrainian Orthodox clergy restored unity with the Catholic Church by concluding the Union of Brest, under which the UGCC retained the Eastern rite and traditions and was considered *Ecclesia sui iuris*⁷¹ in communion with the Pope, and thus was completely independent. This led to the creation of the Uniate Church⁷². In fact, in the absence of its own rulers, the church was sometimes the only institution that represented the interests of its people (see Shevchuk, 2024). Therefore, as Melnychuk (2024) argues, from the second half of the 17th century, most Ukrainian schools existed with the support of the Uniates (mainly the Order of Saint Basil the Great) (see Siropolko, 2001, pp.100-104) and the Orthodox (Lviv Dormition Brotherhood⁷³). This statement remained true till the mid-19th to early 20th century, as evidenced in Bachynskyi (1924). Hrushevskyi (2002, p. 490) describes it as follows:

русини. Перед своїм пробудженням, що відбулося в останні десятиліття XIX ст., вони становили майже винятково етнографічну масу, що складалася з цілковито придушеного, темного й доведеного до крайнього економічного виснаження селянства, в той час як єдину інтелігенцію (вельми невисокої якості) складало духовенство. І [...] польські шляхтичі, у 1860-ті рр. урочисто заявляли в Галицькому сеймі, що вони не знають русинського народу — знають лише хлопів і попів (*niema Rusi, są popi i chłopi*).⁷⁴

Hrushevskyi, 2002, p. 490

⁷⁰ In this Chapter, I will be using the word ‘Ukrainian’ in this context even though at the time it was not widely used unless in quotations.

⁷¹ The term refers to the church that has its own legal and institutional autonomy and can celebrate the liturgy according to its own rite rather than the Latin one, while remaining in full communion with the Catholic Church.

⁷² In Latin: *Ecclesia Graeco-Catholica Ucrainae*; Modern name: Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, abbreviated: UGCC
⁷³ one of the oldest Brotherhood Orthodox organisations established in 1439; converted into Uniates in 1708.

⁷⁴ Rusyns. Before their awakening in the last decades of the 19th century, they constituted almost exclusively an ethnographic mass consisting of a completely oppressed, ignorant peasantry reduced to extreme economic exhaustion, while the clergy constituted the only intelligentsia (of very low quality). And [...] Polish nobles solemnly declared in the Galician Sejm in the 1860s that they did not know the Rusyn people — they only knew peasants and priests (*there are no Ruthenians, only priests and peasants are known [written in Polish]*).

In 1772, the First Partition of Poland occurred, during which the territory of Galicia was transferred to the Habsburg Monarchy. To be more precise, the Kingdom of Galicia and Lodomeria⁷⁵ came under the rule of the Habsburg crown. Accordingly, the empire began to introduce new rules in the newly acquired territories. The first such step, which is important for our research, was Maria Theresa's decision to open a general seminary for Ukrainians from Galicia and Transcarpathia at St. Barbara's Church in Vienna (thus called "Barbareum"). Since most schools were located in parishes, the education of priests had a direct influence on the education of the people. One nuance was that the programme taught at the "Barbareum" did not include any courses in Ukrainian, but the students were required to conduct catechism in the 'local vernacular'. This seminary operated until 1784, when a seminary was opened in Lviv itself (see Siropolko, 2001, pp.489-492). In general, with the arrival of Austrian rule, German became the official language of administration and education, allowing 'newcomers' to integrate into the empire. However, the use of Polish and/or Ukrainian was allowed as a means of communication at the primary stages of education.

The second step was the school reform of 1776-1783 in Galicia. As mentioned earlier, the level of popular education was relatively low, primarily due to the lack of suitable conditions for study, as noted by Siropolko (2001). Krevetskyi (1909, p.41) comments on the situation of those years in Lviv district as follows:

є ледве десять правдивих учителів, одначе з них тільки двоє (у Підкамені і Залізцях) вчать дітей писати, читати, рахувати і початків латини, решта учителів вміє тільки польському читати⁷⁶

Krevetskyi, 1909, p.41

This quote demonstrates that the situation in Galicia was not significantly different from that under Russian Rule, in that teachers did not share a common language with the students, and thus, education itself was hardly possible.

Before Maria Theresa's reforms, education was considered the responsibility of the church. But after these reforms, education came under the control of the state. Romanova (2003, p. 248) noted that Maria Theresa saw education as a unifying factor

⁷⁵ The Ruthenian Part of Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth

⁷⁶ There are barely ten real teachers, but only two of them (in Pidkamen and Zaliztsi) teach children to write, read, count, and the basics of Latin; the rest of the teachers can only read in Polish.

that would help strengthen the multinational state. Felbiger was already a well-known educational reformer in Austria (see Romanova, 2003). Therefore, he was invited to reform the education system in Galicia so that it could comply with ‘*Allgemeine Schulordnung*⁷⁷’. We will not mention all of his innovations, but it is essential to note that it was thanks to him that single-class church-parish schools with instruction in the native language were introduced, allowing individuals to continue their education. School commissions were also created to develop curricula, teaching methods, and approve the use of textbooks. School attendance was compulsory for all children aged 6 to 12. Boys and girls studied together. His education system is similar to the one we have today (see Subtelny, 2009; Kurliak, 1997; Romanova, 2003). However, it is important to note that the plan was not perfectly implemented.

Krevetskyi (1909, p.41) points out that, due to the fact that school commissions consisted of representatives from both Catholic and UGCC Consistories, the issue of the Ukrainian language was tackled for the first time. He says that common people in eastern Galicia do not speak Polish, only “eine Art der russischen oder illyrischen Sprache⁷⁸”. Siropolko (2001, p.500) summarises:

реформа 1774 р. не принесла великих змін в українськiм шкiльництвi: всi новi школи в своїй бiльшостi були з польською викладовою мовою. Бiльше того, багато дякiвських шкiл позакривано на початку ХІХ ст. у зв’язку з покликанням дякiв до вiйськової служби, хоч придворна ухвала звiльняла їх вiд вiйськової служби: так польськi магнати хотiли позбутися учителiв, якi могли вчити українських дiтей рiдною мовою.⁷⁹

Siropolko (2001, p.500)

The scholar’s words once again confirm that (1) official orders are rarely implemented by the book, (2) there was a certain struggle for influence in the region between Ukrainians and Poles, (3) Poles, as before the partition of Poland, were engaged in the Polonisation of Ukrainians, albeit indirectly.

It was only in 1787 that the school commission recognised the Ukrainian language as regional. Thus, the local intelligentsia began asking the government to

⁷⁷ General School Regulations

⁷⁸ “a type of Ruthenian or Illyrian (!C.) language”

⁷⁹ “The reform of 1774 did not bring about major changes in Ukrainian education: most of the new schools used Polish as the language of instruction. Moreover, many deacon schools were closed at the beginning of the 19th century due to the conscription of deacons into military service, even though a court ruling exempted them from military service: this was how Polish magnates wanted to get rid of teachers who could teach Ukrainian children in their native language.”

open schools with Ukrainian as the language of instruction. However, Levytskyi (1934, pp. 113-114) points out that there is no evidence of any such school being opened. We can suggest that the lack of qualified teachers was partially a consequence of the lack of local HEIs.

Joseph II proclaimed German an official state language. He reopened Lviv University⁸⁰ in 1784 (see Subtelny, 2009; Rindler Schjerve, 2003). Three years later, at the request of Uniate Bishop Bilansky, “*Studium Ruthenum*”⁸¹ were established at the university. Firstly, since the prestige of the Ukrainian language was extremely low, no clear scientific terminology had been developed, and teachers often resorted to Polish, especially in written materials. Some of the teachers did not actually know Ukrainian and therefore taught the entire course in Polish. Therefore, in 1797, the province ordered that Ukrainian be spoken among themselves. And in 1809, Lviv Metropolitan Angelovich decreed that every seminarian had to pass an exam in Ukrainian, otherwise they would not be admitted to ordination (see Androkhovych, 1925, pp.54-55). This institution did not prove to be very effective at the time. However, it sowed the seeds for the Ukrainian scientific renaissance. It was the students of the “*Studium Ruthenum*” who played a significant role in the national revival of Galicia in the 1830s and the 1848–1849 revolution in the Austrian Empire (see Siropolko, 2001). In 1809, “*Studium Ruthenum*” was closed as it was primarily planned as a temporary institution that would bridge the gap between the Ukrainian people and science. However, Ukrainian-language education did not last long during this period, as the Education Commission of the Polish Sejm⁸² ordered the closure of Ukrainian church schools and the removal of Ukrainian-language teaching from all other types of schools in 1789 (see Siropolko, 2001, pp. 111–112).

Another interesting point in the linguistic and educational development of Galicia at that time was the Stauropegion Institute. It was founded on the basis of the Lviv Dormition Brotherhood. The Stauropegion Institute was active in the fields of pedagogy, education, science, and publishing, and had a museum and archive (see

⁸⁰ In 1661, the Jesuit college was transformed into a university by decree of King Jan II Kazimierz. However, in 1773, the Jesuit order was banned and the university was closed.

⁸¹ Scientific institute for training candidates for positions as Greek Catholic priests

⁸² Polish name for Polish Parliament

Siropolko, 2001). This institution did not engage in much educational activity, but it did contribute to cultural development. Later, representatives of the Moscowphile⁸³ movement took over the leadership of the institute, and therefore most of the works were published in ‘yazychie’⁸⁴.

Last but not least, it is important to say that the language landscape in general was changing due to ‘*Galiziendeutsche*’⁸⁵. These were German-speaking migrants from other parts of the Empire who came for work, business, or administrative purposes (see Lepucki, 1938). The majority of them arrived between 1782 and 1789. Some of them were helping to develop and modernise local agriculture, while others worked for the empire to control local authorities. Sometimes they were establishing the villages of their own, and sometimes they were mixed with local populations. Their descendants returned within Hitler’s ‘*Heim ins Reich*’⁸⁶ program (1940), escaped from the Soviets or were killed by them (1944-1945) (see Röska-Rydel, Boockmann, Conze, & Prinz, 1999; Lumans, 2003).

The rule of Leopold II was short (1790-1792), and there were no changes in LP towards Ukraine. With the coronation of Francis II, some changes occurred. Siropolko (2001) lists a number of language-related regulations:

- (1) 1805: The Austrian authorities abolished Lviv University and established a lyceum in its place. This decision was motivated by the fact that there were too many universities in Eastern Galicia. And since Krakow fell under Austrian rule after the third partition of Poland in 1795, there was no need for Lviv University. Its activities were resumed only in 1817, but the languages of instruction were only German and Latin (see Siropolko, 2001, p.512).

⁸³ A movement among the Ukrainian population of Galicia, Bukovyna, and Transcarpathia, who had pro-Russian linguistic, literary, and socio-political views, advocated the idea of national and cultural unity with the Russian people. They were generously funded by the Russian emperor. Ideologically, Western Ukrainian Moscowphiles emerged from the struggle against the Poles, but they were also opponents of the *Narodovtsi* (a socio-political movement among the young Western Ukrainian intelligentsia of a liberal orientation).

⁸⁴ Yazychie was an artificially created literary language used in Galicia, Bukovyna, and Transcarpathia, mainly by Moscowphiles. It was a combination of the local vernacular and Ukrainian Church Slavonic, but there was no clear codification. Therefore, most peasants could hardly understand what was written.

⁸⁵ Galician Germans

⁸⁶ Back home to Reich

(2) 1805: a decree that an order transferring direct supervision of education from the state to Latin consistories. The author states that this enabled the Catholics to slow down the development of Ukrainian schooling. To prove that, Siropolko (2001, p. 501) illustrates that “польська шляхта 1812 р. скасувала шкільну повинність на Галичині.⁸⁷”. However, he also admits that slow development of education was also due to a lack of schoolbooks in Ukrainian and qualified teachers who can teach in Ukrainian.

(3) 1813: the imperial decree proclaimed that village schooling should be limited to ‘*Nationalsprache*⁸⁸’ (i.e. German) and native language, and in the city’s schools to German and Polish, without exceptions.

Siropolko’s examples make it clear that German was being established as an all-empire language; in Galicia, Polish was granted a special status of regional language in practice, and Ukrainian was marginalised. To overcome this issue, the school affairs officer at the Przemyśl⁸⁹ consistory, Father Mohylytskyi sought to have Ukrainian recognised as a regional language. As a result, he received a reply stating that Polish was the only regional language, and Ukrainian was merely a dialect that was ‘*poorly developed*’. Moreover, he was advised to adopt the Latin alphabet for the Ukrainian language, as the Cyrillic alphabet was ‘*of no use*’ (see Vozniak, 1924, pp.24-27).

Finally, a commission consisting of 11 provincial officials, two Catholic priests and two Ukrainian priests was formed. This commission voted 13 to 2 that Polish was the regional language in Galicia and, accordingly, children should be taught in Polish. Catechism in Ukrainian was not prohibited. Metropolitan Levytsky responded by explaining that Galicia was not Polish territory, providing detailed justification for this in his report (see Vozniak, 1924, pp.24-27; Siropolko, 2001, p.502). This report explained the historical affiliation of the lands to the Principality of Galicia-Volhynia and clearly outlined the period when the Polish language began to be used in Galicia (i.e., after its capture by the Poles) (see Hryshevskyi, 1967; Ohienko, 1950; Subtelny,

⁸⁷ in 1812, the Polish nobility abolished compulsory schooling in Galicia.

⁸⁸ National language

⁸⁹ Now a Polish city that used to have/still has great number of Ukrainian populations. At the time, was one of the centres of Ukrainian culture and religion.

2009; Rindler Schjerve, 2003; Snyder, 2004; Ploky, 2006). Therefore, in this situation, Father Mohylnytskyi, under the patronage of Bishop Levytskyi, founded the first cultural and educational society in Galicia, namely the “Society of Galician Greek Catholic Priests for the Promotion of Education and Culture among the Faithful on the Basis of the Christian Religion”. Its main task was to prepare, print, and distribute books in the vernacular, including schoolbooks (see Siropolko, 2001, pp.512-513). Vozniak (1924, pp.24-27) notes that the Poles reacted immediately and complained to the papal cardinal. After investigating the matter, the Austrian government supported the Ukrainian side.

Fylypchak (1931, p.48) summarises that the decree of 1818 says that (1) in schools where 100% students are Greek-Catholic, the language of instruction should be Ukrainian. Polish, however, should be taught as a subject within the curriculum; (2) should the schools be mixed, all the subjects, except for religion, should be conducted in Polish. Ukrainian should be taught as a subject within the curriculum for Greek-Catholic children. Siropolko (2001, p.503) argues that in most schools, however, teaching was conducted in Polish due to the machinations of Polish priests.

As for the codification of the Ukrainian language, similar to Smotrytsky's attempt, Berynda worked in Galicia and compiled the Ukrainian Church Slavonic dictionary in 1627. (see Rurak, 2021). After that, the next attempt to develop a writing system for Ukrainian was performed by Shashkevych, Holovatskyi, and Vahylevych. They published the Ukrainian almanack “*Rusalka Dnistrova*⁹⁰” in 1837. It was the first book in Galicia to be printed in the living Ukrainian language, using the new spelling rules. The key principle was phonetic, i.e. “write as you hear, read as you see” (Nimchuk & Puriaieva, 2004, p.60). Due to its innovative nature and patriotic content, the almanack was banned by the authorities. However, it was distributed underground in Galicia. It also attracted interest in Russian-ruled Ukraine (see Ohiyenko, 1950; Nimchuk & Puriaieva, 2004, pp.60-65). The counter-reaction to this publication was the work of Lozynsky, who advocated the use of the Polish version of the Latin alphabet for the Ukrainian language. This idea was not new but was discussed among

⁹⁰ The Mermaid of Dniester

the intelligentsia of the time. The fact that these two works were published within a short period of time sparked heated debate. It was also called the alphabet war (see Ohiyenko, 1950; Hrushevskyi, 1967; Nimchuk & Puriaieva, 2004).

As for changes in language use in the administrative environment, in 1847, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Austrian Empire decided to print all laws and announcements in the eastern Galician counties also in the Ukrainian language, using the Cyrillic alphabet (see Nahaievskyi, 1989).

Summarising the socio-cultural processes of 1743–1748 in the Ukrainian lands within the Austrian monarchy, it is essential to emphasise that the Austrian authorities implemented a series of administrative and educational measures aimed at unifying the educational space in accordance with imperial standards (see Rindler Schjerve, 2003). Despite their declarative modernisation rhetoric, these reforms were mainly bureaucratic in nature and did not ensure a systematic transformation of Ukrainian schooling. Although the government's educational policy provided for the creation of a basic infrastructure for the training of teaching staff, the actual lack of qualified Ukrainian teachers led to the reproduction of linguistic and cultural asymmetry. In this context, the politically active Polish community, leveraging its advantageous administrative positions, actively influenced the distribution of resources and personnel policy, which significantly limited the opportunities for Ukrainians.

At the same time, Ukrainian intellectuals were becoming increasingly aware of the importance of education as a tool for national consolidation. The initiative to establish “Studium Ruthenum” at Lviv University was an attempt to break the vicious circle of educational marginalisation by training teaching staff in Ukrainian. However, due to limited funding, political pressure and a lack of adequate support from the university administration, this project did not achieve the expected results.

The revolutions of 1848, also known as the springtime of the nations, which took place throughout Europe, did not bypass the Austrian Empire. The nature of this revolution was social, i.e. improving living conditions. But no less important was the issue of resolving interethnic conflicts. Only 20% of the population of the Austrian Empire were Austrians, while the rest of the peoples, including Ukrainians, were subject to a policy of Germanisation. This revolution was the result of the strengthening

of national movements in the 1840s. These cultural and political movements gained the most momentum in the territories of modern Italy, the Czech Republic and Hungary (see Rindler Schjerve, 2003; Frei & Hochstuhl, 2013).

Ultimately, the revolution, in fact, did not achieve the desired results, as no autonomy was granted to any of the parties, resulting in its suppression. However, some amendments were granted to calm the people. Thus, the Ukrainian population of Galicia got some improvements in their conditions too. For example, the Austrian Minister of Education ordered that the study of the Rusyn-Ukrainian language be made compulsory in all secondary schools in Eastern Galicia (see Siropolko, 2001).

It is important to note that Ukrainians did not have a strong revolutionary movement (Bachynskyi, 1924), and some of them even supported the Poles. However, some advances were made. In May 1848, the first political organisation, the Holovna Ruska Rada⁹¹, was established in Galicia. Its members included representatives of the intelligentsia and the Greek Catholic clergy. The main goal of the organisation was to fight for the rights of the Ukrainian population. The Rada had departments for political rights, education, peasant affairs, etc. One of the Rada's first demands was the division of Galicia into eastern (Ukrainian) and western (Polish) parts (as also supported by Bachynskyi, 1924). Moreover, they also demanded the unification of eastern Galicia with Transcarpathia and Bukovyna. The language issue was also on the agenda. In fact, the Rada's activities were very extensive, as they also organised a national guard and people's self-defence units to fight the Hungarians. Ideologically, the Rada also worked out the symbols of Ukrainian statehood, including the blue and yellow flag. To promote its ideas, the Council launched the first Ukrainian newspaper in Galicia, "Zoria Halytska"⁹², which continued to be published for nine years, even after the Rada was closed. The Council also organised the activities of the cultural and educational society Halytsko-Ruska Matytsia⁹³ and opened the Narodnyi Dim⁹⁴ in Lviv. Later, in other smaller cities, the local Dims were established (see Polianskyi, 1998; Markovskyi, 2010; Halushka et al., 2016; Kazakevych, 2018).

⁹¹ Supreme Ruthenian Council

⁹² Star of Galicia

⁹³ Galician-Ruthenian Matica

⁹⁴ People's House

The Ukrainian language (as well as Polish) was granted the status of a regional language in 1850. Thus, the development of schools with Ukrainian as a language of instruction began. Tershakovets (1907, p.151) shows the data saying that in 1850, there were 1500 schools with Ukrainian as a language of instruction. However, in 1855, the state redirected the questions of education to the church, which, in the case of Galicia, means the Polish Catholic Church predominantly. There were many disagreements between the Ukrainian and Polish intelligentsia, as well as inside the Ukrainian one. This led to a new wave of the alphabet war mentioned above (see Siropolko, 2001, pp.519-522). It is also worth mentioning here that *kulishivka* of 1856 ‘migrated’ from the Left Bank and had become quite popular in Galicia. This statement is supported by Danylenko (2010, p.20):

It is not therefore incidental that, despite persistent efforts, Kuliś’s translation was not allowed in the Russian Empire while circulating mainly among the Galician Rusyns and the diaspora.

Danylenko, 2010, p.20

In 1867, the Austrian Empire turned into the Austro-Hungarian Empire. It was the only Dual Monarchy of the modern period in Europe with more than 20 ethnicities, none of which had a significant numerical advantage. Consequently, the Empire aimed to preserve multiculturalism and reach compromises among ethnic groups. The right of each ethnic group to preserve its nationality and language was guaranteed by Article 19 of the 1867 Constitution (see Halushka et al., 2016). All regional languages were recognised as equal in the domains of education, public administration, and other public spheres. What is more, if a region had more than one regional language, schools must have been organised in a way that children of the first ethnic group are not forced to learn the language of the second one and vice versa (see *Zasadnicza ustawa państwowa z dnia 21 grudnia 1867 r. o ogólnych prawach obywateli państwa dla królestw i krajów*, 1867, but will be discussed below).

Despite the Constitution’s relatively liberal attitude, the practical realisation of the law varied from region to region. The Austro-Hungarian Empire had strong political enemies on an international scale, such as the Russian Empire, so Budapest and Vienna were forced to collaborate in terms of international relations. However,

they were still competing on the internal level. Thus, they held different views on ethnopolitics and the means of achieving their goals.

The Austro-Hungarian Empire was unofficially divided into Transleithania (Hungarian part) and Cisleithania (Austrian part), and two languages had the official status: German and Hungarian. Additionally, each region may have had its own regional language. Therefore, the Ukrainian population of Halychyna/Galicia and Bukovyna (a part of Cisleithania) and the Ukrainian population of Transcarpathia (a part of Transleithania) had experienced different language law realisation. The only common point was the awareness of both Austria and Hungary that the neighbouring Russian Empire had a large Ukrainian population close to its border, and it might put the integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Empire at risk. Thus, the Polish language was given a wider range of rights (see Kazakevych, 2018). We will look over the situation in Transcarpathia later in this chapter. As for Galicia, Hrushevskyi (2002, p.507) describes:

19-й параграф австрійської конституції, що затверджує національну рівноправність народів Австрії, постановляє, що кожній народності держави, аби вона не була змушена вчитися чужої мови, має бути надана можливість отримувати освіту своєю рідною мовою. У Східній Галичині, де українське (русинське) населення при 13% євреїв і близько 16% поляків становить близько 70%, інтереси української більшості, місцевого корінного населення, мають, звичайно, переважне право на підтримку й ми маємо право очікувати, що в організації шкільної справи їхні інтереси найперше враховуватимуть. До послуг українського населення будуть, мабуть, створені школи всіх типів, починаючи від початкових і закінчуючи вищими, і йому нададуть повну можливість навчатися своєю рідною мовою. Звичайно, це його природне право — лише стверджуване, а не створюване згаданим параграфом конституції, його “національне право”. На жаль, — ні це “національне право”, ні основний закон не забезпечують цієї можливості в дійсності, і ця дійсність є повним контрастом з визнаним законом правом українського населення на національну школу⁹⁵

Hrushevskyi, 2002, p.507

⁹⁵ Paragraph 19 of the Austrian Constitution, which affirms the national equality of the peoples of Austria, stipulates that every nationality in the state, so that it is not forced to learn a foreign language, must be given the opportunity to receive education in its native language. In Eastern Galicia, where the Ukrainian (Rusyn) population accounts for about 70%, compared to 13% Jews and about 16% Poles, the interests of the Ukrainian majority, the local indigenous population, naturally have a preferential right to support, and we have the right to expect that their interests will be taken into account first and foremost in the organisation of school affairs. Schools of all types, from primary to higher education, will probably be established for the Ukrainian population, and they will be given every opportunity to study in their native language. Of course, this is their natural right — only affirmed, not created by the aforementioned paragraph of the constitution, their ‘national right’. Unfortunately, neither this ‘national right’ nor the basic law provide this opportunity in reality, and this reality is in complete contrast to the Ukrainian population’s legally recognised right to a national school.

This quote basically sums up the fact that the issue of Ukrainian-language education in Galicia was deplorable. And the declared rights are difficult, if not impossible, to implement in reality. However, due to political turmoil within the empire itself, any implementation of this law was postponed until 1863.

Ukrainian has become a language of instruction in the only Ukrainian Gymnasium in Lviv: for beginners in 1863/64 academic year, and for senior students in 1873/74. But the situation with teachers and materials desired to be improved. First, the Ukrainian terminology was not developed, as doing science in Ukrainian was frowned upon. Thus, the books (mostly translated from German) were difficult to understand and released in insufficient circulation (see Siropolko, 2001, pp.545-546). Secondly, teaching staff was by and large rather well-trained and represented by prominent scholars of the time, e.g. Androkhovych, Barvinskyi, Kolessa, and many others. Some of them were also members of the Austrian parliament. These teachers were also at the origins of “Prosvita”, but we will talk about that later. Sometimes the lack of schools with Ukrainian as a language of instruction was explained by staff shortage. Opposing that idea, Hrushevskyi (2002, pp.519) states:

Кажуть, що для русинських гімназій не знайдеться й викладачів-русинів. Насправді ж багато їх викладають у польських гімназіях, а немало перебувають “у засланні” в школах Західної Галичини⁹⁶

Hrushevskyi, 2002, pp.519

He also mentions about 15 such teachers that he knows personally. On the question of Polish teachers in Ukrainian schools Siropolko (2001, p. 548-549) notes:

Вороже ставлення до українських учнів засвоїли собі майже усі [...] поляки-інспектори середніх шкіл. [...] в Самбірській гімназії 1898/99 шк. р. в 7-му класі було 23 українці, 22 поляки і 6 жидів; з них до 8-го класу перейшло 11 українців, 21 поляк і 6 жидів; [...] Нема чого доводити тут, що такий вислід іспитів сався не тому, що учні-українці були в порівнянні з поляками менш успішні в науці, а тому, що треба було встановити у 8-му класі перевагу на користь поляків. [...] польський шовінізм справді не одного гімназійного учня підштовхнув свідомо вростатися в українство⁹⁷

Siropolko, 2001, p. 548-549

⁹⁶ It is said that there are no Rusyn teachers for Rusyn secondary schools. In fact, many of them teach in Polish secondary schools, and quite a few are “in exile” in schools in Western Galicia.

⁹⁷ “Almost all Polish secondary school inspectors have adopted a hostile attitude towards Ukrainian students. [...] in the Sambir Gymnasium in the 1898/99 school year, there were 23 Ukrainians, 22 Poles and 6 Jews in the 7th grade; of these, 11 Ukrainians, 21 Poles and 6 Jews moved on to the 8th grade; [...] There is no need to prove here that such exam results were not due to the fact that Ukrainian students were less successful in their studies than Poles, but because it was necessary to establish an advantage in favour of Poles in the 8th grade. [...] Polish chauvinism really pushed more than one secondary school student to consciously become part of Ukrainian society.”

Thus, it clearly shows that the headmasters were not independent and worked for the sake of the benefits of their own nation. Their intention was also to polonise Ukrainians of East Galicia. To be more specific in this statement, let us consider the law on the language of instruction. Siropolko (2001, p.503) argues that Poles managed to agree with the Austrian government against the Ukrainians. He states that the adoption of the Law on the Language of Instruction in 1867 is proof. The 1867 language law (*Ustawa o języku wykładowym w szkołach ludowych i średnich Królestw Galicji i Lodomerii z Wielkim Księstwem Krakowskim, 1867*) on secondary education stated that the language of instruction should be chosen by those who financially maintain the school. Simultaneously, a second language was an obligatory subject in schools. Starting from the third year of study, pupils were also required to learn German. In a few schools, German was the only language of instruction, for example, the II Gymnasium of Lviv (see *Ustawa o języku wykładowym w szkołach ludowych i średnich Królestw Galicji i Lodomerii z Wielkim Księstwem Krakowskim, 1867*, pp. 21-23). This law truly marked the beginning of the decline of Ukrainian education, and it was not repealed despite protests from the Ukrainian community. Siropolko (2001, p. 524) illustrates this decline with quantitative data, comparing the number of schools with Ukrainian as the language of instruction: 1,500 schools in 1850, 1,293 in 1869, and 572 in 1871.

Here, we can note that from the 1870s onwards, the Germanisation of the population in Galicia ceased. And although Galicia was considered part of Cisleithania, the fairly broad powers of the Galician Sejm (especially with regard to education and culture) made it a de facto autonomous province. The Polish community had more rights and powers, and therefore, the Ukrainian population continued to be Polonised.

As for secondary schools, there were none that taught in Ukrainian. It was only in the 1880s that Ukrainians raised the issue of establishing a Ukrainian-language secondary school in Przemyśl (the second largest city after Lviv in eastern Galicia). The number of students met the legal requirements, and the Austrian authorities recognised the legitimacy of this demand. However, the Polish Sejm did not agree to open a Ukrainian-language school and delayed the resolution of this issue in every way possible. Only in 1887 did they agree to open “parallel classes” at the Przemyśl

Gymnasium for Ukrainians. At the beginning of the 1903-04 school year, a separate gymnasium was established for 579 Ukrainians (see Hrushevskyi, 2002, pp.509-510). Hrushevskyi (2002, pp.512) also observes that:

Тим часом для викладання польською мовою, яка й так поставлена порівняно з русинською у надзвичайно вигідні умови, створюють усе нові й нові школи; для цього немає жодних перепон, жодних поневірянь⁹⁸

Hrushevskyi, 2002, p.512

As already mentioned, Latin and German were the languages of instruction at Lviv University until 1848. However, after the adoption of new laws, two separate courses were introduced, taught in Ukrainian. Over time, the number of courses taught in Ukrainian increased (see Mudryi, 1923, p.33). By 1863, Ukrainian had spread beyond the Faculty of Philology. Two new departments were established in the Faculty of Law. Siropolko (2001, p.561) asserts that

це недвозначно свідчило про те, що Львівський університет призначався для українців, а Краківський – для поляків. Але поляки не могли примиритися з таким становищем і гаряче взялися до полонізації Львівського університету⁹⁹

Siropolko, 2001, p.561

The dissatisfaction of Poles with such processes at Lviv University is evidenced by the fact that in 1966, the governor of Galicia demanded that the rector introduce Polish as the language of instruction at the university. After receiving a refusal from the university's academic council, he appealed to the Galician Sejm. There, his request was approved. Moreover, Polish was approved as the language of instruction for majors such as philosophy, law, and theology. Courses taught in Ukrainian were not cancelled, but the teaching of new subjects in Ukrainian was significantly restricted. In addition, the Ministry of Education were issuing individual permits for specific teachers to teach at Lviv University in German or Polish. As for administrative communication at the university, German was considered the official language until 1873, and then Polish became the official language. However, there was already a caveat that requests in Ukrainian should be answered in Ukrainian (see Mudryi, 1923, p. 34-36).

⁹⁸ “Meanwhile, new schools are constantly being established for teaching in Polish, which is already in a very advantageous position compared to Rusyn; there are no obstacles or difficulties in this regard”

⁹⁹ “this clearly indicated that Lviv University was intended for Ukrainians, and Krakow University for Poles. But the Poles could not come to terms with this situation and eagerly set about Polonising Lviv University.”

In 1882, a city decree was issued stating that the language of instruction must be Polish, unless otherwise specified by the Ministry of Education. In this context, congresses of students from Galicia and Bukovyna were held in 1880 and 1884, demanding that instruction be conducted in Ukrainian. Thanks to this, as well as the efforts of Ukrainian ambassadors in the Austrian Parliament, permission was granted in 1894 to establish a department of Ukrainian history at Lviv University. Mykhailo Hrushevsky became the head of the department (see Mudryi, 1923; Siropolko, 2001; Bzunko, 2020).

To better understand the outrage within the Ukrainian community, it is worthwhile to examine demographic data. Hrushevskyi (2002, p.491) quotes *Podręcznik statystyki Galicyi*, t. VII, 1903:

Русини в Східній Галичині становлять корінне автохтонне населення. До цього часу, попри багатовікову денаціоналізацію русинського елементу, вільну й невольну, вони й тепер становлять значну більшість у цьому краї. Навіть за офіційною галицькою статистикою, яка загалом подає відсоток поляків більшим порівняно з дійсністю, русини, за переписом 1900 р. з 50 повітів Східної Галичини у 35 повітах становили понад 60 відсотків населення, у 18 повітах – понад 70 відсотків, у 7 – понад 80 відсотків, а насправді, очевидно, становлять близько 70 відсотків усього місцевого населення, тим часом як решта 30% відсотків ділиться між євреями і поляками.¹⁰⁰

Cited in Hrushevskyi, 2002, p.491

Thus, a significant number of potential students were unable to receive educational services in their native language (or received only a limited number of such services). These figures are fairly conservative estimates, and what is more, they are officially recognised, while unofficial estimates indicate an even greater bias (see Hrushevskyi, 1987).

In subsequent years, there were constant protests by Ukrainian students. After 1904, such protests were increasingly accompanied by clashes with Polish students. There were even fatalities (see Siropolko, 2001, p. 567). For example, in 1910, a similar

¹⁰⁰ Ruthenians in Eastern Galicia constitute the indigenous population. Despite centuries of denationalisation of the Ruthenian element, both voluntary and involuntary, they still constitute a significant majority in this region. Even according to official Galician statistics, which generally overestimate the percentage of Poles compared to reality, according to the 1900 census, Ruthenians constituted more than 60 per cent of the population in 35 of the 50 counties of Eastern Galicia, more than 70 per cent in 18 counties, and in 7 counties – over 80 per cent. In reality, they obviously constitute about 70 per cent of the total local population, while the remaining 30 per cent is divided between Jews and Poles.

gathering of Ukrainian students was to take place. As described by a contemporary of the events, Mudryi (1923, pp. 61-62):

польські студенти довідалися про той намір і вирішили забарикадувати українських студентів [...] українські студенти кинулися на барикаду, щоби розкидати її, але поляки зустріли їх стрілами з револьверів. Одного кулею ранено смертельно в лоб [...]. На постріли зараз же появилася вже заздалегідь наготовлена поліція з рушницями, кинулася на студентів-українців, загнала їх в салі й арештувала. [...] із затриманих в університеті 300 студентів-українців 128 було заарештовано і переведених в тюрму. Коло тюрми вшехпольська юрба кинулася їх бити, а коли поліція їх одігнала, взялася громити українські інституції.¹⁰¹

Mudryi (1923, pp. 61-62)

So, it is obvious that tensions between Poles and Ukrainians were growing, leading to human casualties. This was one of the (not the most important, but) preconditions for the Polish-Ukrainian War (1918-1919). It is also important to note that Ukrainian students also hoped for support from Ukrainians who lived under the Russian Empire. However, this endeavour was not successful. As a result, there was virtually no higher education with Ukrainian as a language of instruction in Galicia. Nevertheless, civic organisations played a certain positive role here (see Hrushevsky, 1967, pp.524-527).

Scientific work and publishing depended on the trained stuff and vice versa. Thus, the educated elite looked to increase the work in these fields. And as they say, every cloud has a silver lining. In 1873, the Ems Decree was introduced in the Russian Empire. This was the year when Galicia turned into the centre of the Ukrainian cultural movement for both banks of the Dnieper. Many of the Left Bank scholars relocated to Lviv (see Hrushevskyi, 1967, pp. 515-517). The “Shevchenko Literary and Scientific Society” was founded in Lviv by the scholars of both banks. It became the centre for the development of Ukrainian science and culture, as imperial Russian oppression could not influence its activities. The society’s goal was to develop Ukrainian literature. In 1892, it was renamed the “Shevchenko Scientific Society” (abbreviated “SSS”). This renaming was a result of the society’s reorientation towards a more

¹⁰¹ “Polish students learned of this intention and decided to barricade the Ukrainian students [...] Ukrainian students rushed to the barricade to break it down, but the Poles met them with revolver shots. One was fatally wounded in the forehead [...]. The shots immediately brought out the police, who were already waiting with rifles, rushed at the Ukrainian students, drove them into the hall and arrested them. [...] Of the 300 Ukrainian students detained at the university, 128 were arrested and transferred to prison. A crowd of Poles rushed to beat them near the prison, and when the police drove them away, they began to destroy Ukrainian institutions.”

scientific and research-oriented approach. The society's areas of activity were history, philology, mathematics, natural sciences, and medicine. They published the "Notes of the SSS", which contained scientific data that we also use in this work. Most importantly, this organisation managed to unite scientists from all over modern Ukraine. The scale of the society's activities decreased significantly during the First World War (see Ohloblin, 1977; Siropolko, 2001; Tkachenko, 2010; Kubaichuk, 2020).

The Polish occupation authorities deprived the Society of the right to publish Ukrainian school textbooks, which was one of its main sources of income, and to organise university courses for Ukrainian students. Accordingly, representatives of the SSS created the Lviv (Secret) Ukrainian University in 1921 (see Ohloblin, 1977; Tkachenko, 2010; Kubaichuk, 2020). Shevelov (1987, p.218) also notes its disability to turn into a powerful scientific institution due to its underground nature.

The creative output of the Shevchenko Scientific Society from 1873 to 1939 amounted to 1,172 volumes of various publications, including 943 volumes of serial scientific publications. The Shevchenko Scientific Society has made an undeniable contribution to the development of Ukrainian scientific terminology. The historical role of the society lies in bringing Ukrainian science beyond the boundaries of Ukrainian studies (see Ohloblin, 1977; Tkachenko, 2010; Kubaichuk, 2020).

Last but not least is the role of Prosvita¹⁰² Society in the context of work on education in Ukrainian. The Society was founded by a UGCC priest, Ustianovych, and some representatives of Lviv intelligentsia in 1868 as a substitute for Halytsko-Ruska Matytsia. At the time, most of Matytsia's members became Moscowphiles, and their activities were no longer useful for educating Ukrainians. There was a certain vacuum in this sphere. The organisation was active on most of the modern Ukrainian territories (see Subtelny, 2009; Mysechko, 1996; Striapko, 2012; Kryshchuk, 2012; Drobysheva, 2024), i.e., both in the Austrian Empire and the Russian Empire (here – illegal). Their aim was to 'enlighten' the wide masses through teaching in a 'popular' language. They were also providing materials and books in Ukrainian. It functioned as a library room

¹⁰² Literal translation: enlightenment

or study hall where people could read books, newspapers, or listen to lectures by famous Ukrainian scholars. They were also organising theatrical plays, concerts, or shared celebrations, e.g. Shevchenko Days. In addition, they helped start libraries, choirs, or other cultural institutions in the villages, towns, and cities. In some cases, Prosvita's branches had schools for children. By 1914, there were 2,500 reading rooms and 100 branches. With the outbreak of World War I, Prosvita's activities were restricted and, in some cases, suspended altogether. Some of its leaders were arrested or sent to camps. However, after World War I, it managed to resume its activities in a somewhat limited format under Polish occupation (see Hrushevskyi, 1967; Siropolko, 2001; Maliuta, 2008).

Bukovyna

In this section, we have already reviewed the situation with schooling, HEIs, book printing, and cultural and educational civic organisations in Galicia during the Austrian rule. However, we did not pay much attention to another historical region – Bukovyna. Therefore, we will now examine what was happening in Bukovyna in the context of the same events that we have already discussed for Galicia.

However, first let us examine the historical development of Bukovyna, summarising what Hrushevsky (1967) wrote about it. In short, after the destruction of Kyivan Rus, Bukovyna was part of the Principality of Galicia-Volhynia. In 1240, it became part of the Moldavian state. Soon, like the rest of the Moldavian state, it became part of the Ottoman Empire. Hrushevsky (1967) notes that Moldavian voivodes used Ukrainian in their written correspondence. However, in 1775, as a result of the Russo-Turkish War, Bukovyna came under Austrian rule with its language laws. So, let's explore schooling, higher education, and other cultural and educational activities in Bukovyna.

Siropolko (2001, p. 604) notes that despite the fact that the majority of the population was Ukrainian, Romanian was recognised as the regional language. This happened due to confusion between religious and national identities. People called themselves '*Wallachian believers*', meaning Orthodox Christians, but they were perceived as Romanians. Therefore, Romanian became the language of instruction in

schools, and Ukrainian was used only to teach religion. With the arrival of the Austrian administration, the development of school networks began (see Smal-Stotskyi, 1897, p.43).

However, from 1786 to 1849, Bukovyna was administratively part of Galicia and was subject to the same laws as Galicia. As we have already mentioned, at the beginning of 1805, real power over education was taken over by the Latin consistory. The Ukrainians' attempts to resist provoked opposition, and the Latin consistory treated Bukovyna even more harshly than Galicia. Smal-Stotskyi (1897) writes:

учителі мусіли прийняти лат. віру, або лишити свої посади; багато шкіл закрито лише для того, що учителі не потіли переступити на лат. віру. Разом з латинізацією ішло польщення шкіл; [... також] учителі мали обов'язок "die deutsche Sprache der Jugend in jeder Classe vollkommen beizubringen", і що учителі [...] з р. 1824-го "nur insoferne sich der rumänischen oder polnischen (в Кіцмани !!) Sprache bedienen sollen, als solche zur Erklärung des Vortrages notwendig sei, damit derselbe von den Schülern verstanden werde; sonst sollen sich die Lehrer der deutschen Sprache bedienen"¹⁰³

Smal-Stotskyi, 1897, p.47

Therefore, we see that (1) the language issue is closely linked to religion, even in the educational environment, (2) priority was given to the German language, while Ukrainian was marginalised. Indeed, Smal-Stotskyi (1897) mentions that the Orthodox consistory sought to take over the management of schools; however, this effort was unsuccessful until 1850. In 1848, a pedagogical course was opened in Chernivtsi, where, in addition to German and Romanian, Ukrainian was also taught.

After becoming an autonomous region again in 1849, Bukovyna focused on developing public education, but with German as the language of instruction. Therefore, Ukrainians were not very eager to send their children to school. More popular were 'dyakivky'¹⁰⁴, where instruction was in Ukrainian. In 1868, the state assumed control over education and began auditing schools. An audit in Bukovyna yielded very disappointing results. However, the number of schools grew and the quality improved. In particular, this was due to the fact that many teachers came from

¹⁰³ "Teachers had to convert to Latin Catholicism or leave their posts; many schools were closed simply because the teachers refused to convert. Along with Latinisation came the Polonisation of schools; [... also] teachers were obliged to "teach the German language to young people in every class" and from 1824 onwards, teachers [...] "Only to the extent that they need to use the Romanian or Polish (in Kitsmani!!) language to explain the lecture so that it can be understood by the pupils; otherwise, the teachers should use the German language"."

¹⁰⁴ schools run by church deacons

Galicia, where teaching conditions were significantly worse than in Bukovyna. Later, teachers' unions even appeared in Bukovyna, such as the "Bukowiener Lehrerverein¹⁰⁵". The choice of language of instruction in public schools was left to local school boards, although the study of German as a separate subject was compulsory for 2-3 hours per week. These processes led to the fact that education in Bukovyna was in better condition than in Galicia. In Galicia, there were about 500 villages without public schools, while in Bukovyna there were none. Additionally, education in Bukovyna lasted an average of four years, whereas in Galicia, it lasted one or two years. Until the 1880s, textbooks in both regions were the same, but later textbooks written by local teachers began to appear and were published by the state. In 1905, Ukrainian teachers from both regions united to form the "Взаємна поміч галицьких і буковинських учителів і учительок¹⁰⁶", but it did not engage in any real activity. In 1918, following the Romanian occupation of the Ukrainian part of Bukovyna, the process of Romanianization of schools began. It should also be remembered that in Bukovyna, as in Galicia, there were Moscowophile circles (see Siropolko, 2001, pp. 605-611).

As for HEIs, there was only one higher school – a theological institution (since 1827). The languages of instruction included Latin and German. Later, Romanian was added. In 1875, Chernivtsi University was founded, and the theological institution was closed. The languages of instruction at the university were German and Romanian. In 1898, two departments with Ukrainian as the language of instruction were established at the university, and a third department of Ukrainian language and literature was subsequently established (see Simovych, 1932; Shevelov, 1987). One of the first student organisations was the Union, where students actively engaged with the population and shared their knowledge of science with them. They also had close relations with the Galicians. At the turn of the century, several similar organisations appeared, which sometimes interacted and sometimes fought each other. After World War I, Chernivtsi University was Romanianised, and the department of Ukrainian

¹⁰⁵ Association of Bukovyna's Teachers

¹⁰⁶ Mutual Aid Society of Galician and Bukovynian Teachers

language and literature, according to Simovych (1932, p. 32), was replaced by a department of modern Slavic literature.

Extracurricular education is usually pushed by public voluntarily organisations. As is already known, 1848 was a year when the activities of such organisations began in Galicia. Albeit Bukovyna is not the case. The first step to such movements was made in 1869 with the establishment of Ruska Besida¹⁰⁷. It gave rise to several additional cultural and educational movements, including Ruska Rada¹⁰⁸ (1870) and the Society for the Dissemination of Generally Useful Knowledge among the People in Bukovyna (1876) (see Ohiyenko, 1922; Shevelov, 1987; Kubaichuk, 2020). However, Siropolko (2001, p.614-615) mentions that all these organisations were affiliated with the Moscowphile movement and, thus, they “не спричинилися до поширення просвіти серед народу в 70-х роках¹⁰⁹”. He also retells the impressions of Smal-Stotsky as “зміни своїй і народної долі очікували від «руського царя»...¹¹⁰”. Siropolko (2001, p.615) also notes that changes began to take place in both societies as early as 1884. Young people with pro-Ukrainian views joined them and began working to “пробудженням народу зі сну¹¹¹”. Kmitskevych, (1935, p.54) states that “Narodnyi Universytet¹¹²” was founded in Chernivtsi in 1910 for the common people to be able to obtain a higher education. Smal-Stotskyi (1897, p.268) summarises the activities of Ruska Besida claiming: “в тяжких часах була одиноким заступником *культурних інтересів* Русі Буковинської перед властями¹¹³”. Thus, we can see that in comparison to Galicia, there was scarce diversity of possibilities for Ukrainian culture to develop in Bukovyna.

Another point to mention is the stance of publishing in Ukrainian in Bukovyna. First, Professors Fedkovych and Smal-Stotsky of Chernivtsi University developed a phonetic spelling system, which was introduced in Bukovinian schools in 1895 (see Nimchuk & Puriayeva, 2004). This alphabet was also used in printing later. There was

¹⁰⁷ Ruthenian Conversation

¹⁰⁸ Ruthenian Council

¹⁰⁹ “did not contribute to the spread of education among the people in the 1970s”

¹¹⁰ “they expected changes in their own and the people’s fate from the “Russian Tsar”...”

¹¹¹ “awaken the people from their slumber.”

¹¹² Popular / public university

¹¹³ “in difficult times, [Ruska Besida] was the sole defender of the cultural interests of Bukovyna Rus against the authorities”

no Ukrainian publishing house in Bukovyna before 1896. Albeit it was possible to print the material in Ukrainian in the local publishing houses. Ruska Rada founded the first Ukrainian publishing house in 1896, and subsequently, others followed. Since there was no ban on printing in Ukrainian, many of the books were also illegally exported to the Left Bank, Podillia, etc. The printing of teachers' magazines and the mass press was also quite widespread. Siropolko (2001, p. 618) concludes

завдяки тому, що цензурні умови на Буковині були ліпші, ніж у Галичині та на Закарпатті, не кажучи вже про Наддніпрянську Україну за царських часів, в Чернівцях друкувалися революційні часописи наддніпрянських українців – “Гасло” (у рр 1902-1903) і “Селянин” (у рр 1903-1905). Обидва часописи мали поширення не тільки в російській Україні, куди їх нелегально перепакувалося, але й на Буковині та в Галичині.¹¹⁴

Siropolko, 2001, p.618

At this stage, it can be said that representatives from various parts of modern Ukraine collaborated to develop and articulate the Ukrainian national idea. It was their work that contributed to the spread of independence sentiments. The publication of “Ukraine Irredenta” (1895) by Bachynsky, a native of Galicia, and “Independent Ukraine” (1900) by Mikhnovsky, a native of the Dnieper region, almost simultaneously proclaimed the idea that the Ukrainian nation had the right and duty to create its own independent state (see Mukha, 2004). Both texts are anti-monarchist and anti-imperialist in nature, but each expresses greater concern about its own oppressor. Also, the first author is more moderate and thinks in the context of socialism (inspired by Marx), while the second is more revolutionary and nationally oriented.

Conclusion and Comments:

In the early period of Habsburg rule, imperial policy was highly bureaucratised, and the creation of an effective education system required reforms and the unification of local customs with central imperial policies. The reforms carried out by Maria Theresa and Joseph II were aimed at separating education from the church, but they

¹¹⁴ “Due to the fact that censorship conditions in Bukovyna were better than in Galicia and Transcarpathia, not to mention the Dnieper Ukraine during the tsarist era, revolutionary magazines of the Dnieper Ukrainians were printed in Chernivtsi – ‘Haslo’ [literary: slogan or password] (in 1902-1903) and ‘Selianyn’ [literary: a peasant] (in 1903-1905). Both magazines were distributed not only in Russian Ukraine, where they were illegally repackaged, but also in Bukovyna and Galicia.”

did not succeed in doing so completely. In addition, the reforms were aimed at ensuring the functioning of the empire rather than satisfying the needs and desires of the local population. Imperial administrators often made mistakes due to their lack of understanding of the cultural, political, and ethno-confessional specifics of Galicia and Bukovyna. This often led to conflicts between the Austrian administration, the local nobility, and the clergy. Thus, we can state that this period witnessed contradictory dynamics: on the one hand, the institutionalisation of educational reforms, and on the other, their inability to ensure a real revival of the Ukrainian educational tradition in the conditions of the imperial multinational system.

After the revolutions of 1848, imperial policy underwent significant changes. The rights of the regions were significantly expanded. In essence, a certain policy of decentralisation took place when conditions were created for the development of local self-government. However, this did not contribute to the development of Ukrainian self-government, largely due to resistance from the Polish elite in Galicia. As for Bukovyna, the ethnic structure of the region was even more diverse, and the empire's attempts to maintain a balance between German, Romanian and Ukrainian elements led to a certain limited cultural pluralism. On the one hand, the empire promoted cultural autonomy, while on the other, it applied the principle of *divide et impera*.

At that time, universities became key platforms for the formation of the Ukrainian intelligentsia. Despite the fact that Ukrainian was hardly used as a language of instruction in higher education, it was at universities that future political, scientific and cultural leaders of Ukrainians grew up. It was they who translated materials into their native language and spread knowledge among the lower strata of the population. Teacher training colleges also played an important role, becoming a channel for social mobility for people from rural backgrounds. Through them, the Ukrainian language and culture gradually gained professional representation in the field of education.

LP in education. Polish and German dominated schooling in Galicia until the mid-19th century. Ukrainian was used as the language of instruction mainly in primary and parish schools. It was only with the creation of cultural and educational organisations (such as Prosvita and Halytsko-Ruska Matytsia) that, under pressure from the Ukrainian elite, the empire officially recognised Ukrainian as a language

suitable for use in education. Thus, we can trace the change in imperial policy from strict Germanisation to increasingly inclusive language policies (note that this cannot be directly compared to the modern meaning of inclusion in this context).

These processes were bottom-up, so they lived on the initiatives of people. In Bukovyna, these processes occurred more slowly, particularly towards the end of the 19th century. Their activities transformed Galicia and Bukovyna into the most educated regions of the Ukrainian world during the imperial era. Thus, this experience played a crucial role in shaping modern Ukrainian culture and laid the ideological groundwork for the liberation struggles of the 20th century.

2.2.3. Ukrainian Lands under Hungarian Rule (LP and education)

Having considered the situation in Ukrainian territories under Russian and Austrian rule, we move on to Transcarpathia – the Ukrainian land that was under Hungarian rule for the longest time, dating back to the days of the princes (see Tyvodar, 2003). Starting from the end of the 17th century, it is worth noting that education was then subordinate to the church. UGCC was slowly spreading in Transcarpathia, but its role in the development of education in Transcarpathia was much smaller than in Galicia. The King of Hungary, as well as the Pope, repeatedly refused requests to establish a seminary for Greek Catholics in Transcarpathia until 1689. In that year, Bishop Osyp de-Kamelis arrived from Rome. In 1692, he appealed to the Austrian King Leopold I with a request to grant Greek Catholic priests equal rights with Latin priests (see Siropolko, 2001; Kichera, 2004), including in matters of education. Although this was a positive step, it did not gain mass support.

Between 1742 and 1767, Olshavskyi served as bishop in Mukachevo. It was he who began to actively establish Ukrainian schools, starting with Mukachevo. Mostly, those who planned to obtain a religious education studied in such schools. This was not always motivated by a calling to become a priest, deacon or acolyte, but sometimes by mercantile motives, as clergy were exempt from serfdom. Olshavskyi worked to develop the education of the clergy and even opened a seminary where adults could learn to read and perform basic arithmetic. He also published bilingual books in Latin

and Church Slavonic. In 1754, he even founded a printing house. It was during his ministry that “вперше з’явився гурток русинів зі званням докторів філософії¹¹⁵” in Transcarpathia (Siropolko, 2001, p. 625). In 1762, a pastoral letter was issued, imposing an obligation on every deacon to teach children. Cathedral deacon Bradach published “Азбука/Azbuka¹¹⁶” and “Сборникъ/Sbornik¹¹⁷” in Vienna. Since the *Creed*¹¹⁸ did not contain the *filioque*¹¹⁹ and he also mentioned the saints of Kyiv, who were not recognised by the Latin Church, all copies of both publications were destroyed (see Siropolko, 2001, pp. 622-627).

It was only in 1771 (the Union took place in 1596) that the UGCC bishop of Mukachevo was released from his subordination to the Roman Catholic bishop. From that time on, Greek Catholic priests began to travel annually to Latin seminaries for studies, as well as to the aforementioned “Barbareum”. So, when it was closed and a seminary was opened in Lviv, the ties between the Greek Catholics of Galicia and Transcarpathia grew stronger. After that, Bazyłowicz began to promote the idea of a single cultural space between Transcarpathia and Ukraine (see Fenych, 1999; Rozlutska, 2018).

However, the real development of schooling in Transcarpathia began only after the reforms of Maria Theresa and Joseph I. The Felbiger system, which we have already mentioned, was also applied in these territories, creating different types of schools tailored to the needs of the settlements (Bohiv, 2014). Bishop Bachynskyi also joined this cause, financing the construction and operation of schools. Moreover, he was appointed inspector of the Uzhhorod school district. In 1792, he contributed to the establishment of a seminary in Uzhhorod. In fact, in addition to pedagogical subjects, German, Hungarian and Ukrainian languages were taught there (see Voloshyn, 1923; Rozlutska, 2018; Tovtyn, 2025).

¹¹⁵ the first group of Ruthenians with the title of Doctor of Philosophy appeared

¹¹⁶ a primer

¹¹⁷ a book of prayers

¹¹⁸ a prayer that expresses the statement of the shared beliefs for Christians

¹¹⁹ Filioque is a reference in the Creed to the origin of the Holy Spirit not only from the Father but also from the Son, which is not contained in the Nicene Creed, and was added to the Creed even before the division of Christianity in 1054, mostly to combat the heresy of Arianism. As of today, we have cases where the Pontiffs of the Vatican, at public events, prayed the Creed without the use of the filioque.

Siropolko (2001, pp. 627-628) notes that at that time there were 300 schools in Transcarpathia with Ukrainian as the language of instruction, but the demand from the population was greater than these schools could satisfy. The author also notes that, although this represented significant progress compared to 50 years ago, the current state of schooling still left much to be desired. The key problem was the lack of a fully unified curriculum, which is why townspeople and craftsmen preferred to send their children to study in Galicia. Bohiv (2014, p. 24) notes:

У містах створювалося по кілька шкіл з руською, угорською, німецькою та єврейською мовами навчання. Народні школи були в усіх великих селах. [...] Щоправда, [...] у малих селах учителювали дяки, що інколи були напівосвіченими. Учні таких шкіл одержували мізерні знання, а тому не могли продовжувати навчання в гімназіях чи училищах. [...] До кінця XVIII ст. на Закарпатті не здійснювалася професійна підготовка педагогічних кадрів. [...] Але хронічна нестача вчителів, слабкий рівень їх освіти ставили на порядок денний необхідність їх професійної підготовки¹²⁰

Bohiv, 2014, p. 24

Therefore, the low level of education and lack of pedagogical knowledge significantly delayed the growth of schooling in Transcarpathia. It was for this reason that Bishop Bachynskyi initiated the creation of courses for future teachers in 1793, modelled on German teacher training seminaries. However, to obtain higher education, most Ukrainians had to go abroad, typically to Vienna, Kharkiv, Moscow, or Lviv (“Studium Ruthenum”). Some of them remained to teach in Galicia, on the Left Bank, or in Russia. What is more, this situation contributed to the fact that Ukrainians with higher education often knew Latin but were unable to write in Cyrillic. Therefore, in 1798, Bachynskyi ordered that Ukrainian be studied (see Hrushevskyi, 1967; Siropolko, 2001, pp. 627-629).

Bohiv (2014) notes that in 1806, the “Ratio educationis” decree was issued, which prohibited anything offensive from a religious or national perspective. Also, Hungarian became the mandatory language of instruction in secondary schools. The author adds that this contributed to the slowdown in the development of popular

¹²⁰ “Several schools were established in cities with Ruthenian, Hungarian, German, and Jewish languages of instruction. Public schools were located in all large villages. [...] However, [...] in small villages, teachers were sometimes semi-educated clerks. Pupils at such schools received a meagre education and were therefore unable to continue their studies at grammar schools or colleges. [...] Until the end of the 18th century, there was no professional training for teaching staff in Transcarpathia. [...] However, the chronic shortage of teachers and their poor level of education made professional training a priority.”

education, especially after 1819, when Hungarian became the mandatory language of instruction in all types of schools. As for teacher training, the situation improved, but as Bohiv (2014, p. 25) notes, they were taught “в дусі ідеології “святостефанської корони”, яка повністю ігнорувала інтереси національних меншостей¹²¹”.

In the 1830s, Luchkay became the school inspector of the Uzhhorod district. He actively defended schooling in Transcarpathia and helped it develop at his own expense (see Bohiv, 2014; Chernychko & Fedynets, 2020; Tovtyn, 2025). For example, he was the first to publish a scientific grammar of the Ukrainian language in Transcarpathia, *Grammatica Slavo-Ruthena* (1830). However, Siropolko (2001) notes that this grammar did not reflect the ‘living’ *Ukrainian language* but rather conveyed the most ancient forms of Ukrainian Church Slavonic. Nevertheless, in 1847, Dukhnovich’s primer (“Книжиця читальня для начинающих¹²²”) was published. Dukhnovich also published the first textbook on pedagogy in 1857 (see Siropolko, 2001; Chernychko & Fedynets, 2020).

The revolutions of 1848-1849 also influenced the cultural revival of Transcarpathia. Among the demands made by Transcarpathian Ukrainians to the government were the establishment of Ukrainian folk schools and a law academy, as well as a request to transform Lviv University into a Ruthenian university (in sync with Galician Ukrainians). They also wanted permission to print periodicals in Cyrillic. Siropolko (2001, p. 630) notes

австрійський уряд, бажаючи подавити повстання мадяр проти Австрії, задумав прихилити до себе українців [...] Внаслідок [...] народні школи передано під керування руських консисторій в тих місцях, де більшість населення була руської національності; в учительській семінарії учні мали набувати знання руської мови, а [...] в гімназіях... в Ужгороді, Сигіті та Мукачеві – руська мова ставала обов’язковим предметом навчання¹²³

Siropolko, 2001, p.630

¹²¹ “in the spirit of the ideology of the “Holy Crown of St. Stephen”, which completely ignored the interests of national minorities”

¹²² Reading book for the beginners

¹²³ “The Austrian government, wishing to suppress the Hungarian uprising against Austria, decided to win over the Ukrainians [...] As a result [...] public schools were transferred to the control of Ruthenian consistories in those places where the majority of the population was of Ruthenian nationality; students at teacher training colleges were required to learn the Ruthenian language, and [...] in secondary schools... in Uzhhorod, Siget and Mukachevo, Ruthenian became a compulsory subject.”

A significant shift towards a pro-Ukrainian LP in educational institutions can be observed in post-revolutionary Transcarpathia (see also Pipash, 2011). Moreover, the Ukrainian language also began to be used in the administrative management of Ukrainian regions. However, the head of these institutions was appointed Moscowphile Dobryansky (see Makarenko, 2008; Chernychko & Fedynets, 2020). Hnatiuk, (1916, p.46) argued that after the formation of the Austro-Hungarian Empire (1867) “потрапили погодити москвофілство з мадярством¹²⁴”, and therefore the Ukrainian movement in Transcarpathia began to decline. The 1868 law on schools established Hungarian as the language of instruction, while also allowing for the establishment of schools for national minorities. As Siropolko (2001, p. 631) notes, “русини не використали належною мірою того права¹²⁵”. Albeit such schools existed. In 1874, there were 571 of them, but their number decreased to 211 in 1880. In 1879, a new law was passed, according to which teaching could be done exclusively in Hungarian.

Material incentives were also used to implement this law. Specifically, teachers were rewarded for the best results in teaching the Hungarian language. This marked the beginning of the Magyarisation of education. Siropolko (2001, p. 631) notes that as early as 1895, the Minister of Education said in his speech to parliament that the teaching of Hungarian in schools was progressing successfully. Ukraine was not among the regions named as unsuccessful. The next step in Magyarisation was less “gentle”. In 1902, an order was issued to close all schools that had not achieved success in teaching Hungarian. Moreover, all school administration-related tasks had to be conducted in Hungarian. The next law, passed in 1907, was not long in coming, requiring all schoolchildren, without exception, to have a high level of spoken and written Hungarian by the end of the fourth grade. By 1913, only 34 Ukrainian-Hungarian schools remained. As Siropolko (2001, p. 632) notes, only 60% of all children attended school in some capacity. It was impossible to influence the situation either from within or from outside (for example, Ukrainians in Galicia appealed to the Hungarian authorities, but their efforts were unsuccessful). Siropolko (2001, pp.633-

¹²⁴ “Moscowphilism with Magyarism managed to reconcile”

¹²⁵ “the Ruthenians did not use that right to the proper extent”

634) notes that the only positive aspect of this situation was that “той стан затримав русинів від повної денаціоналізації”¹²⁶”.

With the outbreak of World War I, schooling declined significantly. A new, autonomous period began in the history of Transcarpathia. The autonomous region of Subcarpathian Ruthenia became part of Czechoslovakia, and it received its own parliament and autonomy in terms of language, education, religion, and local government. It should be noted that since the first edition of Siropolko’s work was published in 1936, these processes are better assessed by Bohiv (2014) with the benefit of hindsight. The author writes that Subcarpathian Ruthenia did not receive actual autonomy until 1938, when it was renamed as Carpatho-Ukraine.

Conclusion and Comments

From the end of the 17th century, the region gradually became integrated into the Austrian administrative space through Hungary. Language here was not just a means of communication, but an instrument of social stratification, determining confessional identity and political views. Initially, German was widely used for educational services, but Ukrainian Church Slavonic and popular Ruthenian language variants were preserved in schools, particularly in rural and parish settings.

After the reforms of Maria Theresa and Joseph II, education in Transcarpathia was systematised and unified. However, the language problem persisted, as German was difficult for children to understand and foreign to them. From 1867, the Hungarian language gained a dominant position due to the policy of Magyarization. It was the educational sphere that became the main instrument of assimilation. The Hungarian Kingdom was clearly focused on spreading the Hungarian language, and LP in education worked to oust the Ukrainian language from the educational process. Thus, although Ukrainian managed to survive in church education, it lost its status as a written or scientific language in secular life. The lack of books or textbooks printed in Ukrainian also became a problem.

¹²⁶ “this state of affairs prevented the Rusyns from complete denationalisation”

Greek Catholic churches, as centres of educational and cultural activity, were unable to resist the state apparatus despite their efforts. However, it was precisely these religious centres that preserved the language and culture that formed the basis of the future national movement.

In summary, German and Hungarian served as official languages and were therefore highly prestigious. The Ukrainian language was quite marginalised, although not as badly as in the Left Bank. The language policies of Transcarpathia can be considered complex and multidimensional, which have shaped the current linguistic environment of the region. The intersection of political, cultural, and educational influences from Hungary, Austria, and, to a certain extent, the Russian Empire has left a distinct mark on the region.

2.3. Ukrainian Revolutions and Early Soviet Language Policy (1917–1930s)

Before analysing language policies in Ukrainian territories during this period, it is important to examine the historical context. In fact, this period is perhaps the most difficult to describe, given the high dynamics of political and administrative changes against the backdrop of shifting front lines during military operations (World War I, 1914-1918; Polish-Ukrainian War, 1918-1919; the Red and White Armies' advances on Ukraine; and internal struggles between representatives of different political factions within Ukraine). Therefore, in the following paragraphs, we have attempted to briefly describe the events of that time, based on the works of Doroshenko (1932), Nahaievskyi (1989), Subtelny (2009), Magocsi (1997), Snyder (1999, 2004), Plokhyy (2017), Maraiev (2020).

The eastern front of World War I passed through the territories of Galicia and Volhynia. Galicia itself was occupied by the Russian Empire in 1914-15. This left a deep traumatic experience on its inhabitants and, to a certain extent, showed that Muscovitism was the wrong direction.

After the February Revolution in Russia in 1917, the Central Rada of Ukraine was formed, which in November 1917 proclaimed the creation of the Ukrainian

People's Republic. The Central Rada's policy was often criticised for its indecisiveness, as independence was only declared on the fourth attempt, despite autonomy within the Russian Empire having been previously declared. Additionally, due to a lack of resources, widespread support from the population, and international assistance, the Central Rada was unable to maintain a stable political situation for the Ukrainian People's Republic. Subsequently, the Bolsheviks advanced on Kyiv, and the Central Rada lost power.

In 1918, with the support of Germany, the Ukrainian State (also called the Second Hetmanate) was established on the territory of Ukraine. However, its existence proved to be short-lived. First, the German authorities did not consider the Hetmanate as an equal political partner, perceiving it only as a means to the end of fighting against Bolshevik Russia. Secondly, Pavlo Skoropadskyi's policy was strategic and long-term in nature, while Ukrainian society expected immediate social and national changes. As a result, the Hetmanate lost its support and power.

At the end of 1918, the Directorate of Ukraine came to power, which was a political body that replaced the Central Rada and represented the socialist orientation of the Ukrainian state-building movement. At the same time, after the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the West Ukrainian People's Republic (abbreviated as ZUNR) was formed in the western Ukrainian lands (November 1918). Both states sought unification, and on 22 January 1919, the Unification Act was proclaimed, which provided for the autonomous status of Galicia within the Ukrainian People's Republic (abbreviated as UNR). Under the agreement, Galicia was to support the UNR in its fight against the Bolsheviks and White Army, while Kyiv undertook to assist in the confrontation with Poland.

In 1919–1920, Ukraine effectively became an arena of armed struggle between several political forces: the UNR, the Bolsheviks, the White Guard troops led by General Denikin, Poland, and Nestor Makhno's anarchist movement. Although a detailed analysis of these events is beyond the scope of this study, it is worth noting that following the signing of the Riga Peace Treaty in 1921, Ukrainian independence could not be preserved. As a result, the territory of modern Ukraine was divided between several states.

Firstly, Soviet troops were unable to hold Kyiv, constant fights were around Kyiv. In the elections to the Constituent Assembly in the autumn of 1917, 10% of voters voted for the Bolsheviks. For example, in the Volyn, Kyiv, Poltava, and Tavria provinces and in the Black Sea Fleet, not a single Bolshevik deputy was elected (see Lenin, 1967). Thus, they decided to relocate to Kharkiv and establish a puppet government there. They called it the Ukrainian People's Republic in the first years, but then renamed it into Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic (Ukrainian SSR) and proclaimed Kharkiv the capital of all Ukraine. Despite limited support, the Bolsheviks eventually managed to establish control over most of the eastern and central territories. It was this Soviet republic that became one of the founders of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in 1922. Hunchak, (1993, p.117) supports this data, describing the process as:

Маневр більшовиків України не вдався: замість вибрати нову Центральну Раду, підконтрольну більшовикам, з'їзд висловив діючій Центральній Раді повне довір'я. [...] Зрозумівши, що в Києві їм не вдасться нічого вдіяти проти Центральної Ради, більшовики разом із фракцією лівих російських соціалістів-революціонерів покинули з'їзд і переїхали до Харкова. Тут вони об'єдналися зі з'їздом Рад Донецького та Криворізького басейнів, що якраз відбувався, і оцей об'єднаний з'їзд проголосив себе першим Всеукраїнським з'їздом Рад, який обрав Центральний виконавчий комітет і Народний секретаріат, тобто перший радянський уряд України.¹²⁷

Hunchak, 1993, p.117

Secondly, after the defeat of the Ukrainian army, Galicia and Western Volhynia became part of the Second Polish Republic. Northern Bukovyna was annexed by Romania, and Transcarpathia, in accordance with the Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye (1919), was annexed to Czechoslovakia.

In parallel with the military and political events of the early 1920s, a mass peasant insurgency movement formed in Ukraine. This was caused by peasant dissatisfaction with the constant change of power and political and economic uncertainty. The most active uprisings took place in the territories of Podillia,

¹²⁷ "The Bolsheviks' manoeuvre in Ukraine failed: instead of electing a new Central Rada controlled by the Bolsheviks, the congress expressed its full confidence in the existing Central Rada. [...] Realising that they would not be able to do anything against the Central Rada in Kyiv, the Bolsheviks, together with a faction of left-wing Russian Socialist Revolutionaries, left the congress and moved to Kharkiv. There they joined forces with the congress of councils of the Donetsk and Kryvyi Rih basins, which was taking place at that very moment, and this united congress proclaimed itself the first All-Ukrainian Congress of Councils, which elected the Central Executive Committee and the People's Secretariat, i.e. the first Soviet government of Ukraine."

Katerynoslavshchyna, Kherson, and Poltava. The most striking manifestation of this phenomenon was the movement led by Nestor Makhno, which turned into a large-scale anarchist force with its own political programme – the idea of ‘free councils’ without centralised power.

Thus, during 1918–1921, Ukrainian lands became the subject of complex geopolitical processes, in which internal attempts at state-building interacted with external forces seeking to establish their own control over the region. This period laid the groundwork for further Soviet domination and shaped the political landscape of Eastern Europe during the interwar period (see Doroshenko, 1932; Nahaievskyi, 1989; Subtelny, 2009; Magocsi, 1997; Snyder, 1999, 2004; Ploky, 2017; Maraiev, 2020).

Last but not least, we do not mention here in detail such state entities as Malynovyi Klyn (Raspberry Ukraine), Zhovty Klyn (Yellow Ukraine), and Zelenyi Klyn (Green Ukraine). Each of these state entities had its own view on language development on its territory, and a general tendency was towards the systematisation and development of the Ukrainian language, but the Soviet rule did not give them opportunity to develop this tendency (see Shymonovych, 1924; Serhiichuk, 2000; Bilyi, 2009).

2.3.1. Central Rada and Ukrainian People’s Republic: LP and Education

The year 1917 in the history of Ukraine is characterised by the revival of Ukrainian statehood, the development of national culture, and, with it, the language. On March 17-20, 1917, the first steps in the formation of the Ukrainian government were taken in Kyiv. The Society of Ukrainian Progress¹²⁸ (TUP, founded in 1908) was the only Ukrainian political group (initially legal, later semi-legal) that existed in Ukraine after the outbreak of World War I in 1914. It created the Central Rada of Ukraine¹²⁹, which initially served as the party’s organisation, and was immediately strengthened by local socialists in Kyiv, as they sought to present themselves as exponents of national feelings.

¹²⁸ Товариство Українських Поступовців

¹²⁹ Українська Центральна Рада

On April 29, 1917 the Constitution of the Ukrainian People's Republic was adopted and Mykhailo Hrushevskyi was elected as the president. The constitution was written in Ukrainian, but it did not mention any language as the state language. However, later declaration of Ukrainian as a state language of the UNR, stimulated the development of the Ukrainian newspaper industry (e.g. *Nova Rada*, *Narodna Volya*, *Borotba*, and *Robitnycha Hazeta*), and the number of Ukrainian books printed increased significantly. Mass media appeared in Kharkiv, Katrynoslav (now Dnipro), Poltava, Vinnytsia, Katerynodar (now Krasnodar, Russia), Novorossiysk and others.

In March of the same year, the first Ukrainian gymnasium was opened in Kyiv. Then, in 1918, the Kyiv and Kamianets-Podilskyi Ukrainian universities were reopened, and the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences and the Central Scientific Library (now the National Library of Ukraine named after V.I. Vernadskyi) were established (see Danylevska, 2009; Terliuk, 2021).

This period saw the rise and active development of the Ukrainian language. It provided the local population with the opportunity to use it freely within the territory of Ukraine. The opening of Ukrainian educational and research institutions and the publication of articles in the Ukrainian language contributed not only to the spread of the language among the population but also ensured a high level of the language in literature and science (see Danylevska, 2009; Terliuk, 2021).

Such a drastic change in LP (compared to the Russian Empire) faced certain challenges. Firstly, it required the normalisation of language (codification of spelling and regulatory and stylistic spheres) and the creation of a terminological scientific base. Secondly, the transition of the entire national education system to the Ukrainian language required trained qualified personnel, appropriate textbooks, etc. (see Kovalenko & Shevchenko, 2005). One of the illustrative points of the policy of Ukrainiasation was the then Law of the Ukrainian State (1918) On Compulsory Teaching of the Ukrainian Language and Literature, as well as the History and Geography of Ukraine in Secondary Schools. This law established the obligation to study the Ukrainian language and history as key components in secondary education, giving priority to the development of the educational system within national and cultural growth. It emphasised the importance of mastering the national language and

history as a foundation for the formation of civic consciousness and the development of national self-perception. It proved important at the time of defending the right to the existence of the Ukrainian state later.

The Minister of Education of the Central Government, I. Steshenko, understood the importance of solving the problems mentioned earlier and, therefore, without delay, instructed Ohiyenko to draw up short rules of Ukrainian spelling. In No. 10 of the magazine “Ukrainian School” for 1918, “The most important rules of Ukrainian spelling” were published. It was approved by the Spelling Commission under the Ministry of Education on May 24, 1918, in Kyiv. In 1919, “The main rules of Ukrainian spelling, adopted by the Ministry of National Education for school use throughout Ukraine”, were published. It can be safely called the first scientific system of Ukrainian spelling (see Herman, 2001; Nimchuk & Puriayeva, 2004).

2.3.2. The Second Hetmanate: LP and Education

On April 29, 1918, a *coup d'état* took place. Consequently, the Central Rada was deprived of its powers. A monarchy in the form of a hetmanate headed by Pavlo Skoropadskyi was proclaimed. Most government actors were replaced with ‘the experts’. The experts were usually Russians, especially the representatives of ESDEKY¹³⁰, who were hostile to the ideas of Ukrainian autonomy or independence, but supported Skoropadskyi. They even demanded that Russian (along with Ukrainian) become the state language. If, during the time of the Central Rada, Ukrainian did not supplant Russian as a means of communication, then during the Hetmanate, it had no chance to do so (although the cultural life of Ukraine flourished under the new regime).

Since education in the Russian Empire was russified, the wider population of the generation of Skoropadskyi had no chance to receive a high-quality education in Ukrainian. Taking that into consideration, Hetman’s policy regarding the army and the administration aimed to win time for the progressive education of Ukrainian personnel in schools. Later, he hoped to train and hire these personnel to take the place of the

¹³⁰ Українська соціал-демократична робітничка партія

experts of Russian origin. However, it was a risky game since the Russian officers could easily take everything into their own hands, so the development of a new pro-Ukrainian team and transition had to be quick (see Danylevska, 2009; Terliuk, 2021).

Giving the Ukrainian language national recognition and creating conditions for its active development were important steps to establish Ukraine as a sovereign and independent state and increase the national self-awareness of its citizens. To achieve this, it was necessary not only to ensure the state status of the Ukrainian language but also to take targeted measures for its full use in all spheres of public life. In particular, he (1) affirmed Ukrainian as a national language in state and local government (ukrainisation in the broadest sense); (2) introduced the official transition to written and oral communication in Ukrainian; (3) aimed to create an environment in which the use of Ukrainian would become natural and convenient for all citizens (see Kopylenko, 1998; Danylevska, 2009; Terliuk, 2021).

The development of Ukrainian-language education involved rethinking the LP in academia, ensuring that all citizens have the opportunity to learn in Ukrainian. This stimulated the expansion of the network of Ukrainian schools, universities, and scientific institutions, ensuring that not only the humanities, but also technical and natural sciences, were taught in the Ukrainian language. Skoropadskyi also continued the state support of culture. Moreover, not only did he support the publication of magazines and books in the state language but also the active support of the arts of theatre and cinema (see Kopylenko, 1998; Danylevska, 2009; Terliuk, 2021).

As for codification of the language, the Hemanate continued the initiative of UNR. “The most important rules of Ukrainian spelling” were approved by the Spelling Committee of the Ministry of National Education in Kyiv on May 24, 1918, and were published in the magazine “Ukrainian School” in issue 10 of 1918. This document was the first step toward creating a spelling system that reflected the needs and peculiarities of the Ukrainian language in the context of contemporary educational and scientific standards (see Danylevska, 2009; Terliuk, 2021).

In 1919, the “Main rules of Ukrainian spelling adopted by the State Ministry of Education for use in schools throughout Ukraine” was published. This was the first scientific system of Ukrainian spelling, the culmination of the work of 19th-century

writers and scientists. Some of these rules were readopted in the 2019 edition of Ukrainian spelling rules.

2.3.3. Directorate of Ukraine and Ukrainian People's Republic: LP and Education

Terliuk (2021) refers to the LP of the Directorate as to the most resolute based on its Law on State Language in Ukrainian People's Republic. As cited in Danylevska (2009, p.71) the use of Ukrainian became mandatory “в Армії, Фльоті і всіх урядових та загальних громадських публічно-правних установах¹³¹”. It is also interesting that under this law, private individuals could apply to state institutions in their own language. This decision has been criticised by some scholars, such as Kopylenko (1998, p.47). However, with the benefit of hindsight, it was a fairly inclusive decision. Another interesting point is that the state only supported publications in Ukrainian at its own expense.

Danylevska (2009, p.89-90) lists a number of regulations proving that the Directorate chose ukrainisation of education as one of its policies. The state paid for schooling of all children-citizens of Ukraine, which also included schools for Jews. The scholar claims that there were decrees that also addressed the use of national minorities' languages (but we did not find any). Simultaneously, Law On the Establishment of Ukrainian Language Courses in All Higher Education Institutions of the Ukrainian People's Republic (cited in Danylevska, 2009, p.89) was adopted in 1919. It was unusual for the academia of the time. The Ukrainian language had to become part of any activity in a HEI. What is more, schoolbooks were extensively printed in this period. During the period from 1917 to 1920, numerous discussions took place about methods of teaching the Ukrainian language, its importance, and its future. These discussions were most intense during the time of the Directory. And for the first time, the issue of the Ukrainian language was considered as state-building at the level of leading Ukrainian scholars (see Danylevska, 2009, pp. 90-93).

¹³¹ “in the Army, Navy and all government and general public legal institutions”

It is also worth noting that the accession of the ZUNR to the UNR, which was already under the leadership of the Directory, determined the peculiarities of its LP (see Subtelny, 2009). The policy of the ZUNR was much more inclusive. The authorities undertook to issue state acts not only in Ukrainian, but also in Polish, Yiddish and German (see Makarchuk, 1997). Ukrainian was granted official status with the adoption of the law On the Use of Language in Internal and External Administration by Authorities and Governments, Public Institutions, and State-Owned Enterprises in the Western Region of the Ukrainian People's Republic in February 1919 (see Terliuk, 2021, p.75).

In this context, it is also important to note that different spelling rules were used in these territories prior to unification, and thus, the unification of these rules was necessary (Nimchuk, 2002, p.10). In the former Russian-controlled territories, spelling rules based on those of Kulish and Maksymovych were used. Meanwhile, Galicia had its own Galician spelling rules created by SSS. For example, the letter “i” was widely used in UNR, but it was rarely used in ZUNR. Another example is the transmission of the quality of palatalization: “жовте́нь” for UNR and “зѣовте́нь” for ZUNR (see Herman, 2001).

Yavorska (2000, p.117) argues that the need for a unified system was clear, but the object of the discussion was the final version of this system:

ніхто не сумнівався в тому, що українська літературна мова повинна мати одну орфографічну систему, питання було лише в тому, як дійти згоди¹³²

Yavorska, 2000, p.117

The author of the article notes that the spelling reform is not only a matter of language but also a matter of national identity. Danylevska (2009) suggests that the codified writing system could have become the representation of unity and stability within the country.

¹³² “No one doubted that the Ukrainian literary language should have a single spelling system; the only question was how to reach agreement.”

відсутність кодифікованого правопису на момент проголошення незалежності УНР (січень 1918 р.) була не стільки мовною проблемою, скільки політичною, бо ставила під сумнів дієздатність і життєспроможність Української держави.¹³³

Danylevska, 2009, p.118

This opinion supports (1) the importance of LP in state-building (as later recognised in the 2019 Language Law), (2) its political importance within Ukraine. Nimchuk (2002, p.3) notes that a single spelling system consolidates national culture, while its absence, on the contrary, disorients its speakers. Additionally, the lack of unified rules hinders the overall literacy of the population.

Thus, the codification of Ukrainian spelling became one of the most important achievements of corpus planning within LP during the Ukrainian Revolution. It was Ohiyenko's spelling that became the cornerstone for the creation of subsequent Ukrainian spellings. Both Soviet and Ukrainian scholars used it as a starting point. The only difference was that the former tried to move away from his norms, while the latter tried to move closer to them.

2.3.4. Early Soviet Union: LP and Education

To begin with, in this chapter, we primarily discuss LP in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, rather than the entire Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Since in English the abbreviations for both are equal (USSR), we would use the working terms Ukrainian SSR and Soviet Union, respectively.

The First All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets took place in Kharkiv in 1917, where resolutions 'On the Organisation of Power in Ukraine' and 'On the Self-Determination of Ukraine' were adopted. However, this did not change the situation immediately. Thus, between 1917 and 1920, there were three attempts to establish a Bolshevik dictatorship in the Ukrainian People's Republic, accompanied by military intervention by Soviet Russia. The party members were part of the Russian Communist Party (abbreviated RCP). The Communist Party of Ukraine was established in 1918,

¹³³ "The absence of codified spelling at the time of the proclamation of independence of the Ukrainian People's Republic (January 1918) was not so much a linguistic problem as a political one, because it called into question the capacity and viability of the Ukrainian state."

but it joined the RCP in 1921. These processes took place in parallel with the rule of the Central Rada, the Second Hetmanate, and the Directory in Kyiv. So, on January 6, 1919, the Ukrainian SSR was proclaimed in Kharkiv (see Doroshenko, 1932; Nahaievskyi, 1989; Subtelny, 2009; Magocsi, 1997; Masenko, 2004; Snyder, 1999, 2004; Ploky, 2017; Maraiev, 2020).

On March 6-10, 1919, the Third All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets adopted the Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR (1919). The language issue is not addressed there at all. The only language-related thing is mentioned in Article IV. It states that the writing on the coat of arms should be in both Russian and Ukrainian. The Constitution itself (both a bill and a final project) was written in Russian. The established government consisted of three Ukrainians only: Skrypnyk, Zatonskyi, and Terletskyi. Kalinichenko and Rybalka (2004, p.47) quote Zatonskyi in this regard:

Називали себе урядом, та самі до того ставилися трохи гумористично. Та й насправді: який же з нас уряд без армії, фактично без території, бо навіть Харківська рада нас не визнавала. Апарату жодного...¹³⁴

As we can see, even in Kharkiv, it was difficult for the Bolsheviks to seize power. A detailed analysis of the political and military developments of this period falls beyond the scope of this discussion. The following section, therefore, focuses on language and education policies. It is worth starting with the transitional period leading up to the formation of the Soviet Union.

переважна кількість членів уряду, за винятком, мабуть, тільки М.Скрипника, були далекими від українського народу, його мови, життя, побуту, звичаїв - цього вони не знали і знати не хотіли, вважаючи прагнення до утвердження української державності справою контрреволюційною. [...] Раковський у кількох своїх перших промовах в Україні зневажливо висловлювався про українську мову і явно недооцінював українське національне питання. На засіданні Київської Ради 13 лютого 1919 р. він заявив, що “декретування української мови як мови державної є реакційним заходом”, а в заключному слові на III Всеукраїнському з’їзді рад висунув твердження, що ми “покінчили з національними відмінностями”. За такого ставлення голови уряду [...] у всіх партійних органах, державних установах, громадських організаціях уся робота й діловодство велося не українською, а російською мовою. При цьому деякі з керівників прямо забороняли користуватися українською мовою. Так, у лютому 1919 р. один з керівних працівників Наркомату пошт і телеграфів Кролевецький розіслав циркулярну телеграму, за якою все листування й діловодство в усіх поштово-телеграфних установах мало вестися тільки російською мовою. Однак в умовах

¹³⁴ “We called ourselves a government, but we were a bit humorous about it. And really, what kind of government are we without an army, without any territory, since even the Kharkiv Council didn’t recognise us? We didn’t have any apparatus...”

наростання українського національно-визвольного руху більшовики були змушені проводити у галузі освіти й культури деякі заходи, які мали сприяти поширенню сфери вживання української мови. Так, 4 квітня 1919 р. він прийняв постанову про обов'язкову публікацію українською та російською мовами всіх декретів, наказів, звернень та інших документів.¹³⁵

Kalinichenko & Rybalka, 2004, p.125

This evidence confirms that the Soviet authorities had no desire to deal with who exactly inhabited the territory of Ukraine. They were more concerned with adapting the local population to their needs. Hence, there was an obligation to use the Russian language in administrative and communication spheres. Officially, this was called the policy of so-called internationalism (see Dziuba, 1968; Masenko, 2004). However, the strong patriotic movement in Ukraine, which emerged during the revolutionary period, was in fact also a result of the work of previous generations. Realising that the government was still unstable (there had been numerous peasant uprisings) and in order not to lose control over the territories of Ukraine, the Soviets made certain concessions. Regarding the delicate situation of the Bolsheviks in power, Kalinichenko and Rybalka (2004, p.47) write:

проголошення харківського зібрання Всеукраїнським з'їздом рад, на якому було представлено менше третини рад, що тоді існували в Україні, не можна вважати легітимним. [...] ЦВК рад України і народний Секретаріат фактично були створені з волі Леніна для того, щоб виправдати й узаконити їхню війну проти УНР, Центральної Ради, зобразити її як внутрішню боротьбу революційних сил проти “буржуазної” політики Центральної Ради [...] Щоб видавати радянську владу в Україні за українську, більшовики перехопили й назву “Української Народної Республіки”, а уряд назвали фактично за прикладом Генерального Секретаріату Народним Секретаріатом. Оголосили Україну федеративною частиною Росії, а федерального уряду там не було: радянська “УНР” фактично була адміністративним краєм, її органи

¹³⁵ “The vast majority of members of the government, with the possible exception of M. Skrypnyk, were distant from the Ukrainian people, their language, life, customs and traditions — they did not know this and did not want to know, considering the desire to establish Ukrainian statehood to be counter-revolutionary. [...] In several of his first speeches in Ukraine, Rakovsky spoke disparagingly about the Ukrainian language and clearly underestimated the Ukrainian national question. At a meeting of the Kyiv Council on 13 February 1919, he stated that ‘declaring Ukrainian the state language is a reactionary measure’, and in his closing remarks at the Third All-Ukrainian Congress of Councils, he asserted that we had ‘put an end to national differences’. With this attitude on the part of the head of government [...] all work and paperwork in party bodies, state institutions, and public organisations was conducted in Russian rather than Ukrainian. Some leaders even directly prohibited the use of the Ukrainian language. Thus, in February 1919, one of the leading officials of the People’s Commissariat of Post and Telegraphs, Krolevetsky, sent out a circular telegram stating that all correspondence and paperwork in all post and telegraph institutions should be conducted only in Russian. However, in the context of the growing Ukrainian national liberation movement, the Bolsheviks were forced to take certain measures in the field of education and culture to promote the use of the Ukrainian language. On 4 April 1919, he adopted a resolution on the mandatory publication of all decrees, orders, appeals and other documents in Ukrainian and Russian.”

Thus, we see that the Ukrainian SSR was de facto a puppet government in the hands of the Russian Bolsheviks, with little support among the population. Its creation was a “cover” for the seizure of the rest of Ukraine’s territory. The creation of this pseudo-republic was intended to distract both the domestic public and the international community and to present the Bolsheviks’ war against the Ukrainians as a civil war. On December 28, 1920, the Union Treaty between the RSFSR and the Ukrainian SSR, which was of a military and economic nature (see *Soiuznyi dohovor mezhdu RSFSR¹³⁷ y USSR*, 1919; Subtelny, 2009, pp.380-387).

On December 30, 1922, the First Union Congress of Soviets opened in Moscow. Representatives from Ukraine were also present, whose powers included only ‘the development and final approval of the constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics’ (see *All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets*, 1922; Magocsi, 1997). However, the agenda of the congress turned out to be different, and Lenin read out the Declaration and the Treaty on the Formation of the USSR, proposing their approval. The representatives of the Ukrainian delegation considered this decision to be hasty and proposed postponing it, but the resolution approving the Treaty was nevertheless adopted by the Congress. Only 23 (out of 352) representatives of the Ukrainian SSR signed it. Thus, the Ukrainian SSR was virtually annexed, since 23 signatures are clearly not enough, especially considering that the delegates had no right to sign such a document at all (see *Pershyi zizd Rad Sotsiialistychnykh Radianskykh Respublik*, 1922; Kalinichenko & Rybalka, 2004; Plokyh, 2017).

¹³⁶ “The proclamation of the Kharkiv assembly as the All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets, at which less than a third of the soviets then existing in Ukraine were represented, cannot be considered legitimate. [...] The Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of Ukraine and the People’s Secretariat were in fact created at Lenin’s behest in order to justify and legitimise their war against the UPR and the Central Rada, portraying it as an internal struggle between revolutionary forces and the ‘bourgeois’ policies of the Central Rada [...] In order to pass off Soviet power in Ukraine as Ukrainian, the Bolsheviks appropriated the name ‘Ukrainian People’s Republic’ and named the government the People’s Secretariat, following the example of the General Secretariat. They declared Ukraine a federal part of Russia, but there was no federal government there: the Soviet ‘UNR’ was in fact an administrative region, its authorities carried out the orders of the Council of People’s Commissars of Russia and, above all, the directives of the Central Committee of the RSDLP(b).”

¹³⁷ Abbreviation of Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic

It is important to note that the position of the communist authorities was quite unstable at that time. Mass peasant uprisings constantly broke out in various parts of Ukraine. In addition to physical, military struggle against the insurgency, the Soviet authorities used other methods. Firstly, the permission of free trade within the NEP somewhat calmed the peasants (Kalinichenko & Rybalka, 2004, pp.181-183). Secondly, a severe drought and crop failure in 1921 affected a significant part of the southern territories of Ukraine. However, in 1921, Moscow did not exempt Ukraine from paying the food tax, so part of the population was arrested and deported for failing to pay the food tax or shot on the spot under a special decree on the use of weapons, while another part simply died of starvation. As of 1 May 1922, about 4 million people according to Soviet estimates (7 million according to international estimates), or 35% of the population of this region, were suffering from famine in five Ukrainian provinces (see Kalinichenko & Rybalka, 2004; Turchenko, 2012; Kyrylenko, 2015).

Shevelov (1987, p.105) claims that between 1918 and 1924 there were three waves of reoccupation of Ukraine by Soviet Russia, but they can be considered collectively, since the LP regarding the Ukrainian language did not change during this period. The key line of this LP, in his opinion, was the introduction of Russian as equal to Ukrainian in these territories, even though it was not true. Skrypnyk (1974, p.17) recalls about 200 recalled that he knew of about two hundred cases of judicial reprisals for using the Ukrainian language.

The majority of Ukrainian institutions were closed and dispersed, for example, numerous departments of 'Prosvita' in 1922. Interestingly, the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences continued to operate, despite reduced funding and restricted printing capabilities. Shevelov (1987, p.107) asserts that it led to a certain fear of using the Ukrainian language in public. Another important event related to the policy of internationalisation was the attempt of the Soviet authorities to Latinise the languages of the peoples of the USSR in the 1920s. As a result, 69 languages were transferred to use the Latin alphabet, e.g. Crimean Tatar. However, Ukrainian linguists at the spelling conference in Kharkiv in 1927. The main reasons against were (1) huge expenses on reprinting everything, (2) Ukrainian would be distanced from Russian, and (3) would approach Polish. At the time, nothing of this was within the interests of Ukrainian

SSR's authorities (see Siropolko, 1934; Ohiyenko, 1950; Shevelov, 1987; Nimchuk, 2002; Masenko, 2004; Nimchuk & Puriaieva, 2004).

At the same time, in terms of education, the Ukrainian language was viewed as a means of educating the broader masses. Between 1919 and 1922, a series of decrees were issued concerning language in education. The most important points were (1) compulsory study of the Ukrainian language, history and geography in schools, (2) equal status of Ukrainian and Russian in schools, (3) teaching of the Ukrainian language to clergy and future teachers. In 1920, it was also proposed to organise Ukrainian language courses for civil servants so that they could use it freely in state institutions and agencies (see Shevelov, 1987, p.107-108).

The 'Code of Laws on Public Education in the Ukrainian SSR' contained a paragraph proclaiming Ukrainian and Russian as languages of national importance. The motivation for this decision was that Ukrainian was the language of the majority of the population, while Russian was the language of the Soviet Union. Thus, both languages had to be taught in all educational institutions (see Durdenevskyi, 1927, p.159).

So, we see that at a certain point, the Soviet authorities shifted from resisting the Ukrainian national movement to appeasing it. Moreover, at the Thirteenth Party Congress in Moscow (April 1923), they officially adopted a policy of *korenizatsia* (also: indigenisation) (see Subtelny, 2009, pp.387-390). Plokyh (2017, p.231) claims that the aim of the policy was to achieve "the creation of loyal local elites". It was also somehow opposing the new government policy to that of the Empire. This policy also applied to other republics. As for Ukraine, the more common term was *ukrainizatsiia* (ukrainisation). Here, we focus on Ukraine only.

The population of Soviet Ukraine in the mid-1920s was less than 30 million, with Ukrainians constituting roughly 80 percent [...]. The ethnic composition of the party was very different. [...] of the Communist Party of Ukraine, Russians made up an absolute majority, with more than 53 percent [...]. Rural Ukrainians regarded the new administration as little more than an occupying force. The party regime in Moscow wanted to change that perception in order to establish its control over the Ukrainian peasantry.

Plokyh, 2017, p.231

As the data shows, the "people's councils" did not accurately represent the people living in Ukraine. Moreover, the people were still quite hostile towards this

government. That is why the government decided to pursue a policy of ukrainisation in order to appease the people and convince them of its necessity.

Representatives of Ukrainian communists actively sought to implement a policy of ukrainisation, but noted that this policy needed to be strengthened. They repeatedly appealed directly to Stalin but received the response that it was “not the right time”. Moreover, Shumsky expressed concern that the so-called ukrainisation was being carried out by Kaganovich (an ethnic Jew) and then Kosior (an ethnic Pole), who in fact had little understanding of Ukrainian culture (Shevelov, 1987, pp.109-118; Subtelny, 2009, pp.387-390; Magocsi, 1997, pp.538-541; Plokhly, 2017, pp.232-234). Another alerting event was when Shumskyi suggested proclaiming both Ukrainian and Russian as the state languages. This idea gained the majority of the votes, but Petrovskyi and Frunze denied the formula of “state languages” (see Babii, 1961, p.283).

As for the situation with the Ukrainian language in education and printing at the beginning of the ukrainisation¹³⁸ process, Shevelov (1987) offers the following data. First, he notes that 63% of schools had Ukrainian as a language of instruction, but the distribution was uneven. For example, in Donbas, there were no schools with Ukrainian as the language of instruction at all (see Popov, 1928, p. 268). Moreover, most urban schools had Russian as a language of instruction. In his 1923 report (see Skrypnyk, 1974, p.50), Skrypnyk notes that some of them did not even teach Ukrainian as a separate subject. Despite Skrypnyk’s efforts to change the situation, educational institutions for factory workers and military personnel did not teach in Ukrainian. Shevelov (1987) highlights that such a state of the art increased the difference between urban and village education, levelling the prestige of the Ukrainian language.

As for printing, Shevelov (1987, p.124) cites data showing that between 1921 and 1924, only 13 Ukrainian grammar books were published (compared to 59 during the three years of the Ukrainian People’s Republic and the Second Hemanate). The situation with dictionaries was no better. Fifteen dictionaries were published in five

¹³⁸ officially it started in 1925, but we can see that the regulations of such nature were adopted even earlier

years, while in the previous three years of Ukrainian government rule, 45 such dictionaries were published.

It is important to note that the policy of ukrainisation that truly started in 1925 primarily concerned cities, as villages were already Ukrainised. Special commissions were created, such as the Commission for the Ukrainisation of the State Apparatus.

In 1925-1927, Ukrainian language courses for civil servants were offered free of charge, but from 1927 onwards, they became fee-based. If a civil servant failed the exam, they were dismissed from their position. Skrypnyk also sought to ukrainise the army, but he did not succeed (Maistrenko, 1979, pp. 115-118). Education was still the area where ukrainisation was most successfully implemented. The number of primary schools with Ukrainian as the language of instruction was 6,105 in 1922 and 14,330 in 1930 (Skrypnyk, 1974, p. 210).

Siropolko (1934, p. 210) noted that as of 1927, 77% of the population was taught in Ukrainian in general primary schools. This was almost equal to the total number of Ukrainians in the population. Other types of schools could not boast such impressive results. Regarding higher education, Skrypnyk (1974, p. 191) notes that by 1929, approximately 30% of institutions had been Ukrainianized. Moreover, there were also bilingual educational institutions at both the school and institute levels. However, they mainly taught secondary subjects in Ukrainian that had no direct impact on their professional activities. For example, political education. Plokhyy (2017, p.232) provides data on the results of ukrainisation in academia, saying that “Ukrainian-language instruction in institutions of higher learning increased from 33 per cent in the 1926-1927 academic year to 68 per cent in 1928 and 1929”.

Thus, we can see the quantitative data of some improvement in higher education with Ukrainian as a language of instruction. Publishing was also influenced by ukrainisation. Shevelov (1987, p.144) claims that books in Ukrainian constituted from 45,8% to 79,9% of the published material between 1925 to 1931. Skrypnyk (1934, p.212) stated that the circulation of the materials published in Ukrainian had grown. However, Shevelov (1987) suggests that this is due to the massive printing of propagandist materials in these years.

It is also interesting that ukrainisation affected not only the territory of the Ukrainian SSR, but also other territories of the Soviet Union where Ukrainians lived. For example, Kuban, which, before the Bolshevik takeover, had shown interest in joining the Ukrainian People's Republic on the basis of autonomy.

Another important step made within ukrainisation policy was the codification of the Ukrainian language. The system developed by Ohiyenko (and others) was working since 1921, but it was not complete since completed in a hurry (see Nimchuk, 2002). The Academy of Sciences hired Krymsky, Gantzov, and Sinyavsky for this purpose. However, other linguists and educators were also involved in the preparatory work. The declared idea was to establish spelling rules for both native and borrowed words. Nimchuk (2002) notes that the spelling carefully and comprehensively covered the spelling of native Ukrainian words, but certain difficulties arose with the spelling of borrowed words. At first, the Academy of Sciences decided to rely on the long history of Ukrainian spelling and on the pronunciation that was dominant in the territory of the Ukrainian SSR.

However, the People's Commissariat expressed the idea that spelling was not only the responsibility of the Academy of Sciences, but also of society as a whole. Moreover, it was worthwhile to involve scientists from the Lviv Shevchenko Scientific Society. Skrypnyk supported this idea, and in May 1927, a large spelling conference was held with more than 50 scientists, who edited the spelling proposed by the Academy of Sciences. The issue of implementing the Latin alphabet was debated during the conference (see above), but the idea was declined. One of the key controversies was the pronunciation of borrowed words, as it differed significantly in Galicia. Therefore, the commission had to revise the spelling to find a compromise, and the People's Commissar of Education approved it in 1928. Similar decisions were adopted by the Academy of Sciences and the Shevchenko Scientific Society in 1929. Since these rules were a compromise, they did not really suit anyone. School teachers complained incessantly. This gained publicity and took on a political character. Skrypnyk resigned. The Academy of Sciences set about correcting the 'compromises' and, in 1933, adopted the final version of the spelling rules (see Siropolko, 1934;

Ohiyenko, 1950; Shevelov, 1987; Nimchuk, 2002; Nimchuk & Puriaieva, 2004; see Masenko, 2005).

Based on data from Shevelov (1987, pp.133-169), Subtelny (2009, pp.383-402), Magocsi (1997, pp.538-547), Kalinichenko and Rybalka (2004, pp.198-212), and Ploky (2017, pp.229-239), we can say that the policy of ukrainisation was largely declarative in its first stage (before 1925). Although, of course, it provided much more freedom for the Ukrainian language than the previous policy of imperial Russia. In fact, as far as the communist milieu itself was concerned, there was no unanimous opinion on this policy. A significant part of the party were Russians, and the issue of the Ukrainian language was not within their sphere of interest. And among the Ukrainians, whose numbers in the party were already insignificant, only a part had truly pro-Ukrainian views. However, at the same time, this policy was actually bearing fruit and can be called successful due to its results in 1925-1930. Magocsi (1997, p.543) highlights the progress in education as a result of ukrainisation:

Wherever Ukrainians predominated, instruction for all children must be in Ukrainian, and that in places where national minorities formed compact groups, education in their respective native languages was guaranteed. Regardless of the main language of instruction, Ukrainian and Russian were required subjects. [...] The results were impressive By 1933, the total number of students and teachers had increased threefold over prewar levels. Nor were adults forgotten. [...] The result was a remarkable rise in the level of literacy, which in 1897 had stood at only 28 percent. By 1926, 64 percent of Soviet Ukraine's total population and 42 percent of its Ukrainian inhabitants were literate.

Magocsi, 1997, p.543

Magocsi's data show the impressive increase in literacy level, though he does not mention the efforts of the UNR and the Second Hetmanate at all. Anyway, we can agree that the policy of ukrainisation endorsed the general literacy level in the country. Subtelny (2009, p. 390), on the other hand, summarises it as follows:

Ukrainization [...] did not go as far as Skrypnyk and his associates would have wished [...] It was not primarily patriotism or traditionalism that caused Ukrainians to retain their native language; rather, it was because, better than any other language, Ukrainian allowed them to obtain an education, to obtain useful information [...] Because of the Ukrainization programs, Ukrainian language and culture ceased being a romantic, esoteric obsession of a tiny intelligentsia or the hallmark of a backward peasantry. Instead, Ukrainian was well on its way to becoming the primary means of communication and expression of a modernizing, industrializing society.

Subtelny, 2009, p.390

Shevelov (1987, pp. 147-148) addresses the consequences of ukrainisation with a greater scepticism, saying that (1) many were using the Ukrainian language only as a means of developing their career, (2) part of the population rejected the policy of ukrainisation because it was coercive and seemed rather artificial. The intelligentsia that the Soviet authorities wanted to create actually existed. These were mainly figures of the Ukrainian revival of 1917-1920 who returned to live in Ukraine, welcoming the Soviet authorities (for example, Hrushevsky, Voronyi, Samiilenko, and others). However, as Shevelov (1987, p. 149) notes, the authorities “сприймала хворобливо-підозріло всяку не контрольовану нею ініціативу на полі українізації¹³⁹”. For example, representatives of VAPLITE¹⁴⁰ and MARS¹⁴¹ were compelled to remain silent and subordinate their creativity entirely to propaganda, and still most of them were repressed (see Kalinichenko & Rybalka, 2004, pp.209-211). Thus, we can say that the Ukrainianisation policy lasted barely three years, from 1925 to 1928.

It is also important to note the role of the church. In previous chapters, we have repeatedly observed that it was often the clergy who were the only defenders of the Ukrainian language under occupation. The period from 1928 to 1931 was marked by the complete destruction of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Shevelov, 1987, p. 154; Kalinichenko & Rybalka, 2004, pp. 216-220). This led to the disappearance of a significant sphere of Ukrainian language use.

Generally, Shevelov (1987, p.156) expresses much less optimism about the results of ukrainisation than Subtelny (2009).

Успіх українізації, якщо такий був, слід шукати в іншому. Хоч пасивне знання української мови не стало загальним, але його набули значно ширші кола, ніж доти. [...] Декотрі інтелігенти, що за інших умов трималися б російської культури, перейшли в українську¹⁴²
Shevelov, 1987, p.156

¹³⁹ were painfully suspicious of any initiative in the field of ukrainisation that they did not control

¹⁴⁰ Literary: Free Academy of Proletarian Literature. It was a literary union in Ukraine established in Kharkiv in 1926. Members of VAPLITE were among the first victims of Stalin's repressions.

¹⁴¹ Literally: Workshop of Revolutionary Words. A literary association founded in Kyiv in 1924. The association rejected political compromise and was therefore persecuted by the Communist Party authorities. In 1929, it was forced to cease its activities. Its members were repressed.

¹⁴² “The success of ukrainisation, if there was any, should be sought elsewhere. Although passive knowledge of the Ukrainian language did not become widespread, it was acquired by a much wider circle of people than before. [...] Some intellectuals, who under other circumstances would have remained loyal to Russian culture, switched to Ukrainian.”

In summary, the policy of ukrainisation did indeed appear revolutionary when compared to the LP of the empire. The policy of ukrainisation was particularly important for education. It was at this time that many scholars were able to publish their scientific works in Ukrainian or on topics related to Ukraine. This policy also contributed to the spread of literacy among the lower classes of society.

However, the opportunities for the development of the Ukrainian language and culture were significantly broader under Ukrainian rule. Moreover, the low level of interest among officials in implementing ukrainisation, as well as increased control by the communist authorities over the activities of artists, undermined the results of ukrainisation. According to researchers, the most unexpected consequence of ukrainisation was an even greater gap in the prestige of the Ukrainian and Russian languages and the consolidation of the former as inferior.

Conclusion and Comments

During the Ukrainian Revolution (1917-1920), the governments of the Ukrainian People's Republic, the Hetmanate, and the Directory introduced several measures aimed at promoting the use of the Ukrainian language in the educational sphere. This included the re-planning of educational programs, the creation of Ukrainian-language educational institutions, support for the publication of Ukrainian-language literature, and the provision of Ukrainian-language teaching staff. Such measures were recognised as important for strengthening national consciousness and preserving cultural heritage. The implementation of "Ukrainisation of education" was aimed at creating conditions for the development of the Ukrainian language as a state language and a means of national self-awareness.

With the Communist Party coming to power, the situation changed. Although on the one hand, the policy of ukrainisation contributed to the development of Ukrainian science (including language) and culture, its artificial imposition by party decrees caused outrage and resistance among the Russian population. Since this policy was not supported by a significant part of the ruling elite, a side effect was a decline in the prestige of the Ukrainian language and an increase in that of Russian. Thus, we can see that language planning becomes a controversial tool for both emancipation and

control over the population. The main ideological standpoints involved include (1) showing the ‘brethren’s equality’ of Soviet nations, (2) enforcing the power of Soviet elites by actually creating the elites, (3) shaping Soviet-Ukrainian culture that is loyal to Moscow.

2.4. Soviet Consolidation and Linguistic Assimilation (1930s–1980s)

Following Lenin’s death in 1922, a struggle persisted among the top party leadership for another seven years. It was only in 1929 that Stalin managed to become the *de facto* leader of the Soviet Union. Following the purges, the distribution of power also underwent changes in the Ukrainian SSR. After Kosior and Chubar, in 1933, Postyshev, in reality, had unlimited power in Ukraine. The policies of these figures were diametrically opposed to those of their predecessors. There were a number of reasons for the transition from a policy of ukrainisation to a policy of russification (see Subtelny, 2009, pp.403-424; Magocsi, 1997; Plokyh, 2017, pp. 245-257).

First, the success of the ukrainisation policy lay primarily in the formation of a new generation of Ukrainian intellectuals. Accordingly, the intelligentsia increasingly thought about expanding the autonomy of the Ukrainian SSR, giving Ukrainian culture a greater role in the arts, and so on. The Stalinist leadership did not approve of this. And already in the early 1930s, ukrainisation began to be perceived as a manifestation of “bourgeois nationalism”. A resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party in December 1932 demanded ‘the elimination of distortions of ukrainisation’, which in fact meant its curtailment. Skrypnyk, the main ideologist and executor of this policy, was accused of nationalism and committed suicide in 1933. As part of the purges, some schools were also switched to Russian as the language of instruction. Language programmes were actively revised, and school textbooks were edited. From 1934, the Ukrainian language began to lose its administrative functions and was replaced by Russian. Any bilingualism (and not only in the Ukrainian SSR) meant in practice the predominance of Russian. (see Subtelny, 2009, pp.403-424; Magocsi, 1997; Plokyh, 2017, pp. 245-257). Novorodovska and Novorodovskyi (2023, p. 66) cites new People’s Commissar of Education Bubnov saying that particularly in

Ukraine “ізоляція від російської культури є виразне націоналістичне перекручування¹⁴³”. Secondly, the Soviet leadership was concerned about peasant uprisings, which continued in Ukraine against the backdrop of forced collectivisation. In his letter to Kaganovych in 1932, Stalin (2004) wrote,

Если не возьмемся теперь же за выправление положения на Украине, Украину можем потерять. [...] поставит себе целью превратить Украину в кратчайший срок в настоящую крепость СССР, в действительно образцовую республику. Денег на это не жалеть.¹⁴⁴

Stalin, 2004, pp.571-573

It was after receiving this letter that Postyshev was given his mandate. Simultaneously, the pressure on the Ukrainian peasants increased; the repression took on an unprecedented scale and turned into a large-scale genocide, known today as the Holodomor (see Magocsi, 1997; Kulchytskyi, 2012; Andriewsky, 2015; Ploky, 2017).

The few people who managed to escape from Soviet Ukraine and moved to the territory of Galicia, Bukovyna, and Transcarpathia in 1932-1933 begged for food and exchanged their valuables for food and a roof over their heads. The Ukrainians of Galicia, Bukovyna, and Transcarpathia had already harboured resentment towards the Russians due to the brutal management methods they had witnessed during the First World War, and this sentiment was further intensified by their experiences with the Russian Empire. Those who lived near the Zbruch River independently made rafts with provisions and tried to ferry them to the Ukrainians of the Russian Empire, but this was rarely successful. Most of those who managed to survive the Holodomor hushed up these facts under fear of death or deportation to Siberia (see United States Commission on the Ukraine Famine, 1988).

It is also quite obvious that in the conditions of famine, there could be no question of schooling in the villages. Rural children did not have the strength to get out of bed, let alone attend school. The Holodomor is a devastating tragedy that significantly impacted the country's language situation. Millions of people died, and the empty lands were settled by soviet colonists. In addition, the Stalinist regime

¹⁴³ “isolation from Russian culture is a clear nationalist distortion”

¹⁴⁴ “If we do not take action now to correct the situation in Ukraine, we can lose Ukraine. [...] we have to set the goal of turning Ukraine into a real fortress of the USSR, into a truly exemplary republic in the shortest possible time. Don't count money for it.”

actively restricted Ukrainian culture and language, trying to suppress the Ukrainian spirit and identity. The settlement of extinct villages by Russians and the promotion of the Russian language and culture became the main tasks of the regime, which saw these methods as a means of maintaining its power and ideology (see Masenko, 2004). Officially, the policy of ukrainisation was never cancelled.

In reality, the party continued to try to develop Ukrainian, but Soviet culture. That is, it directed its efforts towards ensuring that existing manifestations of culture conformed to the party line, while others disappeared. Those who were too famous were turned into a means of manipulation. For example, Shevchenko's extremely nationalistic work was censored and presented as exclusively anti-tsarist. Postyshev himself contributed to the construction of monuments to Shevchenko in Kharkiv and Kyiv. Also, during his time, the capital was moved from Kharkiv to Kyiv. The newspaper *Komunist* and the magazine *Bolshevik of Ukraine* continued to be published in Ukrainian, although most Ukrainian newspapers were closed. Ukrainian theatres were replaced by Russian ones, but the opera remained Ukrainian (see Subtelny, 2009; Shevelov, 1987; Magocsi, 1997; Masenko, 2004; Plokhly, 2017). Despite these seemingly compromising steps, Shevelov (1987, pp. 173-174) writes:

на ділі розгортання українізації цілковито зламано. Хоча б тому, що всі її провідні кадри в Наркомосі й на курсах українізації були виарештувані і або заслані в табори, або розстріляні. Згубні наслідки політики Постишева виявилися, отож, не в забороні української мови чи формальному припиненні українізації, а в майже тотальному розгромі українських кадрів. [...] Арешти й розстріли охопили рішуче всі прошарки української інтелігенції: інженерів і священиків, акторів і кооператорів, агрономів і письменників і т. д.¹⁴⁵

Shevelov, 1987, pp.173-174

So, we can see that the Soviet authorities acted more subtly than the imperial authorities, as there were no direct prohibitions. There were secret orders, persecution and terror. Kostiuk (1960, p. 61) notes that 23% (27,500 people) of party members were 'publicly exposed' for anti-Soviet activities. However, these details are beyond

¹⁴⁵ "In reality, the implementation of ukrainisation was completely disrupted. This was primarily because all of its leading figures in the People's Commissariat and in ukrainisation courses were arrested and either sent to camps or executed. The disastrous consequences of Postyshev's policy were not manifested in the prohibition of the Ukrainian language or the formal cessation of ukrainisation, but in the almost total destruction of Ukrainian personnel. [...] Arrests and executions affected virtually all strata of the Ukrainian intelligentsia: engineers and priests, actors and cooperators, agronomists and writers, etc."

the scope of our study, and we mention them only briefly to contextualise the situation. Ukrainian culture almost completely lost its bandura and lyre players, and most of the cultural figures from the building ‘Слово/*Slovo*¹⁴⁶’ were also destroyed or repressed. Later literature refers to these events as the ‘Розстріляне Відродження/*Rozstriliane Vidrozhennia*¹⁴⁷’. Kostiuk (1960) argues that the same massive terror was aimed at national minorities in Ukraine (Germans, Bulgarians, Jews, Greeks, etc.). Their schools were closed, and the press was restricted from printing.

In addition to such “classical” methods employed by totalitarian regimes, the Soviet Union also actively used corpus planning. It prohibits “national bourgeois” words, syntactic constructions, and orthoepic rules. Instead, it offers others that are closer to Russian (see Shevelov, 1987; Masenko, 2005; Novorodovska & Novorodovskyi, 2023). This also relates to names. In 1930, the Institute of Scientific Ukrainian Language received a new name, the Institute of Linguistics at the Academy of Science. Later, the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences was renamed in 1936 to the Academy of the Ukrainian SSR.

In 1934, a commission was established under the People’s Commissariat to review the work ‘on the language front’ (see Masenko, 2005, pp.143-148). This work resulted in two resolutions on changes that need to be implemented. The final recommendations of the Commission proposed to conduct purges among the linguists, to remove all the works of ‘bourgeois linguists’ in any linguistic discipline, revise the spelling rules and release new dictionaries (see Shevelov, 1987).

Therefore, in order to eradicate bourgeois-nationalist lexemes, grammatical constructions, and orthoepic rules, the party decided to revise the previous edition of the spelling rules (approved by Skrypnyk). In 1933, under the leadership of Khvyliia, new spelling rules were published. There was no public discussion. Presumably, only Kaganovich reviewed it. All periodicals immediately switched to the new rules in May. Although this spelling was printed with a preface by Khvyliia (see Holdenberh &

¹⁴⁶ Literally: word. The building in Kharkiv was built exclusively for Soviet artists and their families in 1926-1928. In May 1933, most of the residents were arrested, repressed or shot. Often, during interrogations involving the use of force, those arrested confessed to crimes they did not commit or to belonging to organisations that did not exist at all.

¹⁴⁷ English names: Executed Renaissance, Red Renaissance. A generation of Ukrainian artists most of whom were socialists and supported the Soviets, but were killed since they were developing the Ukrainian culture and writing in Ukrainian.

Korolevych, 1963, pp.180-181). Shevelov (1987) suggests that it was destroyed after Khvyliia fell victim to purges. He ironically notes: “Хвиля в СРСР належить до категорії неіснуючих осіб¹⁴⁸” (Shevelov, 1987, pp.194-195). However, Shevelov also notes that the next edition of the spelling rules in 1936 probably did not undergo any changes, except for the removal of references to Khvyliia. We have found the 1933 edition of spelling rules in Nimchuk and Puriayeva, (2004, pp.487-514). The analytical comment by Nimchuk and Puriayeva (2004) suggests that there were at least 126 changes in comparison to the spelling rules by Skrypnyk. They state that these changes significantly changed the Ukrainian language system, approaching it to Russian. For instance, the Russian-like use of “*φ*” instead of “*т*” in borrowings from Greek when you have “theta” (θ), e.g. “Атени” (Athens) to “Афіни” (in Russian “Афины”), “катедра/katedra” to “кафедра/kafedra” (in Russian “кафедра”), “етер/eter” (ether) to “эфір/efir” (in Russian “эфир”) etc.

Some features and characteristics of the Ukrainian language since medieval times were completely prohibited (e.g. the eradication of the practice of using feminine suffixes and inflexions: *князь/kniaz* – *княгиня/kniaghynia*; *боярин/boiaryn* – *бояриня/boiarynnia*; *коваль/koval* – *ковалівна/kovalivna*).

The section on grammar, for example, prohibits the use of the instrumental case after impersonal forms ending in “-но/-то” (e.g. “хліб спечено мамою” = bread [is] baked [by] mum) since in Russian this form is considered archaic (see Masenko, 2005). The section on the spelling of borrowed words was completely rewritten to conform to the tradition of their transmission in the Russian language. The most tragic and amusing thing is that the letter ‘*т*’ (=g) was removed from the alphabet, considering it bourgeois-nationalist (see Masenko, 2005, p. 130-131). Some lexemes also fell into this category, e.g. word “*вигріння/vyhrinnia*” (weathering) was changed to “*вивітрювання/vyvitriuvannia*”, similar to Russian “выветривание”; “*північна заграва/pivnichna zahrava*” (northern lights) changed to “*полярне сяйво/poliarne siaivo*” similar to Russian “полярное сияние”, “*автомобілярня/avtomobiliarnia*” (car factory) changed to “*автозавод/avtozavod*”, identical with Russian “автозавод” (see

¹⁴⁸ “Khvyliia in the USSR belongs to the category of non-existent persons”

Masenko, 2005, p.354-399). Thus, dictionaries were also heavily edited. What is more, the department of “Language and Thinking” was open at the Institute of Linguistics. The department had to check whether the linguists’ work complies with Marxism-Leninism and study of the connection between a language and thinking (see Masenko, 2005, pp. 159-160).

Shevelov (1987) emphasises that the chaos around the language had influenced schooling since if a teacher used the bourgeois-nationalist form, they could be punished. In addition, the situation around the spelling rules created an impression of Ukrainian being vague, unstable, and inconstant. Nothing like that ever happened in Russian. Thus, “Престиж української мови, і так уже невисокий, упав ще нижче.¹⁴⁹” (Shevelov, 1987 p. 202). As stated, the damage was not also connected to the development of the language itself, but to its perception by the speakers.

As for education, the then People’s Commissar of Education, Hrynko, proposed an educational system for the Ukrainian SSR back in 1920. On the one hand, schooling became compulsory, and on the other, priority was given to the children of workers and peasants. In cities, there were often schools where both Ukrainian and Russian were taught. The same was true of vocational schools, technical colleges and institutes (Siropolko, 1993, p. 78). In 1933, the universities that were liquidated in 1920 were reopened (in Kyiv, Kharkiv, Odesa, and Dnipropetrovsk¹⁵⁰). It is also important to note that all educational institutions were state-owned. There was no private property.

In fact, in 1936, the Soviet Union established a special committee on higher education. In 1946, it was transformed into the Ministry of Higher and Secondary Specialised Education. According to Ohiyenko (1950), as of early 1937, only 37% of professors and teachers in HEIs were Ukrainian-speaking. In 1935, the Academy of Sciences published ‘terminology bulletins’, which were primarily needed for teaching relevant disciplines after the liquidation of the terminology department at the Academy of Sciences and all its dictionaries of Ukrainian terminology back in 1933. Therefore, instead of Ukrainian (bourgeois-nationalist) terms, international terms in Russian

¹⁴⁹ “The prestige of the Ukrainian language, already low, has fallen even lower.”

¹⁵⁰ now Dnipro

transliteration or Russian terms were proposed (see Novorodovska & Novorodovskyi, 2023).

In general, the status of the Ukrainian language in academia declined, as Russian gained official status and greater prestige. Even entrance exams could be taken in either Ukrainian or Russian (see Koliaska, 1970).

In 1935, a resolution was passed, ‘On the organisation of educational work and internal regulations in primary, secondary and high schools’. This resolution unified educational processes throughout the Soviet Union (the length of lessons and breaks, the duration of holidays and semesters, the number of hours of Russian language teaching, a unified grading system etc.) (see Postanova, 1935; Siropolko, 1993).

In 1937, the Ukrainian SSR adopted a new Constitution (see Constitution of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic, 1937). Its text mentions the regulation of language laws only twice. Firstly, Section VII, Article 90 provides for court proceedings to be conducted in Ukrainian, with persons who do not speak the majority language being provided with full access to the case materials through an interpreter, as well as the right to speak in their native language in court.

The second case concerns education directly:

СТАТТЯ 101. Громадяни Української РСР мають право на освіту. Це право забезпечується загальнообов’язковою восьмирічною освітою, широким розвитком середньої загальної політехнічної освіти, професійно-технічної освіти, середньої спеціальної і вищої освіти на основі зв’язку навчання з життям, з виробництвом, всемірним розвитком вечірньої і заочної освіти, безплатністю всіх видів освіти, системою державних стипендій, навчанням у школах рідною мовою, організацією на заводах, у радгоспах і колгоспах безплатного виробничого, технічного і агрономічного навчання трудящих.¹⁵¹

Constitution of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic, 1937

Therefore, if we consider the Constitution as the main document governing the state, the role of the Ukrainian language is not significant in general, but theoretically, all citizens have the right to school education in their native language. This should promote multiculturalism and tolerance. To use Soviet terminology, it should promote

¹⁵¹ “ARTICLE 101. Citizens of the Ukrainian SSR have the right to education. This right is ensured by compulsory eight-year education, the widespread development of secondary general polytechnic education, vocational and technical education, secondary specialised and higher education based on the connection between education and life, production, the comprehensive development of evening and correspondence education, free education of all types, a system of state scholarships, education in schools in the native language, and the organisation of free industrial, technical, and agronomic training for workers in factories, state farms, and collective farms.”

internationalism. Furthermore, the constitution strips the People's Commissar of Education of the authority to regulate issues related to higher education, art, and culture. In general, the number of Commissars equals eight, which brings the functions of the Ukrainian SSR to the level of municipality rather than a republic (see Shevelov, 1987). Lack of decentralisation was a concept that stimulated the use of Russian in administration. Kalinichenko and Rybalka (2004, p. 232) prove it by comparing the data on the number of:

Якщо у 1922 р. у народному господарстві України було 314 тис. службовців (26,4% від загальної чисельності працюючих за наймом), то в 1940 р. - 2 млн. чол. (30,4%). Одночасно з чисельним збільшенням партійно-державного і господарського апарату розширювалися його функції, він охоплював своєю владою всі ланки суспільного життя. Диктуючи свою волю громадянам, чиновники дедалі більше відгороджувались від народу.¹⁵²

Kalinichenko and Rybalka, 2004, p.232

Last but not least, in this period, the Soviet historians started working on rooting the idea of a 'single, unified nation' in the minds of people. In 1937, the first textbook on the history of USSR was published. Kostiuk (1960) and Shevelov (1965, 1987) claim that the work has an ideological nature rather than a scientific one. Works by Pritsak (1977), Magocsi (1997), and Snyder (2004) demonstrate that this narrative is incorrect.

Kostiuk (1960) notes a notable gap in governance of the Ukrainian SSR between August 1937 and February 1938. Shevelov (1987, p. 180) argues that the Soviet authorities were considering whether the Ukrainian SSR should remain a republic or join the RSFSR. It is likely that Stalin was concerned about his position, especially since Germany had begun to exhibit signs of military and political aggression in Europe as early as 1936. Even though most countries did not take it seriously, the foreign policy situation was escalating.

In 1938, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) adopted a resolution 'On the compulsory study of the Russian language in schools of national republics'. This resolution was the death knell for the policy of

¹⁵² "If in 1922 there were 314,000 civil servants in the national economy of Ukraine (26.4% of the total number of employed persons), then in 1940 there were 2 million people (30.4%). Along with the numerical increase in the party-state and economic apparatus, its functions expanded, and it extended its power over all aspects of public life. Dictating their will to citizens, officials increasingly isolated themselves from the people."

Ukrainisation. It is from this moment that we can consider not only the consolidation of the russification policy, but also the beginning of the creation of the ‘Soviet human’ (see Maistrenko, 1979; Masenko, 2016; Kulchytskyi, 2019). According to this resolution, 4-5 lessons of the Russian language were to be taught to children from grade 2. The official motivation was to prevent the Ukrainian SSR to be pulled away from the Soviet Union (see Siropolko, 1934). Schools for national minorities were also significantly affected. They were converted into mixed schools or schools with Russian as the language of instruction (see Shevchenko, 2013a; Novorodovska & Novorodovskyi, 2023).

Khrushchov only helped to implement this policy, continuing the policies of Postyshev in education and publishing. Shevelov (1987, pp. 182-183) states that massive de-ukrainisation was occurring in the cities and towns of Ukraine, but no statistical data exist. Shevelov (1987, p.183) clearly states:

Засекреченість даних про мову викладання [...] вказує, що деукраїнізація освіти провадилася нишком і дуже поступово, а проте, додаймо, вповні послідовно і безоглядно. У вищих навчальних закладах перехід на російську мову прискорився після створення 1936 року союзно-республіканського комітету в справах вищої освіти (з 1946 року — Міністерство вищої і середньої і спеціальної освіти), якому стали підлягати відповідні установи¹⁵³

Shevelov, 1987, p.183

As we can see, inconvenient data was simply not published. Additionally, the leader of Ukraine, by and large, could not influence the formation of the educational environment and LP within it without Moscow.

Under Khrushchov, mass terror ceased. The situation improved significantly between 1939 and 1940. Having captured Galicia and Bukovyna during World War II and remembering the mistakes of imperial Russia, the Soviet Union decided to play on the pro-Ukrainian, anti-Polish sentiments of the local population of the “newly acquired” lands (see Novorodovska & Novorodovskyi, 2023). For example, academics from Galicia who had lost their status at the Academy of Sciences regained it. Another

¹⁵³ “The secrecy surrounding data on the language of instruction [...] indicates that the de-ukrainisation of education was carried out quietly and very consequentially but, we might add, completely consistently and ruthlessly. In higher education institutions, the transition to Russian accelerated after the creation in 1936 of the Union-Republican Committee for Higher Education (since 1946 – the Ministry of Higher, Secondary and Specialised Education), to which the relevant institutions became subordinate.”

example cited by Shevelov (1987) is the awarding of Krymsky, who (before receiving the order) had no job and no means of subsistence. In particular, Khrushchov spread the idea of uniting the ‘great Ukrainian people’ with one small nuance: into a single Soviet state.

It is challenging to discuss schooling and higher education in the 1940s, as those were the years of World War II, the front line of which ran through virtually the entire territory of modern Ukraine. It is an indisputable fact that during the war, propaganda was extensively incorporated into the educational process, which was still in place. Bolhov (2024, p.17) provides data on educational losses for 1941. Among other things, 8,108 schools were destroyed and another 10,062 were partially destroyed out of a total of 29,814.

Among the problems faced by the school system in the Ukrainian SSR were a shortage of staff, a lack of material resources, and a lack of student records. In addition, emphasis was placed on the need to provide communist education to students. A progressive step in the post-war period was the transition of schools to a seven-year form of education. However, even in the early 1950s, the issue of attracting students to education was quite problematic for various reasons. In rural areas, due to a combination of factors (both natural and caused by the (in)action of the authorities), famine prevailed again in 1946-47. To survive, people ate pigweed, acacia flowers, ‘kalachyky’ (a type of wild plant), sparrows, and mice. According to estimates by experts from the M.V. Ptukha Institute of Demography and Social Studies of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, in 1946-47, excess mortality in Ukraine exceeded 700,000 people, with more than a quarter of the victims being children under the age of 14 (see Ploky, 2017; UINP, 2021). Obviously, such a situation did not encourage the development of schooling in these years.

The 1946 summer plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) set priorities for the development of society, which included the fight against ‘bourgeois culture’ (national-patriotic). In accordance with government tasks, the Ministry of Education of the Ukrainian SSR approved the decision ‘On bourgeois-nationalist concepts in textbooks on the Ukrainian language and literature for schools in the Ukrainian SSR’ (14 September 1946), aimed at

identifying ‘bourgeois-nationalist concepts’ in curricula and textbooks, as well as to identify shortcomings that consisted in the idealisation of the past (see Baran, 1999; Bolhov, 2024).

In 1943, Tychyna¹⁵⁴ was appointed Minister of Education of the Ukrainian SSR. His work in this position was marked by attempts to establish schools with Ukrainian as the language of instruction. Tychyna’s love for the Ukrainian language led to his resignation from this position. From 1953, he was Chairman of the Supreme Council of the Ukrainian SSR and Deputy Chairman of the Council of Nationalities. In 1959, he voluntarily resigned from these high positions because he did not want to sign a resolution allowing parents to refuse to have their children study the Ukrainian language in schools (see Likarchuk, 2010; Pronikov, 2017).

So, when it comes to education in the 1940s and 1950s, the policy of russification continued. On the one hand, a policy of ‘brotherhood of nations’ and equality of all languages was declared, while on the other hand, the dominant role of the Russian language was affirmed. On the one hand, the war slowed down the repressive mechanisms, as the issues of language and education took a back seat. Moreover, in order to mobilise the population, it was considered necessary to use the native language of the population, albeit with strict ideological control. On the other hand, it accelerated the ideological “brainwashing” of the population. The USSR’s conquest of new territories required immediate decisions, so curricula and their content within the framework of Soviet patriotism were widely imposed throughout all republics, including the Ukrainian SSR (see Subtelny, 2009; Magocsi, 1997; Masenko, 2004; Plokyh, 2017; Bolhov, 2024).

In 1945, a new edition of the Ukrainian language spelling rules was published. In 1945, a new edition of the Ukrainian spelling rules was published. Its appearance was caused by the annexation of Western Ukrainian lands and the need to unify spelling throughout the Ukrainian SSR. According to Nimchuk and Puriayeva’s assessment

¹⁵⁴ A famous Ukrainian poet who remained a controversial figure since he managed to survive the repressions of 30s by conforming to the ideology of the party (and possibly betrayed his colleagues). On the other hand, he was working in order to promote Ukrainian culture and help young writers (e.g. Lina Kostenko) within the Soviet system.

(2004, pp. 515-545), it differed little from the previous version (1933). Some elements of the 1928 spelling rules were restored, while others were russified.

Also, from 1945 onwards, the activities of school inspectors were intensified. Their task was to adjust the educational process so that it would foster love for the motherland. In essence, this did not differ greatly from the imperial tools of schooling, the only thing that changed was the focus. For example, while religion was an integral component during the imperial era, it was condemned during the Stalinist era (see Likarchuk, 2010, pp. 24-52).

A striking example of russification policy outside academia is the change in the language landscape. For example, in 1944, there was a mass deportation of Crimean Tatars¹⁵⁵. Between 18 and 21 May 1944, approximately 423,100 people were transported from Crimea in freight cars. According to NKVD estimates, 27% died on the way. According to estimates by the Crimean State Committee, up to 46.2% of people died. The devastated villages and towns were repopulated with residents of the RSFSR and the Ukrainian SSR. A vivid example of linguistic landscape change is the renaming of villages, cities, and towns in Crimea following the deportation of the Crimean Tatars (see Buhai, 1992; Mohyla, 2008). For example, in Crimea, there was a village called “*Ленино/Lenino*” instead of its original Crimean-Tatar name “*Yedi Quyu*” (lit. Seven Wells) or “*Белогорск/Belogorsk*” instead of “*Qarasuvbazar*” (lit. Bazaar on the Karasu river). There were five villages renamed as “*Morske*” (lit. marine) even though they had their original Crimean-Tatar distinct names, such as “*Qapsihor*” (lit. Burnt village) (see Bushakov, 2003; Ukrinform, 2016). These days, Ukraine is trying to ‘decolonise’ public space in the unoccupied territories (see *Zakon Pro zasudzhennia ta zaboronu propahandy rosiiskoi imperskoi polityky v Ukraini i dekolonizatsiiu toponimii* No. 3005-IX, Verkhovna Rada Ukrainy, 2023).

In the 1950s, the party leadership faced a shortage of (qualified) personnel in the post-war years. Therefore, it was decided to introduce better vocational training for students while they were still in school. In 1954-55, an experiment was conducted in which vocational training was introduced in selected schools, where, in addition to their

¹⁵⁵ Qırımtatar halqının sürgünligi

studies, students also worked in relevant factories, plants, etc. (see Bondar, 1968; Koliaska, 1970; Boffa, 1994; Berezivska, 2008). This period is commonly referred to as the Thaw, as Stalin's reign of terror had come to an end. But let's take a look at the results of this period for Ukrainian education.

Despite reports of problems with this experiment, in April 1959, the 'Law on Strengthening the Connection between School and Life and on the Further Development of the Public Education System in the Ukrainian SSR' was adopted. According to this law, parents had the right to choose the language of instruction for their children. Parents mostly chose Russian, as it was considered more prestigious and offered better career prospects. Although the authorities interpreted this provision as a manifestation of democracy, in fact it became an auxiliary means of russification and shifting responsibility (see Zakon URSR, 1959; Berezivska, 2008). Official statements by Soviet Union officials at the time emphasised the inevitability of the merger of all the peoples of the USSR and highlighted the importance of the Russian language in this process. (see Koliaska, 1970). Berezivska (2008, p.261) states that as a result of bilingual education, the number of Russian-speaking students had grown in the cities (up to 70% in Kyiv, 90% in Odesa, and 93% in Luhansk). School teachers and the remnants of the Ukrainian intelligentsia (Sukhomlynsky, Bazhan, Rylsky) tried to protest against russification.

Dziuba (1968, pp.121-122) testifies that:

(1) any public communication as well as official is help in Russian with rare exceptions for Shevchenko's memory days or other events of the type;

(2) HEIs use only Russian;

(3) In 1958, only 21% of children in Ukrainian cities attended Ukrainian schools while in 1926, the figure was as high as 97%.

Dziuba (1968, pp.122) also notes that even these schools can hardly be considered Ukrainian, as any communication outside the classroom is conducted in Russian and the teachers "по-українському "соромляться" говорити¹⁵⁶". These days, postcolonial studies recognise that making someone feel ashamed is one of the

¹⁵⁶ "are 'ashamed' to speak in Ukrainian"

instruments of colonial policies (see Naiem, 2025). Subtelny (2009, p.524) confirms this claim, providing us with a wider context of social pressure on those speaking Ukrainian:

In the cities, social pressure to use Russian is intense and Ukrainian is denigrated as the language of “country bumpkins” The regime has consciously fostered the inferiority complex toward their language and culture that exists among many Ukrainians. And this feeling is reflected in the fact that it is Ukrainians who frequently demand Russian-language education for their children. “What good is Ukrainian? My children need a mastery of Russian to succeed” is a remark one often hears among former (and still socially insecure) Ukrainian peasants who are trying to get ahead in the Russified cities.

Subtelny, 2009, p.524

The Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR on improving foreign language learning dated 27 May 1961 raises the issue of foreign language learning. The law itself quite clearly outlines the problems of the Soviet Union in the field of foreign language teaching. In fact, the resolution applies to all republics, including the Ukrainian SSR. This document regulates everything from teacher training to the process of teaching foreign languages, as well as independent study. Here are a few examples:

1) The problem of the length of study:

Установить, что в общеобразовательных школах, имеющих квалифицированных преподавателей иностранных языков, [...] приступить в 1961/62 учебном году с пятых классов и последовательно завершить его в течение семи лет. Ввести в IX-XI классах вечерних (сменных) средних школ при наличии квалифицированных учителей и соответствующих контингентов учащихся дополнительные факультативные занятия по иностранному языку по два часа в неделю.¹⁵⁷

Postanovlenie Soveta Ministrov SSSR ob uluchshenii izucheniya inostrannykh yazykov,
Sovet Ministrov SSSR, 1961

2) The problem of qualified teachers:

Советам министров союзных республик и Министерству высшего и среднего специального образования СССР: [...] б) организовать, начиная с 1961/62 учебного года, в университетах и в педагогических институтах подготовку учителей по общеобразовательным дисциплинам для работы в школах с преподаванием ряда предметов на иностранном языке. Предоставить Министерству высшего и среднего

¹⁵⁷ “Establish that in general education schools with qualified foreign language teachers, [...] begin in the 1961/62 academic year with fifth grade and gradually complete it within seven years. Introduce additional optional foreign language classes for two hours per week in grades IX-XI of evening (shift) secondary schools, provided that there are qualified teachers and a sufficient number of students.”

специального образования СССР право продлевать в необходимых случаях срок обучения указанных специалистов до 1 года.¹⁵⁸

Postanovlenie Soveta Ministrov SSSR ob uluchshenii izucheniya inostrannykh yazykov,
Sovet Ministrov SSSR, 1961

3) The problem of the variety of the languages studied:

Большинство учащихся изучает немецкий язык, небольшое количество – французский, совсем не изучаются испанский и некоторые другие распространенные языки, что не отвечает потребностям в специалистах со знанием иностранных языков.¹⁵⁹

Postanovlenie Soveta Ministrov SSSR ob uluchshenii izucheniya inostrannykh yazykov,
Sovet Ministrov SSSR, 1961

4) The problem of shortage of learning materials:

увеличить выпуск для лиц, изучающих иностранные языки, словарей, разговорников, книг и брошюр с рассказами и другими художественными произведениями классической и современной английской, немецкой, французской и испанской литературы¹⁶⁰

Postanovlenie Soveta Ministrov SSSR ob uluchshenii izucheniya inostrannykh yazykov,
Sovet Ministrov SSSR, 1961

These quotes clearly illustrate that there were not many foreign language experts in the 1950s. Moreover, German was the most common foreign language, and in the post-war years it was viewed with hostility. In fact, ordinary children had no motivation to learn any foreign languages in the Ukrainian SSR, because in essence, they would never be able to use them. But the authorities needed a certain number of specialists in the languages of Western countries. It is these languages that are emphasised in the law. There is also a section devoted to book printing, because, on the one hand, it was important to provide materials in the living language, and on the other hand, to prevent ‘bourgeois’ propaganda.

As for higher education, in terms of the rollback of ukrainisation, a significant number of teachers had been convicted, exiled, shot or dismissed. As a result, new

¹⁵⁸ “To the Councils of Ministers of the Union Republics and the Ministry of Higher and Secondary Specialised Education of the USSR: [...] b) to organise, starting from the 1961/62 academic year, training in universities and teacher training colleges for teachers of general education subjects to work in schools teaching a number of subjects in a foreign language. Grant the Ministry of Higher and Secondary Specialised Education of the USSR the right to extend the training period for these specialists to one year, if necessary.”

¹⁵⁹ “Most students study German, a small number study French, while Spanish and some other common languages are not studied at all, which does not meet the demand for specialists with knowledge of foreign languages.”

¹⁶⁰ “increase the publication of dictionaries, phrasebooks, books and brochures with stories and other works of art from classical and contemporary English, German, French and Spanish literature for people studying foreign languages”

teachers arrived from the RSFSR. The impact of military action (1939-1945) on the university environment was also intense. Due to military action, universities were often evacuated to the rear (Sverdlovsk, Ufa, etc.), following the example of the evacuation of museums and theatres. This actually increased the pressure on students and teachers, and an increasing number of academics switched to Russian. The fact that universities' primary task was defined as to educate the Soviet intelligentsia, and thus, it also contributed to russification. There was almost no access to teaching materials and textbooks in the Ukrainian language. Dissertations were written mainly in Russian (later this would become the only legal option). There are isolated reports that Ukrainian language courses were sometimes taught in Russian (see Starynskyi & Zavalna, 2022; Bolhov, 2024). However, despite this situation, knowledge of foreign languages was important. For example, to enter postgraduate studies, it was mandatory to know at least one Western European language. The 1962 Resolution clearly states that passing an exam in English, German, French, Spanish, or Italian is obligatory for postgraduate students:

Поступающие в аспирантуру сдают конкурсные экзамены по специальности, истории КПСС и одному из иностранных языков (английский, французский, немецкий, испанский и итальянский) в объеме программы для высших учебных заведений.¹⁶¹

Polozhenie ob aspiranture pri vysshikh uchebnykh zavedeniyakh i nauchno-issledovatel'skikh uchrezhdeniyakh, Sovet Ministrov SSSR, 1962

It is essential to note that the 1960s marked a period of significant school reforms at the union level. The most positive aspect of these reforms was the improvement in the quality of education. The scholar also emphasises the interest of curriculum developers in developmental psychology and contemporary methods of stimulating the development of individual aptitudes. On the downside, there was a strong focus on ideological education. That is, during this period, if an idea coincided with the party line, it could be expressed in both Ukrainian and Russian. Last but not least, parents had the right to exempt children from studying the Ukrainian language

¹⁶¹ “Applicants to postgraduate programmes take competitive examinations in their speciality, the history of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and one of the foreign languages (English, French, German, Spanish, and Italian) at the level of the programme for higher education institutions.”

and literature in order to facilitate their education and free up additional time for extracurricular activities (see Berezivska, 2008, pp.280-292).

Berezivska (2008, pp. 284-287) also gives examples of some rather pro-Ukrainian discussions about textbooks that were approved for publication. From her words, we understand that Ukrainian scholars themselves tried to create textbooks that would reflect the world of a small Ukrainian child, rather than that of a “Soviet child” (see Kulchytskyi, 2019). For example, it was proposed to place a quote from Shevchenko immediately after a quote from Lenin in a reader. Similar disputes arose regarding the number of hours devoted to studying Ukrainian and Russian. On the one hand, everyone in the city was already familiar with Russian. On the other hand, children from the countryside may not understand Russian at all (Berezivska, 2008, p. 282).

A general analysis of educational policy during the period known as “The Thaw” (1953–1964) allows us to conclude that the actual liberalisation in the language sphere was very limited. Despite the general political softening, educational policy did not demonstrate a significant "warming" in relation to the Ukrainian language. The only relative softening was the granting of limited autonomy in adapting curricula at the local level. However, this step was not sufficient for changing the situation, which we can see from Table 3. (after Berezivska, 2008, p.292):

	1958-59		1969-70		1971-72		Changes over 13 years
	quantity	%	quantity	%	quantity	%	+ more - less
Schools, total	29977		27915		26690		-3357
• Ukrainian language	25366	84,8	22471	80,5	21328	89	-4038
• Russian language	4049	13,5	4784	17,1	4665	17,5	+616
Students, total (thousand)	5324,4		7493,8		7439,8		+2115,4
Students educated in:							
• Ukrainian language	3752,8	70,6	4549,3	60,8	4458,2	60	+706,9
• Russian language	1524,6	28,6	2876,6	38,3	2919,9	39,3	+1395,3

Table 3. The Network of general education schools in the Ukrainian SSR (after Berezivska, 2008)

The table clearly shows that the number of schools with Ukrainian as the language of instruction was declining. Most of them were closed, and some were reformed into schools with Russian as a language of instruction. In addition, the number of students receiving education in Russian is growing twice as fast as that of students who receive education in Ukrainian.

Formally, the educational legislation of that time declared the equality of the Ukrainian and Russian languages. However, in practice, the Russian language dominated the structure of school education and the functioning of educational institutions, which indicated an implicit linguistic asymmetry. This period was marked by the acceleration of linguistic assimilation, as schools for national minorities underwent a consistent transformation into Russian-language institutions. There was an intensive russification of the southern and eastern regions of Ukraine, which occurred both through the content of the school curriculum and through migration policy (the importation of Russian-speaking populations into territories affected by the Holodomor, war, and repressions), which had a direct demographic and linguistic effect. Regarding the teaching of foreign languages, the authorities for the first time seriously raised the issue of the need to study them. However, taking into account that the languages mentioned in the legislative acts belonged to ‘ideologically hostile’ states, there is a reasonable doubt that the motive of the drafters of the 1961 Law was exclusively the development of science. Pragmatic military-political considerations probably dominated here.

HEIs during this period and in the future remained the main centres of dominance of the Russian language as the language of instruction and scientific communication. The exceptions were mainly philological and pedagogical faculties, where the functioning of the Ukrainian language was partially preserved.

The period of “The Stagnation” (1964–1985) is usually characterised as an era of increased centralisation and strict standardisation of the educational system, which was a continuation and deepening of the russification tendencies laid down earlier (see Hrytsak, 1996). Let’s take a closer look at the regulations of the period.

The first thing to note is that it was during this period that the transition to compulsory ten-year education took place. This contributed to an increase in the

number of scientists and specialists with higher education. Their necessity was dictated by the complex situation in both the economy and foreign policy. In 1967, the Resolution on Measures for the Further Improvement of the Work of Secondary General Education Schools in the Ukrainian SSR was adopted. As for languages, they were briefly mentioned as follows: “Протягом 1967 року завершити роботу по розробці нових програм з української і російської мов, української літератури, історії УРСР і географії УРСР.¹⁶²” (see Postanova pro zakhody dalshoho polipshennia roboty serednoi zahalnoosvitnoi shkoly v Ukrainskii RSR, Tsentralnyi Komitet KP Ukrainy i Rada Ministrov Ukrainskoi SSR, 1966).

Thus, we can state that the Soviet school was developing, and its needs were growing. For example, changes in administrative borders had to be introduced to students (e.g., changing the status of Crimea from autonomy to an administrative unit). It is also important to add that the general adult public had no reason to be interested in the Ukrainian language or culture. Firstly, Ukrainian artists were oppressed and persecuted, so many wrote ‘for their desk’ and did not publish their works. Secondly, there was almost no contact between the city and the countryside, because, despite the fact that serfdom was abolished in 1848/1861, Ukrainian Soviet peasants could not obtain passports until 1974 (this meant that they could not move freely without special permission, for example, from the head of the collective farm). Consequently, there were no opportunities for cultural exchange between the rural and urban populations. In addition, Ukrainians’ worldview was limited by the “Iron Curtain”. Dziuba (1968, p.112) wrote:

фактором, що зменшує привабливість української культури для багатомільйонного читача, є штучне збіднення її минулих надбань і традицій, по суті, мародерство щодо культурної історії України. Яка ще нація в світі може похвалитися таким становищем, коли найбільші її вчені в галузі суспільних наук – М. Грушевський і М. Драгоманов, люди із світовим ім’ям і світовим визнанням, не відомі в своїй країні? [...] Парадоксальний факт: до революції, за умов одвертої антиукраїнської політики царату, були видані епохальні пам’ятки української історії та суспільної думки: "Істория русов", козацькі літописи - Величка, Граб’янки, Самовидця, - а тепер, ось

¹⁶² “During 1967, complete work on the development of new programmes in Ukrainian and Russian languages, Ukrainian literature, history of the Ukrainian SSR and geography of the Ukrainian SSR.”

уже кілька десятиків років, вони не видаються, хоч давно стали бібліографічною рідкістю, і дістати їх неможливо навіть науковцям.¹⁶³

Dziuba, 1968, p.112

Bazhan (2008, p.153) reports that the KGB arrested and punished ‘plenty’ of young students who were protesting against russification in Kyiv, Dnipropetrovsk, and Lviv in 1961-1964. An analysis of the educational path demonstrates a continuous chain of russification. In fact, the network of kindergartens (especially in large cities and industrial centres) functioned mainly in Russian, which created conditions for early linguistic socialisation in a Russian-speaking environment (see Dziuba, 1968). Children continued their education in schools where most subjects were taught in Russian, which reinforced its role as the main language of knowledge and learning (see Kindrachuk, 2016). At the higher education stage, Russian dominance was almost absolute (with the exception of certain humanities subjects), making it the language of scientific and professional training (Kindrachuk, 2015). Thus, individuals were integrated into a system where Russian was the key instrument of vertical mobility and access to knowledge. After completing their education, the situation did not change in the labour market: business, official documentation and professional communication were conducted exclusively in Russian (see Hrytsak, 1996).

This consistent elimination of the Ukrainian language from all key areas of society (from preschool to professional activity) led to its functional narrowing (or domain loss). As a result, the prestige gap between the languages grew steadily: Russian acquired the status of a language of ‘success’ and ‘officialdom’, while Ukrainian was marginalised to the sphere of private, everyday use (see Masenko, 2005, 2010). A notable sociolinguistic feature of this period is that no direct legislative acts were introduced to prohibit the use of the Ukrainian language. Instead, the state applied a strategy of ‘structural coercion’: systematic, institutionalised conditions were created

¹⁶³ “A factor that reduces the appeal of Ukrainian culture for millions of readers is the artificial impoverishment of its past achievements and traditions, which is essentially looting of Ukraine’s cultural history. What other nation in the world can boast of such a situation, where its greatest scholars in the field of social sciences – M. Hrushevsky and M. Dragomanov, people of international renown and recognition, are unknown in their own country? [...] It is a paradoxical fact that before the revolution, under the conditions of the tsarist regime’s openly anti-Ukrainian policy, epoch-making monuments of Ukrainian history and public thought were published: ‘The History of the Ruthenians’, Cossack chronicles by Velychko, Hrabianka, Samovidets - and now, for several decades now, they have not been published, even though they have long become bibliographic rarities, and it is impossible to obtain them even for scholars.”

in which individuals had no practical need or opportunity to use the Ukrainian language in important social roles.

The reforms started at the end of the 1950s were completed by 1973, as Law of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR ‘On the Approval of the Fundamentals of the Legislation of the USSR and the Union Republics on Public Education’ was passed (see Berezivska, 2008). This law effectively repealed the 1958 law and required all republics of the Soviet Union to bring their legislation into line with the new law. This decision also finally cemented the centralisation of education among the republics of the Soviet Union.

Shcherbytsky, after being appointed as a First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine (1972, see Kalinichenko & Rybalka, 2004), made a statement: “Сьогодні в процесі культурного будівництва, як ніколи, підвищується роль і значення російської мови¹⁶⁴” (cited in Masenko, 2005, p.24). His quote confirms that the authorities saw the future in the Russian language. The next step was the adoption by the Supreme Council of the Ukrainian SSR of the Law of the Ukrainian SSR on Public Education in 1974. Let us take a closer look at how this law regulates language issues.

Articles 3, 4, 26, and 30 of the Law address language issues. Article 3 is declarative and confirms the right of citizens to receive education, in particular in their native language. Article 4 highlights among the basic principles of public education in the Ukrainian SSR “свобода вибору мови навчання: навчання рідною мовою або мовою іншого народу СРСР¹⁶⁵”. Thus, in theory, a student can choose any language from among all the languages spoken by the peoples of the Soviet Union. Article 26 confirms the right of parents to “вибирати для дітей за бажанням школу з відповідною мовою навчання¹⁶⁶” and the opportunity for students to “вивчати мову іншого народу СРСР¹⁶⁷” as an additional subject. The law also provides for the

¹⁶⁴ “Today, in the process of cultural development, the role and significance of the Russian language is increasing as never before.”

¹⁶⁵ “freedom of choice of language of instruction: instruction in the native language or in the language of another people of the USSR”

¹⁶⁶ “choose a school with the appropriate language of instruction for their children”

¹⁶⁷ “study the language of another ethnic group of the USSR”

organisation of preparatory classes for “дітей, які навчатимуться нерідною мовою¹⁶⁸” (see Pro narodnu osvitu, Verkhovna Rada Ukrainskoi RSR, 1974).

Although these provisions are legally progressive at the declarative level, their implementation potential was significantly limited by actual educational practice and administrative structure. Despite the declared possibility of choosing among other languages of the Soviet Union, in practice, this would be problematic, especially with regard to secondary and high schools or rare languages. So, in essence, this norm is a pretext to legitimise education in Russian and to facilitate the transition of other peoples to the Russian language. We can say this because we have already seen from previous data (see Berezivska, 2008) that the network of schools with Ukrainian as the language of instruction was constantly shrinking. So, these norms actually created a situation of ‘choice without choice’. Article 30 is also interesting because it actually recognises that the population does not have homogeneous linguistic behaviour. Moreover, it is this article that provides the instrument for either language change or linguistic convergence. Thus, this law exemplifies the gap between declaration and actual implementation. Declaratively, it enshrines the rights of all peoples, but it becomes the basis for administrative support of the Russian language’s monopoly in education. Berezivska (2008) conducts a deep analysis of a school system of the time and illustrates the positive changes in schooling. However, language issues are not in the list. Kindrachuk (2016, p. 50) also states that the number of Ukrainian-language textbooks and manuals was rapidly declining. There was also a shortage of fiction by Ukrainian writers. Therefore, analysis of the law and researchers’ data allows us to conclude that the policy of russification was implemented despite the declaration of inclusiveness.

Let us return to the overview of the situation with higher education in the 1960s and 1970s. The aforementioned 1958 law enshrined the idea of creating a ‘Soviet people’ (see Masenko, 2016; Kulchytskyi, 2019; Mokryk, 2022), in the formation of which the Russian people played the most significant role. Subtelny (2009, p. 499) refers to Ukraine in this context as “*Ukraine: Second among Equals*”.

¹⁶⁸ “children who will study in a non-native language”

Behind the ideological double-talk, which implies that nations can “flower” while losing their identity, is a hidden agenda: Russification. Because Russians are in the majority, because they created the Bolshevik party and the Soviet system, because they occupy most of the top positions, and because their language is the primary means of communication in the USSR, they are seen as the cement that holds the USSR together.

Subtelny, 2009, p.521

The quote confirms the Soviet Russians’ ideology of their supremacy over other nations. In fact, their assertion that the Soviet Union would not have been formed if it weren’t for the Russians does make sense. However, this assertion has evoked feelings far from gratitude among many oppressed peoples. This ideology explains why the Soviet University was a predominantly Russian speaking environment. Since the university ‘produces’ the state’s elite, the elite had to be educated according to the state’s needs (thus, being russified).

It should be noted that since 1954, knowledge of the Ukrainian language has been removed from the requirements for admission to HEIs. Firstly, this created a barrier to entry into HEIs for Ukrainians, especially those from rural areas. Secondly, by the 1970s, a certain circle of scholars had already formed who, in principle, did not consider the Ukrainian language suitable for science. If we also take into account the purges of the Ukrainian intelligentsia every few years, we can imagine the state of the Ukrainian language in academia. It is also interesting that Russian language and literature were compulsory exams for university admission, even for those who had studied in a different language at school. Under such conditions, it is not surprising that as of 1960, only 48.36% of specialists with higher education in the Ukrainian SSR were Ukrainians. (Kindrachuk, 2015, p.98-100) Hrytsak (1996) asserts that between 1972 and 1979, history as a science ceased to exist in the Ukrainian SSR because (1) the interpretation of history changed radically, and (2) there was no access to historical written monuments (i.e., primary sources). HEIs performed the function of indoctrination through the study of the history of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and approaches to the communist education of workers. Many sources report the release of the Decree on Prohibition to write and defend a thesis in any language other than Russian, dated 1970. These are mostly popular-scholarly sources and non-academic analytical articles written by historians or linguists. However, we were

unable to find the original document or a reference link to it. So, we assume that such an order as a document did not exist; there was only an unspoken ban. That is, they were aware of it, but no formal document was drafted.

The Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR ‘On Measures for Further Improvement of the Study and Teaching of the Russian Language in the Ukrainian SSR’ of 2 November 1978 is a key document that regulated LP in education in the Ukrainian SSR until its collapse (see *Postanova pro zakhody po dalshomu udoskonalenniu vyvchennia i vykladannia rosiiskoi movy v Ukrainskii RSR, Rada Ministriv Ukrainskoi RSR, 1978*).

This document perfectly illustrates our previous arguments about the declarative nature of the USSR’s language policies. The title of the document refers to ‘improving the study’ of both Ukrainian and Russian. However, there is not a single sentence in the document about studying the Ukrainian language. Accordingly, it can be assumed that its real purpose is to increase the number of Russian-speaking citizens and the prestige of the Russian language (see *Postanova pro zakhody po dalshomu udoskonalenniu vyvchennia i vykladannia rosiiskoi movy v Ukrainskii RSR, Rada Ministriv Ukrainskoi RSR, 1978*).

The first step towards this is the introduction of Russian language studies from the 1st grade (for schools where Russian is not the main language of instruction). Moving the start of Russian language learning to the age of 6-7 ensured its maximum incorporation into the students’ cognitive picture of the world and social sphere of life. Thus, students developed bilingualism with a predominance of Russian at an early stage of childhood (see *Postanova pro zakhody po dalshomu udoskonalenniu vyvchennia i vykladannia rosiiskoi movy v Ukrainskii RSR, Rada Ministriv Ukrainskoi RSR, 1978*).

The next step was to increase the number of teaching hours allocated to the study of Russian. This, in turn, reduced the number of hours allocated to the study of other subjects, in particular Ukrainian language and literature (see Berezhivska, 2008).

Although the Resolution uses the term ‘further improvement’, the real motivation was to strengthen the role of the Russian language as the ‘language of interethnic communication’. This was an official euphemism meaning the functional

unification (i.e., russification) of the public space of the USSR. Thus, this resolution became an instrument for achieving political and ideological goals that are not directly mentioned in the text of the resolution, i.e. the creation of a single Soviet people. Thus, it can be concluded that this resolution was the final stage in the displacement of the Ukrainian language from the educational sphere and the consolidation of a linguistic hierarchy dominated by Russian (see Postanova pro zakhody po dalshomu udoskonalenniu vyvchennia i vykladannia rosiiskoi movy v Ukrainskii RSR, Rada Ministriv Ukrainskoi RSR, 1978).

The resolution also pays considerable attention to the material, technical and human resources for teaching Russian. This resolution set priorities in the allocation of resources in favour of the Russian language, as funds were allocated for equipping classrooms, providing teaching materials and additional professional training for teachers (see Postanova pro zakhody po dalshomu udoskonalenniu vyvchennia i vykladannia rosiiskoi movy v Ukrainskii RSR, Rada Ministriv Ukrainskoi RSR, 1978).

In 1983, the Resolution of the Collegium of the Ministry of Education of the Ukrainian SSR “On additional measures for improving the study of the Russian language in general education schools and pedagogical institutions of the Ukrainian SSR” was released. This resolution supplemented the previous one in terms of russification and served as a roadmap. Its first part, marked as classified, contains the following paragraph:

Ужити всіх заходів, щоб вільне володіння російською мовою нарівні з рідною стало нормою для молоді, яка закінчила середні навчальні заклади, громадським обов’язком кожної молодої людини.¹⁶⁹

Postanova kolehii Ministerstva osvity URSR “Pro dodatkovy zakhody po vdoskonalenniu vyvchennia rosiiskoi movy v osvitnikh shkolakh i pedahohichnykh navchalnykh zakladakh Ukrainskoi RSR”, Ministerstvo osvity Ukrainskoi RSR, 1983

In our opinion, the key imperative of the document lies in this passage, and it can be reformulated as assimilation through bilingualism. Although the wording suggests equality (functional bilingualism), in reality, in a situation where Russian is the language of power and career advancement, this is a *de facto* recognition of Russian

¹⁶⁹ “Take all measures to ensure that fluency in Russian, on a par with one’s native language, becomes the norm for young people who have completed secondary education, and a civic duty for every young person.”

dominance. Moreover, language is clearly an ideological tool, since fluency in Russian is equated with civic duty.

This 1983 resolution introduces Russian to children at an even earlier stage, i.e., during preschool education, particularly in rural areas (where Ukrainian has traditionally been dominant). The document also contains certain recommendations for parents, which go beyond LP regulating public communications and influence the primary socialisation of young children. One of the most important points is the financial stimulus for teaching and learning Russian.

26. Передбачити в проектах бюджетів на 1984 та наступні роки потрібні асигнування;
- на підвищення (16%) ставок заробітної платні вчителів підготовчих і перших класів, які провадять заняття з російської мови, вчителів російської мови й літератури IX-X (XI) клас загальноосвітніх шкіл та шкіл-інтернатів, педагогічних училищ з неросійською мовою навчання, розташованих в сільських місцевостях та в селищах міського типу;
- на підвищення стипендіатських витрат у зв'язку з поширенням на студентів, що навчаються в педагогічних інститутах за фахом "Російська мова та література в національній школі" стипендіатського забезпечення.¹⁷⁰

Postanova kolehii Ministerstva osvity URSS "Pro dodatkovy zakhody po vdoskonalenniu vyvchennia rosiiskoi movy v osvitynikh shkolakh i pedahohichnykh navchalnykh zakladakh Ukrainiskoi RSR", Ministerstvo osvity Ukrainiskoi RSR, 1983

Therefore, material incentives for russification were quite overt. As in earlier resolutions, the authorities see teachers as a tool for implementing their plans to create a 'Soviet human' (Kulchytskyi, 2019). Ukrainian language teachers could not receive salary increases to such a level. It is also important that the Soviet authorities financed improvements in the material conditions of students, at least through the construction of dormitories, laboratories, and other facilities. Thus, the idea that the Russian language is associated with a better standard of living is instilled from an early age.

Another example is the division of student groups into subgroups for studying Russian. For example, a class of 30 students studied Ukrainian as a whole with one teacher, while the same class was divided into subgroups of 15 students for studying

¹⁷⁰ "26. Provide for the necessary allocations in the draft budgets for 1984 and subsequent years;
- to increase (16%) the salaries of preparatory and first grade teachers who teach Russian, Russian language and literature teachers in grades IX-X (XI) grades of general education schools and boarding schools, teacher training colleges with non-Russian as the language of instruction, located in rural areas and urban-type settlements;
- to increase scholarship expenses in connection with the extension of scholarship support to students studying at pedagogical institutes in the speciality 'Russian language and literature in national schools'."

Russian. This approach significantly increased the effectiveness of learning the material. Moreover, the 1983 resolution also changed priorities regarding the study of foreign languages, as the increase in the number of hours devoted to Russian often came at the expense of time allocated to the study of foreign languages (see Postanova kolehii Ministerstva osvity URSR “Pro dodatkovy zakhody po vdoskonalenniu vyvchennia rosiiskoi movy v osvitnikh shkolakh i pedahohichnykh navchalnykh zakladakh Ukrainiskoi RSR”, Ministerstvo osvity Ukrainiskoi RSR, 1983).

In summary, the 1983 resolution most significantly introduced russification into education. Fluency in Russian became not just a language choice, but a social and economic necessity.

In fact, a new wave of educational reforms began in 1884. However, it was aimed at improving internal structure and control over school activities rather than improving teaching. Nevertheless, regarding the language issue, the authorities promoted measures to ‘improve conditions for learning Russian’ alongside Ukrainian (see Berezivska, 2008, pp. 305-310).

The adoption of the new Constitution by the Soviet Union in 1977 was dictated by the then-leadership of the Soviet Union to enshrine on paper the advent of the stage of ‘developed socialism’ and the concept of the ‘Soviet people’. Thus, in 1978, not only the resolution ‘On Measures for Further Improvement of the Study and Teaching of the Russian Language in the Ukrainian SSR’, but also a new Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR was adopted. It had to comply with the Soviet one (see Subtelny, 2009; Magocsi, 1997; Snyder, 2004; Ploky, 2017). An important difference from previous documents is the official proclamation of Ukrainian as the state language. Again, this was rather declarative, given the 1983 resolution.

If we consider this Constitution without the 1989 amendments, its LP did not provide for an official language in the Ukrainian SSR. However, the use of Russian on a par with Ukrainian was clearly defined in areas such as the judiciary, administration, education and law enforcement. It is difficult to assess the extent to which the declared rights could be realised in practice. For example, in 1976, the Ukrainian Helsinki

Group¹⁷¹ was formed. In response, the KGB arrested and sentenced five of its founding members to 7 to 10 years in prison and 5 years of exile. Therefore, it can be quite difficult to assess the extent of the violation of human rights guaranteed by the Constitution (see Subtelny, 2009; Magocsi, 1997; Snyder, 2004; Plokhyy, 2017). No real mechanisms existed to monitor compliance with the Constitutionally guaranteed rights.

Therefore, returning to the text of the Constitution, the right to education in one's native language is declared, but its actual implementation was questionable due to the aforementioned resolutions of 1978 and 1983. Even at the stage of choosing a school, purely for practical reasons, especially in cities, the network of schools with Ukrainian as the language of instruction was significantly reduced, so it was not always possible to enrol a child in such a school. All public communications by the authorities and all documentation were conducted in Russian and this did not contradict the Constitution.

To sum up, during the period of Stagnation, LP was completely subordinate to the ideological imperative of forming the 'Soviet people'. The Russian language had become a primary factor in the integration of the Soviet Union. This period marked the time when the policy of russification was most firmly established in the legal context. Language asymmetry was essentially institutionalised in the field of education. The key instruments of russification were (1) early intervention (the introduction of Russian language learning from preschool age); (2) direct funding of the russification process (e.g., through salary supplements for Russian language teachers); (3) widening the gap between Ukrainian and Russian language prestige by displacing the Ukrainian language from socially prestigious domains.

The next period in the history of the Soviet Union was Perestroika, with its so-called policy of glasnost (i.e. relaxation of censorship). It was caused by a deep economic crisis. The Soviet Union attempted to 'restart' its economic and political processes, which, as we know, it failed to do. In Ukraine, in addition to the problems affecting the entire union, the cover-up of the Chernobyl tragedy (1986) had a negative

¹⁷¹ The group's goal was to monitor the Soviet Government's compliance with the Helsinki Accords, which ensure human rights.

impact on the perception of Soviet power. At the same time, the popularity of the Narodnyi Rukh¹⁷² and the desire for change shook the Soviet regime. (see Subtelny, 2009; Shevelov, 1987; Magocsi, 1997; Snyder, 2004; Plokhy, 2017).

In 1989, Verkhovna Rada adopted the Law of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic “On languages in the Ukrainian SSR”. This law states that “Українська мова є одним з вирішальних чинників національної самобутності українського народу¹⁷³”. For the first time, the Ukrainian language was granted the status of the sole state language, although the status of Russian as a language of international communication in the Ukrainian SSR was not undermined. The right to use all languages of national minorities on the territory of the Ukrainian SSR was also declared. Additionally, some state administrative functions became available in the Ukrainian language, with Russian available upon request. Moreover, civil servants were required to be proficient in both Ukrainian and Russian. At the same time, however, it is prohibited to refuse employment due to ignorance of the Ukrainian or Russian language (see *Pro movy v Ukrainskii RSR*, Verkhovna Rada Ukrainskoi RSR, 1989).

In general, this law enshrined the symbolic significance of the Ukrainian language at the republican level. It also significantly expanded the legal powers of the Ukrainian language. A legal basis for a new ukrainisation of education emerged. At the same time, the law guaranteed extraordinary tolerance for linguistic diversity. It was obviously of a declarative nature, as the dominance of Russian in society and the educational sphere remained significant, and the law did not provide for any means of influencing this situation. Certain all-Union methods of influence on the Ukrainian SSR remained in place, which did not facilitate the transition to the Ukrainian language. The implementation of this law in the field of education was also impossible in the absence of institutional changes, staff training and teaching materials. Therefore, despite its practical ineffectiveness, the 1988 law became the legal basis for the process of democratisation and national revival. At the same time, trends towards bilingualism continued, with Russian occupying a stronger position. This law embodies the

¹⁷² Literally: People’s Movement.

¹⁷³ “the Ukrainian language is one of the decisive factors of the national identity of the Ukrainian people”

transition from Soviet LP towards national LP, but with many ‘dependencies’ on the old system.

Conclusion and Comments

The LP of the Soviet Union in the Ukrainian SSR over seven decades (1920–1991) was not monolithic, but rather a cyclical process that fluctuated between functional expansion and harsh assimilation, always caught between the declared equality of languages and the actual dominance of Russian as an instrument of integration.

1920s-1930s: The initial stage of the USSR’s functioning was marked by a policy of indigenisation (in Ukraine, known as ukrainisation). This stage was extremely beneficial for the development of the Ukrainian language, as its institutional introduction into education, culture, and the state apparatus was unprecedented. It also succeeded in forming a new generation of Ukrainian intellectuals. However, this policy was used to strengthen the status of Soviet power and quickly ended in mass repression among the same intellectuals.

1930s-1950s: At the beginning of this stage, there was a radical reversal in party policy. The policy of ukrainisation was abolished and condemned for its ‘nationalist orientation’. A significant part of the Ukrainian elite was physically destroyed. The Ukrainian language underwent changes in the rewriting of its rules. The key goal was not to adapt to the new realities of speech, but to adjust and bring it as close as possible to Russian. As far as education was concerned, the Russian language gained increasing importance in primary school curricula and plans, increasingly replacing the Ukrainian language.

1953-1964-1985: the periods of the so-called Thaw and Stagnation did not differ much in terms of LP in education. The advantages of these stages included a significant improvement in the quality of education and its consolidation as a vital sphere in society. Officially, the party encouraged linguistic diversity, but in practice, the declaration of language equality evolved into an implicit asymmetry. These phenomena were legalised during the Stagnation period in the form of resolutions in 1978 and 1983, according to which the Russian language received several privileges.

This cemented the status of Ukrainian as a language of everyday life, particularly in rural areas and among marginalised groups. Russian, on the other hand, was seen as the language of social mobility, career advancement, science and power.

1985-1991: the period of Perestroika was marked by instability in public life. As far as LP is concerned, only one law on language was passed during this short period, and it was rather symbolic and comparatively democratic. However, this did not detract from its compromising nature and ineffectiveness in practice.

2.5. Language Policy in Independent Ukraine (1991–2025)

Since regaining independence in 1991, Ukraine's LP can be divided into four periods, each of which has been decisive for the country's linguistic landscape. This division is based not only on the direction of legislation on the state language, but also on the availability of mechanisms for implementing this legislation. The first three of them were happening in peaceful times, and the fourth is the outcome of the Russian invasion of Ukraine (2014). In this chapter, we will examine the LP from a rather descriptive perspective, taking into account just the most prominent reactions of society. It helps to understand the context that shaped the people's reactions examined during the interviews (see Chapter IV).

2.5.1. LP, Soviet legacy, and state of peace (1991–2013)

The state LP of independent Ukraine has long been the subject of political debate and is often manipulated by some political forces (Ruda, 2012). In fact, the first stage of Ukraine's LP started far before it gained Independence and was characterised by official recognition of Ukrainian, but ignoring the issue on the level of real use. For five years after Ukraine's declaration of independence, language relations were still regulated by Soviet norms, a standard practice for countries in such situations. The Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR of 1978, which established the status of the Ukrainian language as the state language, continued to operate on the state's territory. However, the use of other national languages, primarily Russian, was permitted in the

work of state organisations. In fact, it solidified the process of russification that had been underway for the previous years.

In 1989, the law “On languages in the Ukrainian SSR” was adopted, the validity of which officially expired in 2012 (Boiko, 2023). The law stipulates that the state language is Ukrainian, and the state must provide all necessary conditions for citizens to master it in depth. However, there is a nuance: in the preamble, it was declared that despite the granted state status and the importance of the Ukrainian language, Russian remains the language of inter-ethnic communication among the peoples of the Union, and therefore, the Ukrainian SSR must ensure its free use. As we can see, during the period of Ukraine’s declaration of independence, the Russian language prevailed in virtually all spheres of life (Bilaniuk, 2004, 2008, 2010; Pavlenko, 2008, 2010; Masenko, 2010; Kulyk, 2011; Marusyk, 2015; Danylenko, 2016; Hentschel, & Palinska, 2022; Rabanus, 2023).

After Ukraine regained its independence in 1991, the Ukrainian language became a mandatory means of communication in the public sphere of social life, and the path to realising its convergence function was long and thorny. Article 10 of the Constitution of Ukraine, adopted on June 28, 1996, declares the Ukrainian language the sole state language in Ukraine, listing it among the country’s main constitutional values. According to the Decision of the Constitutional Court (1999),

Конституцією України статус державної мови надано українській мові (частина перша статті 10). Це повністю відповідає державотворчій ролі української нації, що зазначено у преамбулі Конституції України, нації, яка історично проживає на території України, складає абсолютну більшість її населення і дала офіційну назву державі.¹⁷⁴

Rishennia Konstytutsiinoho Sudu Ukrainy u spravi za konstytutsiinymy podanniamy 51 narodnoho deputata Ukrainy pro ofitsiine tlumachennia polozhen statti 10 Konstytutsii Ukrainy shchodo zastosuvannia derzhavnoi movy orhanamy derzhavnoi vlady, orhanamy mistsevoho samovriaduvannia ta vykorystannia yii u navchalnomu protsesi (No. 10-rp/99), The Constitutional Court of Ukraine, 1999

¹⁷⁴ The Constitution of Ukraine grants the status of the state language to the Ukrainian language (part one of Article 10). This fully corresponds to the state-building role of the Ukrainian nation, as stated in the preamble to the Constitution of Ukraine, a nation that has historically lived on the territory of Ukraine, constitutes the absolute majority of its population, and has given the official name to the state.

However, as Boryslavska (2017, p.14) states, the fact that the law “On languages in the Ukrainian SSR” (1989) remained in force, the status of Ukrainian has not changed much in reality. Mokryk (2025) refers to it as colonial inertia in culture, where the legacy of colonial rule continues to influence society long after colonial rule has ended.

The first president of Ukraine, Leonid Kravchuk (1991–1994), had a reputation far from being a pro-Ukrainian. His party’s past left a profound imprint on the perception of ordinary people. He implemented the policy of ukrainisation primarily in the field of education, paying insufficient attention to other spheres of public life. However, in reality, the educational space remained bilingual. During the presidency of Kravchuk, the language legislation did not undergo any changes (see Besters-Dilher, 2010).

Against the backdrop of the economic crisis in Ukraine in 1994 (caused by moving from the planned economy to the market economy), early presidential elections were held, in which Kuchma won (1994-2005). Taking into account the dissatisfaction of part of population of Ukraine with the ukrainisation of education, he made one of the points in his program the slogan of protecting the Russian language and giving it official status. Besters-Dilher (2010, p. 90) highlights that “Kuchma simultaneously signaled a return to the idea of “one nation – two languages””, which later was, no accident, in a modified form of “two languages – one nation”, seen in the program of the Party of Regions. However, the state LP of Ukraine during his presidency was ambiguous because Kuchma did not fulfil his pre-election promises on implementing the two-language policy but laid the foundations for the growing debate about the status of the Ukrainian and Russian languages in the state. Despite his relative pro-Russianness, it was during his presidency that the current Constitution of Ukraine was adopted, establishing Ukrainian as the state language.

The adoption of the Constitution in 1996 marks the beginning of the second stage of LP development in Ukraine. This period is characterised by its dual, contradictory nature, i.e. both the implementation differed from the declared norms, and the norms themselves were changing back and forth. According to the Constitution (1996), the national LP also defines the following principles:

- The state is obliged to promote the study of languages of international communication and ensure their use in Ukraine;
- The state is obliged to promote the development of the linguistic identity of all indigenous peoples and national minorities of Ukraine and to take care of the linguistic needs of Ukrainians living abroad;
- Prohibition of any discrimination based on language principle;
- Guarantee, in accordance with the law, the right of citizens of national minorities to study in their native language or to study their native language in state and public educational institutions or through national and cultural associations;
- Ukrainian legislation specifically regulates language use procedures;
- Candidates for the post of President of Ukraine, judges, and judges of the Constitutional Court are required to know the state language.

On the eve of the 1999 elections, Kuchma returned to the topic of the second official language by permitting Ukrainians to take exams for higher educational institutions in Russian. Pre-election promises provoked heated discussions about bilingualism in the state. In turn, some MPs appealed to the Constitutional Court of Ukraine, in which they asked to clarify the content of Article 10 of the Constitution. The Constitutional Court of Ukraine explained that the official and state languages are identical and, according to the constitutional prescription, there is only one state language in Ukraine, and it is Ukrainian.

Trying to smooth out the rough edges as well as outrun his opponent (a representative of the Communist Party, Petro Symonenko, closely related to Russia), Kuchma started drifting to a more pro-Ukrainian position than he had previously. This also affected his language policies. Thus, this change was reflected in his policies after his re-election. One of the external manifestations of his change of views was the release of the book “Ukraine is not Russia”. It was also during his presidency that Russia attempted to build construction of a dam across the Kerch Strait to the Ukrainian island of Tuzla without permission from the Ukrainian side. This conflict was small, but Russia was able to test its behaviour in the information space, the (lack of) reaction of the international community and Ukraine itself (Kuchma ordered all troops to be put

on combat readiness). This is considered the first open act of aggression by the Russian Federation against Ukraine. We can suggest that this was one of the events that stimulated Kuchma not to abandon the idea of integration into the EU.

As we can see, this period of Ukrainian political activity is highly dynamic. In his aspiration to please Russia and to satisfy the people's request to join the EU simultaneously, he ratified the European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages in 2003¹⁷⁵. The Charter guaranteed the status of regional languages to 13 minority languages in Ukraine. According to the Charter, the use of regional languages must have been encouraged in public life and administration. The state had to ensure the use of these languages in education, providing teachers' training and opportunities for the use of these languages as the language of instruction in pre-school, primary, secondary, and sometimes higher education. Ukraine was also obliged to support the development of media in minority languages. However, this contributed to an even more significant imbalance of the language situation in Ukraine. The pro-Ukrainian part of the society was shocked by such facilitation of the russification of Ukraine, while the pro-Russian part was not satisfied because the Russian language did not regain its full power.

The adoption of the State Program for the Development and Functioning of the Ukrainian Language for 2004-2010 is another example of the chaotic nature of language policies of this period. The complicated international relations, together with internal instability (i.e. some irregular manifestations of support for the Ukrainian language on the one hand, accompanied by an emphasis on respecting the rights of the Russian-speaking population on the other hand) did not change the reality of the language situation in Ukraine (see Zalizniak & Masenko, 2001; Besters-Dilher, 2009, 2010; Ruda, 2012; Boiko, 2023).

The pro-Ukrainian stance of the next president, Viktor Yushchenko (2005-2010), became more publicly pronounced only during the latter part of his time in the office. Despite his opponents' accusations of an aggressive policy of ukrainisation,

¹⁷⁵ Draft Law on Amendments to Certain Laws of Ukraine in Connection with the Update of the Official Translation of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages was registered in the Verkhovna Rada on October 13, 2025. The point is that in the previous translation, the term 'national minorities' was used, while the original documents referred to 'numerical minorities'. This issue must be resolved in accordance with the law. As of early December, this law had not yet been signed by the President of Ukraine. The new official translation, if adopted, excludes the languages that are not 'numerical minorities', thus excluding Russian.

absolute Ukrainian-centrism was actually impossible for him. After all, Yushchenko had his sights set on the EU, which meant that it was necessary to adhere to the standards of the Council of Europe. In 2006, the Universal¹⁷⁶ [Proclamation] of National Unity was signed, according to which the state, in particular, had to ensure:

Всебічний розвиток і функціонування української мови як державної та мови офіційного спілкування у всіх сферах суспільного життя на всій території України - як основи самоідентифікації народу і держави¹⁷⁷

Universal of National Unity, 2006

However, to avoid societal clashes and under pressure from representatives of the Party of Regions, the right to freely use Russian or another native language was guaranteed. In 2006, the European Charter of Regional or Minority Languages entered into force, and it became the main argument of opponents of strengthening the status of the Ukrainian language in Ukraine.

Only at the end of his term, on February 15, 2010, the President of Ukraine, Viktor Yushchenko, approved the “Concept of National Language Policy” by his decree. It clarified the tasks, priorities, and methods for addressing Ukraine’s language issues. Establishing the Ukrainian language as the national language in all spheres of public life throughout Ukraine, as well as the working language of officials and employees of state bodies and local self-government bodies, was one of the program’s objectives.

As a representative function in international communication, one of the priorities of the national LP is to bring the practice of language legislation into compliance with the Constitution. This concept marked a significant step in the development and implementation of the state LP, aimed at enhancing the status of the Ukrainian language and ensuring its continued functionality as a national language (Boiko, 2023). Additionally, the document outlines the priorities for implementing the language provisions of the Constitution, which contribute to the development and

¹⁷⁶ The term “Universal” (Ukrainian: “Універсал”) usually refers to a series of political and legal proclamations. While the closest English equivalents are “Proclamation” or “Declaration”, the term “Universal” is often retained in historical contexts to reflect its unique meaning in Ukrainian political tradition. However, in this particular case, this document functioned as a pact. It aimed to establish a common vision for Ukraine’s democratic development shared by all political parties.

¹⁷⁷ “the comprehensive development and functioning of the Ukrainian language as the state language and the language of official communication in all spheres of public life throughout the territory of Ukraine - as the basis of the self-identification of the people and the state”

protection of linguistic diversity in Ukraine. However, if we talk about the real consequences of adopting this decree, Kobryn (2017, p.37) claims that

для реалізації положень цієї Концепції не було прийнято жодного нормативно-правового акта, і на сьогодні вона виконує своєрідну роль “декларації намірів” мовної політики, хоча за змістом є проукраїнською та державницькою¹⁷⁸

Kobryn, 2017, p.37

Boiko (2023) says that the third stage of LP in Ukraine begins with the adoption of the Law on the Principles of State Language Policy (“Pro zasady derzhavnoi movnoi polityky”, Verkhovna Rada Ukrainy, 2012). However, we should mention the events that led to the adoption of this law. In 2010, the presidential election was won by a political party with a policy direction opposite to that of the national government, particularly in LP. During the presidency of Yanukovich (2010-2014), the process of officially consolidating bilingualism began. During this period, state support for the Ukrainian language actually stopped. For instance, in the Law of Ukraine “On the State Budget of Ukraine for 2011”, the expenses for “ensuring the development and use of the Ukrainian language” were reduced by fourfold. In the following year, this article disappeared from the budget altogether. Instead, in the 2013 budget, expenses for “measures to implement the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages” were increased more than ten times (see Makarets, 2019).

These changes appeared first in the sphere of education, the only Ukrainianized sphere within the previous decades. The then head of the Ministry of Education and Science, Tabachnyk, attempted to implement the “Concept of Language Education in Ukraine” (without public discussion), which was supposed to allow free choice of the language of instruction. Although this attempt had no legal consequences (due to regular monthly protests by students and parliamentary opposition), it nevertheless somewhat altered the direction of the state LP (see Marusyk, 2015).

In 2010, the draft law “On Languages in Ukraine” was submitted to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, which became the subject of lively discussions due to the big slogan about the need to protect the rights of Russian-speaking citizens. The

¹⁷⁸ No regulatory acts have been adopted to implement the provisions of this Concept [=Concept of National Language Policy], and today it serves as a kind of ‘declaration of intent’ for language policy, although its content is pro-Ukrainian and pro-statehood.

societal reaction manifested itself in a gathering under the walls of the Ukrainian House, known as the “Language Maidan”. For several months, the politically active Ukrainian citizens demanded the document not be considered. Then, the opposition submitted its pro-Ukrainian bills, which were never considered in the session hall.

Realising that the adoption of the draft law “On Languages in Ukraine” would significantly reduce the position of the Ukrainian language, Lytvyn (then Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine) sent it to the OSCE High Commissioner for National Minorities Vollebek and the Venice Commission for review. Vollebek noted in his response that adopting such a law would increase the tension between speakers of different languages and cause a linguistic split in the state (see “Assessment and recommendations of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities regarding the draft Law “On Languages in Ukraine” (No. 1015-3), Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, 2011). In the conclusion of the Working Group of the Venice Commission, it was noted that the document does not consider the natural language situation, which is characterised by the dominance of the Russian language in major cities. This law was also submitted for consideration by Ukrainian scientific institutions (the Institute of the Ukrainian Language, the O. Potebnia Institute of Linguistics, the I. F. Kuras Institute of Political and Ethnonational Studies of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, the Academy of Sciences of the Higher School of Ukraine, etc.), which recognized such a law as contradicting Art. 10 of the Constitution of Ukraine because in its essence, the bill supports the Russian language.

The bill was withdrawn from consideration. Instead, its slightly modified version was registered. The new draft law “On the principles of State Language Policy”¹⁷⁹ (see Ukaz Pro Kontseptsiiu derzhavnoi movnoi polityky No 161/2010, President of Ukraine, 2010), February, 15), which was later adopted in 2012, included the following changes:

(1) the increase of the threshold for regional languages to 10% (meaning that if at least 10% of the population speaks the minority language, it can acquire the regional status);

¹⁷⁹ Also referred to as Kivalov-Kolesnichenko law (2012)

(2) clarification of the hierarchy of the status of the state language (i.e. Ukrainian) over the minority languages and ensuring that neither of the regional languages could create obstacles for the use of the state language;

(3) all the official communication of the armed forces should be conducted in the state language;

(4) the use of regional languages in the courts is possible only after the agreement of all the parties.

The law was harshly criticised by civil society. Thus, in 2014, the Parliament recognised it as unconstitutional, and the Constitutional Court supported that decision in 2018 (Decision of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine in the case on the constitutional submission of 57 Members of Parliament regarding the constitutionality of the Law “On the Principles of State Language Policy”, Constitutional Court of Ukraine, 2018). The reason for that was explained by Melnyk (Judge of the Constitutional Court) as follows:

його [закону] прийняття заклало законодавчу основу для чергового етапу системної русифікації України. Реальною двоєдиною метою Закону було нівелювання конституційного статусу української мови як державної і надання усупереч Конституції України такого статусу російській мові та вивіщення її над іншими мовами національних меншин України, що є абсолютно неприпустимим з огляду на значення та функції української мови у становленні, функціонуванні та розвитку України як суверенної і незалежної держави. Закон закладав нормативні основи для руйнації Української держави.¹⁸⁰

Separate opinion of Judge M. I. Melnyk concerning the Decision of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine in the case on the constitutional submission of 57 Members of Parliament as to the constitutionality of the Law of Ukraine “On the Principles of State Language Policy” (Document no. nc02d710-18), Constitutional Court of Ukraine, 2018.

It should be mentioned that at the end of February 2014, when Oleksandr Turchynov, the Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, was performing the duties of the President of Ukraine, the parliament adopted the law “On recognition of the repeal of the Law of Ukraine “On the principles of state language policy”. However, to avoid possible disturbances among the Russian-speaking population, the law was

¹⁸⁰ adoption [of this law] laid the legislative basis for the next stage of the systemic russification of Ukraine. The real dual purpose of the Law was to level the constitutional status of the Ukrainian language as the state language and to grant such status to the Russian language, contrary to the Constitution of Ukraine, and to elevate it above other languages of national minorities in Ukraine, which is absolutely unacceptable given the importance and functions of the Ukrainian language in the formation, functioning and development of Ukraine as a sovereign and independent state. The Law laid the regulatory basis for the destruction of the Ukrainian state.

never signed. This caused dissatisfaction of those who understood that Russia started a hybrid war (including media, business, money flows, etc) against Ukraine at that time.

In April 2014, the Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, Turchynov and Prime Minister Yatsenyuk made a joint statement about establishing a special status for the Russian language and guaranteeing its protection. However, after the new president was elected in 2015, the National Unity Council was established and later entrusted with developing proposals for the state LP. According to the Presidential Decree, the Council focuses on analysing social processes and developing proposals for strengthening national unity, promoting culture, and harmonising ethno-national and interfaith relations. It also serves to strengthen the role of the state language, counter propaganda myths, and foster interregional cooperation. Additionally, the Council reviews draft laws and acts of the President of Ukraine pertaining to historical memory, language and information policy, education, and culture. It also participates in preparing presidential addresses to the people and the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. (see Decree of the President of Ukraine No. 697/2015 on the decision of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine on the new edition of the Military Doctrine of Ukraine, President of Ukraine, 2015).

Therefore, it was only in the third period of language policies in Ukraine that legislators began to develop tools to address the issue of post-Soviet nation-building in terms of language ideologies. In fact, socio-political unrest in the country (the Revolution of Dignity, the escape of President Yanukovych and the Russian invasion of Ukraine) contributed to even greater destabilisation of the country from within. On the other hand, these events prompted changes in the consideration of language policies in Ukraine (see Chapter IV; Makarets, 2019; Kobryn, 2023).

The Autonomous Republic of Crimea / Qırım Muhtar Cumhuriyeti

It is worth noting that since Crimea is an autonomous region within Ukraine, it has its own parliament, known as the Verkhovna Rada of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. Of course, Ukrainian legislation applies to Crimea. Therefore, although legislation in Crimea cannot contradict the Constitution of Ukraine (1996), it may still

have its own differences. So, we decided to examine the key points regarding languages in Crimea in its Constitution. The Crimea has its own Constitution (1998) that came into force in 1999 (see *Zakon Ukrainy Pro zatverdzhennia Konstytutsii Avtonomnoi Respubliky Krym N 350-XIV*, Verkhovna Rada Ukrainy, 1998). The constitution adopted by the Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea contains provisions related to language issues.

Article 4, paragraph 2 guarantees that all normative legal acts, including the constitution, must be published in Russian and Crimean Tatar, in addition to the state language. We were able to find both Ukrainian and Russian versions of the Constitution (see *Zakon Ukrainy Pro zatverdzhennia Konstytutsii Avtonomnoi Respubliky Krym N 350-XIV*, Verkhovna Rada Ukrainy, 1998; *Konstytutsiya Avtonomnoi Respubliki Krym: Zakon № 239-k-2/98*, Verkhovnaia Rada Ukrayiny, 1998). Moreover, we managed to find its English translation, but not the Crimean Tatar one. In terms of administrative use, Article 12 also enables the courts to use Russian upon the agreement of all parties.

Article 10 ensures “the functioning, development, use and protection of Russian, Crimean Tatar and other national languages” alongside the state language. Under the same article, Russian is recognised as the language of interethnic communication (as is the case under the Constitution of Ukraine). The same article also guarantees the right to education in one’s native language in pre-school institutions if funded by the state or republic. Otherwise, these languages can be learned through cultural institutions.

It is also interesting to note Article 11, which confirms the possibility of obtaining documents (passport, employment record book, marriage certificate, etc.) in Ukrainian, Russian; and Crimean Tatar upon request. For clarification, we turned to our informant (Crimean Tatar, 25-34, L1: Crimean Tatar). She said that this possibility did indeed exist in theory, but “there weren’t even any stamps in Crimean Tatar”, let alone translated documents. She adds, “On paper, it’s one thing, but in reality, it’s another”. She confirmed the possibility of requesting the documents in Russian.

Last but not least, Article 13 regulates public relations in the Crimea, granting equal use for Ukrainian and Russian. ‘Another language acceptable for both parts’ is also mentioned as a possibility.

After analysing the content of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea’s constitution, we can say that it significantly expands the scope of application of Russian law compared to the Ukrainian constitution. It also contains a formal element of tolerance towards other languages. However, as we have learned in practice, this tolerance did not exist. Seeing the example of Crimean Tatar, it can be concluded that the mention of the Crimean Tatar language was rather a convenient cover for the introduction of Russian in the region, just like it was with the European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages. The Crimean Constitution (1998) was adopted during the presidency of Kuchma, whose LP, as we already know, were not particularly pro-Ukrainian.

2.5.2. LP in the Context of the First Wave of Russian Aggression (2014–2022)

We will consider the dynamics of changes in Ukraine’s LP separately, since it was Russia’s aggression in 2014 that gave impetus to the fourth stage of LP creation in Ukraine. Although, according to Boiko (2023), this stage began as late as 2019, we believe that the 2016 laws, together with the decentralisation reforms (see Mire, Muradian & Nekhaienko, 2022), were the first step towards the fourth period. First, the period from 2016 to 2018 is characterised by the development and adoption of laws aimed at strengthening the status of the Ukrainian language in education and the mass media.

As for the sphere of Education, a more detailed review is presented in Chapter III. However, it is still important to note that in 2017, the Law of Ukraine “On Education” entered into force, establishing Ukrainian as the official language of education. Hungary, Moldova and Romania strongly reacted to this norm since Ukrainian was recognised as the only language of education. The right to receive primary education in a minority language remains, but implementing this right is quite challenging. Despite such reactions from neighbouring countries, the Venice

Commission approved the document, noting only the need to extend the transition period.

As for media, it is worth noting that during this period, the Law of Ukraine “On the Basics of State Language Policy” remained in force. Thus, in 2016, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted the Law of Ukraine “On Amendments to the Law of Ukraine “On Television and Radio Broadcasting” (regarding part of the songs in the state language in musical radio programs and radio broadcasts)”, which introduced quotas for part of the Ukrainian language products on the radio and for conducting radio programs in the state language (see *Zakon Pro vnesennia zmin do deiakykh zakoniv Ukrainy shchodo chastky muzychnykh tvoriv derzhavnoi movoi u prohramakh teleradioorhanizatsii*, Verkhovna Rada Ukrainy, 2016). The exact percentages depend on the type of TV and radio¹⁸¹.

In 2017, the Law of Ukraine, “On Amendments to Certain Laws of Ukraine Regarding the Language of Audiovisual (Electronic) Mass Media”, entered into force, establishing even bigger quotas (up to 75%) for Ukrainian-language products on television. Although these steps did not ultimately resolve the issue of non-accommodational bilingualism among TV channels (as previously noted in Bilaniuk, 2010) and radio stations, they significantly increased the share of the Ukrainian language on the air. These legislative initiatives are crucial steps toward strengthening the country’s linguistic and cultural identity.

However, after the language law of 2012 was declared unconstitutional, no document regulated the field of language relations (except for Article 10 of the Constitution of Ukraine). This situation prevailed until 2019, when Petro Poroshenko, the fifth President of Ukraine, signed the Law of Ukraine “On Ensuring the Functioning of the Ukrainian Language as the State Language”. The law was designed to regulate the use of the Ukrainian language and protect it from threats, including those posed by

¹⁸¹ The more detailed figures are:

- to establish a 35% quota for songs in Ukrainian for the time slots from 7:00 to 14:00 and from 15:00 to 22:00;
- the quota is introduced gradually: during the first year – 25%, the second – 30%, the third – 35%;
- for radio stations whose license stipulates that they broadcast more than 60% of their product in EU languages, a preferential quota for songs in Ukrainian is established – 25%;
- a quota for the Ukrainian language of broadcasting – 60%;
- the quota for the language of broadcasting is also introduced gradually: during the first year – 50%, the second – 55%, the third – 60%.

the Russian hybrid war in the media, leading to the creation of a language ombudsman to safeguard Ukrainian as the state language. These efforts reflect the evolution of LP in Ukraine, focusing on strengthening the position of the Ukrainian language in various spheres of public life and governance, as well as promoting national unity and effective nation-building through language use. It is worth noting that Article 1 of the 2019 Law states that “the status of the Ukrainian language as the only state language is conditioned by the self-determination of the Ukrainian nation which, in its turn, is state-building”, which in fact reflects the achievements of previous policies and anticipates their growth. That is, legislators understand that at this stage of the Ukrainian state’s development, linguistic identity plays a significant role in the self-determination of Ukrainians and influences state formation.

Critics of the law argue that it also restricts the languages of national minorities and indigenous peoples, while its defenders argue that, at a stage where assimilation is a real threat, another law would be impossible. Kulyk states that the Ukrainian context is inherently discriminatory due to historical factors (see Shevchenko Scientific Society in the U.S., 2021). First, the Ukrainian language was oppressed for centuries, and thus, the vast majority of the Ukrainian-speaking population did not recognise having any language rights. Simultaneously, the Russian language was so privileged that now, even with a tiny decrease in its position, its speakers feel threatened. Kulyk (Shevchenko Scientific Society in the U.S., 2021) confirms this saying that “якщо держава починає змінювати мовну ситуацію на користь раніше дискримінованої мови То це викликає невдоволення або обурення або навіть протести з носіїв колись привілейованої мови¹⁸²”.

It is worth noting that state sponsorship of the population’s awareness of indigenous peoples, their languages and cultures took place at the same time. For example, in 2014, the Department of the Crimean Tatar Language was established at Taras Shevchenko University (see Katayeva, 2024).

Finally, the authorities directed their attention to studying European models of language regulation from the perspective of their potential application in Ukraine

¹⁸² if the state begins to change the linguistic situation in favour of a previously discriminated language this causes dissatisfaction or outrage or even protests from speakers of the once privileged language

(which Kulyk (2021) finds unsuitable) and the popularisation of the English language, yet in a declarative manner so far.

2.5.3. LP in the Context of Russian Full-Scale Invasion of Ukraine (2022-2025)

Ukraine responded to the start of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 within the framework of LP regulation. The first such law was the Law on Amendments to Certain Laws of Ukraine Regarding Restrictions on the Import and Distribution of Publishing Products Related to the Aggressor State, the Republic of Belarus, and the Temporarily Occupied Territory of Ukraine (2022). The essence of this law is that it regulates the import of printed products published in the Russian Federation, Belarus or in the occupied territories by the occupying authorities. The law prohibits such imports for commercial purposes but does not prohibit the import of such publications for personal use (up to 10 copies). Moreover, this law allows the import of books written in Russian and published outside Ukraine, even for commercial purposes. Exceptions are publications from the Register of Publications with Anti-Ukrainian Content. Therefore, this law does not regulate LP, but rather the book market in order to protect it from saturation with Russian propaganda in wartime conditions (see *Zakon Pro vnesennia zmin do deiakykh zakoniv Ukrainy shchodo vstanovlennia obmezhen na vvezennia ta rozpovsiudzhennia vydavnychoi produktsii, shcho stosuetsia derzhavy-ahresora, Respubliky Bilorus, tymchasovo okupovanoi terytorii Ukrainy*, Verkhovna Rada Ukrainy, 2022).

In 2023, the Law On the use of English in Ukraine was adopted. Given the context, it is worth noting that this law is explicitly oriented towards Ukraine's European and Euro-Atlantic integration, as stated in the Preamble. This statement expands the functions of English beyond mere communication and lends it symbolic significance. This law also increases the linguistic prestige of English. According to the law, a wide range of positions in the civil service and security agencies require a certain level of proficiency in English. This creates a peculiar filter, whereby the bilingualism of the ruling elite is already perceived in the context of Ukrainian-English rather than Ukrainian-Russian. English is becoming essential for career advancement.

Moreover, Article 4, paragraph 6 provides for financial rewards (which equals 10% of the salary) for knowledge of English at the B2 level. On the one hand, this motivates employees to learn English, but on the other hand, it raises concerns about corruption risks (see *Zakon Pro zastosuvannia anhliiskoi movy v Ukraini*, Verkhovna Rada Ukrainy, 2023).

With regard to education, Article 8 of this Law provides for early exposure to the English language, specifically from early and primary school age. Part of the verification of the effectiveness of such implementations is the mandatory state final assessment (upon completion of secondary school) in English. This also significantly raises the status of the language in the educational domain and influences the language behaviour of parents and children (see *Zakon Pro zastosuvannia anhliiskoi movy v Ukraini*, Verkhovna Rada Ukrainy, 2023). It is important that, unlike the 1983 resolution on the Russian language, this law provides for:

Жодне з положень цього Закону не може тлумачитися як таке, що спрямоване на звуження сфери функціонування і застосування української мови як державної, а також використання мов корінних народів і національних меншин (спільнот) України.¹⁸³

Zakon Pro zastosuvannia anhliiskoi movy v Ukraini, Verkhovna Rada Ukrainy, 2023

This means that English cannot be used instead of Ukrainian or the languages of national minorities (communities) in any case. Moreover, this law does not apply to such important areas of state activity as the judiciary, criminal proceedings, etc.

This is an important guardrail to avoid conflict with the current 2019 Law. At present, this is a declaration of intent, as we cannot assess the implementation of this law. Among the likely negative effects is the possibility of functional competition between English and Ukrainian or even a shift in some communicative functions. However, this is only possible if the majority of citizens are fluent in English, which is not the case at this stage (see *Zakon Pro zastosuvannia anhliiskoi movy v Ukraini*, Verkhovna Rada Ukrainy, 2023).

¹⁸³ “None of the provisions of this Law may be interpreted as aimed at restricting the scope of functioning and use of the Ukrainian language as the state language, as well as the use of languages of indigenous peoples and national minorities (communities) of Ukraine.”

In summary, we can note that English as a powerful language is used to weaken the influence of the Russian language. This law effectively establishes a second functional language and, in the context of language planning, can be seen as a step towards the formation of de facto bilingualism. Critics of the law also point out that it may contribute to social inequality based on language competence, given that not all citizens of Ukraine currently have equal access to learning English (see Pavlusenko, 2023).

Conclusion and Comments

The language issue in Ukraine has consistently remained a relevant concern. Even today, it remains relevant. The declared priority of LP in Ukraine is the establishment of the Ukrainian language, as it has been chosen as the primary symbol of the Ukrainian people's identity, who reside on Ukraine's territory and comprise the absolute majority of the state's population.

Throughout the entire period of independence, LP has always been characterised by complex and multidimensional dynamics. The whole issue has always been of interest not only from a linguistic point of view, but also from a political and cultural perspective. The legislation of this period reflects the evolution of Ukrainian society in terms of language, from post-Soviet russification, where Ukrainian had only declarative significance, to the establishment of Ukrainian as the sole state language, a unifying and symbolic force.

The initial stage of independence was characterised by the inertia of Soviet LP and language practices. The Russian language dominated the media, education and urban space. There were no mechanisms to regulate this process, which is why linguistic asymmetry persisted. Therefore, this phase of 'declarative ukrainisation' had no practical implementation, except in the educational environment, where some ukrainisation did take place during Kuchma's presidency.

The instability of LP is a key feature of the next period. On the one hand, certain steps were taken towards the real implementation of ukrainisation during Yushchenko's presidency. On the other hand, laws on the languages of national minorities were passed, which de facto institutionalised Russian as the second state

language. During Yanukovych's presidency, the situation worsened, especially due to the Kivalov-Kolesnichenko law (2012), which established Russian as the second regional language in russified regions. Moreover, this law polarised society, thus threatening Ukraine's national security.

In fact, after the Revolution of Dignity (2014), the LP took on a distinctly symbolic meaning. The Ukrainian language became an element of resistance against Russian aggression, an instrument of statehood and self-determination. The role of the Ukrainian language in the public sphere is growing, as is its linguistic prestige, particularly following the 2017 and 2019 laws. At the same time, sociolinguistic studies of this period reveal a gradual shift in the linguistic behaviour of the population, particularly an increase in its use among youth and in urban environments, as well as in digital communication.

The full-scale Russian invasion (2022) radically accelerated these processes. Language choice became an act of solidarity, self-identification, and a manifestation of sympathy and gratitude. During this period, there was a mass transition of citizens to Ukrainian, and numerous initiatives were launched to popularise the Ukrainian language. Thus, public opinion coincided with the 2019 legislation.

To sum up, during the period of independence, Ukraine's LP has transformed from declarative to effective (for example, the activities of the language ombudsman). While language was initially more of an object of political compromise, after Russian aggression, it gained the role of a manifestation of national consciousness. The language legislation of 1991–2025 not only reflects the political transformations of the state, but also records a profound change in social perceptions of language. LP acquired the meaning of security strategy and a tool of civil consolidation.

2.6. Summary and Reflections

The study of the status of the Ukrainian language over the past three hundred years is a complex undertaking; therefore, the present study has divided this period into distinct eras. The initial phase under consideration is that of the imperial period. A comparison of the policies of the Austro-Hungarian and Russian Empires reveals a

significant disparity in the political and social conditions that contributed to the formation of the Ukrainian community in the late 17th and early 20th centuries. One of the factors contributing to this imbalance was the implementation of language and educational policies. However, it should be noted that the educational sphere in the Ukrainian lands was marginal to both empires. The peasantry and impoverished bourgeoisie experienced significant disadvantage in both the Austro-Hungarian and Russian empires. However, it is important to acknowledge that the Austro-Hungarian Empire played a pivotal role in the institutional development of Ukrainian-language education, particularly in Galicia.

With regard to Russia, the fundamental aspect of its stance on Ukrainian-language education was the assertion that “the Ukrainian language is non-existent, has never existed, and will never exist”. The Russian Empire proactively fostered the concept of a ‘triune Russian peoples’, signifying a deliberate policy of forced assimilation of Ukrainians (and Belarusians) into the Russian populace. The above list of prohibitions on the Ukrainian language, although not exhaustive, clearly demonstrates the consistent policy of russification, which reached its zenith with the Valuev Circular and the Ems Decree. These orders comprehensively excluded the Ukrainian language from public usage. Indeed, even Ukrainian songs were prohibited from being performed on stage, and Ukrainian-language books could be neither printed nor imported.

In fact, the sphere of education functioned as a tool of russification. Since the time of Catherine II, Russian became a language of instruction. The educational material was centrally controlled and was characterised by an emphasis on the ‘greatness of the Russian state’ and the ‘common historical destiny’ of the Ukrainian and Russian populations. The study of both Ukrainian history and literature has historically been confined to the paradigm of a shared heritage. In point of fact, during the 19th century, private schools and home education emerged as a response to this, albeit that these were primarily the preserve of the intelligentsia, for example Lesia Ukrainka, rather than the general populace. Subsequently, this practice was also prohibited.

In Galicia, however, the situation was different, since the key ‘competitor’ of Ukrainian culture was not imperial, but the Polish one. The Ukrainian language was considered secondary in importance, with Polish and German being the primary languages of instruction until the mid-19th century. Following the development of constitutional principles in the aftermath of the 1848 revolution, Ukrainians were presented with enhanced (in comparison to what they had before) opportunities to cultivate their cultural identity. It was during this period that institutions such as the Halytsko-Ruska Matytsia (1848), Prosvita (1868), Narodnyi Dim in Lviv, and a network of Ukrainian folk schools emerged, which became centres of linguistic and educational revival. It is therefore evident that, despite the evident difficulties and limitations, Galicia managed to develop institutional forms of cultural and educational life. It is important to note that this was not achieved in isolation; rather, it was the result of collaboration with scholars and activists from the Left Bank, such as Hrushevskyi.

The LP of Austria-Hungary towards Ukrainians was, in our opinion, indifferent and inconsistent. On the one hand, the right of the Ukrainian language to its own distinct identity was recognised. Conversely, it was frequently employed as a political instrument to combat both the Russian Empire and the increasingly national-aware Poles of that era. The formation of the Ukrainian intelligentsia was also influenced by Austria-Hungary’s educational policy. It is evident that Ukrainian schools, seminaries and gymnasiums in Lviv, Przemyśl, Kolomyia and other cities played a pivotal role in the formation of national consciousness and the emergence of a new elite. These institutions played a pivotal role in advancing Ukrainian printing and scientific research.

While talking about the Russian Empire (and then the Soviet Union), the fact of linguistic imperialism can be clearly seen even on the level of LPs. The situation with the Austro-Hungarian Empire seems to be milder since assimilation of the Ukrainian language to German or Hungarian is simply impossible. However, if we think about Phillipson’s (1992) definition of linguistic imperialism as a subtype of linguicism, we can see that the language ideologies and language practices of the Austro-Hungarian authorities were aimed at reproducing “an unequal division of

resources (both material and immaterial) between groups” (Phillipson, 1992, p.47) defined on the language principle. That is, schools with Ukrainian as a language of instruction were in small numbers, for quite a long time, HE was not provided in Ukrainian, and teaching materials in Ukrainian were lacking as well.

Thus, a comparative analysis of the two imperial language policies enables us to draw several conclusions. Firstly, in both cases, the language was regarded by the authorities as a political instrument. However, within the Russian Empire, its function was to unify and russify its subjects (i.e., to profoundly deprive Ukrainians of their culture). Conversely, in Austria-Hungary, language frequently served as a means of balancing between national groups, thereby engendering a degree of cultural pluralism. Secondly, the disparity in LP was instrumental in delineating the divergent trajectories of the Ukrainian national movement’s development. Within the Russian Empire, the Ukrainian national movement predominantly manifested in an underground capacity, characterised by intellectual ‘dissidence’. In contrast, in Galicia, a distinct legal and public form of national activity emerged, exemplified by the establishment of the inaugural Ukrainian political party in this region. Thirdly, the level of education and language literacy among the Ukrainian population was contingent upon access to schools with instruction in the native language, resulting in a certain lag in the educational level of ordinary people in sub-Russian Ukraine even in comparison to the Ukrainians under Austro-Hungarian Empire.

The years 1917-1930 shaped a certain relationship between the Ukrainian LP and its connection to nation-building. Each of the governments (the Central Rada, the Second Hetmanate, the Directorate, and even the early Soviet regime) saw language as a means of modernisation and legitimacy for their own rule. However, the political orientation and understanding of national identity differed for each of these governments.

Speaking of the Central Rada, LP was shaped by a democratic and inclusive vision of nation-building. The key tasks of the LP of the Central Rada were to establish Ukrainian as the state language and to support the languages of national minorities. Therefore, we can assume that the LP of the Central Rada was based on the principles of cultural autonomy that emerged from the Ukrainian national movements of the late

19th century. Education itself became a key tool for the revival of the language. Ukrainian was made the language of instruction, teacher training was reorganised, and new teaching materials in Ukrainian were developed and printed. The LP of the Central Rada was radically different from the tsarist LP.

During the Second Hetmanate, the approach to LP was somewhat different. The Ukrainian language was recognised everywhere. However, to increase the efficiency of the government and maintain the support of Russian officers, it was decided to avoid radical language reforms. Therefore, Russian retained its dominant position in the administration and higher education. At the same time, Ukrainian prevailed in primary and secondary schools. In general, Skoropadsky's model of governance was an elitist, pragmatic model that prioritised stability and order over language reforms.

The Directorate took a much more active stance on introducing the Ukrainian language into schools, government, and public life. Despite political and military instability, the Directorate promoted the idea of linguistic unity as the main source of cultural nationhood. Support for these ideas had limited success in practice, due to a lack of funding, constantly shifting front lines, and other factors. However, it was this government that saw language as a means of political resistance.

The language policies of the early Soviet regime were ambiguous yet powerful. The desire to win over the non-Russian peoples of the future USSR in order to retain power resulted in active support and promotion of the Ukrainian language in the early stages. Despite statements and resolutions, the only real years of ukrainisation were 1925-1928. However, Ukrainian intellectuals achieved a great deal during this time. One of the key moments was the establishment of a new spelling system (under the leadership of Skrypnyk and Ohiyenko). However, the development of Ukrainian education can also be considered an indisputable achievement. In the 1920s, an incredible number of schools, clubs, and cultural centres were opened, which contributed to the spread of Ukrainian literacy and writing among Ukrainians. However, starting in 1928, some reforms were rolled back due to the growing contradiction between linguistic inclusion and political centralisation of power. ukrainisation began to be called a national deviation. Many participants were shot or

sent to the far east of the USSR. This marked the beginning of a new era of russification.

Starting in the 1930s, the language policies of the Soviet authorities took a course towards subordinating the Ukrainian language to Russian (which, in fact, was the continuation of the imperial policies of the Russian Empire), although the equality of both languages was officially declared. A significant part of the Ukrainian intelligentsia perished during Stalin's purges of the 1930s. Consequently, those who were directly involved in cultural and educational activities related to Ukraine and for Ukrainians were replaced by Russians. The Russian language was increasingly used, declaring it a necessity for interethnic communication within the framework of friendship between the peoples of the Soviet republics. The resulting system institutionalised linguistic inequality while maintaining the formal appearance of equality.

In the post-war period, the Soviet LP worked with two key instruments: (1) ideological normalisation, and (2) administrative regulation. The educational sphere played a key role here. The number of schools teaching in Ukrainian steadily declined, especially in urbanised and industrialised areas. The Ukrainian language was marginalised and lost its prestige. This process generated a pattern of asymmetrical bilingualism, whereby most Ukrainians became proficient in Russian, while Russian speakers rarely reciprocated. If neither scenario was implemented, linguistic convergence (*Surzhyk*) occurred. In any case, the Soviet LP successfully assimilated Ukrainians and Russians.

During World War II and immediately after it, the regime focused on reconstruction, economic normalisation, and the establishment of international relations. But the party also wanted to control linguistic processes. For example, in 1945, a new spelling system was introduced, which contributed to the further russification of Ukrainians. However, at the end of the 1950s, the central government of the USSR undertook a reform of education. The issue was approached thoroughly, and the reform itself, in the context of education (the form of teaching), became quite progressive and useful. However, as far as LP in the Ukrainian SSR was concerned,

the Russian language was gaining more and more influence, both in education and in public life.

The policies of the 1960s, 1970s and early 1980s only reinforced this process. Higher education became completely russified. In some places, lectures were still given in Ukrainian, but mainly in philology departments. It is possible to observe a certain cyclical nature to LP, as every time relative freedom arrives, Ukrainian almost disappears from public life, especially in large cities.

During the period of independence, language policies also lacked a clear direction. In the early years, they followed the policies of the Ukrainian SSR by inertia. It was during this period that the language issue became politicised and was often used for political struggle. This complicated any processes aimed at changing the language situation, as both supporters and opponents of ukrainisation made up a significant part of the population. In the 2010s, LP policies once again moved closer to russification. The Verkhovna Rada passed relevant laws, creating an environment for the Ukrainian language to be pushed into the background.

However, after Russia's illegal annexation of Ukrainian territories, LP became even more relevant. In truth, this issue has almost never lost its relevance for Ukraine. So, after 2014, more and more people began to refuse to use the Ukrainian language in public. This time, ukrainisation took root in universities, as it was students who opposed pro-Russian forces and understood the importance of the issue. In 2017-2019, the government responded to these trends by passing a series of laws on education and the functioning of the state language. It sought to balance national consolidation with minority rights, affirming Ukraine's commitment to European linguistic standards despite Russian narratives portraying it as discriminatory. Language came to be perceived as a guarantee of security and a marker of identity.

The full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine has accelerated the transition to the Ukrainian language for many people whose previous generations had been russified. It should be noted that there has been unprecedented national unification around the Ukrainian language. The Russian language has almost disappeared from the public sphere (media, education, administration). The state has also begun to pay more attention to encouraging citizens to learn other foreign languages.

Therefore, LP in Ukraine has been inseparable from the struggle for political autonomy. Periods of national revival have always been accompanied by the development of the Ukrainian language, and its suppression has always been followed by periods of discrimination and terror. In addition, it is important to note that the educational environment is a key area for the implementation of language policies, regardless of whether these are nation-building policies or policies of imperial integration.

CHAPTER III. EDUCATION AND LANGUAGES IN UKRAINE

3.1. Language in Education: Legal Situation

According to the Law of Ukraine on Education No. 2145-VIII (“Pro osvitu”, Verkhovna Rada Ukrainy, 2017), “everyone has the right to quality and accessible education”. The state provides free, complete secondary education, while the number of private schools in Ukraine accounts for approximately 2% of the total number of schools (see Omelianiuk, 2021). Generally, private schools in Ukraine are subordinate to local education authorities or education departments, similar to public schools, and their graduates take the same nationwide standardised tests as students from public schools. Since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, some private distance-learning schools have significantly increased their enrolment, in some cases by as much as sevenfold (see Vorotna, 2021). Given the relatively small number of private schools in Ukraine, legislation is designed to regulate language use in education uniformly across virtually all secondary education institutions in the country.

The Laws of Ukraine On Higher Education No. 2984-III and No. 1556-VII (“Pro vyshchu osvitu”, Verkhovna Rada Ukrainy, 2002; 2014) give HEIs more autonomy in choosing the languages of instruction, especially in private and commercial institutions. Regarding HEI, private institutions constitute approximately 30% of the total number (see Reitynh zakladiv vyshchoyi osvity Ukrayiny, 2025). Clearly, state oversight of language use in such institutions is challenging, if not altogether unfeasible. This is due, firstly, to the number of educational institutions and their employees. Actually, the state provides mechanisms for regulating the language situation (relevant laws, bylaws, decrees, etc.) but does not clearly indicate who is responsible for controlling these processes. Our study includes the public universities located in Kyiv, Kharkiv, Odesa, and Lviv. Nevertheless, this section also reviews the official language policies of several private HEIs so that we can have a fuller picture of the desired situations there.

3.1.1. School

Language policy in the field of education is recognised as one of the most sensitive topics in Ukraine. This is often the subject of debate among activists, representatives of national minorities, as well as politicians, both at the local and national levels (see Ruda, 2012). Moreover, this issue often appears in Ukraine's foreign policy, especially when talking about relations with its neighbours (e.g., Hungary, Russia, etc).

The role of language in education serves as an objective indicator of the social status of the language, such as its prestige and future prospects. In fact, Cooper (1989), Kaplan and Baldauf (1997) identify corpus and status planning through education as the most effective long-term tools for influencing societal language use. The practice of language planning in the world confirms that developing language education in schools is considered the most effective means of improving communication skills. It is worth noting that this observation is based on the research of sociolinguists and psychologists, who are convinced that language in childhood and school plays an important role in the formation of socio-demographic factors affecting the linguistic behaviour of an individual. For example, Spolsky (2004) and Tollefson (1991, 2002) claim that educational policies shape language ideologies and thus individual linguistic behaviour. Therefore, the success or failure of LP in sociolinguistics is directly related to the influence of state measures in the field of education.

We can generally define “language education” not only by the use of language in the educational process, but also by aiming at active learning and the development of students' language skills. It covers not only the learning of language rules and vocabulary, but also the development of reading, writing, listening and speaking skills. This definition is supported by the studies of Brown (1994), Byram (1997), and others. What is more, the Council of Europe (2020) defines language education as the integration of all language skills towards active, real-world use in its Common European Framework of Reference for Languages. Hence, language education contributes to the development of students' ability to use the language not only in the school environment but also in various spheres of life, which is crucial for their success both in education and in their future careers. Taking into account intercultural and

linguistic diversity, language education should foster the development of linguistic tolerance and mutual understanding among students, thereby contributing to the construction of harmonious international relations.

In a narrower sense, language education can be viewed as language acquisition within the system of educational institutions, which includes some basic metalinguistic reflections. This approach is one of the fundamental components of modern Ukrainophone education, i.e. where Ukrainian is the main language of instruction. This is evidenced by the mention in the Decree No. 347/2002 Doctrine of Development of State Education (President of Ukraine, 2002, April 17) about the creation of a system of continuous language education, which guarantees citizens of Ukraine the good command of the national language, the possibility of mastering their native language and at least one foreign language. In this regard, it is stated in the doctrine that:

3. Держава повинна забезпечувати [...] виховання шанобливого ставлення до [...] української мови, а також до історії та культури всіх корінних народів і національних меншин, які проживають в Україні, формування культури міжетнічних і міжособистісних відносин¹⁸⁴;

8. У державі створюється система безперервної мовної освіти, що забезпечує обов'язкове оволодіння громадянами України державною мовою, можливість опановувати рідну (національну) і практично володіти хоча б однією іноземною мовою. Освіта сприяє розвитку високої мовної культури громадян, вихованню поваги до державної мови та мов національних меншин України, толерантності у ставленні до носіїв різних мов і культур [...] Забезпечується право національних меншин на задоволення освітніх потреб рідною мовою, збереження та розвиток етнокультури, її підтримку та захист державою. У навчальних закладах, в яких навчання ведеться мовами національних меншин, створюються умови для належного опанування державної мови¹⁸⁵.

According to these quotes, language education should not only contribute to the development of language competence but also form linguistic and civic identities,

¹⁸⁴ 3. The state must ensure [...] the upbringing of a respectful attitude towards [...] the Ukrainian language, as well as towards the history and culture of all indigenous peoples and national minorities living in Ukraine, the formation of a culture of interethnic and interpersonal relations.

¹⁸⁵ 8. The state shall create a system of continuous language education, which shall ensure the mandatory mastery of the state language by citizens of Ukraine, the opportunity to master the native (national) language and practically master at least one foreign language. Education shall contribute to the development of a high linguistic culture of citizens, the upbringing of respect for the state language and the languages of national minorities of Ukraine, tolerance in relation to speakers of different languages and cultures. [...] The right of national minorities to satisfy their educational needs in their native language, the preservation and development of ethnoculture, its support and protection by the state shall be ensured. In educational institutions where education is conducted in the languages of national minorities, conditions shall be created for the proper mastery of the state language

contribute to the preservation and development of the country's cultural heritage, and play an important role in the formation of national self-awareness.

Article 7 of the comparatively newer law On Education ("Pro osvitu", Verkhovna Rada Ukrainy, 2017) says that

Мовою освітнього процесу в закладах освіти є державна мова [=українська]. У класах (групах) з навчанням мовами національних меншин, які є офіційними мовами Європейського Союзу, гарантується право на використання мови відповідної національної меншини в освітньому процесі поряд з державною мовою [...] Особам, які належать до корінних народів, національних меншин України, гарантується право на вивчення мови відповідних корінного народу чи національної меншини в комунальних закладах загальної середньої освіти або через національні культурні товариства [...] Особам з порушенням слуху забезпечується право на навчання жестовою мовою та на вивчення української жестової мови.¹⁸⁶

This includes the latest amendments to the Law, made in 2023. In fact, such wording implicitly excludes the possibility of using Russian in the educational environment, while guaranteeing the provision of language rights for representatives of other national minorities living in Ukraine. The level of inclusion for people with hearing impairments is thus ensured partially, that is, exclusively through Ukrainian Sign Language. Article 9 of On Ensuring the functioning of the Ukrainian language as the state language No. 2704-VIII ("Pro zabezpechennia funktsionuvannia ukrayinskoyi movy yak derzhavnoyi", Verkhovna Rada Ukrainy, 2019) obliges

педагогічні, науково-педагогічні і наукові працівники, крім іноземців чи осіб без громадянства, які запрошені до закладів освіти та/або наукових установ та працюють на тимчасовій основі як наукові, педагогічні, науково-педагогічні працівники або викладачі іноземної мови¹⁸⁷

to know the state language and use it when performing official duties. This obligation is aimed at creating an immersive Ukrainian environment for schoolchildren and improving language acquisition. Actually, the position of Commissioner for the

¹⁸⁶ The language of the educational process in educational institutions is the state language [=Ukrainian]. In classes (groups) with instruction in the languages of national minorities, which are official languages of the European Union, the right to use the language of the relevant national minority in the educational process along with the state language is guaranteed [...] Persons belonging to indigenous peoples and national minorities of Ukraine are guaranteed the right to study the language of the respective indigenous people or national minority in municipal institutions of general secondary education or through national cultural societies [...] Persons with hearing impairments are provided with the right to be taught sign language and to learn Ukrainian sign language.

¹⁸⁷ pedagogical, scientific-pedagogical and scientific workers, except for foreigners or stateless persons, who are invited to educational institutions and/or scientific institutions and work on a temporary basis as scientific, pedagogical, scientific-pedagogical workers or foreign language teachers

Protection of the State Language (henceforth Language Ombudsman) was created by the same law that entered into force on July 16, 2019. However, the data provided by the Language Ombudsman indicates that only 38% of pupils communicate exclusively in Ukrainian during breaks (Upovnovazhenyi zakhystu derzhavnoi movy, 2024).

As for studying the Ukrainian language itself as a school subject, it remains one of the core components of the national curriculum, aimed at fostering linguistic competence, cultural awareness, and civic identity among students. Sometimes studying the Ukrainian language becomes a challenge since it is not the pupil's L1, and they might face difficulties in understanding instructions at the primary stages. The Ukrainian language curriculum is a mandatory component of the educational programme in all public schools. As for teachers of other subjects, our research data confirms that in the early years after regaining Independence, many teachers themselves struggled to use proper school terminology in Ukrainian actively. This is due to the fact that they were trained in Russian and used to the terminology derived from the Russian language, as well as clichés inherited from the Soviet school system.

So, when considering the issue of the effectiveness of language education, it is worth referring to the results of research conducted in this field. However, we should consider the fact that there were two major time points when the quality of education dropped, according to the Survey of the State Service for Education Quality (Derzhavna sluzhba yakosti osvity, 2024) and the overview report “Saved learning? Education in Ukraine during the full-scale war” by Cedos, 2022. First, the COVID-19 pandemic caused significant learning loss among schoolchildren. Then, the Russian full-scale invasion in 2022 worsened the situation as many children could not attend school at all; some of them could join online only (e.g. those who live in dangerous areas or those who migrated to other countries). Although the war began in 2014, its real impact on education was not felt until 2022. It was then that more research on this topic became available both on local (see Upovnovazhenyi zakhystu derzhavnoi movy, 2023, *Richnyi Zvit Pro stan dotrymannia Zakonu Ukrainy “Pro zabezpechennia funktsionuvannia ukrainskoi movy iak derzhavnoi” u 2023 rotsi*; Zenchenko, 2025; Avsheniuk & Seminikhyna, 2025) and international levels (OECD, 2023, “Recovering lost learning opportunities in Ukraine: Key education policy strategies”). The challenge

for us is that these studies are focused on the general level of education rather than language education itself. An interesting example of investigating language education at schools is the research published by Vseosvita (2024, *Osvitni vtraty ukrainskykh uchniv za dva roky viiny: Shcho vidomo?*). The author claims that there is a significant drop in the effectiveness of language learning (in reading both Ukrainian and foreign languages). In general, the analysis of all the above-mentioned reports confirms that in rural areas the decline in language results is more significant, even more so than in cities. Derzhavna sluzhba yakosti osvity (2023) reports that technical problems (electricity, internet), stress and inexperience of both teachers and parents led to a decrease in the quality of language education (a third of those surveyed did not have constant access to learning).

Another problem, which is mentioned in most of the above reports, is that the teaching method does not always meet the CEFR standards. Usually, language learning occurs through theory and grammatical rules without a proper communicative approach. Additionally, if the student's L1 is not Ukrainian, they have no opportunity to practice their communicative skills. However, this tendency has been changing recently. The position of the local teachers who believe that language (communicative) abilities are key in all subjects of study programs is the vital factor here. Therefore, effective language education remains a goal to be achieved by implementing it as a component of the overall learning process. This creates a certain contradiction. The claim 'Ukrainian only' does not align with the objectives of CEFR, which is strongly oriented towards plurilingualism and intercultural education (Council of Europe, 2020).

While legislation sets ambitious goals for Ukrainian and foreign language acquisition, real-life practices show limited success. The report "Language skills of Ukrainians: Sociological report" by Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS), 2024 shows that

Майже кожен другий серед дорослого населення України (49%) не має жодних навичок англійської мови, тобто не може навіть прочитати і зрозуміти короткий текст. [...] Якщо взяти за мінімальний рівень знання наявність хоч однієї навички, а володіння усіма чотирма (читання, письмо, побутове і професійне спілкування) хоча б на мініальному рівні як ознаку досвідченого рівня, то ми отримаємо діапазон частки знавців іноземних мов серед українського населення у вигляді консервативної

і м'якої оцінки. Цей діапазон становить для англійської мови 23-51%, польської – 10-22%, німецької – 5-14%, французької – 2-7%. Для іспанської, угорської і турецької мов навіть м'яка оцінка знання не перевищує 3%.¹⁸⁸

meaning that at least 23% and at best 51% of the population have basic English skills, which is not a very low percentage, especially if we compare this data to many of the European indicators. The Eurobarometer survey shows that “3 out of 5 Europeans can have a conversation in at least one other language than their mother tongue”, while “English is spoken by about half of the Europeans (47%)” (European Commission, 2024, New Eurobarometer: Europeans strive toward multilingualism and value language diversity). However, it is important to say that the survey designs are not equal, so the data comparison is not accurate. At the same time, the KIIS (2024) survey shows that

Майже кожен другий (49%) учасник дослідження з тих, хто має дітей віком до 18 років, впевнений, що підвищення рівня знання англійської мови матиме значний позитивний вплив на майбутнє дитини, 37% впевнені, що це цілком змінить життя на краще, 6% зазначили, що це матиме позитивний вплив, проте незначний.¹⁸⁹

Such evidence suggests that the population understands the importance of learning foreign languages. The same report also shows that many people are making personal efforts to learn English, without relying solely on the state.

On the other hand, Ukraine is struggling at creating an inclusive language environment for multiple national minorities. This is also reflected in the position of the (former) Language Ombudsman of Ukraine Taras Kremin: “[е] необхідність нормативно врегулювати порядок утворення класів з навчанням мовами національних меншин ... Мною як Уповноваженим із захисту державної мови

¹⁸⁸ Almost every second adult in Ukraine (49%) has no English language skills, meaning they cannot even read and understand a short text. [...] If we take the presence of at least one skill as the minimum level of knowledge, and mastery of all four (reading, writing, everyday and professional communication) at least at a minimum level as a sign of proficiency, then we will get a range of the share of foreign language experts among the Ukrainian population in the form of a conservative and soft estimate. This range is 23-51% for English, 10-22% for Polish, 5-14% for German, and 2-7% for French. For Spanish, Hungarian, and Turkish, even a soft estimate of knowledge does not exceed 3%.

¹⁸⁹ Almost every second (49%) survey participant with children under 18 is confident that improving their English language skills will have a significant positive impact on their child's future, 37% are confident that it will completely change their life for the better, and 6% said that it will have a positive impact, but only a small one.

ініційовано загальноукраїнську кампанію сприяння опануванню державної мови¹⁹⁰”. (Upovnovazhenyi zakhystu derzhavnoi movy, 2024, July 07)

Thus, analysing the existing legislative base (and its changes) for school education, we can say that Ukraine’s language education policy reflects broader nation-building goals. It aims at strengthening the role of Ukrainian as a state language after 2014 and especially after 2022. There is a visible shift away from Russian as a language of instruction following the 1989 Language Law, which, in fact, since 1991, has never been the language of education officially. More measures to control the use of Ukrainian and eliminate the use of Russian were introduced, e.g. the creation of the position of Commissioner for the Protection of the State Language. The tensions between inclusivity and nation-state imperatives still create challenges for school education on its way to being inclusive. Ukraine’s legislation aligns with European standards in theory but it struggles with practical implementation for minorities. This is chiefly related to the political and security context (Russian aggression towards Ukraine; Hungary’s territorial claims over Transcarpathia). Thus, the balance between state-building, minority rights, and European integration remains fragile. What is more, education quality and access have declined due to broader educational disruptions (such as COVID-19, economic crisis). The data analysed also shows that in this regard, inequality is growing between urban and rural areas. This is also applicable to language education in general. Teaching personnel sometimes use outdated (Soviet) practices of language teaching, which have proven to be ineffective. Hence, CEFR ideals (plurilingualism, communicative competence) are not fully realised in Ukraine’s context.

All in all, the language situation in school education not only reflects the influence of certain linguistic factors on the educational process but also reflects the complexity of the language, cultural and political environments and their impact on communication and learning processes.

¹⁹⁰ “[There is] a need to regulate the procedure for establishing classes with instruction in the languages of national minorities...As the Commissioner for the Protection of the State Language, I have initiated an all-Ukrainian campaign to promote the mastery of the state language”

3.1.2. University

While schools form basic language skills and initial ideas about language, universities have a greater long-term and systemic impact on language behaviour, shaping language ideologies and fostering language competence through the training of leaders, scholarly activity, and greater freedom of LP. Higher education plays a significant role in these processes for several reasons.

First, higher education institutions are places of training for specialists who often acquire a higher social status in society. Language norms, ideologies, and competencies acquired in universities directly influence their professional and social practices, which, in turn, spread throughout society (see Kroskrity, 2000). The educational process at universities is aimed at developing advanced language skills – academic writing, public speaking, critical analysis, and interlingual communication. All of these skills subsequently have a long-term impact. By influencing the linguistic behaviour of those who will then influence public discourses, universities become platforms for the reproduction and modification of linguistic norms and practices.

Secondly, universities have more opportunities to implement multilingual practices through blended learning formats, internationalisation of curricula, student or teaching exchanges, etc. And more freedom in determining internal LP (compared to schools) provides the opportunity to implement these processes. At the same time, through curricula, institutional policies, and social interactions, universities can legitimise certain languages or varieties as prestigious, scholarly, or “correct”, while marginalising others. This ideological shaping impacts language maintenance, shift, and revitalisation efforts at the community and national levels.

Third, since universities not only provide education but are also centres of research development, particularly in the fields of language, culture, and social sciences, they also disseminate language ideologies through academic publications, educational programs, and community initiatives. All of this makes them key agents in shaping public perceptions of language.

Actually, another confirmation that these processes have an impact is the number of higher education applicants. The report by MON shows that about 70% of the population has higher education. However, an important nuance is that only some

of them work in the major they received during their studies. Despite the slight decrease in postgraduate students in the 2010s, in recent years, the number of HEIs, as well as postgraduate and doctoral programs, has increased significantly. This tendency indicates the rapid development of the educational sector in the country. Reshetnyak (2020) indicates that the number of postgraduate students decreased by 27.5% between 2010 and 2018. However, the precise analysis of the data presented by the State Statistics Service in its Report on Postgraduate studies in Ukraine shows the opposite trend between 2018 and 2023. The number of postgraduate students increased by 15.59% between 2018 and 2021 (pre-full-scale invasion period). The social conditions of the Russian full-scale invasion alter this percentage to an even higher level: a 103.79% increase between 2018 and 2023, or a 76.3% increase between 2021 and 2023. However, there are no scientific studies that have researched this phenomenon so far.

So, if we turn specifically to the Ukrainian context, it is worth considering the academic space in two contexts: (1) post-Soviet and (2) European integration. The first years after the regaining of independence, as Lanvers and Lunyova (2023, p.61) note, there were “tensions between the then lingua franca, Russian and the national language, Ukrainian”. The reasons for this tension are the same as for schools: teachers received their education in Russian, the use of the Ukrainian language in some parts of society was still marginalised, and educational materials in Ukrainian did not exist for some subjects. Over time, this situation changed, but our data show that exceptions still remain. Lanvers and Lunyova (2023, p.61) also argue that Ukraine’s “strong decision to join the Western world with its values of democracy, human rights and freedom” contributed to a greater involvement of the English language in the educational process. In fact, European integration processes stimulate Ukrainian HEIs to increase the share of English and other European languages in their curricula (see Zaichko, 2023).

After the Declaration of Independence in 1991, language education policy in Ukraine faced many challenges and has gone through some changes. Its biggest priorities were (1) the transformation from the Soviet education system to a new one open to world standards and values and (2) the formation of national self-awareness and the maintenance of cultural heritage.

Prior to the adoption of the Law of Ukraine On Higher Education of 2002, the main law regulating higher education in Ukraine was the Law of Ukraine “On Education”, which was adopted in 1991 (see Pro osvitu No. 1060-XII, Verkhovna Rada URSR, 1991). In addition, there were other regulatory documents that supplemented and specified provisions on higher education, but it was the Law On Education of 1991 that was the basic one.

In fact, Ukrainian has always been defined as the key language of instruction for educational institutions, but HEIs have always had more freedom in that than schools. For example, until a 2019 amendment, private institutions could choose their language of instruction. One of our informants (Interviewee 6) said that her friend, who was studying at a private university, was taught in Russian (approximately 2010s), and there was no option to choose another language of instruction. The 2019 amendment removed that autonomy, meaning only certain languages are permitted – typically Ukrainian, English, or other EU languages, but not Russian. Article 48 now requires compliance with broader education and language laws governing permissible languages used in HE. In fact, the Law On Ensuring the functioning of the Ukrainian language as the state language, 2019, only reinforces that amendment. It prioritises Ukrainian in public life, including education and science, and mandates its use in university settings; sets enforcement mechanisms and penalties for non-compliance. What is more, in 2024, the Law On the Use of the English language in Ukraine was adopted (bill was drafted in 2023). It recognises English as a language of international communication and incentivises its use in universities (e.g. websites in English; English-medium instruction for programs targeting international and high-tech contexts).

Sometimes universities themselves take initiative and change their internal policies before the state implements any changes. For example, NaUKMA¹⁹¹ has unilaterally banned Russian use on campus, for ideological and identity reasons, reflecting a broader trend toward linguistic distancing from Russian in HE environments (see Kraliuk, 2023). Other examples are some Kharkiv Universities,

¹⁹¹ Abbreviation for National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy

where voluntary Ukrainian-language training programs for staff to enhance language norms across everyday and academic settings were implemented (see Fram, 2023).

Apart from that, a number of state agencies and the Ministry of Education aim to monitor compliance with the official norms. The Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine is the key institution for Ukrainian Education. This ministry is also important for the issues of this work, because (1) it is responsible for licensing and accreditation, which means it thoroughly defines the languages and content used in the educational programmes; (2) under the Law on Higher Education, 2014, it should enforce language requirements as part of institutional standards.

The same law has become the cornerstone for establishing the National Agency for Higher Education Quality Assurance (Ukrainian: Національне агентство із забезпечення якості вищої освіти, НАЗЯВО, abbr. NAQA) (see Postanova № 244: Pro utvorennia Natsionalnoho Ahenstva iz zabezpechennia yakosti vyshchoyi osvity, Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, 2015, April 15). NAQA does not directly influence LP as its primary aim is implementing the quality assurance provisions of the Higher Education Law in line with European ESG-2015 standards (see NAQA, Stratehiya Nazionalnoho ahenstva iz zabezpechennia yakosti vyshchoyi osvity do 2026 roku).

As mentioned before, the position of Language Ombudsman was also created within the implementation of the same law. His main aim is to enforce the 2019 language law across all public spheres, including universities. Moreover, (s)he possesses the power to compel compliance from educational actors, initiate investigations, and even issue fines. Any citizen can file complaints to the office. However, this position implies not only punishment and control, but also provision of the linguistic instruments to the citizens. For example, the official websites suggest the list of free courses, conversation clubs, and online resources for learning and improving your Ukrainian language skills (see Commissioner for the Protection of the State Language, 2020).

Regulatory documents are also important in managing language issues in education. The examples of these documents can be of the following types:

- Ministerial Resolution (see Postanova № 896: Pro Derzhavnu natsionalnu prohramu “Osvita” (“Ukraina XXI stolittia”), Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, 1993).
- Presidential Decree on National Strategy of Education Development in Ukraine up to 2021 (see Ukaz pro Natsionalnu stratehiiu rozvytku osvity v Ukraini na period do 2021 roku, President of Ukraine, 2013)
- Ministerial Order (see Nakaz Pro zatverdzhennia Stratehichnoho planu diialnosti Ministerstva osvity i nauky Ukrainy do 2027 roku, Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine, 2024).

These documents record the attempts of the Ukrainian state to consistently build a strategic vision for LP in the field of education. Already in 1993, within the framework of the program “Education: Ukraine of the 21st Century”, for the first time at the level of state policy, the priority of developing national education with reliance on the Ukrainian language as a key component of statehood was declared. Another strategic task was to integrate the Ukrainian education system into the European and global educational and scientific space. The realisation of this task is seen through the implementation of the principles and standards of the Bologna process (after 2005) in Ukrainian higher educational institutions (see Nakaz Pro zaprovadzhennia u vyshchykh navchalnykh Zakladakh navchalnoi dystsypliny “Vyshcha osvita i Bolonskyi protses”, Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine, 2004; Signatory Universities, 2020).

In 2013, a more detailed Strategy for the Development of Education was enshrined by the Presidential Decree (see Ukaz pro Natsionalnu stratehiiu rozvytku osvity v Ukraini na period do 2021 roku № 344/2013, President of Ukraine, 2013), which retained the general orientation towards Ukrainian-language education, but it did not yet clearly define control or accountability mechanisms.

In contrast, a more modern document – the order of the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine of 2024 – already contains specific indicators, deadlines and goals for LP, in particular regarding the implementation of Ukrainian language standards in the educational process, training of personnel and monitoring compliance

with language legislation (see Nakaz Pro zatverdzhennia Stratehichnoho planu diialnosti Ministerstva osvity i nauky Ukrainy do 2027 roku, Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine, 2024). The document says that the main priorities are the formation of a generation capable of effective work and lifelong learning, as well as the protection and dissemination of the values of national culture and civil society. State policy should contribute to strengthening the sovereignty, independence and democracy of the state, considering Ukraine as an integral part of Europe and international society.

However, despite the existence of these strategic documents, the sequence of their implementation was not always obvious. For example, between 1993 and 2013, there was a certain discontinuity in strategic planning, and until 2019, the state practically did not have a system for monitoring the language regime in higher education. Thus, these documents demonstrate the state's efforts to form a LP, its evolution - from general declarations to attempts to introduce mechanisms of control and accountability.

Among the most important types and categories of LP, language policy in the field of education stands out as one of the most multi-vector systems that affects the social, economic and cultural development of the country. It is a key component of state administration aimed at ensuring human rights and freedoms, their free development and self-expression. 2019 was the year of the most significant changes in terms of regulatory control over the use of the Ukrainian language in the public space. This law entailed numerous amendments to the previous legislation and became a turning point for society in general, as well as for the educational sector.

Ideally, universities should recognise the importance of linguistic diversity and pay due attention to the implementation of policies that will promote this aspect. This will help create a favourable language environment for students (especially those whose L1 is different from Ukrainian), support their cultural diversity and prepare them for life in the modern world. Multilingualism opens wide opportunities for students in the labour market. In the globalised world of business, cooperation with different cultures and nationalities is increasingly needed. Therefore, knowledge of several languages can become an important competitive advantage for university graduates.

However, the implementation of a LP in universities can be a difficult task, as it requires solving numerous problems related to language barriers, different levels of language proficiency, political tensions, and cultural differences.

Conclusion and Comments

The Law of Ukraine “On Education” and “On General Secondary Education” clearly define language requirements for schools. The state language of education is Ukrainian, and it is mandatory for all schools, including private ones. Institutions with instruction in the languages of national minorities may use minority languages, but the study of Ukrainian remains mandatory. The Law “On Ensuring the Functioning of the Ukrainian Language as the State Language” strengthens the mandatory nature of Ukrainian as the language of instruction in schools. Educational policy in schools is regulated at the national level with a clear framework for languages. As for HEIs, although the state language of education is officially Ukrainian, these institutions may teach subjects in other languages, especially at the master’s and postgraduate levels, or in programs for foreign students. State control over the language of instruction in HEIs is less strict than in schools, and LP in universities often depends on the specifics of the institution and its profile. The use of Russian is not officially allowed by any of the aforementioned laws. The only way to officially use it as a language of instruction at university is to create a special group in case it is envisaged by a university statute.

3.2. Ukrainian Education in the context of European integration processes

To describe the European integration path of Ukrainian education, it is necessary to outline the international processes that took place between Ukraine and the EU. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine had to implement many new reforms in various areas of life. At that time, the first steps towards European integration had already been taken. For example, in 1992, Ukraine became a member of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe. And already on March 2 of the same year, the EU Council proposed concluding partnership and cooperation agreements, to which Ukraine agreed on July 14 (see Vidnyansky, 2016). The

condition for cooperation between the EU and Ukraine was the latter's renunciation of nuclear weapons. In the following years, cooperation between Ukraine and the EU intensified, mainly in the economic sector, which resulted in the signing and ratification of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between Ukraine and the European Communities and Their Member States in 1994. Ukraine officially declared its desire to acquire the status of associated EU membership in 1998 (see more Khronolihia dvostoronnikh vidnosyn, 2016). This decision was accompanied by the approval of the Strategy for Ukraine's Integration into the EU №615/98 (see Ukaz Pro zatverdzhennia Stratehii intehratsii Ukrainy do Yevropeiskoho Soiuzu, President of Ukraine, 1998), which, in particular, stated that Ukraine's national interests are to acquire full membership in the EU.

After these decisions, interaction between Ukraine and the EU intensified. The Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their member states, of the one part, and Ukraine, of the other part, became another significant part of Ukraine's integration into the European Union. Both parties were working on this Agreement during 2012 (see Vidnyansky, 2016). The Agreement had to be signed in 2013, but because of the position of the then-President of Ukraine, the Association Agreement was not signed. This became the basis for mass discontent among the population. Ukrainska Pravda (2013, November 22) reports that on November 21, 2013, more than 1,500 people gathered on Independence Square to protest against the suspension of the European integration process. Most of them were students of Kyiv universities, and the protest lasted all night. Every day, the number of people increased. These protests were marked by particular brutality on the part of the Berkut¹⁹², and about a hundred civilians were killed (see Khronolohia Revoliutsii Hidnosti, liutyi 2014 | NEBESNA SOTNIA: Heroyi ne vmyrayut..., 2017, February 10; Harding & Mamo, 2024; Britannica, 2024).

On the night of February 20-21, negotiations on the settlement of the situation in Ukraine continued with the participation of opposition leaders Arseniy Yatsenyuk,

¹⁹² a police unit within the structure of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, which existed in 1992-2014. The unit was assigned special tasks: maintaining public safety, combating organized crime. It was repeatedly involved in suppressing protests, speeches and demonstrations in Ukraine. It was noted for its particular cruelty towards Euromaidan protesters in the winter of 2013-2014. Thus, it was liquidated on February 25, 2014 for abuse of power.

Oleh Tyahnybok, and Vitaliy Klitschko, as well as German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier, Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski, and Russian Ombudsman Vladimir Lukin. The ambassadors of France and Russia were also present at the meeting. They agreed to initiate the Agreement on the settlement of the crisis (see *Ukrainska Pravda*, 2014, February 21). All those present, except for the Russian representatives, witnessed the signing of the Agreement. The protests lasted until February 22, 2014, when former President Yanukovych fled to Russia (see Harding & Mamo, 2024; *Britannica*, 2024). These events, on the one hand, delayed Ukraine's European integration steps. On the other hand, they helped crystallise a common vision and understanding of this process among both the Ukrainian population and politicians. On March 21, in Brussels, Prime Minister of Ukraine Arseniy Yatsenyuk and leaders of EU countries signed the political part of the Association Agreement between Ukraine and the EU. The agreement was ratified on September 16 of the same year (see *Ukrainska Pravda*, March 21, 2014). On July 11, 2017, the Council of the EU completed the ratification of the Association Agreement with Ukraine (see Lenzu, 2017, July 11), and on September 1, the Association Agreement between Ukraine and the EU entered into force (see *European Union–Ukraine*, 2017, July 25). On February 28, 2022, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky signed Ukraine's application for EU membership (see *Ukrainska Pravda*, February 28, 2022). On June 23, Ukraine received candidate status for EU membership (see *Ukrainska Pravda*, 2022, June 23).

The importance of education and educational cooperation for the formation of democratic values and the development of civil society has become universal. In this context, education has become a priority issue for the governments of all European countries. Researchers such as Koroliova (2007, 2013) and Lokshyna (2023), among others, have conducted significant work on studying issues related to European integration and Ukraine's participation in integration processes. They investigated the impact of globalisation on educational services and the development of the country's education sector. It was due to this influence that there was an urgent need to determine the main directions of development of the market of educational services in Ukraine. What is more, in this context, education has become one of the most important issues in European countries as well.

Koroliova (2013) states that the educational sphere is no exception in the context of integration issues in Europe. The author emphasises that the rapid globalisation of society, as well as the internationalisation of the world economy, pose new challenges to higher education. European countries are trying to address these challenges by integrating educational spaces both at the local level (at the level of interaction between universities) and at a more global level. For example, at the level of the ministries of education. This indicates that the integration of the educational services market is becoming not only a national trend but also a global one. The variety of approaches and structures of education in European countries allows other countries to adopt this experience and adapt it to their own needs.

Koroliova (2013) indicates that the following events marked the intention to integrate education service markets in Europe:

1. Signing of the Great Charter of Universities (see Signatory Universities, 2020);
2. Creation of the European Higher Education Area (Bologna Process; see below);
3. EU programs for cooperation in the field of education, e.g., Erasmus+.

With the exception of the above-mentioned regulatory documents (see Chapter 3.1) aimed at defining education in Ukraine, in 1998, the Presidential decree №615/98 On approval of the Strategy of Ukraine's integration into the European Union since 1998 was adopted (see Ukaz Pro zatverdzhennia Stratehii intehratsii Ukrainy do Yevropeiskoho Soiuzu, President of Ukraine, 1998). This Decree is an important document since it is one of the first documents that highlights the path that Ukraine has to take in order to integrate its education into the EU educational space. Article 6 “Cultural, educational, scientific and technical integration” of the Decree says that

культурно-освітній та науково-технічний [напрямки] займають особливе місце, зумовлене потенційною можливістю досягти вагомих успіхів у інтеграційному процесі саме на цих напрямках. Вони охоплюють галузі середньої і вищої освіти¹⁹³. It also defines the integrational process as “впровадженні європейських норм і стандартів у освіті, науці і техніці, поширенні власних культурних і науково-технічних здобутків у ЄС¹⁹⁴.

see Ukaz Pro zatverdzhennia Stratehii intehratsii Ukrainy do Yevropeiskoho Soiuzu, President of Ukraine, 1998

¹⁹³ cultural, educational and scientific and technical [directions] occupy a special place, due to the potential opportunity to achieve significant successes in the integration process in these areas. They cover the fields of secondary and higher education

¹⁹⁴ implementing European norms and standards in education, science and technology, disseminating our own cultural and scientific and technical achievements in the EU

Even despite the fact that the then-president and his policy were not distinguished by their orientation towards joining the EU, this document became an expression of the European integration intentions of the Ukrainian state.

The general vision of the development of the educational system of Ukraine was also highlighted in the Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine “On the State National Program ‘Education’ (‘Ukraine of the 21st century’) (see Pro derzhavnu natsionalnu prohramu ‘Osvita’ (‘Ukrayina XXI stolittia’), Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, 1993). In the section on international relations, the desire of the Ukrainian state to work on ensuring that Ukrainian education seekers have the opportunity to study abroad was declared.

Going back to the completion of declared intentions, we would like to mention the following facts. In 2001, Ukraine created the Observatory Board of the Great Charter of Universities. As of 2024, their website states that more than 90 Ukrainian universities have signed the Magna Charta Universitatum (see Signatory Universities, 2020).

In 2005, at a conference in the Norwegian city of Bergen, Ukraine officially joined the “Bologna Process”. The Bologna Declaration (1999) regulates the formation of a single European Higher Education Area. Its main tasks include the creation of a two-level education system, harmonisation of systems through a diploma supplement, implementation of the European system of recalculation of credit units, support of student and staff mobility, quality assurance of education, social protection and responsibility of HEIs, integration of science and education, openness of Europe and development to solve the problem of lifelong learning. In their works, Riabchenko (2007) and Ilchenko and Sheiko (2014, p. 122-125) report the main principles of the European Higher Education Area and explain them as follows:

(1) autonomy and accountability (this means that each university has a great level of freedom in its choice of the curricula declared back in Magna Charta Universitatum, but at the same time this puts more responsibility on a university);

(2) education as public responsibility (which means that the values acquired during obtaining education and those promoted by academia should coincide with the values cherished by society);

(3) research-based higher education (which means that scientific knowledge should remain the cornerstone of higher education);

(4) organising diversity (which means that all the national systems, languages, traditions and majors existing in the EU should be respected and have equal opportunities; flexibility is the key feature here);

(5) quality as a fundamental building stone (which means that the quality of higher education ensures trust, mobility and attractiveness in Europe. Its assessment covers teaching, management, research and is outcome-oriented, including the knowledge and skills of graduates, not just the content or duration of studies);

(6) trust building (which is usually realised through thorough common work of all the participants on the quality criteria);

(7) relevance to the labour market (which guarantees a student that their skills are required on the labour market and that a student will have an opportunity of lifelong learning);

(8) compatibility of qualifications at different levels (which means academic recognition of the obtained levels in different countries based on ECTS, so that a student can be accepted to various universities based on their previous diplomas);

(9) attractiveness (which means that HEI in Europe should cherish friendly environment towards any student and provide the students with the educational programmes adapted to the needs of a wider audience);

(10) mobility (which should be the result of the completion of the previous principles) (see more European University Association, 2001, p.7-9).

According to Koroliova (2013, p.2), Ukraine is taking steps to integrate its higher education system into the European one; however, at the time, “the quality of educational programmes still needs improvement”. The decision of the board of the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine (see Vyscha osvita Ukrainy – Yevropeyskyi vymir: stan, problemy, perspektyvy, Ministerstvo osvity i nauky Ukrainy, 2008) released 5 years earlier, claims that in order to implement the

provisions of the Bologna Declaration, Ukraine has to take comprehensive measures, which include (1) the revision of the content of educational programmes and a boost to their effectiveness, (2) formation of a scientific network of Ukrainian educational institutions that will guarantee the mobility in the labour market and conditions for continuous learning, (3) implementation of the best practices of developed countries that ensure a balance between mass and elite education.

However, there were numerous obstacles along the way. Moisieieva and Usachov (2014, p.37) note that in the first years after Ukraine joined the Bologna process, according to statistics, about 70% of school graduates entered universities, which provoked the so-called massiveness of higher education and numerous disparities. In a number of European states, the situation was significantly different; only a small part of citizens could enter and graduate from institutions of higher education, which definitely added prestige and competitiveness to educational institutions. Since the situation that has traditionally developed in Ukraine is somewhat different, and the course to integrate the specifics of the Bologna process required not only the automatic transfer of the bureaucratic and formal educational component but also a comprehensive approach, under which all socio-political and economic conditions are appropriate and allow maximum effectiveness integrate qualitative and necessary changes into the education system of Ukraine (see Moisieieva & Usachov, 2014).

Analysing the main problems of that time, many scholars noticed the new trends in Ukrainian education. According to Riabchenko (2007), one of the main trends is the significant acceleration and expansion of professional training. The high rate of change in this area requires adaptability and an innovative approach to the organisation of the educational process. In addition, there is an increase in the number of educational institutions, which indicates a growing interest in obtaining higher education. In the context of the development of education and science in the 21st century, Ukraine actively uses the latest information technologies, which have become a key factor in the training of highly qualified specialists who are able to meet the requirements of the modern labour market.

The system of training specialists in Ukraine is a living organism, constantly evolving and improving in accordance with its two key functions, according to Riabchenko (2007). First, it serves economic needs by providing a steady flow of high-quality labour and promoting productivity. Secondly, it performs important social and political roles, satisfying the intellectual and spiritual needs of people and contributing to the overall development of the individual. This system not only trains specialists but also contributes to the formation of civic culture and stability in society. In the current conditions, the main task of the development and improvement of higher education is the further improvement of the quality of training of professional talents. Therefore, Koroliova (2007) states that education of highly qualified specialists is a condition for the gradual transformation of labour productivity factors, acceleration of scientific and technical progress and development of national production.

The primary tasks of the state policy of education development in Ukraine at the current stage are the implementation of a comprehensive approach to changes in the content of education and increasing its effectiveness. This means not only the adaptation of educational programs to modern requirements, but also an emphasis on the development of critical thinking, creativity and communication skills of students. In addition, it is important to introduce lifelong learning that allows people not only to receive a basic education, but also to continue learning throughout their lives in order to improve their career opportunities and personal development.

The democratisation of education should also be a top priority. Koroliova (2013) emphasises that this includes ensuring equal access to education for all strata of the population, regardless of their social or financial status. Since knowledge is changing rapidly today, one-time training can no longer provide the necessary qualifications for the entire working life. Specialists, in order to be competitive in the labour market, must constantly update their knowledge and skills. High-tech industries require continuous professional development from employees, as technology changes rapidly and new tools and methods are constantly emerging.

Therefore, Koroliova (2007) emphasises that in order to ensure adequate qualifications, lifelong learning should be provided to the workforce. The role of heads of educational institutions in this process is extremely important. They should be

leaders in implementing changes, ensuring high-quality education and preserving the country's unique educational traditions. Such an approach will allow to preserve and raise the level of education in Ukraine, making it more competitive in the international arena.

Antoniuk (2021) cites data indicating the success of Ukraine's integration into the European Union educational space. In her opinion, the active expansion of the network of regional cooperation between HEIs of Ukraine and European countries and the growth of international communication with partner institutions allow Ukrainians to participate more often in international projects and join European educational programs as students, teachers, researchers, etc. A vivid example of the successful consequences of European integration is that, in 2021, four Ukrainian universities ranked among the world's best universities. However, Antoniuk (2021) also warns about certain problems in this process. She claims that participation in the programs of interstate cooperation was quite uneven. In 2010, about 80 universities did not participate in international academic mobility programs, which had a negative impact on the degree of inclusion of Ukrainian students and scientists in modern global educational processes. The issue of the number of grants that Ukrainian teachers and students receive for studies or internships in Europe is still not decisive and does not constitute a significant number capable of bringing fundamental changes to domestic universities with experience (2,450 grants as of 2020, no data is available for us to compare it to the other countries) (Antoniuk, 2021, p. 589). Unfortunately, these numbers often do not generally correlate with the number of grant applications submitted, as Antoniuk (2021, p. 589) cites the example of only 6 out of 130 applications submitted to the Higher Education Capacity Building Competition in 2016 being successful. One of the obstacles on the way to the maximum involvement of Ukrainian universities in the European and international educational and scientific community is that not all institutions of higher education have the opportunity to coordinate relevant projects, due to the lack of an appropriate regulatory and legal framework, funding, foreign language skills and communication connection with other objective reasons (see Antoniuk, 2021, p. 589).

One of the key tasks regarding the transformation of the educational system, as already mentioned above, is the involvement of higher education students in scientific activities, which can provide comprehensive and high-quality training of future specialists. And the need for the formation of a creative personality, which has been repeatedly declared by the Ukrainian state, requires a change in methods and means. To apply such skills and abilities at the university, they need to be laid from early childhood, that is, in school and preschool education. That is why the second wave of systemic changes in education appeared. It started from school education and the 2015 reform was called “Nova Ukrainska Shkola¹⁹⁵” (henceforth NUSh). The Ministry of Education of Ukraine (2016) outlines the main principle of NUSh as the competence approach. According to the criteria of the European education system, the quality of education is that which provides citizens with the knowledge, skills and attitudes they need to thrive and to ensure Europe’s economic resilience and social prosperity (see European Commission, 2024, October 11).

Panchuk (2024) asserts that the competencies outlined in the program documents of the National Academy of Sciences align with European principles governing the construction of the educational system in modern society. Since these changes have been implemented since 2015, the first outcomes of the reforms are to be expected in 2027¹⁹⁶. To be more precise, the main priorities of the European education system, on which Ukraine also relies, are, in particular, mobility, high language competencies, digitisation, flexible skills for adaptation to changing environmental conditions, etc. Lokshyna (2023) believes that it is especially important to understand the need to ensure interaction between education, scientific research and public services.

Panchuk (2024) emphasises that the most recent data for 2023 regarding the implementation of European trends and the results of direct cooperation in the education system of Ukraine are reflected in the Report on the implementation of the Association Agreement between Ukraine and the European Union (see Government of

¹⁹⁵ New Ukrainian School

¹⁹⁶ The Ukrainian education system provides nine or eleven years of schooling, so the alumni of NUSh will be able to apply for a university in 2027 (or for colleges and professional institutes in 2025).

Ukraine, 2023, *Zvit pro vykonannia Uhody pro Asotsiatsiiu mizh Ukrainoiu ta Yevropeiskym Soiuzom*, p. 123-124). The data presented there show that Ukraine's participation in the EU "Erasmus+" educational program demonstrates high-quality and productive results. The annual work program "Erasmus+" for 2023 also increased the budget in order to meet the needs of Ukrainians affected by the war. In addition, 35 new competitions of this program have been opened for Ukraine by 2024, which involve the participation of specialists from various professional fields.

To sum up, it is important to note that the EU sees education not only as the means of conveying knowledge but also as a productive setting for laying down the values and views of future European citizens. In this paradigm of views, language competence occupies one of the key places. Modern integration processes in Europe and the world in general have turned knowledge of a foreign language into a subject of first necessity for students at mass secondary schools. Thus, Ukraine adopts this approach, creating conditions for students to learn foreign languages at school (usually L2 is introduced in the first or second year of primary school (the declared CERF level to be reached is B1 at grade 9 and B2 for grade 11), and L3 is introduced in the first year of middle school; sometimes the introduction of L3¹⁹⁷ might happen in high school). However, of course, Ukraine must take into account the socio-political situation. That is why Ukraine emphasises the importance of the Ukrainian language as the cornerstone of the educational process. This approach, to some extent, is similar to the French or Polish.

¹⁹⁷ In Ukraine, children learn Ukrainian from grade 1. English (or rarely other language, usually German/French/Chinese) is taught either from grade 1 or 2. From grade 5, other foreign language (excluding national minority languages; usually German/French/Spanish) is sometimes introduced.

3.3. LP in HEI: the declared strategies of the universities

(examples from KNU¹⁹⁸, ONU¹⁹⁹, LNU²⁰⁰, KhNU²⁰¹ and other universities)

In higher educational institutions, the language policy is determined by an important factor affecting the quality of education, the level of accessibility and the development of students' language skills. Savoyska (2020) argues that the implementation of this policy is a key task to ensure an inclusive and diverse learning environment conducive to the successful learning of each student.

There are a number of reasons why the study of the implementation of language policies in HEIs in Ukraine is of considerable scientific interest and is not limited solely to the analysis of state regulation. First, as shown in the previous sections, Ukraine is a multiethnic and multilingual country in which the L1 does not always coincide with the state language, Ukrainian. Second, the long historical period as part of various empires (see Section 2) has led to widespread russification of the population in Ukraine and Magyarisation in Transcarpathia. For such language communities, the use of the Ukrainian language is often limited to official written communication, which affects the practices of language choice in the educational environment. Thirdly, Ukraine's European integration course is forcing it to become increasingly open to policies of multilingualism and diversity, in particular with regard to the languages of the European Union and Great Britain. Thus, in the context of Ukrainian higher education, educational institutions in Ukraine strive to find a balance between forming a protectionist LP, overcoming russification, and ensuring European openness to multilingualism. Universities are implementing their own LP strategies aimed at ensuring quality education, intercultural dialogue and development of students' language competences. In this research, we decided to prioritise top universities (see Osvita.ua, 2025, July 08) from the largest cities of Ukraine, namely Kyiv, Lviv, Kharkiv and Odesa. Such an approach offers representation of different regional varieties, as each of these universities has a solid reputation in its region and represents the best standard of the local community. We decided to focus on classical universities

¹⁹⁸ Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv

¹⁹⁹ Odesa I. I. Mechnykov National University

²⁰⁰ Ivan Franko National University of Lviv

²⁰¹ V. N. Karazin Kharkiv National University

rather than technical or medical ones since they encompass a wider spectrum of majors. What is more, these universities are ones of the oldest in the country, so we can see the result of century-long experiences and views. So, we focused on Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv (KNU), Odesa I. I. Mechnykov National University (ONU), Ivan Franko National University of Lviv (LNU), V. N. Karazin Kharkiv National University (KhNU). What is more, we decided to include some other universities from these cities that are highly prioritised among university entrants. The ranking is based on the average score of the National Multi-Subject Test (NMT) of prospective students who, in 2024, were admitted to universities for fee-paying (contract-based) study (see Osvita.ua, 2025, July 08). Examining their policies will reveal a variety of approaches and experiences in their implementation, reflecting best practices and challenges facing Ukrainian higher education in the context of LP.

Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv

Article 1.6 of the Statute of Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv (2022), p.3 claims that “мовою освітнього процесу в Університеті є державна мова²⁰²” (see Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv, 2022). Even though the Statute refers to the Laws (1) On Ensuring the functioning of the Ukrainian language as the state language No. 2704-VIII (“Pro zabezpechennia funktsionuvannia ukrayinskoyi movy yak derzhavnoyi”, Verkhovna Rada Ukrainy, 2019), (2) On Higher Education No. 1556-VII (“Pro vyshchu osvitu”, Verkhovna Rada Ukrainy, 2014), (3) On Education No. 2145-VIII (“Pro osvitu”, Verkhovna Rada Ukrainy, 2017), it leaves the right to define English as the language of official instruction to the Academic Council of the University in certain cases. These include cases when all the participants of the educational process know English. In case at least one participant submits a written request for translation, the university is obliged to provide it. Generally, the Statute (2022) implements the provisions of the aforementioned laws and regulations. What is more, Article 7.2. of the Statute (2022, p.35) says

Для викладання навчальних дисциплін іноземною мовою Університет утворює окремі групи для іноземних громадян, осіб без громадянства, [...], або розробляють

²⁰² “the language of the educational process at the University is the state language”

індивідуальні програми. При цьому ці особи вивчають українську мову як окрему навчальну дисципліну. Перелік іноземних мов, якими здійснюється викладання навчальних дисциплін, визначаються Вченою радою²⁰³

Article 7.4. of the Statute (2022, p.35) adds that “посади педагогічних працівників можуть займати особи [...], які вільно володіють державною мовою²⁰⁴”. This illustrates the university’s openness to international academic mobility in combination with the respect to local laws and national regulations. Last but not least, the university Statute displays the euro-integrational principles that we described in Chapter 3.2.

If we try to find some more practical points on the language(s) of instruction, we can see the following examples of their regulations by the university: Paragraph 1, item 3 of the Taras Shevchenko National University Admission Regulations (2025, p. 254), which refers to the applicants for a Bachelor’s degree, states that

Іноземні громадяни та особи без громадянства, які вступають до Університету, повинні володіти українською та / або англійською мовою на рівні B1, відповідно до мови викладання на обраній освітньо-науковій програмі²⁰⁵.

The Taras Shevchenko National University Admission Regulations (2025, p.3) state in paragraph 2, item 3 that refers to the PhD degree states that

Іноземні громадяни та особи без громадянства, які вступають до Університету, повинні володіти українською та / або англійською мовою на рівні B2, відповідно до мови викладання на обраній освітньо-науковій програмі²⁰⁶.

Thus, we can see that the University offers rather limited and sometimes vague choice of languages even though trying to balance between the official laws and inclusiveness.

It is remarkable that the aforementioned official regulatory documents of the university indicate the demand for future students to use formal style, clear and correct language in their motivational letters and research proposals, but they never indicate the language itself.

²⁰³ For the purpose of teaching academic disciplines in a foreign language, the University establishes separate groups for foreign citizens and stateless persons [...] or develops individual programmes for them. At the same time, these persons study the Ukrainian language as a separate academic discipline. The list of foreign languages in which academic disciplines are taught is determined by the Academic Council of the University.

²⁰⁴ Academic positions may be held by individuals [...] who have a fluent command of the state language.

²⁰⁵ foreign citizens and stateless persons entering the University must have a B1-level proficiency in Ukrainian and/or English, depending on the language of instruction of the chosen educational and scientific programme

²⁰⁶ foreign citizens and stateless persons entering the University must have a B2-level proficiency in Ukrainian and/or English, depending on the language of instruction of the chosen educational and scientific programme

In general, we can see that KNU implements a LP that reflects the importance of the language factor in the process of reforming and consolidating Ukrainian society. The policy contains principles, models and directions for implementation and aims to promote the use of the Ukrainian language in HEIs. However, implementing the LP has faced several challenges, including a lack of clarity and efficient practical tools. On the other hand, the thorough examination of the university website revealed that the university has been actively working on the introduction of the Ukrainian language courses for students and employees since 2022. These courses are aimed at developing language skills and supporting the use of the Ukrainian language as the main language of communication. By promoting the use of the Ukrainian language, KNU contributes to the preservation of the cultural and linguistic identity of Ukrainian society and supports the development of the Ukrainian language as one of the fundamental elements of national culture and self-identification, which is reflected in the “Патріотизм і звитяга²⁰⁷” section of the website.

Odesa I. I. Mechnykov National University

In recent years, ONU has been trying to implement the conditions of the Bologna Charter into its activities, which, in linguistic terms, means promoting multilingualism and supporting the use of Ukrainian as the state language. This is reflected in the regulatory documents of the university. For example, the Statute (see Odesa I. I. Mechnykov National University, 2017, p.12) says that

Система виховної роботи в ОНУ імені І. І. Мечникова спрямовується на формування у студентів і викладачів високої культури і реалізується через:...прищеплення студентам демократичного світогляду, дотримання громадянських прав і свобод, поваги до традицій, культури, віросповідання й мов спілкування народів світу; ...сприяння розвитку високої мовної культури громадян, вихованню поваги до державної мови та мов національних меншин України, толерантності в ставленні до носіїв різних мов і культур²⁰⁸.

²⁰⁷ Lit. translation: “Patriotism and valor”. It is important to know that the notion of “patriotism” has exclusively positive connotation in the Ukrainian language and means being loyal to the country and possessing high national self-awareness.

²⁰⁸ The system of educational and civic engagement activities at I. I. Mechnykov Odesa National University is aimed at fostering a high culture among students and faculty and is implemented through ... instilling in students a democratic worldview, adherence to civil rights and freedoms, and respect for the traditions, cultures, religions, and languages of the peoples of the world; ... promoting the development of a high level of linguistic culture among citizens, cultivating respect for the state language and the languages of Ukraine’s national minorities, and fostering tolerance towards speakers of different languages and cultures.

What is more, the official Strategic Priorities for the Development of the I. I. Mechnykov Odesa National University for 2020–2025 (2020) indicates “*internatiolisation of activities*” as one of its lines of activity. We can see “розширення традиційних сегментів залучення іноземних студентів [...] Англійська для всіх (викладання; вебсторінка; силабуси, контент на сучасних електронних платформах; мовні курси)²⁰⁹” among official tasks within this line.

The role of LP in promoting multilingualism cannot be overestimated. ONU’s LP actively supports the use of several languages in the academic and administrative environment. This contributes to the creation of a more inclusive and diverse learning environment. In addition, Shumytska (2022) highlights that promoting multilingualism at university helps prepare students for the global workforce. In a world where knowledge of several languages is increasingly in demand, mastery of different languages opens up new opportunities for career growth and international cooperation. Thus, LP in higher education institutions such as Odesa National University is of strategic importance for preparing students for the international arena and developing their intercultural skills. This is also reflected in its Statute (2017, p.7) which says that the university of obliged to encourage

сприяння набуттю студентами всіх спеціальностей комунікативної компетентності іноземною мовою на необхідному рівні; ... [та]... формування повноцінних англомовних освітніх програм за рівнями магістра та бакалавра²¹⁰.

The mechanisms for ensuring such tasks are not clearly spelled out in the university’s regulatory documents, but the Statute (2017, p. 29) also contains references to financial methods of encouragement:

Ученим, які досягли особливих успіхів у розробленні найсучасніших наукових проблем на світовому рівні, і викладачам, які володіють і використовують у роботі знання іноземної мови на сучасному рівні, за рахунок спеціального фонду може встановлюватися надбавка до заробітної плати, розмір якої визначається контрактом.²¹¹

²⁰⁹ Expansion of traditional segments of international student recruitment ... “English for All” (instruction; website; syllabi; content on modern electronic platforms; language courses)

²¹⁰ facilitating the acquisition by students of all specialisations of communicative competence in a foreign language at the required level; ... [and] ... the development of full-fledged English-language educational programmes at the bachelor’s and master’s levels.

²¹¹ Scientists who have achieved special success in developing the most advanced scientific problems at the world level, and teachers who possess and use knowledge of a foreign language at a modern level in their work, may be granted a salary supplement from a special fund, the amount of which is determined by contract.

It is also important to note that most faculty contracts require that they publish at least a certain number of articles in international publications (i.e., in a foreign language). What about the state language then? The Statute (2017, p.11) of the University says that the standards of educational activity of ONU define “Мовою викладання в ОНУ імені І. І. Мечникова є державна мова²¹²”. However,

З метою створення умов для міжнародної академічної мобільності ОНУ імені І. І. Мечникова має право прийняти рішення про викладання однієї чи кількох дисциплін англійською та/або іншими іноземними мовами, забезпечивши при цьому знання здобувачами вищої освіти відповідної дисципліни державною мовою. Для викладання навчальних дисциплін іноземною мовою в ОНУ імені І. І. Мечникова створюються окремі групи для іноземних громадян, осіб без громадянства, які бажають здобувати вищу освіту за кошти фізичних або юридичних осіб, або розробляються індивідуальні програми. При цьому ОНУ імені І. І. Мечникова забезпечує вивчення такими особами державної мови як окремої навчальної дисципліни. Перелік іноземних мов, якими здійснюється викладання навчальних дисциплін, визначається ОНУ імені І. І. Мечникова. За бажанням здобувачів вищої освіти ОНУ імені І. І. Мечникова створює можливості для вивчення ними мови національної меншини в обсязі, що дає змогу здійснювати професійну діяльність в обраній галузі з використанням цієї мови.²¹³

Statute, 2017, p.11

As we can see, these provisions resemble the corresponding provisions of other universities, which is ultimately explained by the requirements of current legislation. It is also important to note that there is no publicly available list of foreign languages approved for curriculum development.

In general, the implementation of a LP in higher educational institutions, such as ONU, is crucial for promoting linguistic diversity, supporting the use of Ukrainian as the state language, and preparing students for success in the global community (see Shumytska, 2022). By solving the challenges and opening opportunities related to the implementation of LP, higher education institutions can play a key role in shaping the language landscape of the nation-state and its role in the world community.

²¹² The language of instruction at I. I. Mechnykov ONU is the state language.

²¹³ In order to create conditions for international academic mobility, I. I. Mechnykov ONU has the right to make a decision to teach one or more disciplines in English and/or other foreign languages, while ensuring that higher education applicants have knowledge of the relevant discipline in the state language. For teaching academic disciplines in a foreign language, I. I. Mechnykov ONU creates separate groups for foreign citizens, stateless persons who wish to obtain higher education at the expense of individuals or legal entities, or develops individual programs. At the same time, I. I. Mechnykov ONU ensures that such persons study the state language as a separate academic discipline. The list of foreign languages in which academic disciplines are taught is determined by I. I. Mechnykov ONU. At the request of higher education applicants, I. I. Mechnykov ONU creates opportunities for them to study the language of a national minority to the extent that allows them to carry out professional activities in the chosen field using this language.

Ivan Franko National University of Lviv

Lviv National University (LNU) has a clearly defined LP in its Statute (see Ivan Franko National University of Lviv, 2025), the Strategic Plan (2019) and the Regulations (2024). The Statute (2025, p.7) declares that “мовою викладання в Університеті є державна мова²¹⁴”. At the same time, the policy also recognises the importance of multilingualism and encourages the study of foreign languages. For example, the Statute (2025, p.7) also indicates that

Вчена рада Університету має право прийняти рішення про викладання однієї, кількох або всіх дисциплін, виконання індивідуальних завдань та проведення контрольних заходів англійською мовою, за умови, що усі здобувачі освіти, які вивчають відповідні дисципліни, володіють англійською мовою. У разі якщо є письмове звернення від одного чи більше студентів, Університет забезпечує переклад державною мовою²¹⁵

In general, university policies do not provide for penalties for failure to comply with these rules. We assume that, since violation of these norms is punishable under the Law of Ukraine “On Ensuring the Functioning of the Ukrainian Language as the State Language” No. 2704-VIII (“Pro zabezpechennia funktsionuvannia ukrayinskoyi movy yak derzhavnoyi”, Verkhovna Rada Ukrainy, 2019), the university does not assume the task of imposing penalties. However, we can see that the university strongly values and encourages the use of foreign languages as evidenced by the Regulations (2024, pp.73-74):

Працівникам Університету за знання та використання в роботі іноземної мови: однієї європейської – 10 %; однієї східної, угро-фінської або африканської – 15 %; двох і більше мов – 25 % від посадового окладу (ставки заробітної плати). Ця надбавка не встановлюється працівникам, для яких вимогами для зайняття посади передбачено знання іноземної мови, що підтверджено відповідним документом²¹⁶.

the Regulations, 2024, p.73

Науково-педагогічним працівникам Університету, які викладають навчальні курси мовою країн Європейського Союзу, може встановлюватися надбавка за складність і напруженість у роботі в розмірі до 50 % від посадового окладу. Ці надбавки

²¹⁴ The official language of instruction at the University shall be the State language.

²¹⁵ The Academic Council of the University shall have the right to decide on the instruction of one, several, or all academic disciplines, the completion of individual assignments, and the conduct of assessment activities in the English language, provided that all students enrolled in the respective disciplines possess proficiency in English. In the event of a written request from one or more students, the University shall ensure translation into the State language

²¹⁶ University employees shall receive a salary supplement for knowledge and use of a foreign language in their work: 10% for one European language; 15% for one Eastern, Ugric-Finnic, or African language; 25% for two or more languages, calculated as a percentage of the official salary (base pay rate). This supplement shall not be granted to employees for whom knowledge of a foreign language is a mandatory requirement for the position, as confirmed by the relevant documentation.

встановлюють на навчальний семестр за поданням декана факультету відповідно до ухвали Вченої ради Університету.²¹⁷

the Regulations, 2024, p.74

Providing the opportunity to learn and communicate in different languages helps the study of cultural diversity and deepens understanding of different cultural contexts. This can have a positive effect on the involvement of students in the academic process and increase their academic achievements and overall satisfaction with university life. One of the main challenges is ensuring effective communication and implementation of LP at all levels of the educational institution, from administrative staff to teachers and students. This requires a coordinated effort and ongoing support from institutional leaders. Thus, the Statute (2025, p.22) requires that “кандидат на посаду Ректора Університету повинен володіти державною мовою відповідно до рівня, визначеного Національною комісією зі стандартів державної мови...”²¹⁸ and Statute (2025, p.53):

Науково-педагогічні, наукові та педагогічні працівники Університету, крім іноземців чи осіб без громадянства, які запрошені до університету та працюють на тимчасовій основі ... зобов'язані володіти державною мовою та застосовувати її під час виконання службових обов'язків. Рівень володіння державною мовою науково-педагогічними, науковими та педагогічними працівниками засвідчується документом про повну загальну середню освіту ... або державним сертифікатом про рівень володіння державною мовою²¹⁹

Implementation of LP in higher educational institutions is often difficult and costly (see Shumytska, 2022). To overcome these problems, LNU has created a LP that aligns with the state regulations, but also identifies directions for further improvements, which should contribute to the development of a more inclusive and diverse learning environment at the university.

²¹⁷ Academic staff members of the University who teach courses in the languages of European Union countries may be granted a supplement for complexity and intensity of work in the amount of up to 50% of the official salary. Such supplements are established for an academic semester upon the recommendation of the dean of the faculty and in accordance with the resolution of the Academic Council of the University.

²¹⁸ A candidate for the position of Rector of the University must have proficiency in the State language at the level determined by the National Commission on State Language Standards...

²¹⁹ Academic, research, and teaching staff of the University, with the exception of foreign citizens or stateless persons invited to the University on a temporary basis ... shall be required to possess proficiency in the state language and to use it in the performance of their official duties. The level of proficiency in the state language of academic, research, and teaching staff shall be certified either by a document of complete general secondary education ... or by a state certificate attesting to the level of proficiency in the state language.

V. N. Karazin Kharkiv National University

The language policy of Kharkiv National University (KhNU) is not much different from that of the KNU, ONU, and LNU. The cornerstone of the policy is the Laws of Ukraine on Education and Language (the ones described in Chapter 3.1.). Thus, the Statute (see V. N. Karazin Kharkiv National University, 2022, p.8) proclaims that

мовою освітнього процесу в Університеті є державна мова. Застосування мов в Університеті визначається законами України “Про забезпечення функціонування української мови як державної” та “Про освіту”²²⁰.

KhNU also shows understanding of the importance of personal example in education and implementation of language policies. Thus, the Statute (2022, p.8) also obliges “кандидат на посаду ректора повинен вільно володіти державною мовою²²¹”. The same is valid for the university teachers (Statute, 2022, p.52). What is more, the Statute (2022, p.55) mentions that “Науково-педагогічні та педагогічні працівники Університету зобов’язані [...] виховувати у здобувачів освіти повагу до державної мови²²²” and the Internal Regulations (2018, p.5) the says that “працівники університету зобов’язані [...] особистим прикладом утверджувати повагу до держави Україна, її народу, мови, культури, історії²²³”. Thus, we can see that KhNU has clarified the priority of the state language in its Statute not only in regard to formal instruction, but also in broader educational practices. Shaping language attitudes and values is also included in the priorities of the university policies. The requirement of linguistic proficiency for high-ranked positions also boosts language prestige and promotes the state language in the institutional culture. This approach reflects the role of the educational institutions in the maintenance and promotion of Ukrainian.

²²⁰ The language of the educational process at the University is the state language. The use of languages at the University is regulated by the Laws of Ukraine “On Ensuring the Functioning of the Ukrainian Language as the State Language” and “On Education.”

²²¹ the candidate for the position of Rector must be proficient in the state language.

²²² The scientific, pedagogical and pedagogical staff of the University are obliged [...] to foster in students respect for the state language

²²³ University employees are obliged [...] to establish respect for the state of Ukraine, its people, language, culture, and history by personal example

However, KhNU also acknowledges the importance of multilingual competencies in an increasingly globalized academic environment. For instance, in the Statute (2022, p.8), a special place is dedicated to English as a language of science and international communication:

Вчена рада Університету має право прийняти рішення про викладання [...] англійською мовою за умови, що усі здобувачі освіти, які вивчають відповідні дисципліни, володіють англійською мовою. У разі, якщо є письмове звернення від одного чи більше студентів, Університет забезпечує переклад державною мовою.²²⁴

In addition, the annual rector's report (2024) devotes a significant place to the analysis of the language situation at the institution, in particular, the growing role of English, which is considered almost on an equal footing with the state language (see *Shchorichnyi zvitrektora: informatsiino-analitychni materialy za pidsumkamy 2024 roku*, V. N. Karazin Kharkiv National University, 2024). The report records a number of practices that demonstrate institutional support for bilingualism: providing scientific literature in both Ukrainian and English (p. 99), maintaining English-language university pages on social networks (p. 176), a gradual increase in the share of classroom hours during which academic disciplines are taught in English (p. 17), as well as expanding the list of educational programs with two languages of instruction (Ukrainian/English) (p. 53), etc. What is more, this is the first document out of the analysed ones that mentions the implementation of a comparatively new Law On the Use of English in Ukraine No. 3760-IX ("Pro zastosuvannia anhliiskoyi movy v Ukrayini", Verkhovna Rada Ukrainy, 2024). So, the annual rector's report (2024, p. 107) says that

враховуючи прийнятий у 2024 році Закон "Про застосування англійської мови в Україні", [...] Щотижня бібліотека модерує розмовні клуби з носіями мови, до яких долучаються як студенти і викладачі університету, так і школярі.²²⁵

Having analysed the official language policies of the university, it can be stated that KhNU focuses on compliance with state language legislation, although, like the

²²⁴ The Academic Council of the University has the authority to decide on the delivery of instruction [...] in English, provided that all students enrolled in the respective courses demonstrate proficiency in English. In the event of a written request submitted by one or more students, the University shall ensure translation into the state language.

²²⁵ taking into account the Law "On the Use of the English Language in Ukraine" adopted in 2024 [...] Every week, the library moderates conversation clubs with native speakers, which are attended by both university students and teachers, as well as schoolchildren.

previously considered universities, it does not provide for any internal control mechanisms. At the same time, the university emphasizes the importance of the English language, which is due, firstly, to compliance with the requirements of the legislation, and secondly, to economic benefits, in particular, attracting foreign students and increasing the prestige of the institution in the international arena. KhNU pays relatively little attention to multilingualism in its policies, but demonstrates openness to intercultural interaction and participates in a number of relevant international projects.

In this Chapter, we also take into account the experiences of other universities. The following examples might be interesting to consider since (1) NaUKMA is famous for its recent LP; (2) The Ukrainian Catholic University is one of the most prestigious private universities in Ukraine that participates in international exchanges and invites teachers from all over the globe; (3) we have received a considerable number of answers from National Technical University of Ukraine “Igor Sikorsky Kyiv Polytechnic Institute” and the National Technical University “Kharkiv Polytechnic Institute”, they are also among the most prestigious universities in Ukraine according to the ratings.

National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy (abbr. NaUKMA) actively promotes the use of the Ukrainian language in the educational process and research activities, promoting the development of national linguistic and cultural identity among students. In fact, on 27 January 2023, the university committee approved new internal rules prohibiting the use of “the language of the aggressor state in communication” within the walls of the educational institution (see Kraliuk, 2023). Society accepted such regulations quite ambiguously. First, many Ukrainians supported the initiative as a response to Russia’s military aggression, considering it an important step in moving away from Russian cultural influence and strengthening Ukrainian national identity. However, some educators and scientists are concerned that such restrictions may cause

difficulties in the scientific environment, where a significant amount of research and literature is still available only in Russian.

Bills providing for restrictions on the use of Russian in the educational process are being studied for implementation in various educational institutions of Ukraine, including schools where Russian may be prohibited even during breaks. Proponents of such decisions believe that this will contribute to the protection of the Ukrainian language and the creation of a Ukrainian-speaking environment. Instead, critics emphasise that a complete ban could violate academic freedom and reduce access to knowledge, which is important for students of technical and natural sciences who use Russian-language sources.

Moreover, both parties agree that it is (almost) impossible to control such a decision. In general, the issue of banning the Russian language in education remains controversial, with an emphasis on finding a balance between national identity and the educational needs of Ukrainians in a global scientific context.

The language policy of **The Ukrainian Catholic University** (UCU) (based in Lviv) is based on the principles of multiculturalism, promotion of national identity and academic mobility of students and teachers. Having analysed the document “*Internal system for ensuring the quality of education*” (Ukrainian Catholic University, 2020) and the annexes mentioned in it, we can state that at UCU, Ukrainian is the main language of instruction, the official language of communication at all levels. This corresponds to the mission of the university to maintain the identity and preserve the cultural values of Ukraine.

It is also worth noting that, despite the Ukrainian orientation, to promote academic mobility and integration into the international academic environment, English is actively used in the teaching of individual courses, as well as in scientific research and publications. Moreover, the university encourages the development of multilingualism among students and teachers. The use of several languages allows for more effective integration of students from other countries and facilitates the exchange of experiences in an international environment. UCU offers educational courses for learning other languages, in particular Polish and German. This enables students to

expand opportunities for further study or work abroad. Inviting teachers from abroad ensures the exchange of knowledge and experience and also requires a partial transition to English during lectures or conferences.

Thanks to this LP, UCU creates a multilingual environment that promotes professional growth, international cooperation, and the preservation of Ukrainian cultural and linguistic traditions.

In her work, Chernenko (2010) claims that both the **National Technical University of Ukraine “Igor Sikorsky Kyiv Polytechnic Institute”** (KPI) and the **National Technical University “Kharkiv Polytechnic Institute”** (KhPI) pay attention to the development of language culture among students, promoting the study of language and culture of both national and other languages.

In addition, KPI and KhPI organise various cultural events, exhibitions, conferences and language clubs, which promote active communication between students of different cultural and linguistic groups. This contributes to the formation of an open and tolerant environment for learning and communication, as well as the development of language competence and intercultural education.

Above all, these universities play an important role in maintaining linguistic diversity and the development of education in different languages in Ukraine. Their active participation in this process consists of the implementation of various initiatives and programs aimed at supporting foreign language students and studying the languages and cultures of different nationalities.

An analysis of the current statutes of both universities shows that, like the statutes of KNU, ONU, LNU and KhNU, they are based on the provisions of Ukrainian legislation, taking into account the European integration course of the state. In particular, the Ukrainian language is defined as dominant in the educational process, while at the same time, at the request of students, separate groups with instruction in another language may be formed. In addition, the university undertakes to create conditions for the study of languages of national minorities to the extent that allows students to carry out professional activities in the chosen field using the appropriate language at their request (see The Statute of the National Technical University of

Ukraine “Igor Sikorsky Kyiv Polytechnic Institute”, 2023; The Statute of National Technical University “Kharkiv Polytechnic Institute”, 2019).

To sum up, these universities create conditions for learning and research in different languages, which allows students from different countries to receive quality education in a linguistic environment convenient for them. This contributes to the attraction of foreign students and academic staff to Ukrainian universities and facilitates the exchange of knowledge and cultural experiences between different countries.

Our report is consistent with the opinion of Shumytska (2022), who claims that the Ukrainian universities might face various problems in the implementation of their LP, such as:

- Limited resources for language education;
- Resistance to language change;
- Insufficient knowledge of the language among staff and students.

To implement the LP in higher educational institutions, it is necessary to adopt a set of strategies that take into account the various challenges and needs of the university community. According to Shumytska (2022), providing a wide range of language services to support staff and students is another such strategy. It can include language courses at different levels of language proficiency, language exchange programs for deepening language skills and intercultural communication, as well as a language assessment system for effective monitoring of progress. Another important strategy mentioned by Shumytska (2022) is creating a language-friendly environment where each language is respected and valued. This may include holding events to celebrate linguistic diversity, promote intercultural dialogue and understanding, and support initiatives aimed at supporting linguistic minorities and their culture.

In addition, it is important to cooperate with other institutions and organisations that have experience in the field of language education and LP development. This may include introducing partnerships with language centres, educational organisations, international exchange programs, etc., to share best practices, resources and ideas to support linguistic diversity and implement effective university language policies.

However, in our opinion, the lack of institutional control over LP implementation is rather a drawback in the universities' strategies. Control strategies should not exclude incentive strategies but rather complement them.

In summary, the implementation of language policies in higher education institutions is critical to promoting linguistic diversity and ensuring equal opportunities for all students and staff. Despite the challenges, the successful implementation of LP can be achieved through the adoption of appropriate strategies and the cooperation of various participants in LP.

CHAPTER IV. LP IMPLEMENTATION IN UKRAINIAN ACADEMIA

4.1. Research Questions

This study aims to conduct comprehensive research into the application of actual LP in Ukraine in the higher education system. Completion of this task involves several factors. In the previous chapters, we presented an overview of historical processes (starting from the second half of the 18th century) that shaped the contributory factors of LP development in Ukraine. In addition, we analysed the existing LP in Ukraine, paying attention to those connected to the sphere of higher education. The empirical part of our research is to carry out a case study on the implementation of language policies in higher education institutions and compare the prescribed LP to the real situation. Hopefully, this would enable us to make suggestions for the LP improvements in Ukraine.

Let's recall the research questions that we outlined in the introduction. RQ1 is "What are the historical factors contributing to the development of LP in Ukraine?"; RQ2 is "Which of the existing LPs are related to the sphere of education?"; RQ3 is "What is the reality of the implementation of LP in academia?"; RQ4 is "What are the factors motivating people to change their language choice?"

The analysis of historic dynamics in chapters 1, 2, and 3 enables us to answer **RQ1**. Chapter III focuses on the data that answer **RQ2**. The answers to **RQ3** and **RQ4** are presented in this chapter.

While preparing for the study, we discovered that access to the data was restricted. As a result, we encountered the following important research limitations (as of October 2022):

- Crimea and parts of Luhansk and Donetsk have been annexed by Russia in 2014, so
 - (1) the fieldwork cannot be conducted there,

(2) in case the data are collected online, they might be distorted. This might happen due to constant control and pressure from the occupying authorities.

- 18% of Ukrainian territory is currently occupied by Russia. Military operations are being conducted there.
- 5 million people are internally displaced; therefore, regional variability cannot be determined by the region of residence.
- About 6 million Ukrainians received temporary protection outside of Ukraine.

Due to these limitations and the large number of displaced persons, we focused on studying the LP application in HEI, as education is a relatively stable domain. To be more precise, the leading universities of the largest cities of Ukraine, namely Kyiv, Lviv, Kharkiv and Odesa, were prioritised. Firstly, these cities represent the four primary geographical regions of Ukraine, thereby ensuring a diverse regional representation among the participants. They are the most populated cities in the chosen direction (Kharkiv for the eastern, Odesa for the southern, Lviv for the western). Additionally, as the capital, Kyiv offers a broad spectrum of individuals from various backgrounds, further enhancing the diversity of the sample. The broader picture of the demographic situation in these cities is presented in Table 4 (data quoted from Census, 2001; Movnyi sklad raioniv, 2019; Derzhstat Ukrainy, 2022):

	Population by estimate ²²⁶ as of 2001	Percentage of population with L1: Ukrainian as of 2001	Percentage of population with L1: Russian as of 2001	Present population by estimate ²²⁷ as of February 1, 2022 (Держстат України, 2022)
Kyiv region	4 388 014	80.5%	17.76%	1 795 542
City of Kyiv	2 566 953	72.15%	25.27%	2 950 702
Kharkiv region	2 895 813	53.8%	44.29%	2 580 614
City of Kharkiv	1 449 871	31.77%	65.86%	no data
Odesa region	2 455 666	46.28%	41.95%	2 349 749
City of Odesa	1 010 298	30.41%	64.75%	no data
Lviv region	2 605 956	95.32%	3.77%	2 476 113
City of Lviv	749 768	88.75%	9.72%	no data

Table 4. Cities' demographics

²²⁶ The latest complete Census conducted in Ukraine.

²²⁷ The number of population (estimation) is calculated according to the available administrative data on the official birth and death registration including changes in registration of the residence. Data can be revised.

To have a clearer starting point as for languages spoken at home, we would also like to present data from the surveys by Rating Group (2016, p.148; 2017, p.230; 2018, p.211; 2019, p.249; 2023, p.154; 2024, p.178):

	Kyiv	Kharkiv	Odesa	Lviv
<i>2016</i>				
Ukrainian	28%	3%	3%	89%
Russian	34%	73%	78%	6%
Equally Ukrainian and Russian	37%	21%	18%	5%
Equally Ukrainian and another language	1%	3%	0%	0%
Equally Russian and another language	0%	1%	1%	0%
<i>2017</i>				
Ukrainian	30%	3%	4%	89%
Russian	33%	78%	84%	4%
Equally Ukrainian and Russian	36%	18%	11%	6%
Equally Ukrainian and another language	1%	0%	0%	0%
Equally Russian and another language	0%	0%	1%	0%
<i>2018</i>				
Ukrainian	25%	3%	4%	89%
Russian	38%	81%	79%	5%
Equally Ukrainian and Russian	37%	16%	16%	6%
<i>2019²²⁸</i>				
Ukrainian	59%	21%	19%	93%
Russian	69%	94%	96%	13%
Other	1%	1%	2%	1%
Difficult to say/ No answer	2%	0%	0%	0%
<i>2023</i>				
Ukrainian	59%	16%	16%	96%
Russian	38%	78%	80%	3%
Bulgarian	0%	0%	1%	0%
Polish	0%	0%	0%	<1%
Other ²²⁹	1%	6%	2%	<1%
Difficult to say/ No answer	2%	1%	<1%	<1%
<i>2024²²⁸</i>				
Ukrainian	73%	43%	35%	97%
Russian	54%	84%	92%	5%
Bulgarian	<1%	<1%	1%	0%
Romanian	0%	<1%	<1%	0%
Slovak	0%	<1%	0%	0%
Polish	<1%	1%	<1%	<1%
Other	1%	2%	2%	1%
Difficult to say/ No answer	<1%	<1%	0%	<1%

Table 5. Languages Spoken at Home

²²⁸ Here people had an opportunity to choose more than 1 language

²²⁹ The authors of the research state that “the majority of the answers ‘other’ here mean ‘in both Ukrainian and Russian’.

Considering the overviewed research methods and their limitations, the questionnaire and individual interview methods were identified as the ones that best fit the research needs and cannot be compromised due to these limitations. Firstly, because both interviews and questionnaires can be conducted online, and there is no need to go to the war zone. Secondly, there is no need to gather a great number of people in the same place (which is not recommended in Ukraine since it can be attacked). Thirdly, even those who are displaced can participate by sharing their experiences. Fourth, the anonymity of the questionnaire makes participants feel more secure about their lives after publication in cases of being occupied by Russians. This research employs a mixed-methodological approach, utilising both quantitative and qualitative data.

4.2. Questionnaire

4.2.1. Methodology

Having analysed the existing research methods, we understood that methods such as corpus linguistics, controlled experiments, or variationist analysis do not meet the needs of our research. Some other methods that might meet the research needs cannot be implemented due to research limitations, so we focused on creating a questionnaire on Google Forms that included both closed-ended questions (for quantitative analysis) and open-ended questions (for qualitative analysis).

Creating a questionnaire may seem simple, especially when compared to the methodologically and logistically more complex scientific experiments in technical or medical fields. However, the fact that we only have one chance to collect data makes the process of preparing the questionnaire very important. Therefore, it is crucial to understand what our research subject entails. It is important for us to use this research to:

- (1) collect relevant sociodemographic data, as an official census has not been conducted in Ukraine for more than twenty years; simultaneously, we can still refer to some sociolinguistic research like Bilaniuk and Melnyk, 2008; Hentschel and Palinska, 2022; Rabanus, 2023; Tsar, 2023, etc;

- (2) collect data on language attitudes in accordance with sociopolitical events in society throughout a person's life (Revolution on Granite in 1990, Orange Revolution in 2004, Revolution of Dignity in 2014, Full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022);
- (3) to explore the internal motivations for the participant's language choice and its possible change;
- (4) learn about the speaker's attitude towards multilingualism and the situations that encourage such an attitude.

Dillman (1978, cited in Schleeef 2014) states that questionnaires can be roughly divided into five types depending on their focus: behaviour, beliefs, knowledge, attitudes, and attributes. In fact, our questionnaire (see Appendix D) is designed so that its different sections focus on different points from this list. Firstly, we use the attributive part, i.e. the one with general questions, where we collect data about respondents' features. Secondly, we focus on behaviour by asking the participants about their linguistic habits in different contexts. Thirdly, we attempt to elicit their attitudes, giving them the opportunity to express their feelings and emotions about language use. In fact, we do not verify the participants' language knowledge; instead, we ask them to declare it themselves. Schleeef (2014) suggests using the word '*item*' instead of '*question*' when referring to the questions in the questionnaire, since they are not always actual questions. He also underlines the importance of a clear distinction between instructions and questions/items. In our case, this problem is omitted because the software we used, i.e., Google Forms, allows a section description box for general instructions and a question box for the question itself. Thus, we do not need this differentiation; therefore, we will use the term 'question' for any actual question or statement that requires a response in the questionnaire.

However, Schleeef (2014, p. 48) outlines the key rules of *question/item* creation. Having summarised his recommendations, we can say that one should:

- ✓ create short, simple, natural-sounding sentences that are unbiased, clear, and unambiguous;
- ✓ avoid potentially loaded words, acronyms, abbreviations, technical terms, colloquialisms, all-inclusive or all-exclusive words;

- ✓ include only questions that respondents are likely to have sufficient background to answer;
- ✓ refrain from any sensitive questions unless it is absolutely necessary as in case of the present study;
- ✓ be as concise as possible.

Generally, all the questions can be divided into closed-ended and open-ended questions. Closed-ended questions are those that provide a set of possible answers that are previously arranged, so the possible answers are limited. Once collected, these answers can be analysed, which is an advantage. On the other hand, one cannot collect complex data on beliefs and ideas using this format (see more De Vaus, 2002). Many types of questions can be considered in a closed-ended format. They include yes/no questions (e.g. stating the fact of language change), checklists (e.g. choosing the languages the person speaks), rankings (e.g. ranking the languages they know best to worst), rating scales, semantic differential questions, true-false questions, and so on. In our research, we utilise some of these question formats, including checklists, multiple-choice questions, and rating scales.

Open-ended questions provide more room for respondents to express their own thoughts and ideas but are also more challenging to analyse quantitatively. First, if such questions are optional, many respondents often leave them unanswered. To address this issue, we made the most important of these questions mandatory. However, not all open-ended questions in our questionnaire are mandatory, as we were concerned that respondents might abandon the survey completion altogether; for instance, providing the reasons for their language choice was optional. We attempted to use them sparingly and mixed closed-ended questions with open-ended ones. However, we also followed Schlee's (2014, p.49) advice to place them toward the end of the questionnaire rather than at the beginning. The prevailing types of open-ended questions that we use are short-answer questions and questions of clarification (that follow a closed-ended question).

Typically, a typical questionnaire consists of an introduction, a middle section, and a conclusion. Schlee (2014) outlines the layout of the introduction as follows:

(1) the title of the questionnaire; (2) a brief explanation of the purpose of the research and who is responsible for conducting the study; (3) a polite request to fill in the questionnaire fully and honestly; (4) a short outline of what the questionnaire will cover and how long it will take to complete; (5) a promise of anonymity and confidentiality (see Dörnyei, 2003: 93ff., for anonymity in longitudinal studies where data from the same individual have to be matched); (6) the researcher's name, institution, and contact details; and (7) an expression of thanks.

Schleef, 2014, p.50

Given that the questionnaire was conducted by means of Google Forms, we decided to locate a brief message including all these points in the preamble of the first section (see Appendix D). However, a more detailed explanation of the purpose was also outlined in the message we sent to our potential respondents, along with the link to the questionnaire. This message took different forms of expression, depending on the communication channel used (please find a more detailed explanation on how we disseminated information about the questionnaire in Chapter 4.2.2. Data Collection).

The middle section of the questionnaire is the most important part, as it helps us extract the information we need to analyse. Many experts recommend placing demographic questions at the very end of the questionnaire (e.g. Dörnyei, 2003; Dyer, 2006; Schleef, 2014). However, demographic questions served two purposes in our research: (1) to gather actual demographic data and (2) to filter respondents appropriate for the scope of our study, as the questionnaire addressed both students and teachers. That was the reason why they were put at the beginning of the questionnaire. It is recommended that the length of this part of the questionnaire does not exceed 30-50 questions (Schleef, 2014). The longest option (the one for teachers) of the main body of our questionnaire contains 21 questions, but some of them are grid questions and more than a single question is decoded in it.

The concluding section reiterates that personal data are protected, and respondents are required to confirm their consent to the processing of their personal data. Additionally, this section invites the respondent to participate in the next stage of the research, i.e., an individual interview. The informants who agreed on this are asked to provide their email address or another communication channel for future correspondence.

Given that our questionnaire consists of six sections, we chose to display a progress indicator to respondents as they complete it. This allows them to understand their current position within the questionnaire and manage their time accordingly.

Next, I will present a more detailed layout of the questionnaire we developed. The first stage of our research involved creating a questionnaire for the two main groups the research focuses on: (i) university students and (ii) university teachers. The main questions we are interested in are whether or how the actual situation differs from what is written in the law and how events in Ukraine have affected the choice of language in the academic environment since Ukraine regained its Independence in 1991. The questionnaire consists of 6 sections (see the original questionnaire layout in Appendix D). They are:

- Respondent's general information
- Respondent's background in an educational institution
- Respondent's student experience
- Respondent's teaching experience if any
- Dynamics of language choice in academia
- Dynamics of language choice in private life

At the preamble of the questionnaire, the respondent can read a short introduction about our research and the people involved in it. We also state that the purpose of the questionnaire is not to assess the respondents' personal judgments and that it is completely anonymous. What is more, we indicate the approximate amount of time that the questionnaire will take. Lastly, we highlight the opportunity to choose more than one option in most questionnaire questions. This last part of the preamble was added after pilot test of the questionnaire.

The first section focuses on personal language use and elicits the data that we are going to compare to those obtained in the following chapters. It contains only two questions: "Q.1.1. What is (are) your mother tongues?" and "Q.1.2. What is (are) the language(s) that you use most often in your daily life?". Both questions provide multiple-choice answers. The combination of these questions provides us with the opportunity to determine whether a respondent is bilingual and how they identify their mother tongue(s), thereby revealing their (former) linguistic identity.

The second section focuses on collecting general information about the respondent (e.g., age, gender, educational background). Despite some scholars recommending to ask these questions at the end of the questionnaire, we need to collect them in order to branch the questionnaire for (a) students, and (b) teachers. The questions that compose this section are: “Q.2.1.What is your age group?”, “Q.2.2.What is your sex?”, “Q.2.3.Where (1) were you born, (2) received school education, (3) was your constant residence before the Russian full-scale invasion, (4) do you live now?”, “Q.2.4.What is your level of education?”, “Q.2.5.What is your major?”. The Q.2.1. and Q.2.2. are single-choice questions that allow us to extract demographic data from our participants. The Q.2.3. is a grid question that also allows checking more than one box for a single question but optimises the form completion experience for the informant and allows us to collect the data on the living conditions that might have influenced language choice. The Q.2.4. is a single-choice question that allows us to understand how much academic experience the respondent has. The Q.2.5. is a single-choice question with the option “other”, where the informant can indicate what scientific field they come from, as this can also influence the linguistic choice in academia.

The third section comprises questions about the informants’ student experience. This section is to be completed by both current students and ex-students. The questions of the section are: “Q.3.1. What is(are) the language(s) that your teachers used during classes?”, “Q.3.2. What is(are) the language(s) that you used with (1) classmates, (2) teachers?”, “Q.3.3. What influenced your language choice?”, “Q.3.4. Indicate the HEI where you study/were studying?”, “Q.3.5. Have you ever had any teaching experience in HEI?”. The first two questions are multiple-answer questions. The Q.3.1. is aimed at eliciting all the possible languages that the students were exposed to by their teachers, while Q.3.2. discovers the number of languages that students themselves consider acceptable for formal and informal academic communication. The Q.3.3. provides the information on motivations to use a certain language and the motives for change in language attitude. The Q.3.4. gives us the opportunity to track geographical position and, thus, the academic environment. The Q.3.5. is used for branching the questionnaire between those who can provide some valuable data on teaching and those who cannot.

The fourth section regards teaching, which is to be answered only by the informants who declared themselves to be teachers in HEI in Q.3.5. This section of the questionnaire included the following questions: “Q.4.1. What is(are) the language(s) that you use during lectures, seminars, workshops, etc?”, “Q.4.2. What is(are) the language(s) that you use to communicate (1) with colleagues in the formal domain, (2) with colleagues in the informal domain, (3) with students during personal communications, e.g. working on research together?”, “Q.4.3. Indicate the HEI where you teach.”. The Q.4.1. is aimed to elicit all the possible languages that the teacher sees as eligible for academic domain, i.e. communicating with the students. It is a multiple-choice question, so the respondent can select more than one option. The Q.4.2. is a Likert-type question that also allows checking more than one box for a single question but optimises the user experience for the respondent. This question aims to prompt the respondent to consider the various levels within academic domains. The Q.4.3. is a short-answer question. In fact, this answer allows us to check that the person answering the questions from this chapter is not doing it by accident and declares their teaching experience.

The fifth section is a part of the qualitative data collection. It includes “Q.5.1. What internal or external factors influence your language choice in academic communications now?” and “Q.5.2. In what language(s) do you think the educational process in Ukraine should take place in the future? Why?”. The purpose of these long-answer questions is to identify language priorities in academia, gain insights from the inside, and identify trends that may drive change. The respondents are encouraged to describe their thoughts, feelings, and motivations regarding language choice in academia.

The sixth section focuses on studying the influence of socio-political and historical events on language choice. The aim of this section is to investigate the influence of socio-political factors on the choice of language and to trace changes in the language choice of teachers and students. The questions that make up this section contribute to the achievement of this aim, namely: “Q.6.1. Has your language choice changed in academic communication in formal situations after (1) Ukraine gained Independence (1991), (2) the Orange Revolution (2004), (3) the Revolution of Dignity

(2014), (4) the full-scale Russian invasion (2022)?”, “Q.6.2. If yes, why?”, “Q.6.3. Has your language choice changed in academic communication in informal situations after (1) Ukraine gained Independence (1991), (2) the Orange Revolution (2004), (3) the Revolution of Dignity (2014), (4) the full-scale Russian invasion (2022)?”, “Q.6.4. If yes, why?”. The Q.6.1. and Q.6.3. are Likert-type questions aimed to let the informants self-assess the level of change in their linguistic behaviour. The Q.6.2. and the Q.6.4 are non-obligatory long-answer questions where people can reflect on the reasons that caused their language shift or the reasons that made them stick to their L1.

Additionally, the questionnaire includes consent for the processing of the received data and an invitation to participate in the subsequent stages of the research.

Prior to the official distribution of the questionnaire, a pilot test was conducted with three voluntary participants. The purpose of this pre-test was to assess the clarity and functionality of the questionnaire. Upon receiving feedback from the participants, we determined that the average time to complete the questionnaire was approximately 12 minutes. Additionally, the feedback provided allowed for the refinement of several question formulations to enhance clarity and reduce potential misunderstandings. We also added some extra instructions on the completion of the form to its description. These adjustments were made to ensure the validity and reliability of the questionnaire in the subsequent stages of data collection.

Given the focus on bi/multilingualism in Ukraine in our research, we addressed the issue of which language the informants should be addressed in the questionnaire. We decided for Ukrainian. The choice to present the questionnaire in Ukrainian was motivated by the following reasons:

- the state language of Ukraine is Ukrainian, so it is natural to find it in official communications in Ukraine;
- the Ukrainian language is the only *lingua franca* for all Ukrainian citizens.

The questionnaire was created by means of Google Forms software due to its (1) accessibility, (2) user-friendly interface, and (3) simplicity in (up)loading data. What is more, it does not require registration from the respondents, which makes them more eager to participate because in that way their anonymity is guaranteed. More

information on the processes of administering, distribution, and data collection is described in the following subchapter.

4.2.2. Data Collection

As mentioned before, we piloted the questionnaire on three volunteer participants. Having received their feedback, we implemented the improvements into the questionnaire body. In fact, these were additional instructions regarding the Google Forms interface when displayed on mobile devices.

The target audience of the questionnaire was university students and teachers, both current and previous. The primary method of distributing the questionnaire was through email. We manually collected the institutional email addresses of university teachers, university student unions, and university administration using the official websites of the selected universities. Then, we sent the invitation letters, where we introduced ourselves, presented the aim of our research, and kindly asked them to participate and share the questionnaire with their colleagues, students, and teachers. This resulted in a certain surplus of informants with the role of teacher. The student unions were not efficient enough in contacting the students. That is why we decided to send short messages to student channels on social media (primarily Telegram). We asked people, even those who were not going to complete it, to share the questionnaire with their friends in order to (1) reach a wider audience, and (2) increase the age variation of the respondents. This strategy was partially successful, as the age group of 18-24, which comprises 54.8% of the informants, is nearly equal to the distribution of the other age groups (15.5% are 25-34 years old; 11.3% are 35-44; 11.7% are 45-54). The number of people in the age groups 55-64 and 64+ is lower (5.4% and 1.3%, respectively), as people of this age in Ukraine are less accustomed to using computers or social media, and completing Google Forms might have been difficult for them.

The questionnaire was open from August 2023 to January 2024. Within this period, we have received answers from 240 respondents. There were 121 positive responses to participate in the possible subsequent stages of the research (i.e., individual interviews). However, some people left blank the text box where they should

have indicated their contact information, and since we were not collecting their personal data, we were unable to contact them ever again.

The potential challenges we expected to face included the timing of questionnaire completion, the accuracy of informants' memories, and the ability to dedicate sufficient time to open-ended questions. Since we cannot track the number of people who opened the questionnaire but never finished it, no comments can be made on this issue. However, we can claim that the open-ended questions received more attention than we expected. In fact, many people answered such questions with a full sentence or more, even for those items that were not obligatory to be completed. This fact might be connected to the high sensitivity of the topic at the moment of data collection and the emotional need to express their views.

Once all the answers were collected, we downloaded the data in Excel format and automatically assigned a unique identification number to each informant. Since the data contained both numerical and textual answers, we had to create a separate copy of the file to analyse the numerical data only. The analysis of the data collected can be found in Chapter 4.4. Language Choice in Academia in Ukraine, Chapter 4.5. Views for the Future, and Chapter 4.6. Language Choice and Factors for Its Change.

4.2.3. The informants' description

Detailed data analysis requires some preparation and effort to display the data itself. Therefore, the first stage of our analysis is to “clean” the data (i.e., unify it), which means, for instance, getting rid of incorrectly filled-out questionnaires. Actually, since people could freely distribute the questionnaire, it was sometimes filled out by individuals without the necessary prior requirements, such as those who studied outside of Ukraine.

The first stage of data unification involved determining whether all participants met the research criteria. The key criterion is their role in the higher education system of Ukraine, that is, having experience as a recipient or provider of educational services. In fact, since the questionnaire was distributed mainly through university environments, no problems arose at this stage.

The next step was to generalise regional variability of the universities the informants are connected to. As noted earlier, the main focus of the study is on four geographical regions of Ukraine and their largest cities, namely: Kyiv, Kharkiv, Odesa, and Lviv. To clarify the data, we manually reviewed all responses and determined that some respondents (1) did not fall under the specified geographical criteria (for example, respondent 89 was educated in Poland and has no experience teaching at a higher education institution in Kyiv, Kharkiv, Odesa, or Lviv), or (2) did not have any higher education experience at all or incorrectly indicated this experience, but did not leave contact details for clarification (for example, respondent 78 noted that he “already received education”, but indicated the level of education as “completed secondary education”). There were also respondents who were able to be contacted for clarification of the data (for example, respondent 10 clarified that she is indeed a student at National Technical University “Kharkiv Polytechnic Institute” (KhPI)). Additionally, a more detailed review of the questionnaires enabled us to understand certain details of conditionally unformatted answers. For example, respondent 73 received an education in the city of Chernivtsi, which does not meet our criteria. However, this respondent conducts his teaching activities in Kyiv. In general, at this stage, we eliminated the use of data obtained from the following ten informants: 13, 52, 68, 69, 71, 78, 86, 89, 154, and 231. Thus, the number of questionnaires to be processed is 230, and the informants’ IDs were redistributed to them again, resulting in N=230 as the final number of participants. The list of informants, along with their basic variables, can be found in Appendix F.

After cleaning the data from conditionally erroneous ones, we proceed to the description of quantitative data, that is, the statistics of the study participants. Actually, at this stage, it already becomes clear how diverse the sample is. The first thing we should note is that out of the 230 questionnaires that we found suitable for analysis, 162 individuals (70.4%) do not have teaching experience, while 68 individuals (29.6%) do. Although only 29.6% of respondents have teaching experience, not all of the remaining respondents were students at the time of the questionnaire. Some of them belong to the older age group and reflect on their own past student experience. This allows us to broaden the analysis of the language situation in higher education

institutions, covering a wider time perspective. Having processed the final list of respondents, we can describe our sample according to the following parameters:

Age

The distribution of participants by age may appear uneven, as the vast majority of questionnaire participants are individuals aged 18 to 24, namely 55.65%. The distribution of the remaining participants is as follows: 16.09% belong to the 25-34 group, 10% to the 35-44 group, 11.3% to the 45-54 group, 5.65% to the 55-64 group, and 1.3% to the 65+ group. However, these results are due to the fact that 18 to 24 is the average age of any Ukrainian student. In Ukraine, people typically finish school at 17 and then pursue a university education for four to six years. In fact, the role of a teacher is much more evenly distributed by age categories than by the age of students as you can see in Figure 1).




Figure 1. Teaching Experience According to the Parameter of Age

To test this hypothesis, we separately analysed the age of everyone who indicated their teaching experience. As we expected, when taking into account only those with teaching experience, just 4.41% of them were people aged 18 to 24; 14.71% – those aged 25-34; 27.94% – 35-44; 17.65% – 45-54; 30.88% – 55-64; 4.41% – 65+.

Gender

When developing our questionnaire, we were not sure whether to include the gender parameter at all. This parameter does not directly affect the obtained

questionnaire data and does not shape our sample. However, we finally decided to keep this parameter, as it is believed that women tend to give more detailed answers (see Schleef, 2014). Therefore, later it will be possible to test this hypothesis when analysing qualitative data. Currently, we can say that of all participants in our questionnaire, the number of women is 160 (69.57%), non-binary individuals are 3 (1.30%), and men are 67 (29.13%). Actually, these data also confirm the statements that, in general, women are more open to participating in surveys, questionnaires, etc.

Education

The next important parameter of the study is education, in particular the level and field of education. The main task of the questionnaire was to cover the most diverse categories of respondents with higher education. At the same time, one of the challenges that arose during the analysis was the ambiguity of the perception of educational levels, due to the reforms of the higher education system in Ukraine, described in the previous sections.

In particular, among young people, there is a widespread belief that obtaining a bachelor's degree does not constitute the completion of higher education without obtaining a master's degree. At the same time, although a master's degree does indeed correspond to the level of complete higher education in Ukraine, a bachelor's degree is a distinct qualification level that provides graduates with suitable professional opportunities. Additional difficulties in understanding the educational system are created by categories such as “спеціаліст/specialist”, which was abolished and equated to a master's degree after Ukraine joined the Bologna Charter.

Furthermore, unlike in European countries, in Ukraine, the perception of the difference between the scientific degrees of “Candidate of Sciences” (PhD-equivalent) and “Doctor of Sciences” (DSc or Higher Doctorate) remains significant, especially among the older generation. This indicates the persistence of traditional ideas about the academic hierarchy and the need for further popularisation of the modern system of scientific qualifications.

As we can see from the data obtained, there are 79 participants (34.35%) who have already completed secondary education and are currently pursuing higher

education; 41 (17.83%) have already received a bachelor's degree, and 56 (24.35%) have received a master's degree. Most of them are students without teaching experience. 39 respondents (16.96%) have received a Candidate of Sciences degree, and 15 (6.52%) have received a Doctor of Sciences degree. These data also confirm the previous conclusions about the age distribution of participants, because in Ukraine, the right to teach is held by Candidates of Sciences, Doctor of Sciences, and sometimes, depending on the qualification, by holders of a master's degree.

One of the important aspects of the study, along with the respondents' level of education, is also their educational field. This issue assumes particular significance in relation to the historical and sociolinguistic factors discussed in the previous sections.

Historically, the language environment of educational institutions has been subject to significant external control, particularly during periods of imperial domination – the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union, and partial Russian occupation since 2014. However, despite such restrictions, certain educational fields demonstrated a higher level of Ukrainianisation than others. This phenomenon had often not only political but also purely practical reasons. Thus, in the fields of linguistics, cultural studies, ethnography and other humanitarian disciplines, the objects under study often served as carriers of the Ukrainian linguistic tradition. This contributed to the preservation of linguistic and cultural elements even during periods of repression and prohibitions.

Instead, disciplines of technical, medical, or theoretical nature were mostly integrated into the general imperial educational space, which led to their transmission through official sources, primarily in Russian language. In this context, the mechanism of terminological borrowings played an important role: new concepts in the field of science and technology were first adapted in the Russian language, after which Ukrainian and other languages of the peoples of the empire already perceived them in this form or modified them in accordance with their own phonetic and morphological norms. This led to a deeper integration of Russian-language terminological systems into national scientific discourses and a further strengthening of their role in assimilation.

An important methodological challenge in studying this parameter was that respondents were given the opportunity to independently determine the affiliation of their educational direction with a particular field of science (academic major). As it turned out later, some majors do not have a clear classification in the minds of the respondents, which caused a certain variability in the answers.

In view of this, we consider it necessary to emphasise that the data obtained primarily reflect the subjective perception of the respondents. At the same time, the mechanisms for controlling and validating the answers turned out to be insufficient to completely eliminate possible misunderstandings, which should be taken into account when interpreting the results. In any case, we attempted to summarise the answers of our informants as accurately as possible, but we do not guarantee that someone who chose “technical sciences” does not actually belong to the “law and economics” category or vice versa. The data we obtained indicate that 45.22% of the informants have a major in Humanities; 21.74% classified themselves as owners of a major in Law and Economics; 18.70% as in Medicine and Natural Science; and 14.35% as in Technical Sciences.

Geographical parameter

The geographical component plays a key role in shaping the language situation in Ukraine since regional variability is observed both within the Ukrainian language itself (dialectal differentiation or [lack of] tendency to use Surzhyk) and in the use of languages of national minorities, which are usually restricted to certain regions (e.g., Hungarian in Transcarpathia; Polish in Lviv region (the use of which was also mentioned by some teachers from the Lviv University). Taking this factor into account is important for a correct analysis since the study of exclusively large urban centres could distort the overall picture of the language environment; language practices in peripheral areas often differ significantly from those recorded in administrative centres (as proven by Census 2001 data).

In view of this, to obtain representative data, it was decided to include in the questionnaire some questions that allow for tracing the geographical trajectory of respondents. Specifically, questionnaire participants were asked to indicate their (1)

place of birth (Figure 18), (2) region of secondary education (Figure 19), (3) place of permanent residence before the start of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine (Figure 20), and (4) place of permanent residence at the time of filling out the questionnaire (Figure 21). The visualised data of the answers can be found in Appendix E. This approach allows not only to assess the spatial distribution of language practices, but also to trace the potential impact of migration processes on respondents' language choices.

It is also important to note that, according to the official administrative division, Ukraine is a unitary state, which includes 27 regions: 24 oblasts/regions, 1 autonomous republic (the Autonomous Republic of Crimea), and 2 cities with special status: Kyiv and Sevastopol. In fact, these administrative regions became the option of choice for the respondents.

The data obtained indicate a certain geographical concentration of respondents, which is particularly due to the specificity of the sample, focusing on representatives of higher education institutions in specific cities. The study mainly includes residents of Odesa (&region), Lviv (&region), the City of Kyiv and the Kyiv region. These cities dominate the answers regarding place of birth, secondary education and permanent residence before the start of the full-scale invasion.

At the same time, it is worth noting the relatively low number of respondents from Kharkiv (&region), which probably reflects the consequences of military operations (it has been bombed on daily basis). The survey coincided in time with the first massive wave of missile attacks on Ukraine's energy infrastructure. Although the consequences of these attacks were felt throughout the country, Kharkiv, as a city located closer to the front line, was subjected to particularly intense threats. Under these conditions, the city's residents were forced to spend more time in bomb shelters, suffered from sleep disturbances due to air raids, and focused their resources on solving critical life tasks rather than participating in research surveys. Given these circumstances, we extend our special gratitude to the residents of Kharkiv, who, despite difficult conditions, found the opportunity to participate in the study.

Conducting the questionnaire after the start of full-scale Russian aggression significantly affected the composition of the sample, since a significant part of potential

participants: (1) changed their place of residence and educational institutions, (2) went abroad due to the destruction of their own homes, (3) ended up in temporarily occupied territories and could refrain from participating in the questionnaire due to security and confidentiality considerations, (4) became victims of war. Another important nuance is the sharp increase in the number of people who chose the “Other” option (understood as being abroad) in the question of permanent residence after 2022. This indicates the number of refugees who left for other countries but continue their studies in an online format in Ukraine. Thus, the results obtained reflect not only the language and educational situation but also a wide range of socio-demographic changes caused by military circumstances.

Geographical coding of educational institutions and teaching activities. In order to systematise the geographical parameter in the sample, we introduced standardised labelling for higher education institutions. To do this, all universities indicated by informants were manually coded according to their location. If the institution is located in Kyiv, it was assigned the label “edu: Kyiv” (30.43%), in Kharkiv – “edu: Kharkiv” (9.57%), in Odesa – “edu: Odesa” (32.17%), in Lviv – “edu: Lviv”(26.52%). In cases where the respondent received education in another region or abroad, the labelling “edu: other” (1.30%) was used (but these people participated since they are teaching in one of the chosen regions).

A similar approach was used to classify the teaching activities of the respondents. If the respondent works as a teacher in Kyiv, he was given the label “teach: Kyiv”, respectively for other cities – “teach: Kharkiv”, “teach: Odesa”, “teach: Lviv”. For the informants who have student experience in one of the targeted locations but whose teaching experience is outside these cities or abroad, we used the label “teach: other”, and for those who do not have any teaching experience, we used the label “teach: none” (71.30%). This method allowed the structure of the data and ensured their comparability in further analysis. To standardise and compare the data, we took the number 66 (the total number of respondents with teaching experience) as 100%. This allowed us to normalise the indicators and ensure a proportional representation of the distribution of characteristics among this group of respondents. Thus, we obtained the following data: “teach: Kyiv” (18.18%), “teach: Kharkiv”

(10.61%), “teach: Odesa” (18.18%), “teach: Lviv” (48.48%), and “teach: other” (4.55%).

Thus, it can be assumed that the high concentration of teachers who were working in Lviv at the time of the questionnaire is due to the same factors as the relatively low level of involvement of respondents from Kharkiv. Moreover, despite the even distribution of requests between regions, the sample obtained from Kharkiv is smaller, which is probably indirectly explained by the security situation.

Native language(s)

The results obtained provide a general idea of the sample, but the central aspect of the study remains the language issue. Before analysing language practices in higher education institutions where respondents work or study, it is necessary to consider their language background. Particular attention should be paid to the issue of “mother tongue” (=L1), since it is key to understanding linguistic identity and language choice.

As noted earlier, respondents had the opportunity to choose more than one option when indicating their ‘native language’²³⁰. However, empirical data demonstrate that the majority of respondents identify only one language as their “mother tongue” (=L1). This trend is likely due to several sociolinguistic factors that reflect the unique characteristics of the language situation in Ukraine. Among them, three main ones can be distinguished:

- (1) Non-accommodational bilingualism: despite daily contact with two languages – usually Ukrainian and Russian – a significant part of the population prefers one of them within the framework of their own linguistic identity, which is a characteristic feature of the language environment in Ukraine (see Pavlenko, 2008, 2010; Kulyk, 2011; Bilaniuk, 2010; Hentschel & Palinska, 2022).
- (2) Military context and emotional factors: at the time of the study, public sentiment towards the Russian language was largely determined by the full-

²³⁰ See the problem of this term described in Chapter 1.4. Terminology

scale Russian invasion, which could have influenced the answers of informants (see Hentschel & Palinska, 2022; Kulyk, 2023; Tsar, 2023).

(3) Surzhyk as a factor of uncertainty: in some regions of Ukraine, the use of Surzhyk is widespread. For individuals who employ such hybrid practices in their daily lives, the issue of native language may remain uncertain or variable (see Bilaniuk, 2004; Pavlenko, 2008, 2010; Danylenko, 2016; Hentschel & Palinska, 2022).

In addition to the above groups, among the informants there were also native speakers of languages other than Ukrainian and Russian, but their share in the study was rather insignificant – only 6 people (four of whom chose their language as the only L1 while 2 combined that with Russian or Russian and Ukrainian, see Figure 2). This confirms that the issue of linguistic identity in Ukraine remains binary in the public consciousness, despite the country’s actual linguistic diversity.



Figure 2. Informants’ declared L1(s)

However, the question of defining one’s native language here does not reflect linguistic diversity, but rather indicates certain social, cultural or political choices of people. Mentioning Ukrainian as a native language does not always indicate communication in Ukrainian in everyday life. This is evidenced by the data from the question “Q.1.2. What is(are) the language(s) that you use most often in your daily life?” (see Figure 3): although a significant part of the informants indicated only Ukrainian or only Russian as the language of daily communication, the majority still

combine several, which can be interpreted in unison with the answer “accommodate to the environment”. We can also see several examples where languages atypical for Ukraine are indicated, such as Japanese or English. This is more likely to indicate work for foreign companies, the use of the language for academic purposes, or a marriage to a foreigner, especially considering that these languages were not mentioned among the L1s.




Figure 3. Informants' declared everyday languages

To summarise the profile of our informants, the share of youth in our sample is quite notable. This can be explained by their better competencies in technology. The bigger share of informants whose current residence is in the western part of Ukraine is due to internal displacement of people as a consequence of the Russian-Ukrainian war. Informants' L1 varies, but for the majority it is Ukrainian. There also are some people with L1 unusual for Ukraine, but their share is insignificant. As for the languages of everyday use, Ukrainian still dominates, even though the use of exclusively Russian or the combination of both together equals two-thirds of the number of those with Ukrainian L1. Table 18 in Appendix F displays summary data on background characteristics of informants.

4.3. Interviews

4.3.1. Methodology

As Schleef (2014) notes, questionnaires mostly provide us with numerical data, so the people behind this data are often forgotten. In order to enliven the data received, we decided to conduct semi-structured interviews and see how the data we received are situated in real life.

The interview is a research instrument that allows us to collect data with greater depth and meaning than that collected via a questionnaire. The interview situation aims to provide access to the “internal” world of the interviewees, revealing their perceptions and motivations behind certain language choices, and investigating constructs such as attitudes, beliefs, motivations, and identity. Although the use of language during the interview may sometimes attract our attention, these interviews are not aimed at collecting sociolinguistic data in its original sense.

Before working on interviews as a method of this research, we reviewed the other types of interviews, their drawbacks and the difficulties that might occur. The first difficulty in using interviews in research lies in the fact that they can be defined and utilised in various ways. For some, an interview is a methodology, an approach, and for others, it is a technique, a tool used “for a greater purpose”. Moreover, as Prior (2018) notes, an interview can be a study in itself or complement other research methods (for example, as a follow-up interview does). However, in any case, the important features of an interview remain the asymmetric participant format (the interviewer always has more “power”, they control the course of the interview; the listener/reader learns new things only about the guest) and partial or complete predetermination.

Another difficulty is that interviews have evolved into a variety of social practices over time. The general public is already accustomed to various formats of (non-scientific) interviews and has been directly or indirectly involved in many formats before reaching adulthood (see Edley & Litosseliti, 2010). Among them, we could mention healthcare surveys, political polls, Instagram Reels interviews, police questioning, TV talk shows, and so on. That is why potential interviewees have certain

expectations about the interview process itself. At the same time, Briggs (1986) argues that these expectations may vary across different socio-cultural contexts.

Schaeffer (1991) notes that the use of standardised interviews may distort the results, as the questions provided may prompt the interviewee to a certain view of their life without capturing the actual experience. Prior (2018) refers to it as a problem of “ecological²³¹ validity”, which, in his opinion, can be solved by numerous piloting materials.

Given all the above caveats, we set out to explore different interview formats to determine if semi-structured interviews were the most suitable approach. The first obstacle that we faced was that the standardised type of interview does not exist. The interviewer is responsible for selecting the interviewing techniques according to the research design and needs. What is more, the interviewer should take into account their personal communicative style and the psychological stance of the communicative situation. Roulston (2010) suggests that introverted interviewers tend to choose more structured interview formats. Despite the vast variety of interview formats, here we will focus on structured, open-ended, semi-structured, and focus group interviews, anticipating that we decided for “semi-structured” interviews.

Structured Interviews

This type of interview is distinguished by its rigid nature, where spontaneity rarely takes place. Foley (2012) criticises this type of interview, saying that the interviewees are passive participants of such research. This increases the risks of leaving some topics unexamined even though some of them might be relevant to the research. Simultaneously, Prior (2018) highlights the fact that no type of interview is flawless. He also adds that structured interviews are of great assistance in case the researcher needs to address a large sample of respondents within a limited time. What is more, the researcher must keep in mind that if his L1 differs from the interviewee’s, more misunderstandings might occur during structured interviews. In such cases, the involvement of a mediator or interpreter is highly recommended.

²³¹ by ‘ecological’, we refer to the high degree of correspondence between the conditions in the research setting and the contexts outside the research setting

Open Interviews

This type of interview lies at the opposite end of the spectrum from structured interviews but preserves its unsymmetrical nature. The researcher does define the set of discussion topics prior to the interview. However, the actual questions are usually formulated within a communicative situation considering the perspectives that the interviewee is giving. This way, the interviewee becomes a (more) active participant and co-shapes the process. Richards (2009) underlines the fact that despite many scientists' tendency to call this type of interview unstructured, the underlying organisational structure is just deeper built into the interview.

Open interviews “produce a large amount of data to transcribe, code, and analyse” (Prior, 2018, p.233), which is neither convenient in a limited time nor useful for focusing on specific topics. In simple words, it means that the main problem is that the necessary information (which must be comparable for all informants) may not emerge. On the other hand, the possibility of talking about a topic in one's own words gives the interviewee more freedom and a sense of safety, especially when investigating highly sensitive topics.

Semi-structured Interviews (the chosen type)

Prior (2018) claims that semi-structured interviews are a subtype of structured ones, while we agree with Dörnyei (2007), who defines them as a compromise between the structured and the open ones. He also claims that most interviews within applied linguistics belong to this type even if the design of each of them might differ significantly.

The technical challenges that this interview type puts in front of the scholar include difficulties in comparing participants and generalising findings since the organisational procedure might vary from participant to participant (Prior, 2018). Thus, the preparation process becomes even more important since any improvisation requires greater focus and mental effort. In fact, one of the challenges – memorising what was said – is now overcome thanks to technological advancements. As a result, the interviewer is not obliged to search for a balance between interpersonal communication

and minuting the interview anymore. Conversely, this tool requires recording of the online conversation, which might put pressure on the interviewee, as they might be afraid to be assessed for the way they speak, look, or use particular lexemes.

Focus Group Interviews

This type of interview entails one interviewer (the researcher) and two (conjoint interview) or more (group interview) interviewees. Despite being rarely used in applied linguistics, this type of interview showed its advantages in investigating bilingualism in a social context (Prior, 2018). The groups are usually “formed from *pre-existing units* (e.g., classroom, family, workplace, team) or recruited based on specific characteristics [...] (e.g., gender, social class, [...] occupation)” (Prior, 2018, p.234).

As mentioned earlier, the format of focus groups or group interviews might allow for collecting more sociolinguistic data than one-to-one interviews but taking into account ethical issues (such as social desirability bias, language insecurity, and the influence of the current socio-political context), we decided to avoid using this type of data collection. Due to the rigidity of structured interviews and the ambiguity of the open ones, we settled on semi-structured interviews.

Chosen Interview Layout

Having examined the methods of performing the interviews, we moved on to the design of an interview prompt that meets our research needs. Before moving on to the actual design of the interview prompt, there were several aspects that we had to consider, as they shaped the multidimensional nature of the interviewing process. They are (1) rapport, (2) language, and (3) interculturality.

The question of building rapport between the interviewer and interviewee has been hotly debated by many scholars. According to Atkinson (1998), Seidman (2013), Brinkmann and Kvale (2015), and others, a free and friendly atmosphere facilitates openness and honesty during the interview. Simultaneously, Duncombe and Jessop (2012) define rapport-creating as “faking” friendship, and Spradley (1979) highlights that openness and honesty can take place even without fondness between the interviewer and the interviewee. Prior (2018) summarises this discussion saying that

the use of rapport should cater for the needs of the research and, thus, should be planned during the research design. He emphasised that: “rapport is as much an ethical matter as it is a practical one, great care must be taken to ensure that it is not abused for the sake of getting data” (Prior, 2018, p.239).

The second question we addressed was the choice of language for this communication. In fact, the “language issue” has been a sensitive topic in Ukraine (see Bilaniuk, 2005, 2010; Chernenko, 2010; Ruda, 2012; Boriak, 2013; Shandra, 2013; Kondratiuk, 2014; Danylenko, 2016; Tsar, 2023, etc.) and still is since after the Russian full-scale invasion, the attitudes towards Russian hardened for a part of the population.

Since the interviews followed the questionnaire, we decided to conduct them in Ukrainian as well. This choice is motivated by the fact that people in Ukraine are used to public communications in Ukrainian. Simultaneously, we decided to be flexible with this issue, and, in case the interviewee would choose to speak in any other mutually understandable language (e.g. English), that would be acceptable, or we would go with non-accommodational bilingualism (as explained in Chapter I). The issue of language usually appears if the interviewer’s L1 does not coincide with the interviewee’s L1. In Ukraine, this situation partially resolves itself due to the highly bilingual environment, which often lacks accommodating tendencies when talking about Ukrainian and Russian (see Bilaniuk, 2010; Kulyk, 2011; Hentschel & Palinska, 2022). This, but also a shared cultural background, facilitates the process of comprehension. Taking this into consideration, we believe we also tried to align with the interviewee’s need to keep the option of speaking in their L1 while being interviewed (see Pavlenko, 2007) by suggesting that they speak the language they want. This has particular importance when it comes to autobiographic research.

Last but not least is the issue of interculturality. Since the interviewer is Ukrainian, we might assume that this barrier is significantly lower than during the interviews when the participants are of different origins. We acknowledge that there may be some cultural differences due to age, region of origin, or other social factors. However, their impact can be considered insignificant since the interviewer was a resident of Kyiv, Odesa, and another western city near Lviv and can generally adapt to these environments.

We adopted an exploratory, trial-and-error approach by conducting pilot interviews within the given time constraints. In designing the prompt for our semi-structured interviews, we developed a general framework encompassing key areas of interest. However, we maintained flexibility to adapt should the need arise or if the interviewee demonstrated a particular interest in exploring specific topics in greater depth.

Given that all participants reside in different locations, we opted to use the Zoom platform for video calls and to record the sessions, facilitating more efficient data processing. Consequently, our initial contact with each interviewee was via email, where we briefly reminded them of their participation in the questionnaire research, confirmed their willingness to contribute further, and extended an invitation to take part in the interview.

The pre-established structure of the interview is organised as follows: it begins with a semi-formal greeting, during which the interviewer introduces themselves and assures the interviewee that all communications will remain strictly confidential. The interviewer then provides information about the estimated duration of the interview, encourages the interviewee to ask questions if any aspect is unclear, and reiterates their right to discontinue the interview at any time.

The primary part of the interview begins with the interviewer inquiring about the interviewee's experience in academia (focusing on what kinds and level of communication they encounter). It can also be considered part of the introduction, as it serves as an icebreaker.

The first block of questions includes "Q.1.1. So, our research concerns language laws in Ukraine and their observance in universities. Please tell me, what language laws in education do you know about?", "Q.1.2. Do you consider them relevant today?", "Q.1.3. Do you believe that the language use should be officially controlled or it is a personal responsibility?". This part is aimed at assessing the knowledge of the interviewee about the existing language policies and, if necessary, filling any gaps in their knowledge of the issue.

The second block of questions consists of three questions that focus on eliciting the genuine subjective experiences of the interviewees in their academic environment.

These questions are: “Q.2.1. In your experience, does the real situation differ from that described in the laws? (Has the real situation changed since your studies?)?”, “Q.2.2. For you, is there a difference in the choice of language for communication with colleagues and students? If yes, what is it?”, “Q.2.3. Did you feel comfortable communicating in the university environment with teachers, students, and administration in terms of language use? Why yes/no?”.

The third set of questions examines the challenges encountered by the student or teacher. In fact, not all of these questions might be asked or, on the contrary, some of them might be explored in greater depth depending on the responses. However, the core structure of this block looks the following way: “Q.3.1. What are the problems you face at university that are connected to language policy at the university?”, “Q.3.2. Have you ever faced any difficulties accessing learning materials or participating in activities due to the language barrier?”, “Q.3.3. How inclusive do you think the university is for non-native speakers (e.g. Erasmus students) or speakers of minority languages (e.g. Crimean Tatars)”, “Q.3.4. In your opinion, how should the academic community (and the laws of Ukraine) react to russophones?”, “Q.3.5. How should they interact with the applicants who studied in Russian-speaking schools?”, “Q.3.6. How should students from (potentially) de-occupied territories be integrated?”. Initially, this block aimed to address the interaction with linguistic minorities. However, responses to open-ended questions in the preliminary questionnaire indicated minimal interest in this topic. Instead, many participants highlighted the tension between the use of Ukrainian and Russian languages, resulting in a shift in focus for this part of the interview.

The fourth block of questions includes the following questions: “Q.4.1. Do you think the legal framework for the use of languages in higher education should be changed? If yes, how?”, “Q.4.2. Should applicants be given the opportunity to choose the language they can study in? If yes, what languages could they choose from?”, “Q.4.3. How could the university better support multilingualism and the use of different languages?”. In this part of the interview, we aim to uncover views that participants may be hesitant to express regarding the present situation. By providing them with the opportunity to focus on the future and envision the conditions they would

desire, we gain insight into their intentions concerning language choice. This approach is intended to identify potential trends in the evolving language policies within the academic environment in Ukraine.

The fifth block of questions serves primarily as an opportunity for the interviewee to provide feedback. They can add any thoughts they may have recalled about previously discussed topics, raise issues they believe deserve attention but were not covered, or bring up anything else. The script includes two questions: “Q.5.1. Is there anything else you would like to share about your experience with language use at the university?” and “Q.5.2. Do you have any additional comments on how language policy impacts academic and social life in teaching and/or student environments?”.

After conducting pilot interviews, we revisited the methodological approaches of the study and concluded that additional personalised data should be collected for a full analysis necessary to answer RQ4. In this regard, a separate additional sixth block was included in the interview structure, which was marked as optional from the very beginning. Before it began, respondents provided separate consent. This block was even less structured: the interviewer briefly explained the concept of linguistic biography and invited the interviewee to describe their own. After that, depending on the content of the monologue answer, clarifying questions could be asked. In further analysis, it was this interview fragment (together with the answers to open Q.3.3., Q.5.1., Q.6.2., Q.6.4. in the questionnaire) that served as the analytical basis for forming the answer to RQ4.

Following this, we thank the interviewee for their contribution and encourage them to share any further thoughts on the topic via email, should they wish to express new insights. At this point, the recording stops, and the interviewer once again expresses gratitude to the interviewee for their assistance, concluding the conversation. More information on the processes of administering, reaching out to interviewees, and data collection are described in the next subchapter.

4.3.2. Data Collection

The preparatory phase of the study involved conducting two pilot interviews, the main purpose of which was twofold: (1) to assess the clarity and relevance of the question formulation, and (2) to roughly measure the duration of the online interview. The collected feedback enabled a qualitative revision of the interview script, which is presented in its final form in the previous Chapter 4.3.1. Methodology.

The pilot interviews were conducted in the summer of 2024, while the actual interviews took place in the spring of 2025. In retrospect, it is worth recognising that the time gap between the individual stages of the study, in particular between the initial questionnaire and the subsequent involvement of respondents in the interview, significantly affected the level of their involvement. This gap turned out to be a factor that weakened the connection between the research initiative and the participants' motivation. The conclusion I drew from this situation is that, in the context of a social environment characterised by high dynamics of events and psychological fatigue, even a pause of several weeks can transform the perception of research interaction from a relevant interest to a secondary or burdensome task. Thus, the time factor should be considered as one of the latent but influential parameters of research risk, especially in conditions of war and constant instability.

The first stage in the attempt to establish contact was a targeted communication strategy that combined elements of a unified approach with personalised elements of the appeal. We sent individual emails tailored to the specifics of each respondent, taking into account their previous participation in the questionnaire and status (student/teacher), and, if possible, sent private messages through alternative communication channels, particularly messengers (Telegram, Facebook Messenger, Instagram, etc.).

This mixed approach was chosen due to the flexibility of communication channels in an unstable information environment and taking into account the possible loss of access to institutional email addresses. The personalisation of messages was intended not only to increase the likelihood of a response but also to emphasise research ethics and respect for the time and circumstances of potential participants. The body text of the message included a link to Calendly (calendly.com), a business

communication platform used to plan, prepare, and manage external meetings. The link directed the participant to book a convenient timeslot in the format of the “One-to-One” meeting via Zoom. The participant was also given the opportunity to ask questions before the meeting began. It is worth mentioning that some people enrolled for the meeting but never joined online, and no explanation was provided.

Once all the interviews were conducted, we transcribed them by means of Notta.ai software. Using an automatic text transcription program made it possible to speed up this process. However, since the program did not perform this task perfectly, it was necessary to proofread and edit the transcript, which allowed us to get even better acquainted with the text of the received response. The analysis of the data collected can be found in Chapter 4.4. Language Choice in Academia in Ukraine and Chapter 4.5. Views for the Future, and 4.6. Language Choice and Factors for Its Change.

4.3.3. The interviewees’ description

Based on the results of the questionnaire, we identified individuals who expressed their willingness to participate in further stages of the study, including in-depth interviews. Several selection criteria were developed to create a balanced sample. The first, and at the same time key, parameter was the L1, which was presented in the form of checkboxes, including the option of “Surzhyk”. Given the geographical representativeness, we sought to ensure the presence of at least one respondent with L1 Ukrainian and one with L1 Russian (or L1 Ukrainian + Surzhyk, or L1 Russian + Surzhyk) within each city.

The second selection criterion was the respondent’s position in the academic context: student or teacher. This allowed us to ensure socio-professional variability within the sample, guaranteeing the inclusion of at least one teacher and one student from each location. These parameters became the basis for further stratified randomisation. Separately, although less formally, we also took into account gender balance to the extent possible.

Hence, we intended to recruit at least 16 participants (and potentially 32 if gender was included) out of the 121 individuals who expressed willingness to

participate. However, as is often the case in empirical research, actual engagement did not match the initial declaration: despite the high level of interest, we were able to conduct only 6 interviews. The profiles of the interviewees include key sociodemographic characteristics relevant to the study (see Table 6). Some of the 121 expressed their willingness to fill out another online form but expressed their reluctance or inability to participate in personal conversations. The rest did not respond despite the numerous reminders. Finally, the list of interviewees looks as follows:

Interviewee ID	Participant Profile	
Interviewee 1	L1: Russian	Age: 25-34
	Academic location: Kyiv	Gender: male
	Academic role: teacher	
Interviewee 2	L1: Surzhyk & Ukrainian	Age: 18-24
	Academic location: Kyiv	Gender: male
	Academic role: student	
Interviewee 3	L1: Russian	Age: 45-54
	Academic location: Odesa	Gender: male
	Academic role: teacher	
Interviewee 4	L1: Surzhyk	Age: 18-24
	Academic location: Odesa	Gender: female
	Academic role: student	
Interviewee 5	L1: Ukrainian	Age: 45-54
	Academic location: Lviv	Gender: male
	Academic role: teacher	
Interviewee 6	L1: Russian	Age: 25-34
	Academic location: Lviv	Gender: female
	Academic role: student	

Table 6. Background Characteristics of Interviewees

The situation with respondents from Kharkiv, a city located in close proximity to the zone of active hostilities, deserves special attention. It was this location that caused the greatest difficulties in establishing contact. Given the context, it can be assumed that there were several factors that complicated communication:

(a) some of the potential participants were forced to leave the city, and therefore lost access to or stopped using university email accounts registered in Ukrainian domains;

(b) given the potential scenarios of occupation, sharing one's own thoughts on the language situation could be perceived as risky, especially in conditions when the language issue has acquired high political and ideological tension;

(c) constant shelling, air raids, and other forms of military threat significantly affect the psycho-emotional state of the city's residents, limiting their ability to participate in non-institutional or research activities that are not critical to daily survival.

However, the issue of the absence of respondents from Kharkiv remained methodologically significant for us, so in July 2025, we decided to establish contact with other teachers from that city who had not participated in the previous stages of the research. The aim of this initiative was to discuss two key aspects: (1) their personal experience of implementing language legislation in higher education; and (2) possible reasons, in their opinion, why their colleagues might have refused to participate in the interviews. At the end, we managed to recruit one person through a shared network of university workers. The interviewee's profile is L1: Russian; Academic location: Kharkiv; Academic role: student; Age: 45-54; gender: female. The interviewee was born, raised and educated in Crimea. She kept answering the questions, sticking to the institutional rules and official view of language use, and said that she decided to switch to Ukrainian in her early adulthood as a result of becoming acquainted with the Ukrainian literature. However, she did not share any other personal views on the topic, and thus, we did not include her interview in the analysis. As for the possible reasons for her colleagues' refusal to participate in an online interview, she mentioned the constant bombardments and shellings of the city and the fact that people need more time for resting or doing their ordinary chores. She also highlighted the importance of trust, saying that giving an interview that is being recorded might seem unsafe for people who are under constant threat of occupation by the Russians. All in all, this result did not completely satisfy us (as we had aimed to gather more information about the interviewee's personal views), but we did manage to receive an explanation for why our requests were ignored.

We also managed to reach out to a former student of KNU who is from the Crimea and of Crimean Tatar descent. She said that she had never heard any word in

Ukrainian and had never spoken Russian until she went to school. Within her school experience, her home language remained Crimean Tatar, school language – Ukrainian, and the language she used with friends was Russian. Simultaneously, after the 2014 occupation, she moved to Kyiv in the summer of 2014 and has never spoken Russian ever since. However, again, she was just repeating the norms of the official law without expressing personal opinions, so we did not include her answers in the analysis as well. She also confirmed that some people might be afraid of giving this kind of an interview since their relatives are still living in the occupied territories, and it might be dangerous for them.

4.4. Language Choice in Academia in Ukraine

This section is designed to provide the data analysis to answer RQ 3 “What is the reality of the implementation of LP in academia?”. Sections 3, 4, and 5 of our questionnaire were designed to provide a comprehensive analysis of language choice in academic communication and the factors that influence it. We focused on both internal reasons related to personal changes in respondents and external factors, in particular, socio-political and historical events that could have shaped language behaviour in different periods.

Sections 3 and 4 focus on the language choices of students and teachers as separate categories of informants, considering them in quantitative terms and taking into account their geographical affiliation. This approach allows us to compare the behaviour of different groups and identify patterns in language choice. At the same time, one question was qualitative in nature: “Q.3.3. What influenced your language choice?” It was optional in order to minimise the risk of refusal to complete the questionnaire and concerned the period when respondents gained their language experience. The analysis of the answers to this question will be presented in the Chapter 4.6.1. Questionnaire, which allows us to supplement the quantitative data with in-depth explanations of motivational factors.

Section 5 focuses on current factors influencing language choice at the time of completing the questionnaire. Question “Q.5.1. What internal or external factors

influence your language choice in academic communications now?” allows us to assess current trends and compare them with the informants’ past experience. Despite the optional nature of the question, we received 185 responses, which provides sufficient representativeness for statistical analysis. The next question in this section, “Q.5.2. In what language(s) do you think the educational process in Ukraine should take place in the future? Why?”, allows us to assess promising language priorities in the academic environment and identify respondents’ expectations regarding language education policy.

Section 6 aims to assess the impact of external factors, in particular socio-political upheavals, on language choice. To this end, questions were formulated regarding key historical events: (1) Ukraine’s Independence (1991), (2) the Orange Revolution (2004), (3) the Revolution of Dignity (2014), (4) the Russia’s full-scale invasion (2022). For each event, respondents were asked whether their language choice had changed and were asked to explain the reasons for these changes or the absence of any changes. The analysis encompassed both formal and informal domains of communication, enabling an assessment of the dynamics of language choice in the context of various social and political factors. The data obtained not only should illustrate past and present trends, but also provide a basis for predicting language behaviour in the academic environment of Ukraine.

4.4.1. Students’ Experience in Academia (Q.3.1., Q.3.2.)

At this stage, it is worth recalling that some respondents described only their student experience, others described both their student and teaching experiences, while some spoke exclusively about their own teaching practice. That is why the number of informants whose answers relate to student experience is 227 people. First, we will determine in which languages the educational process is actually conducted in Ukraine. To do this, we will consider the answers to the question “Q.3.1. What is(are) the language(s) that your teachers used during classes?” in relation to the geographical parameter, i.e. depending on the city in which the informants received their education.

In order to obtain the desired results, we selected all participants who had experience of studying in Kyiv, Kharkiv, Odesa or Lviv. Since the answers were

numerous and varied, we decided to group them according to the objectives of this study. Given our interest in the coexistence of Ukrainian and Russian languages, as well as in the actual implementation of resolutions regarding the English language, we focused on the use of these languages in the academic space. In addition, we paid attention to Surzhyk, because its role in Ukrainian society is changing, and the issue of (dis)confirmation of its acceptance in the academic environment is of particular interest to sociolinguistic research in Ukraine. Thus, after processing the answers, we identified the following options for language of instruction used: (1) exclusively Ukrainian; (2) exclusively Russian; (3) Ukrainian and Russian (this also includes mentions of other languages used for teaching certain disciplines, in particular foreign languages, except for English); (4) Ukrainian and English (this also includes references to other languages used for teaching certain subjects, except for Russian); (5) Ukrainian, English and Russian (this also includes references to other languages used for teaching certain subjects); (6) Ukrainian, Russian and Surzhyk; (7) Ukrainian, English and Surzhyk; (8) Ukrainian, Russian, English and Surzhyk (this also includes references to other languages used for teaching certain subjects); (9) Ukrainian and Surzhyk.

Since, there are respondents who received their education exclusively in Russian, as shown in Figure 4, we decided to determine the age category to which they belong, because this practice, after Ukraine gained independence, actually contradicts the legislation. Two of the four informants belong to the 45–54-year age category (edu:Lviv and edu:Kharkiv), one to the 55–64-year category (edu:Odesa), and another to the 34–45-year category (edu:Odesa). Therefore, it can be assumed that three of them might have received their education during the existence of the USSR or before the adoption of the Constitution of Ukraine in 1996. Thus, only one case, recorded in Odesa, can be considered as one that clearly does not meet the current requirements of the legislation.




Figure 4. Geographical distribution of languages of instruction reported by students, absolute numbers

Upon reviewing the data obtained, several important points are worth noting. First, as expected, the use of exclusively Ukrainian is characteristic of the Lviv region. Second, the most even ratio between the use of Ukrainian and Russian is observed in Kyiv. This can be attributed to the fact that the capital traditionally attracts students from all regions of Ukraine, resulting in a more diverse language environment. Third, during the report, it turned out that one of the problems was the lack of definition of the context of English use – that is, we did not distinguish between cases when English was used as the language of instruction of English itself or the language of instruction of other disciplines. Despite this, it can be emphasised that the percentage of mentions of English in Kyiv significantly exceeds similar indicators in other cities. For a visual representation of these observations, let us turn to Figure 5, which shows the distribution of all languages by city, reduced to 100% in each case.




Figure 5. Geographical distribution of languages of instruction reported by students, percentage

The next question – ‘Q.3.2. What is(are) the language(s) that you used with (1) classmates, (2) teachers?’ – allows us to analyse the extent to which respondents distinguish between formal and informal language environments at university. In particular, do they realise the difference in the choice of languages for communicating with teachers and with their fellow students? This approach allows us to consider the perception of different academic domains through the lens of language behaviour.

To analyse this data, we used the same approach as when processing question Q.3.1. However, this time it was necessary to add two more categories of answers: (10) Russian and English, and (11) exclusively Surzhyk. This already indicates that there are more possible language combinations among students that coexist in the academic space. Even though the number of these variations is small compared to the use of only one language, the very fact that students are aware of their language choices is of great analytical importance.

If we consider the results not in absolute terms but in percentages (where 100% represents all informants from one city), we can see that the proportion of students who use Ukrainian in informal settings exceeds 50% in Kyiv and Lviv. As for Kharkiv and Odesa, the data show that in these cities, the ratio between the use of exclusively Ukrainian, exclusively Russian, and a combination of both languages is almost equal.

This observation raises certain questions, as both cities are traditionally considered to be largely russified, and the use of Ukrainian even at a level of around 30% would seem unlikely. Both observations might be traced in Figure 6.




Figure 6. Geographical distribution of languages of informal communication reported by students, percentage

However, several factors should be taken into account:

- (1) the questionnaire was conducted after the start of the full-scale Russian invasion, and this period is known for a boost in national self-identification through language (Kulyk, 2023; Tsar, 2023);
- (2) 55.65% of the informants are respondents aged 18–24, and young people are currently the main drivers of language change in Ukraine;
- (3) the university environment can be perceived as a semi-formal domain, even if communication takes place between peers with the same social status.

Following our previous approach to processing data on language choices, for the analysis of question “Q.3.2. What is(are) the language(s) that you used with (2) teachers?”, we also sorted students’ answers into several categories, focusing on the use of Ukrainian, Russian, English, Surzhyk, and combinations thereof. As a result, the following categories were identified: (1) exclusively Ukrainian; (2) exclusively Russian; (3) exclusively English; (4) Ukrainian and Russian; (5) Ukrainian and English; (6) Ukrainian, Russian and English; (7) Ukrainian, Russian and Surzhyk; (8)

Ukrainian, English and Surzhyk; (9) Ukrainian and Surzhyk. Figure 7 shows the percentage distribution of respondents' answers across these categories.




Figure 7. Geographical distribution of languages of formal communication reported by students, percentage

In this case, when it comes to communication between students and teachers outside the educational process (i.e. not the language of instruction), as well as the student's own language choice (since, although the language of instruction is regulated by law, the final decision still rests with the teacher), we observe a clear tendency towards the predominance of the Ukrainian language – the state language.

As for Kyiv, it is the only city where students selected the option 'English only', although such cases are few, only 1.43%. At the same time, the percentage of those who use 'Ukrainian only' in the capital is quite high – 71.43% (which makes it second in the rating, just after Lviv). It is in Kyiv that the greatest variability in language choices is observed.

In Kharkiv, 63.64% of students represent the minimum proportion among those who self-reported using 'exclusively Ukrainian' for communication in a formal domain. Notably, students from Kharkiv universities did not report any use of Surzhyk or English. Kharkiv is also the city with the highest level of 'exclusively Russian' usage; however, the overall percentage remains low, at 4.45%. The combination of

both Ukrainian and Russian languages accounts for 31.82%, which is the highest proportion compared to the other cities.

In Odesa, the rate of ‘exclusively Ukrainian’ usage is also relatively low – 67.57%. Similar to the situation in Kharkiv, the rate of ‘exclusively Russian’ usage is higher than in Kyiv or Lviv but remains low overall – only 4.05%. A comparable trend can be observed in the use of Surzhyk – 2.7%, which, however, does not create a significant contrast with the indicator of communication between fellow students, where this percentage is 4.05%. In addition, in Odesa, as in Kyiv, other language combinations have been recorded, albeit in small percentages. At the same time, unlike in Kyiv, the number of respondents who reported using English is lower.

In general, the use of Surzhyk in communication with teachers is low in all cities (below 3%). However, as shown in Figure 6, the proportion of Surzhyk use in interactions between fellow students, for instance, in Kharkiv, is significantly higher and reaches the maximum among all cities (13.64%).

Thus, comparing the answers to these questions, we can state that the overall trend is: the more formal the communication is, the more Ukrainian is being used. Anyway, the Ukrainian language remains dominant in academia, although the degree of dominance varies by city and communicative situation. Russian and mixed language practices appear primarily in Kharkiv and Odesa, usually in informal settings.

Kyiv. Ukrainian is clearly dominant in formal communication, with minor Russian and mixed bilingual practices. When talking about the languages of instruction, Kyivan students report decrease to the use of Ukrainian, but it is not Russian that is increasing. The language choice falls for mixed practices (Ukrainian and Russian; Ukrainian, Russian, and English). These three categories make up for about 75%. Informal communication in academic setting in Kyiv is also characterised by the strong prevalence for Ukrainian (about 56%). However, both Russian (10%) and mixed practices (18.57%) are quite widespread as well. Thus, Kyiv shows strong preference for Ukrainian in formal domain in public communication, but still both language of instruction and informal practices reflect bi- and trilingual repertoires. This result suggests high linguistic flexibility.

Kharkiv. Ukrainian still leads as a language of instruction (31%) but such mixed practices as 'Ukrainian, Russian, and English' (22,73%) together with 'Ukrainian and Russian' are quite prominent. (18.18%). Formal domain is definitely dominated by Ukrainian (63.64%). The role of multilingual practices (Ukrainian, Russian, and English) are also impressive and equals 31.82%. The informal domain is presented by a significant use of Russian (18.18%). However, it is not the highest numbers since options 'Ukrainian' and 'Ukrainian and Russian' equal 59.09%. The category 'Ukrainian and Surzhyk' is also spread here (13.64%).

Odesa. In this city, the reported languages of instruction vary between Ukrainian and mixed language practices. Ukrainian still prevails (36.49%), with 'Ukrainian and Russian' being the second option (20.27%). The 'only Russian' category share remains relatively low (2.7%). As for the formal domain, Ukrainian keeps its dominant position (67.57%). The use of both Ukrainian and Russian languages accounts for 21.62%. The other repertoires are present, but in small amounts. Informal communication is characterised by slight dominance of Ukrainian (35.14%), with the categories 'Russian' (22.97%) and 'Ukrainian and Russian' (22.97%) coming right after it. Odesa expresses a pattern similar to Kharkiv, though Ukrainian leads slightly more consistently. What is more, the presence of mixed language practices is quite notable. Russian keeps its strong social presence in informal domain.

Lviv. The academic environment of Lviv is characterised by the highest linguistic homogeneity, where Ukrainian strongly prevails across all domains (as the language of instruction = 68.85%; in formal domain = 85.25%; in informal domain = 86.89%). Minority bi-/multilingual cases are present but rare.

To sum up, Ukrainian serves as a lingua franca in the institutional and educational domains. Russian persists primarily in informal domain, in particular in eastern and southern regions (which is the result of LP in these territories described in Chapter II). Mixed practices appear in all regions, but especially where linguistic boundaries are socially porous (Kharkiv, Odesa). In this case, it mostly means mixing the use of Ukrainian and Russian. English appears mostly within bilingual academic repertoires, not in informal domain. The percentage of English use is higher in Kyiv

and Lviv. The data demonstrate regional variation and context-sensitive multilingualism that is expressed through coexisting multilingual practices.

Examining the data on the question of the language of instruction, we can conclude that the use of Russian in a university context is mostly initiated by representatives of the older generation. The informants provided more details about the reasons that motivated their language choices in their answers to the question “Q.3.3. What influenced your language choice?”, the analysis of which is presented in Chapter 4.6.1.1. Language Choice Motivation as a Student.

4.4.2. Teachers’ Experience in Academia (Q.4.1., Q.4.2.)

As mentioned above, some of the informants describe their teaching experience. That was a separate section in the questionnaire where they were asked to reflect on their language choices in the role of teachers. The questions they had to answer were similar to those for students. In particular, we asked about the language of instruction, language of communication with fellow teachers in both formal and informal domains, and the language of communication with students outside the lectures. Following the pattern of analysis of the students, we attributed the tags “teach: Kyiv”, “teach: Kharkiv”, “teach: Odesa”, “teach: Lviv”, and “teach: other” depending of the universities they are teaching in. The number of informants for this part of the research equals 63, as we consider only those who have teaching experience in one of the four cities under study. Since the number of teachers is unevenly distributed among cities, all data was converted into percentages.

The first question (“Q.4.1. What is(are) the language(s) that you use during lectures, seminars, workshops, etc?”) is aimed at discovering whether the language of instruction really corresponds to that stated in the law and regulatory documents, but also to compare what teachers said with what students did. Here, we should keep in mind that the student experience encompasses a longer time period than that of the teachers. Thus, we considered the answers with regard to the geographical parameter.

In the students’ section, we focused on the use of Ukrainian, English, Russian, and Surzhyk. None of the teachers mentioned Surzhyk in their responses, so we

automatically excluded this category. However, it is quite interesting that Polish is clearly recorded in Lviv. Therefore, we include it in the representative responses. All other foreign languages, as in the analysis of student responses, are excluded. Thus, as you can see in Figure 8, the following categories are formed for analysis: (1) exclusively Ukrainian; (2) exclusively Russian; (3) Ukrainian and English; (4) Ukrainian, English and Polish; (5) Ukrainian and Polish.




Figure 8. Geographical distribution of languages of instruction reported by teachers, percentage

According to the data obtained, Kyiv stands out in that the proportion of those who use English is significantly higher than in other regions. It is also interesting that English is the only additional language (i.e. in addition to Ukrainian) mentioned by teachers in Kyiv. At the same time, compared to the students' answers, it can be said that the teachers' answers are rather formal and reflect the 'letter of the law'.

Odesa shows a similar pattern, except that the proportion of those who use English in combination with Ukrainian is significantly lower – 8.33% compared to 66.67% in Kyiv.

Kharkiv is the only region where teachers generally acknowledge the use of Russian (14.29% compared to 0% in other regions). I would like to remind that Figure 5 shows that the combination of Ukrainian and Russian in teaching averages 20%. It

should also be taken into account that the respondents' student experience covers a longer period of time, probably including the last years of the USSR. If that is the situation reported after 1991, then it is clearly against the law.

Lviv has a higher rate of English use compared to Odesa, but it is interesting to note the emergence of atypical language combinations – Ukrainian and Polish or Ukrainian, English and Polish. In total, these options account for 15.63%. These results in Lviv can be explained by several factors: (1) geographical proximity to Poland; (2) part of Lviv's population having mixed Ukrainian-Polish origins, due to the city's history under the occupation of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Polish Republic (1918–1939); (3) the region's economic and scientific continuity with Poland during periods of crisis.

The next question we're looking at is "Q.4.2. What language(s) do you use to chat with students during personal communications, like when you're working on research together?". This helps us determine if there's a difference for teachers when they interact with students during class versus outside of class, and also allows us to compare these answers with those of the students. The language categories include: (1) exclusively Ukrainian, (2) exclusively Russian, (3) Ukrainian and Russian, (4) Ukrainian and English, (5) Ukrainian, English and Polish and are presented in Figure 9.




Figure 9. Geographical distribution of languages used to interact with students outside the classroom, percentage

The data confirms previous findings that Kyiv is the region where English is most widely used alongside Ukrainian in the educational process. Kharkiv remains the only region where teachers acknowledge the use of Russian. Interestingly, this percentage coincides with the indicator of Russian use in the classroom. The combination of Ukrainian and Russian is also mentioned by informants in Kharkiv and Kyiv. At the same time, Odesa remains more formal: despite the data provided by students, teachers do not recognise the use of Russian separately or alongside Ukrainian. In Lviv, there is a continuing trend towards the use of Polish as an additional language, albeit in very small numbers – only 3.13%.

We see that the reported variability of language choices among teachers is significantly lower than among students. This may be explained by the fact that teachers are more knowledgeable about language legislation, as well as by the fact that during the questionnaire, civil society's attention was focused on the language issue in higher education institutions. Participation in such a questionnaire, even as part of a foreign study, could be perceived as a potential test of their language behaviour.

At the same time, it should be noted that (1) the questionnaire was anonymous for those who did not wish to leave their details, and (2) there are no serious sanctions for violating the legislation on the use of languages. The likelihood of a fine being imposed is low, as this requires a complaint from students to the language ombudsman. However, the evidence shows that such cases exist (for instance, see *Richnyi zvit Pro stan dotrymannia Zakonu Ukrainy "Pro zabezpechennia funktsionuvannia ukrainskoi movy yak derzhavnoi" u 2023 rotsi, Upovnovazhenyi zakhystu derzhavnoi movy*, 2023, pp. 145-164). At the institutional level, university administrators impose disciplinary measures, which can range from a fine or reprimand to dismissal (see Baibak, 2023) or suspension from work (see Baliukh, 2023), on staff members who violate language legislation.

As a next step, we decided to consider the issue of communication with colleagues in (in)formal contexts, starting with the formal domain, i.e. the question "Q.4.2. What is(are) the language(s) that you use to communicate (1) with colleagues in the formal domain?". First and foremost, this referred to university events, department meetings, academic councils, etc. The language categories include: (1)

exclusively Ukrainian, (2) Ukrainian and Russian, (3) Ukrainian and English, (4) Ukrainian, English and Polish and are presented in Figure 10.




Figure 10. Geographical distribution of languages used to interact with fellow teachers in formal domains, percentage

The results show that the trend towards completely formalised responses continues. Absolutely all teachers from Kyiv and Odesa indicated Ukrainian as the language of communication in official situations with fellow teachers. In fact, Ukrainian is present in all variations. In Kharkiv, the category ‘exclusively Russian’ disappeared and the category ‘Ukrainian and Russian’ appeared, with the same percentage as the ‘exclusively Russian’ category had previously. Teachers from Lviv also indicated the use of English and Polish, but in minimal quantities.

To try to overcome the tendency to too formal answers, we decided to ask “Q.4.2. What is(are) the language(s) that you use to communicate (2) with colleagues in informal domain?”. In Figure 11, the following language categories were outlined: (1) exclusively Ukrainian, (2) exclusively Russian, (3) Ukrainian and Russian, (4) Ukrainian, Russian and English, (5) Ukrainian and English, (6) Ukrainian, English and Polish:




Figure 11. Geographical distribution of languages used to interact with fellow teachers in informal domains, percentage

According to the data presented in the diagram, several observations can be made regarding the language choices of teachers in different cities. First, there is an increase in the diversity of language choices: teachers responded less formally compared to previous questions. In Kyiv, the category ‘Ukrainian and Russian’ (16.67%) shows a significant increase compared to previous responses. In addition, the use of the language pair ‘Ukrainian and English’ remains stable. In Kharkiv, there is a clear increase in the use of Russian in communication. This is the only region where the category ‘Ukrainian’ is not dominant (only 28.57%). It can be assumed that the ratio of Ukrainian to Russian language use is approximately 1:1, since the number of teachers who communicate exclusively in Russian is equal to the number of those who chose the category ‘Ukrainian only’. Odesa shows a similar trend, although Ukrainian remains the most widely used language (41.67%). At the same time, it is in Odesa that the category ‘Ukrainian, Russian and English’ appears (8.33%). Lviv traditionally maintains a high preference for Ukrainian (93.75%), with no indicators of Russian language use in any combination.

4.4.3. Social and Political Influences (Q.6.1., Q.6.3.)

The difference in the responses of students and teachers indicates that they are referring to different time periods. This highlights the need to define clear time frames that would help to stabilise the assessment of changes in language choice in the academic sphere and identify the factors behind these changes. In this regard, we formulated two questions: “Q.6.1. Has your language choice changed in academic communication in formal situations after (1) Ukraine gained Independence (1991), (2) the Orange Revolution (2004), (3) the Revolution of Dignity (2014), (4) the full-scale Russian invasion (2022)?” and “Q.6.3. Has your language choice changed in academic communication in informal situations after (1) Ukraine gained Independence (1991), (2) the Orange Revolution (2004), (3) the Revolution of Dignity (2014), (4) the full-scale Russian invasion (2022)?”. These questions enable us to track the impact of key historical events on language choice across various communicative domains. Analysis of the responses will help not only to identify changes in language behaviour, but also to understand how socio-political upheavals have affected the formal and informal aspects of academic communication.

To begin with, we would like to define the general trends. Thus, we will analyse the answers to these questions given by all 230 informants. With regard to the concept of language attitude, in our study, it primarily concerns the interaction between the Ukrainian and Russian languages. In order to unify the data and more accurately reflect the dynamics of change, we chose the parameter ‘language of everyday communication’ and narrowed it down to the following categories: Ukrainian, Russian, Surzhyk, or combinations thereof. The categories were arranged on a scale from the most Ukrainian-speaking to the most Russian-speaking options, which allows us to visualise the gradual transition between the linguistic poles. As a result, we obtained the following groups of people labelled according to their languages of everyday communication: (1) Ukrainian, (2) Ukrainian and Surzhyk, (3) Ukrainian, Russian and Surzhyk, (4) Ukrainian and Russian, (5) Surzhyk, (6) Russian and Surzhyk, (7) Russian. This approach (i.e., excluding rare variants such as Turkmen, English, etc.) ensured the comparability of data and avoided excessive fragmentation of language responses.

Next, we compared the results with the answers to Q.6.1, as one can see in Figure 12. This allowed us to trace how macro-level events affected micro-level individual language choices and how informants perceived changes in their own language practices within the context of historical transformations. The results are presented as percentages, which provides a clearer visual representation of the dynamics of change. Table 19 with absolute values is provided in Appendix G.




Figure 12. Change in Language Choice in Academia (formal domain: 1991, 2004, 2014, 2022) by Everyday Language.

As can be seen in Figure 12, the dynamics of language choice changes demonstrate a gradual evolution from more flexible to predominantly stable models of language behaviour. In general, there is an increase in the proportion of ‘Yes’ answers regarding changes in language choice over time, confirming our assumption that the

frequency of complete change increases against the backdrop of key socio-political events.

For the Ukrainian-speaking group, the percentage of changes remains relatively low throughout all periods, indicating stability in linguistic identity and a lower propensity for language accommodation in [academic] communication. On the other hand, groups that communicate in different languages on a daily basis, i.e. those prone to language accommodation a priori, show higher dynamics of change, especially after 2014. This confirms the active processes of language shift triggered by the start of the Russian-Ukrainian war (2014) and the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation (2022), as well as the corresponding increase in socio-political sensitivity to language choice. Figure 12 also shows that after the events of 2014, there was a noticeable increase in the number of ‘Yes’ answers among groups that previously leaned towards Russian-speaking or mixed options. After 2022, this trend only intensified. We can interpret this as an indicator of a rethinking of linguistic affiliation under the influence of the war and the formation of new models, including academic communication, oriented towards the Ukrainian language. It is also important to add that should we look more precisely at the absolute numbers of this distribution (see Appendix H), we would see that in the category of “surzhyk, russian” $n=1$. This makes this category rather irrelevant for generalising about attitudes towards language change. However, such a low number of people choosing this option shows us that such linguistic repertoire is rather unusual in Ukraine. The reasons for these are historical. First, Surzhyk was a bridge for the Ukrainian-speaking population trying to mimic the dominant language of high prestige, i.e. Russian. The Russian-speaking population did not need to shift to Ukrainian and, thus, both Ukrainian and Surzhyk historically played the role of marginalised varieties. Even though this tendency is changing now (Surzhyk is more often to play the role of the bridge in the de-russification process as confirmed through the interviews), there relevant life experience does not exist in the quantities that would be representative in the research.

At the same time, consistently high scores in the ‘No’ category among Ukrainian-speaking respondents confirm the deep-rootedness of Ukrainian as the main language of the academic environment in this group. It is essential to note that the

presence of those who answered ‘Yes’ in this category after 2022 does not necessarily imply an automatic transition to Russian on a whole, it might mean the transition to English or another language after being relocated. If we examine the qualitative data, this is more likely the result of people indicating the ‘language of everyday communication’ at the time of completing the questionnaire, when answering question Q.6.1 based on past habits. Additionally, this sometimes indicates that a person previously accommodated their interlocutor but no longer does so.

The category ‘Do not remember’ was created for (1) those who are younger than the events mentioned, (2) those for whom these events took place in childhood, (3) those who prefer not to say. As we can see in Figure 12, this answer is predominantly present for the year 1991 – that is, the informants who chose this answer were probably not yet born at that time or were children (cf. the age parameter of our informants). The almost complete absence of the ‘Do not remember’ category in questions about 2014 and 2022 suggests a relatively high awareness of language shift among respondents.

In summary, the graph illustrates a gradual yet clear upward trend in language change towards the ukrainisation of academic communication, i.e., the practical implementation of Ukrainian laws and internal regulatory documents of the respective universities. The most pronounced changes occurred in 2014 and 2022, confirming the correlation with key political events in Ukraine’s recent history. This, in turn, shows that language behaviour in the formal domain of academia not only reflects individual language preferences but also acts as a marker of social adaptation to new political, social, and cultural realities.

To assess the relevance of the identified changes to university communities, it is useful to refer to the results of responses to question Q.6.3, which focuses on the informal domain of academic communication. To ensure data comparability, we used the same ‘everyday language’ groups as in the previous question. This approach allowed us to avoid excessive fragmentation of the sample and preserve the analytical integrity of the study. The results of this comparison are presented in percentage values in Figure 13 and in absolute numbers in Table 20, which is included in Appendix G.

The discrepancy in the answer options between questions Q.6.1. and Q.6.3. is due to the specific nature of the communicative situations they describe. Formal and informal academic communication exhibit different degrees of social regulation, which influences the nature of language choice and the potential for nuanced assessment by respondents. In question Q.6.1., which concerns formal situations of academic communication, three categories of answers are proposed ('Yes', 'Do not remember', 'No'), since in a formal context, linguistic behaviour is usually subject to established norms and institutional requirements. Therefore, changes in language choice here are rather dichotomous in nature ("there was a change" or "there was no change"), and intermediate degrees of certainty or partiality of the decision are less relevant.

In contrast, question Q.6.3., which concerns informal situations of academic communication, provides a wider range of response options ('Yes', 'Rather Yes', 'Do not remember', 'Rather No', 'No'). This is because informal communication is characterised by a higher degree of individual variability and flexibility in language practices, allowing respondents to more accurately express the degree of change or fluctuation in their own language choices. The use of a five-point scale made it possible to capture gradations in attitude and behaviour that would have been lost if only three categories had been used.

Thus, the difference in the number and types of answer options is due to methodological expediency – the need to reflect different levels of stability and variability in language choice across formal and informal communicative spheres.

LANGUAGE CHOICE IN ACADEMIA (INFORMAL DOMAIN: 1991, 2004, 2014, 2022) BY EVERYDAY LANGUAGE




Figure 13. Change in Language Choice in Academia (informal domain: 1991, 2004, 2014, 2022) by Everyday Language.

The results shown in Figure 13 demonstrate the complex dynamics of language practices in the informal domain of academic communication. In general, when compared to the formal context, there is greater variability and flexibility in language behaviour (this can be explicitly tracked in Figure 6, Figure 9, and Figure 11). In fact, since private speech is not regulated by law, this allows more room for individual language strategies.

Once again, the most stable position across all time categories is occupied by the group of Ukrainian-speaking informants. Since 1991, the number of those who communicate “exclusively in Ukrainian” has only been growing, and we do not see the opposite trend (the transition from Ukrainian to Russian). In our qualitative research, we will consider the facts that sometimes people switched to Russian during their student years under the influence of society but then changed their language choice back. This result reflects the intensification of language self-determination processes

associated with political and cultural transformations in Ukrainian society, among which the Revolution of Dignity (2014) plays a key role as a “turning point”.

In categories where Ukrainian was combined with Russian or Surzhyk, the level of dynamism is higher. These categories are characterised by a gradual increase in positive responses (‘Yes’, ‘Rather Yes’) in the period after 2014, which, on the one hand, indicates a decrease in tolerance for Russian language use in everyday academic interaction. On the other hand, it suggests that these individuals possessed sufficient knowledge and skills to speak Ukrainian at a professional level. On the contrary, the option with Russian + Surzhyk does not display any dynamics at all, neither in formal, nor in informal situation.

In contrast, the group of informants who indicated Russian as their everyday language of communication shows relative stability with a comparatively low level of positive responses (‘Yes’, ‘Rather Yes’) in the period after 2014. These responses account for 12.51% of the total. This indicates entrenched language behaviour and/or a lower willingness, knowledge and skills for language adaptation in informal communication. If we look at the results for this group for the period after 2022, there has been a significant increase as compared to the previous results, and it equals 50%. However, the percentage of negative responses (‘No’ and ‘Rather No’) remains consistently high at 50%.

Interestingly, the proportion of responses “Do not remember” and “Rather no” is decreasing every year. This is due, first of all, to the age of the informants. Secondly, it is due to the fact that the language issue has become increasingly relevant in society and, against the backdrop of socio-political events, language reflection among representatives of the academic community has increased.

In general, the data in Figure 12 and Figure 13. suggest that informal academic interaction is more flexible in terms of language choices and use than formal interaction. It is in the informal domain that individual strategies of (non)adaptation to new linguistic, cultural or social norms are most noticeable. It can be said with certainty that the Ukrainian language has not only begun to function more effectively in the formal domain but is also gradually establishing itself as the language of academic communication in interpersonal settings. Thus, change in language preferences

becomes a manifestation of collective reorientation, reflecting a shift from post-colonial dynamics to national-state dynamics²³². We also tried to track if there is any difference in these data with regard to the geographical parameter. However, these trends did not vary much across different regions. The precise data can be found in Figures 22-29 in Appendix H.

4.5. Views for the Future

4.5.1. Questionnaire (Q.5.2.)

The fifth part of the questionnaire asked respondents to answer the question “Q.5.2. In what language(s) do you think the educational process in Ukraine should take place in the future? Why?”. In this section, we sought to encourage respondents to reflect on current changes in language attitudes and to consider how they perceive the consequences of these changes, particularly in terms of the transformation of language prestige. It is precisely their projections and perceptions that are of research interest to us, as they reflect individual views of the language situation in education.

The data are structured as follows. The question was open-ended and therefore not marked as mandatory. Despite this, we received 223 responses. As mentioned in the data description, ten questionnaires were rejected due to non-compliance with the sample parameters, resulting in 213 responses included in the analysis. The average length of a response was 14 words, but there was considerable variation: some respondents limited themselves to short answers such as ‘Українською’²³³ or ‘Українською і англійською’²³⁴, while others offered detailed explanations consisting of two or three complex sentences up to 86 words (the maximum length). This multi-level structure of responses is indicative, as it shows the varying degrees of

²³² This shift was also noted by Prof. Kulyk in his speech “One War, Two Displacements: Language Practices and Attitudes of Ukrainian IDPs and Refugees” as part of the Seminar in Ukrainian Studies public event series at Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute on October 01, 2025.

²³³ In Ukrainian

²³⁴ In Ukrainian and English

involvement of participants and their awareness of LP issues and the future of language development in Ukrainian higher education.

The responses were imported into the MAXQDA software environment for further qualitative analysis. MAXQDA is the software that ensures qualitative coding of the textual data (segments) and visualisation of connections between categories. In terms of content, most of the statements are neutral or balanced in nature, but there are also examples of heightened emotionality. Although it may be difficult to extract emotions from written data, some emotional markings were clearly visible. In particular, some respondents used exclamation marks to reinforce the emotional tone of their statements (informants 37, 65, 103, 125, 130).

Analysis of the text content enabled us to perform initial coding of the responses, identifying semantic categories such as ‘patriotism through language’ and ‘language and professional mobility’, among others. In general, respondents often characterised Ukrainian as their ‘native’ or “official/state” language, English as the ‘language of international communication’ or ‘professional language’, while Russian as the ‘language of the enemy’ or ‘aggressor’. After a more detailed analysis of the data obtained, we grouped individual codes into broader thematic clusters. Such clustering allowed us to structure the responses according to key areas of language use orientation and identify the most representative sub-codes that reflect the dominant trends in the perception of language use in academic contexts. A list of thematic codes and their subcodes is provided in Table 7.

THEMATIC CODES	SUB-CODES	SEGMENTS
Primacy of Ukrainian Language in Education (16)	War/security/antiimperialist discourse	25
	Patriotic discourse	33
	Legal requirement	53
	National identity	30
Role of English in Education	Career perspectives	8
	Globalisation and international integration	40
	Surzhyk	2
	International languages	8

Inclusion of Other Languages/Language Varieties ²³⁵	Languages of Indigenous Peoples and National Minorities	13
Flexibility and Choice in Language of Instruction	Linguistic Inclusion	13
	Pragmatic Approach	15
Exclusion and Negative Sentiment towards Russian	Language of Aggressor	11

Table 7. Thematic codes for answer to Q.5.2.

As we can see, there are 5 main thematic clusters that the informants bring to our attention. The further exploration of these thematic blocks can assist in creating a picture of the future vision of languages in education in Ukraine.

Theme 1. Primacy of Ukrainian Language in Education.

There is a strong advocacy for Ukrainian as the primary language of instruction in the educational settings, with numerous informants emphasising its importance for national cohesion and development. 42.72% (91 out of 213) of the informants state that Ukrainian should be the only language of instruction (we counted those who mentioned ‘exclusively Ukrainian’ or ‘Ukrainian and other languages for classes of foreign language’), and many others still see Ukrainian as the main language of education, but in combination with other languages. The most frequently cited reason for the primacy of Ukrainian is its status as the state language. Respondents highlight that, as citizens of Ukraine, they should speak and be educated in the state language. For instance, “Українською. Бо ми українці, живемо в Україні і є громадянами цієї країни, кожен свідомий громадянин має володіти державною мовою і говорити нею.”²³⁶ (Informant 9). It was quite surprising to receive the answer written in Russian stating “На Украинском. Так как это наш государственный язык”²³⁷ (Informant 126). The role of the Ukrainian language in national identity is also a key factor, with informants stating that Ukrainian is an identifier “Українською, оскільки це наша державна

²³⁵ the roles of surzhyk, international languages and and peoples and national minorities languages are different, but we put them into the same category since all of them were not widespread in the academic environment of Ukraine for quite a long period of time.

²³⁶ In Ukrainian. Because we are Ukrainians, we live in Ukraine and are citizens of this country, every conscious citizen must know the official language and speak it.

²³⁷ In Ukrainian. Since it is our state language

мова яка є нашим ідентифікатором ...²³⁸”, a marker of identity, a code of nation, and essential for preserving self-identity. For examples, informant 122 states “Українською, бо мова є кодом нації, яка відрізняє нас від інших країн і просуває нашу культуру²³⁹”

Some informants link the language to national security, seeing it as a guarantee of safety and prevention of external interference, e.g., informant 127 says “українською. Це гарантія нашої безпеки та запобігання втручанню ззовні.²⁴⁰”, and crucial for the formation of younger generations, e.g. informant 58 is sure that the education should be “Українською, так як вважаю це надважливим фактором у становленні молодих українців²⁴¹”. The language is also often seen as a component of culture and a medium for its expression (see the quote from informant 122 above).

Quite many responses emphasise the legal mandate for Ukrainian as the language of instruction, referring to it as ‘correct and legal’ (informant 65), ‘according to the law’ (informants 109, 165, 175, etc), and that it just ‘must be’ (informant 102). The importance of developing and preserving the language is also well-pronounced. For instance, informant 149 states “Українською бо державна + для її збереження та розвитку²⁴²”. However, even though we coded this sub-theme as “Legal requirement”, it is important to note that appealing to the law, people might hide the real motivations of such ideas. Moreover, many of these statements sounded as a part of patriotic discourse. That is why this category is a sub-code of the theme Primacy of Ukrainian Language in Education. Informant 11, despite mentioning English, clearly defines the role of Ukrainian: “Українською, оскільки це наша єдина державна мова, але має завжди бути високий рівень викладання англійською для покращення міжкультурної комунікації²⁴³”.

While acknowledging the importance of English as an international language, many informants still mark Ukrainian as a priority language. They highlight that the

²³⁸ In Ukrainian, since that is our state language that is our identifier.

²³⁹ In Ukrainian since the language is the code of nation that differentiates us from other countries and promotes our culture

²⁴⁰ in Ukrainian. This is a guarantee of our security and prevention from outside interference.

²⁴¹ In Ukrainian, as I consider it a very important factor in the development of young Ukrainians

²⁴² In Ukrainian because it is a state [language] + for its preservation and development

²⁴³ In Ukrainian, as it is our only state language, but there should always be a high level of teaching in English to improve intercultural communication

use of English is important but should be limited to specific contexts such as specialised programs, international academic cooperation, and student exchange (see informant 8 “Українською, оскільки це наша державна мова яка є нашим ідентифікатором, проте англійськомовні ОП теж не завадять, аби полегшити іноземцям навчання в Україні²⁴⁴”). This brings us to the question of the use of English in the Ukrainian academia.

Theme 2. Role of English in Education.

46% of the informants (98 out of 213) advocate for wider inclusion of English in the educational process alongside with Ukrainian. They underline its significance as an international language in professional communication and access to scientific achievements. Informant 40 claims “Українська та англійська мови, бо українська - це мова культури. Англійська - для розвитку міжнародної комунікації та доступу для якісних ресурсів.²⁴⁵” English is seen as crucial for integrating into the Western environment and accessing the global knowledge and resources. For instance, informant 107 suggests that

Інколи навчальний процес може відбуватися англійською, але значно в меншому обсязі, ніж українською. Це, на мою думку, можна робити з метою розширити горизонти студентів і дати їм можливості для перейняття досвіду іноземних країн.²⁴⁶

Informant 107

Some suggest that English should be used in specialised programs or for specific fields of study, particularly in specialised universities; there are also those whose vision of English is limited only to programs for foreign students, but the number of these informants is really low, just 3.76% (8 out of 213). Informant's 61 answer is a glaring example of such a position “... якщо є профільні програми іншими іноземними мовами (англ, франц, німецька) тоді цими мовами²⁴⁷”. A high command of English is desired as a means to improve intercultural dialogue and future

²⁴⁴ Ukrainian, since it is our state language which is our identifier, however, educational programs with English as a language of instruction will also not hurt to make it easier for foreigners to study in Ukraine

²⁴⁵ In Ukrainian and English, because Ukrainian is the language of culture. English is for the development of international communication and access to quality resources.

²⁴⁶ Sometimes the educational process can take place in English, but to a much lesser extent than in Ukrainian. This, in my opinion, can be done in order to broaden the horizons of students and give them opportunities to adopt the experience of foreign countries.

²⁴⁷ ... if there are specialised programs in other foreign languages (English, French, German) then in these languages

career opportunities. Informant 35 considers it important in this regard, alongside Ukrainian:

1. Українська - для збереження самоідентичності. 2. Англійська - мова міжнародного спілкування. Знання іноземної мови є ключовою у самостійному навчанні, покращенні набутих навичок і більше опцій для працевлаштування.²⁴⁸

It is also important to note that, despite many associating English with professional success, some informants recognise that the current level of English among many teachers and students may be insufficient for its effective application in HEIs as informant 155 notes “українською, англійською (але поки що її рівень у більшості викладачів та студентів недостатній)²⁴⁹”. In general, English as a means of internationalisation and engagement in global science and the job market is a recurring theme and numerous informants mention it. In addition to English, other languages are mentioned as well.

Theme 3. Inclusion of Other Languages/Language Varieties.

5.16% of the informants (11 out of 213) also mention the languages of national minorities alongside Ukrainian and English, e.g. informant 210 suggests “Українська, Англійська, в окремих ситуаціях (спільнотах) частково мовами меншин (напр. угорська)²⁵⁰”. Even though the percentage is rather low, it is important to have these answers since the interviewees did not mention the topic of national minorities themselves unless the interviewee asked them directly. Informants mostly refer to Crimean Tatar as the language of the biggest indigenous group in Ukraine (to be more precise, informants 2, 20, 55, 59, 89, 154 mention that Crimean Tatar should be studied alongside Ukrainian – and sometimes English – based on the wish of the student or their location). However, some refer to other national minority languages, such as Hungarian, saying that teaching in these languages should be provided to those who need it according to the human rights, children’s rights, and the Laws of Ukraine. Popular languages such as Spanish, French, German, and Italian are also mentioned as

²⁴⁸ 1. Ukrainian - to preserve self-identity. 2. English - the language of international communication. Knowledge of a foreign language is key in independent learning, improving acquired skills, and more options for employment.

²⁴⁹ Ukrainian, English (but so far its level is insufficient for most teachers and students)

²⁵⁰ Ukrainian, English, in certain situations (communities) partly in minority languages (e.g. Hungarian)

additional options for the students. Usually, they are described as options in addition to Ukrainian and English or those required for specialised courses/programs as it can be seen in the following quotes:

Українською, оскільки держава має підтримувати свою мову і, одне з її зобов'язань - захищати державну мову. Мають бути окремі курси англійською, як світової мови (лекції). Можливі залучення інших мов, такі як: німецька, польська, французька, іспанська та інші, як мови, до прикладу, запрошених лекторів для зацікавлених студентів.²⁵¹

Informant 194

Я вважаю, що навчальний процес має відбуватись в основному українською мовою. Адже це наша державна мова. До того ж, триває війна і ми ще більше маємо її берегти, відстоювати та розвивати. Звісно, що на певних спеціальностях може відбуватись навчання іноземною мовою (крім російської), наприклад, якщо це іноземна філологія, або викладач іноземець і ділиться цінними знаннями.²⁵²

Informant 110

In fact, linguistic inclusion is often aimed at foreigners, saying that their education can be conducted in a language other than Ukrainian, but usually with a mandatory course of Ukrainian. For instance, informant 19 suggests “Українська, англійська, (додаткова мова - НЕ російська - для іноземців, або студентів профільних гуманітарних спеціальностей)²⁵³” and informant 86 supports this statement “Тільки українською. А для іноземців англійською або їхньою рідною мовою (якщо таких студентів багато)²⁵⁴”. Surprisingly, informant 159 has even mentioned Latin, which can be explained by the fact that the major indicated is natural sciences. Other unusual statements were provided by informants 6 and 124, who suggest that Surzhyk mild use in academia might make the learning environment more comfortable for people from villages and decrease the tension of a formal atmosphere. Informant 106 instead sees it as lack of professionalism and, thus, requires strengthening the position of Ukrainian.

²⁵¹ In Ukrainian, since the state must support its language and, one of its obligations is to protect the state language. There should be separate courses in English as a world language (lectures). It is possible to involve other languages, such as: German, Polish, French, Spanish and others, as languages, for example, of guest lecturers for interested students.

²⁵² I believe that the educational process should take place mainly in Ukrainian. After all, it is our state language. In addition, the war is ongoing and we must protect, defend and develop it even more. Of course, in certain majors, teaching can take place in a foreign language (other than Russian), for example, if it is foreign philology, or the teacher is a foreigner and shares valuable knowledge.

²⁵³ Ukrainian, English, (additional language - NOT Russian - for foreigners or students of specialised majors in humanities)

²⁵⁴ Only in Ukrainian. And for foreigners in English or their native language (if there are many such students)

Theme 4. Flexibility and Choice in Language of Instruction.

The main issues discussed around the flexibility of language choice refer to the contexts of English use. As we have counted, 88.72% of the informants support the use of ‘exclusively Ukrainian’ or ‘Ukrainian + English’, 5.16% also included national minorities’ languages in their vision of the future. Thus, only 6.12% of informants remain for the other possible scenarios, and most of them still exclude the possibility of the use of Russian (see the next thematic cluster description). Informant 138 states that the educational process should be “Тою мовою, яка є більш зрозумілою для слухачів²⁵⁵” and informant 147 expresses a very similar idea saying “Будь-яка мова. Головне, щоб викладач міг порозумітися зі здобувачами освіти²⁵⁶”. Informant 125 is the most liberal in this regard, stating that

Я вважаю що це залежить від викладача, а не від держави або від ВНЗ, якщо викладач або студент не хоче розмовляти наприклад українською, то не треба його змушувати, наша країна вільна і ми кожен сам може вибрати якою мовою розмовляти, навіть якщо це буде мова країни наших ворогів!²⁵⁷.

Here Russian is meant but not named, but there are also some cases where Russian is named. Informant 26 suggests using Russian as the language of instruction only for foreign students, but she stresses that these foreign students should also be mastering Ukrainian alongside. Informant 128 sees Ukrainian and Russian equally suitable for higher education in the future but also recognises the role of English [the comment itself is written in Russian]: “Украинский, русский на выбор участников учебного процесса. Английский также как международный стандарт де-факто²⁵⁸”. Apart from these examples, what our analysis showed for this thematic cluster is that usually it is the use of English that Ukrainians should be flexible with since its high value on job market.

²⁵⁵ In the language that is the most comprehensible for the listeners.

²⁵⁶ Any language. The main thing is that the teacher and the students are able to understand each other.

²⁵⁷ I believe that it depends on the teacher, not on the state or the university. If a teacher or student does not want to speak Ukrainian, for example, then they should not be forced to do so. Our country is free, and we can each choose which language to speak, even if it is the language of our enemies!

²⁵⁸ Ukrainian, Russian, at the discretion of participants in the educational process. English is also used as the *de facto* international standard.

Theme 5. Exclusion and Negative Sentiment towards Russian.

Comments supporting the inclusion of Russian in the “language menu” of future education in Ukraine are rather an exception. In fact, most of the informants who mention it at all categorically reject this possibility, e.g.,

Однозначно, українською! Англійська, французька, італійська та інші як додаткові для власного розвитку та «розширення кордонів»; але російська — ні; жодному разі.²⁵⁹
Informant 130

This sentiment is rooted in the fact that Russia is the aggressor state, and thus the presence of Russian is seen as a threat to national security and identity, as informant 188 notes:

Звісно, українською. Українська мова - державна мова в Україні і, водночас, не захищена державою на великій території України (центр, південь, схід). На сьогодні, російська мова- це мова агресора²⁶⁰.

Informants also express strong anti-imperial narratives calling for the eradication of the Russian language from the Ukrainian linguistic landscape and eliminating the presence of Russian cultural elements in Ukraine. The illustration of this tendency is well-pronounced by informant 135:

загальний освітній процес повинен відбуватися українською та англійською мовами. якщо це школа для представників національних меншин, тоді там повинна бути присутня і їхня мова. ніякого прояву «русского языка» не повинно бути в Україні взагалі. повне викорінення цього жаху, повне знищення пам'яток архітектури, мистецтва, літератури русских митців²⁶¹

²⁵⁹ Definitely, in Ukrainian! In English, in French, in Italian and others as additional ones for one's own development and «expanding borders»; but Russian — no; no way.

²⁶⁰ Of course, in Ukrainian. The Ukrainian language is the state language in Ukraine and, at the same time, is not protected by the state on a large territory of Ukraine (centre, south, east). Today, the Russian language is the language of the aggressor

²⁶¹ the general educational process should take place in Ukrainian and English. if this is a school for representatives of national minorities, then their language should also be present there. there should be no manifestation of the «Russian language» in Ukraine at all. the complete eradication of this horror, the complete destruction of monuments of architecture, art, literature of Russian artists

4.5.2. Individual Interviews

As mentioned in Chapter 4.3.2, we managed to conduct six semi-structured interviews. Section IV of the semi-structured interview was dedicated to the future languages of the Ukrainian academia. In fact, the precise questions depended on the previous discussion, but the plan was to elicit information on the following issues:

- ✓ In your opinion, is it necessary to change the legislative framework governing the use of languages in higher education? If so, how exactly?
- ✓ Should applicants be given the opportunity to choose the language in which they can study? If so, which languages could they choose from?
- ✓ How could the university better support multilingualism and the use of different languages?

Having analysed the data from the interviews in relation to these questions, we can categorise them into seven general thematic blocks mentioned by the interviewees.

(1) Sufficiency of Current Legislation vs Need for New Laws

Interviewee 5 believes that the current LP, i.e. the 2019 Law on Ensuring the Functioning of Ukrainian as the state language, are by and large sufficient for elevating the prestige of Ukrainian. He emphasises that adherence to existing laws, especially in official domains, should be sufficient to maintain the balance between protecting the Ukrainian language and ensuring the rights of speakers of other languages under the current circumstances.

Я думаю, що воно наразі є достатньо, ну як достатньо. Звичайно, що можна ще удосконалювати. Я думаю, головне, щоб виконували те, що є. Для початку [...] якщо взяти закон про використання української мови [=2019 Law, ...] Я вважаю, що це є дуже добрий закон, оскільки він фактично ставить використання української мови на рівень, який дійсно повинен бути як рівень закону державної мови. Особисто я прихильник, що його треба дотримуватися. В повсякденному житті, в родинному колі, вважаю, що люди мають право спілкуватися як їм заманеться. Мова яка там є батьків, дідусів, тобто це не можна забороняти. Але все таки перше, державні установи - раз. Засоби масової інформації, два, громадські місця, три. Тобто це повинна бути суто державна мова.²⁶²

Interviewee 5: a teacher; age: 45-54; L1: Ukrainian; Lviv

²⁶² I think that it is sufficient at the moment, well, sufficient enough. Of course, there is still room for improvement. I think the main thing is to implement what we have. To begin with [...] if we take the law on the use of the Ukrainian language [=2019 Law, ...] I believe that this is a very good law, because it actually puts the use of the Ukrainian language on a level that should really be the level of the state language. Personally, I am in favour of complying with it. In everyday life, in the family circle, I believe that people have the right to communicate as they wish. The language of parents and

Interviewee 2 outlines the persistent issues with the Russian language use, suggesting that some control mechanisms and enforcement are more critical than creating new legislation:

мабуть, відповідальність кожного учасника, але якісь додаткові міри з деканату, умовно, було б теж логічно очікувати. Тобто, в моєму розумінні, це має бути так, що, ми знаємо, якісь накази деканату, перші, що всі ведуть державною. І, там, знаємо, щосеместрове, щорічне опитування студентів, чи дійсно викладач дотримується цього.²⁶³

Interviewee 2: a student; age:18-24; L1:Surzhyk+Ukrainian; Kyiv

In contrast, Interviewee 1 explicitly states that the current legislative framework should grow stricter and advocates for more aggressive policies.

Залежить від контексту. Якщо ви б спитали мене в версії 2012 року, я як початково сам російськомовний на 200%, я би сказав, а вже це персональна справа [...] після Майдану і розстрілів на Майдані мене позиція почала поступово змінюватися, і я в принципі нічого не мав проти, наприклад, тих законів, які приймалися в той проміжок між 14 на 22 роком. [...] Ну а після 22 року це вже, власне, я забудь-яке жостке поводження в контексті мови, і хоч там і лякають, як міфічними бандерівцями, там різними мовними патрулями і так далі, але я б влаштовував мовні патрулі, бо мова зараз, в тих умовах, які зараз в Україні є, це як лакмусовий папірець і маркування в душі свій-чужий. Якщо людина розмовляє українською, він, звісно, може бути кривою і шпіоном, або корупціонером, але принаймні на поверхні можна вже одразу визначити, що людина скоріш адекватна, ніж ні. з великою долею імовірності, а коли людина говорить російською і не париться, то вже в мене просто чисто на психологічному рівні вже якась пересторога. І це при тому, що я сам російськомовний [був. ...] Тож залежить від контексту, якщо країні нічого не загрожує, тоді можна гратися в мультикультуралізм, в підтримку меншин, в підтримку прав людини спілкуватися будь-якою мовою будь-де. Але враховуючи як зараз справи, який зараз стан речей в Україні, то місця компромісу тут я просто не бачу наразі.²⁶⁴

Interviewee 1: a teacher; age: 25-34; L1: Russian; Kyiv

grandparents cannot be prohibited. But still, first, state institutions - one. The media, two, public places, three. That is, it should be strictly the state language.

²⁶³ Probably, it's the responsibility of each individual participant, but it would also make sense to expect some additional measures from the dean's office, so to speak. I mean, in my understanding, it should work like this: we know there's an official order from the dean's office stating that everyone teaches in the state language. And, say, we also know there's a semesterly or yearly student survey to check whether the lecturer actually follows this rule.

²⁶⁴ It depends on the context. If you had asked me back in 2012, as someone who was originally 200% Russian-speaking, I would have said, well, that's a personal matter [...] After Maidan and the shootings on Maidan, my position started to gradually shift, and I basically had nothing against, for example, those language laws that were being adopted in the period between 2014 and 2022. [...] But after 2022, honestly, I'm all for any kind of tough measures in the language sphere. Even though people try to scare you with those mythical "Banderites," language patrols, and so on, I would actually support language patrols – because language now, in the conditions Ukraine is living through, is like litmus paper, a kind of marker for who's "us" and who's "them." If someone speaks Ukrainian – sure, they might still be a rat, a spy, or a corrupt official – but at least on the surface you can immediately tell that the person is more likely to be on the adequate side than not. With a high degree of probability. And when someone speaks Russian and doesn't even think twice about it, I just feel some instinctive psychological alarm. And that's coming from me – someone who was a Russian-speaking myself. [...] So it depends on the context: if the country isn't under threat, then sure, you can play around with multiculturalism, support minorities, human rights, speak any language anywhere. But given how things stand now in Ukraine, I just don't see any room for compromise at this point.

Interviewee 6 also shares the ideas of Interviewee 1. She implies that existing rules are not strictly enforced and that more concrete top-down directives are necessary rather than relying on individual responsibility.

На мою думку, все має бути доволі суворо, це має бути наказ зверху, не знаю з якимось можливо системами покарання, чи навпаки бонусів. Тобто це має бути на законодавчому рівні. На власну відповідальність викладачів дуже важко покладатися²⁶⁵

Interviewee 6: a student; age:25-34; L1: Russian; Lviv

Interviewee 3 has a milder attitude but still emphasises the importance of adherence to the official regulations in formal domains. He highlights the difference between formal and informal communication and states that the regulations of formal communication should never overreach into informal settings. He sees that possibility as a potential threat to constitutional rights.

Ну, це вже немає впринципі дискусії, це вже є безпосередній наказ для державних інституцій, і тут немає простору для ніяких дискусій. Те, що поновоштабне вторнення розставило всі крапки над 'і' [...] всі ці дискусії вже затягнулися за 30 років незалежності, вже достатньо цих дискусій, тут, в принципі, вже зараз і дискусії як такої немає. [...] формально все [і раніше] було в рамках закону. Програми, всі документи, звичайно, писалися вже давно українською мовою. [...] Були викладачі, які принципово викладали українською мовою, розмовляли і було тільки принципово розмовляв і викладав російською мовою. [...] коли було зручніше перейти в дискусії на російську мову, то [я] переходив. Зараз, ну, фактично не переходимо. Тому ще і студенти зараз також спілкуються більшість українською мовою. Тобто вони вже звикли до цього. Я, наскільки, знаю, як це було. Я запитав колегу в КІМО [Київський інститут міжнародних відносин], наприклад, якби в принципі вони всі в побуті також спілкувалися російською мовою, ну, за радянського часу. І в 1991 році всі наказом всі лекції українською мовою все. І потім вони, в фаховій дискусії легше вести українською мовою. Звичайно, в побуті, хто як спілкується.²⁶⁶

Interviewee 3: a teacher; age: 45-54; L1: Russian; Odesa

²⁶⁵ In my opinion, everything should be quite strict, it should be an order from above, I don't know, perhaps with some kind of punishment system, or conversely, bonuses. In other words, it should be at the legislative level. It is very difficult to rely on the personal responsibility of teachers.

²⁶⁶ Well, there is no longer any debate on this matter; it is now a direct order to state institutions, and there is no room for discussion. The fact that the new invasion has dotted all the i's [...] all these discussions have already dragged on for 30 years of independence, enough of these discussions, here, in principle, there is no discussion as such now. [...] formally, everything [in the past] was within the law. The programmes and all the documents, of course, had long been written in Ukrainian. [...] There were teachers who taught in Ukrainian on principle, spoke and only spoke and taught in Russian on principle. [...] When it was more convenient to switch to Russian in discussions, [I] switched. Now, well, we don't really switch. That's why most students now also communicate in Ukrainian. That is, they are already used to it. I know how it was, as far as I know. I asked a colleague at KIMO [Kyiv Institute of International Relations], for example, if in principle they all communicated in Russian in everyday life, well, during the Soviet era. And in 1991, by order, all lectures were in Ukrainian. And then it was easier for them to conduct professional discussions in Ukrainian. Of course, in everyday life, everyone communicates as they wish.

Similar views are shared by interviewee 4, who believes that the political position of people who use Russian in informal communications can still be pro-Ukrainian, and the language used is rather a matter of habit.

Звичайно, поміж собою, там, поза заняттям, ми, деякі люди все ще продовжують спілкуватися російською мовою, тому що вони звикли, скажімо так, і вони стараються *придерживатись* мовної політики під час навчального процесу, а поза заняттями, скажу так, хто як, якщо чесно. Тобто це не відображає їхнього політичного погляду, як вони це пояснюють. Бували деякі такі ситуації, коли ми все-таки обговорювали використання російської мови позад заняттями, і скажу так, що воно не завжди пов'язано з тим, як людина бачить ось політичну ситуацію у нас в країні.²⁶⁷

Interviewee 4: a student; age: 18-24; L1 Surzhyk; Odesa

At the same time, she does not express any need to strengthen the existing legislative framework, but, similarly to interviewees 2 and 5, believes in the necessity of better control mechanisms:

щодо навчального процесу, то мені, здається, все-таки повинні вживатися саме якісь нормативні заходи, ось там перелік політик, перелік різноманітних законів, ось які в них будуть контролювати все це на державному рівні. Тому що у нас навчальний процес, це звичайно величезна кількість документацій, всі ці наукові роботи там і тому подібне, і звичайно, що воно повинно регулюватися, скажімо так, зверху, згори. Ось, але і при цьому кожна людину сама повинна розуміти важливість дотримання всіх цих правил, там законів, політик. Мені здається, якщо людина йде здобувати вищу освіту, то вона повинна усвідомлювати, що це все [...] потрібно розуміти, що ти все-таки живеш в країні, де державна мова, це лише українська. [...] це стосується саме навчального процесу. [...] ми живемо в Україні, тут державна мова українська. Звичайно, ти повинен все це робити українською. Те, що ти краще знаєш російську, ну, це не стосується навчального процесу, бо ти повинен був розуміти, куди ти йдеш, тобто, і чим ти, в принципі, будеш займатися. В побуті, звичайно, розмовляй і, ну, російською, там, чи суржиком, чи як тобі заводно, але це навчання, це документи різні, там, роботи, і це все повинно, ну, треба притримуватися правил і норм.²⁶⁸

Interviewee 4: a student; age: 18-24; L1 Surzhyk; Odesa

²⁶⁷ Of course, among ourselves, there, outside of class, we, some people still continue to communicate in Russian, because they are used to it, let's say, and they try to *adhere to* [Surzhyk is used] the language policy during the educational process, and outside of class, I will say this, who knows how, to be honest. That is, it does not reflect their political views, as they explain it. There were some situations when we still discussed the use of the Russian language outside of class, and I will say this, it is not always connected with how a person sees the political situation in our country.

²⁶⁸ As for the educational process, I think there really should be some kind of formal, regulatory measures – like a clear set of policies, a list of different laws that would control all of this at the state level. Because in our educational system there's obviously an enormous amount of documentation – all the academic work, and so on – and of course it should be regulated, let's say, from the top down. But at the same time, every individual should personally understand the importance of following all these rules, laws, and policies. I believe that if a person decides to pursue higher education, they should be aware that this all matters [...] and that they live in a country where the state language is Ukrainian, and only Ukrainian. [...] This specifically concerns the educational process. [...] We live in Ukraine, and here the state language is Ukrainian. Naturally, you have to do all of this in Ukrainian. The fact that you know Russian better is irrelevant to the educational process, because you should have understood where you were going and what you would be doing. In everyday life, of course, speak Russian, Surzhyk, or whatever you want – but when it comes to studying, to documents, to academic work, you have to follow the established rules and standards.

Thus, we can observe a tendency among our interviewees with L1: Russian to adopt a stricter view of language laws and their implementation in formal domains. At the same time, younger representatives seek to eradicate Russian influence from both formal and informal communication, whereas the older generation continues to distinguish between the two domains.

(2) The role of the Russian Language

There is a strong consensus among the interviewees that Russian is more than just another foreign language, but it carries significant political implications. Interviewee 5 claims it to be a political instrument rather than a national minority language. Interviewee 1 considers Russian as a “litmus test” to distinguish “friend from foe”. Interviewee 2 states that his temporary use of Russian in the past was the result of “stupidity and lack of consciousness”, and now his attitude is “sharply negative” since it is the sign of “outdated information” and “incompetence” in academia. Interviewee 4 also connects abandoning Russian with the conscious approach. Interviewee 6 explicitly states that any tolerance of Russian “brings the frontline closer”. It is only Interviewee 3 who offers a nuanced perspective, supporting the dominance of Ukrainian in the formal domain, but acknowledging the problems of regulating Russian as the language of informal communication in such cities with a complex linguistic history, such as Odesa. He also supports the idea of the existence of Russian-speaking people with a pro-Ukrainian position in academia, while others often doubt.

(3) The Role of English

As noted in the questionnaire, English is said to play a vital role in education, which is also true for the interviews. All the interviewees recognise it as essential for staying updated and presenting scientific work globally, particularly in technical fields of study. Interviewee 1 suggests that it should be implemented in the educational process alongside Ukrainian. The others share the possible challenges of this decision, especially for the older generation.

(4) Indigenous Peoples, National Minorities and Language Policies

It should be said that neither by law nor by the interviewees themselves is Russian seen as a national minority language that may have some language rights in Ukraine in the near future. Interviewees 1 and 6 recognise the language rights of national minorities, but they limit the ensuring of these rights to the level of school education only, if provided with public funds. The rest should be provided by the cultural societies of NGOs. These interviewees share the idea that higher education in the Ukrainian language is necessitated by future career building and social integration. Interviewee 2 states that private higher education institutions could possibly teach in minority languages but explicitly excludes Russian.

Я не проти, щоб ну був закон, який дозволяти національним меншинам їхні власні навчальні заклади. Це чудово. Просто я на мою думку, я б обмежив це середньою освітою. Тобто не можна це заклади вищі (.) навчальні заклади. А вони, якщо вони державні, то вони українською, але там залишити дозвіл на створення приватних вищих навчальних закладів. Мовою нацменшини. Ну і, знаю, в рамках України, як Україна в якомусь році заборонила комуністичну партію, я б зробив таке саме виключення для російської мови. Тобто російською мовою не можна²⁶⁹

Interviewee 2: a student; age:18-24; L1:Surzhyk+Ukrainian; Kyiv

Interviewee 6 also supports language learning for indigenous peoples, such as Crimean Tatars or Karaites, at the university level since their languages are endangered. She also does not mind creating facultative courses in national minority languages learning at the state universities if required. Interviewee 4 also agrees with the fact that the languages of indigenous peoples and national minorities deserve more attention but rejects the idea of their getting the status of state languages. She does not object to the use of these languages in the educational process in theory but acknowledges the difficulties of such practices transitioning to the university level of education.

²⁶⁹ I don't mind if there is a law that allows national minorities to have their own educational institutions. That's great. I just think I would limit it to secondary education. That is, it's not possible to have higher (.) educational institutions. And if they are state-owned, then they are in Ukrainian, but there should be permission to create private higher educational institutions. In the language of the national minority. And, I know, within Ukraine, when Ukraine banned the communist party in a certain year, I would make the same exception for the Russian language. That is, it's not possible in Russian.

(5) Integration of Students from Potentially De-occupied Territories

The answers to this issue vary. Interviewees 1 and 2 suggest an adaptation program for the study of the Ukrainian language (an additional school year or foundation year at university). Simultaneously, interviewee 1 expresses profound scepticism about the de-occupation itself. He also does not believe that such an additional year is sufficient to overcome the outcomes of a decade of russification. He also thinks that those who wished to avoid russification have already left the occupied territories²⁷⁰. These answers are very theoretical, and every time the question of reintegration was raised, the usual first reaction was silence. The interviewees were unsure how to properly address this issue or whether it could be resolved at all. Interviewee 6, for instance, claims that imagining such a situation is fantastic in itself. She provides possible solutions, but she expresses strong scepticism towards the possibility of resolving this issue at all:

Гарне питання, ну таке, звісно, дуже фантастичне. [...] Тому що люди жили 11, ой, майже там, скільки 13 років, у зовсім інакшому контексті і історія про студента, який втік з Луганська недавно там розказували. Це швидше виняток такий дуже, він дуже підтримуючий, дуже теплий, але я сумніваюся, що там багато таких хлопців. І якщо це діти, які зростали, яким там буквально було 3 роки на момент окупації, які зараз там навчаються, в якому форматі вони, чи вони повернуться, я не певна. Ну, однозначно, конкретно з дітьми, не знаю, з дорослими так, коли людина там вже 20 років попала в окупацію, в силу обставин там залишилася, але вона досі, якби, однозначно за ті території варту боротися, це наші території, наші люди, які чекають, я знаю, таких людей. Але стосовно дітей мені дуже важко зрозуміти формат. Ну, швидше за все, це має бути якісь пропущений рік, ну, типом надання якихось пільг, якоїсь роботи, точно з психологами, це має бути, вона вже мала бути створена якась програма на державному рівні, яка би давала гарантії, твоя дитина там вступить до вишу для неї, бути створена якась, напевно, облегшена програма там 1-го року.²⁷¹

Interviewee 6: a student; age:25-34; L1: Russian; Lviv

²⁷⁰ This is not true according to

(1) Boy, A.-D. (2024, December). Ukrainer auf der Flucht: Wer geht freiwillig zurück in Putins Besatzungszone? Spiegel.de; DER SPIEGEL. <https://www.spiegel.de/ausland/ukraine-warum-gehen-ukrainer-in-die-von-russland-besetzten-gebiete-zurueck-a-5453ad9a-3984-4843-92dd-4ff8120aab59#ref=rss?>

(2) International Organization for Migration (IOM), Jul 25 2023. DTM Ukraina - Zvit pro sytuatsiiu z vnutrishnim peremishchenniam - Zahalne opytuvannia naselennia Raund 13 (11 travnia - 14 chervnia 2023 roku). IOM, Ukraine;

(3) International Organization for Migration (IOM), Feb 14 2024. DTM Latvia – On the Way Back: Survey with Ukrainian nationals – Annual (2023). IOM, Latvia.

²⁷¹ That's a good question, but of course it's very fantastical. [...] Because people lived there for 11, oh, almost 13 years, in a completely different context, and they recently told the story of a student who fled Luhansk. This is more of an exception, he is very supportive, very warm, but I doubt that there are many such guys there. And if these are children who grew up there, who were literally 3 years old at the time of the occupation, who are now studying there, in what format they are, whether they will return, I am not sure. Well, definitely, specifically with children, I don't know, with adults, yes, when a person has been under occupation there for 20 years, has remained there due to circumstances, but still, if anything, definitely worth fighting for those territories, they are our territories, our people who are waiting, I know such people. But with regard to children, it is very difficult for me to understand the format. Well, most likely, it should be some kind of a gap year, like providing some benefits, some kind of work, definitely with psychologists, there should

Interviewee 3 completely avoids this question, shifting responsibility to the government, but after the interviewer insisted on expressing a hypothetical position, he elaborated a fuller answer:

я не знаю, що з ними робити це, вирішувати буде міністерство [...] якщо ми гіпотетично це взагалі сприймаємо, що це можливо, то [...] все одно має складатися екзамени з українською мовою, але мають бути інший привілюваний статус для отримання місця, тобто нижчий бал, тобто для людей, які повертаються з окупованих території, які хочуть інтегруватися, щоб для них були, як колись у нас були, окремі місця для тих, хто прибував з Криму, з Донбасу, [...] в принципі, звичайно, мають бути додаткові, відразу додаткові заняття з української мови, тобто окремі групи для тих, хто погано володіє. Зараз серед студентів, в принципі, такої проблеми немає, але я пам'ятаю, часто були у нас студенти, хто з Молдови, чи навіть і до часів [full scale] вторгнення були, хто приїжджав з Донецька, які були, ну, в Одесу не дуже часто, але були випадки, яким було складно, в принципі. Але українська мова, це ж не естонська, не якась там, тобто додаткові заняття, якщо є бажання, це дуже легко, все покривається. Тобто я думаю, що це окремий статус для таких абітурієнтів, плюс додаткові години для таких груп окремі, не просто українська мова, як вона є у першому курсі, там один раз на тиждень, [...] а реальні курси заняття²⁷²

Interviewee 3: a teacher; age: 45-54; L1: Russian; Odesa

As we can see, his answer continues the trend of doubt about the possibility of the de-occupation in the near future, but his view on possible reintegration is much more positive than that of the previous interviewees.

There is a general consensus on the importance of all the reintegrated students to learn in Ukrainian, but there lacks an understanding of the tools and strategies to implement this consensus in reality.

(6) Multilingualism in Academia

The answers to the previous thematic blocks reveal the interviewees' attitudes towards Ukrainian, English, Russian, indigenous languages, and languages of national

be there should already be a programme at the state level that would give guarantees that your child will enter university, well, that there will be some kind of simplified programme for the first year.

²⁷² I don't know what to do with them, the ministry will decide [...interviewer's insistence...] if we hypothetically accept this at all, that it is possible, then [...] there should still be exams in the Ukrainian language, but there should be another privileged status for obtaining a place, that is, a lower score, that is, for people returning from the occupied territories, who want to integrate, so that there are, as we once had, separate places for those who came from Crimea, from Donbas, [...] in principle, of course, there should be additional, immediately additional classes in the Ukrainian language, that is, separate groups for those who speak it poorly. Now, among students, in principle, there is no such problem, but I remember, we often had students from Moldova, or even before the [full-scale] invasion, there were those who came from Donetsk, who were, well, not very often in Odesa, but there were cases for whom it was difficult, in principle. But the Ukrainian language, it's not Estonian, it's not some other language, that is, additional classes, if there is a desire, it's very easy, everything is covered. That is, I think that this is a separate status for such applicants, plus additional hours for such groups, separate, not just the Ukrainian language, as it is in the first year, there once a week, [...] but real courses, classes

minorities. However, the issue of a multilingual educational space still requires further comment. Since there has been no clear state policy on the concept of multilingualism, each university is addressing this issue in its own way. Interviewee 2 concludes that English is enough for international connections with other scholars and to make the study of international students comfortable:

У нас в КПІ були такі програми, я не знаю, чи вони прям Еразмус називаються, але [...] лекції ведуться англійською мовою, вони [=іноземні студенти] цілком розуміють. Я думаю, що і викладачів легко знайти, які можуть вести лекцію англійською мовою.²⁷³

Interviewee 2: a student; age:18-24; L1:Surzhyk+Ukrainian; Kyiv

Interviewee 3 also claims that the presence of educational programmes with English as the language of instruction at the master's level is sufficient to cover the needs of international students (mostly Chinese in this case).

Interviewee 1, however, believes in multilingualism in the Ukrainian academia, but only after an increase in the presence of international students and their extended periods of stay. Interviewee 5 says that in his field of study (Ukrainian History), there are not many international students. His experience includes dealing with a group of Turkmen students who were accompanied by a language facilitator, and the interviewee had to adjust the program for his part of the course so that the materials would be accessible for translation. He also mentioned extensive use of visual materials.

Conclusion and Comments

In this Chapter, we examined the attitudes of the informants and interviewees to the future languages of the Ukrainian academia.

Informants believe that the use of Russian undermines national culture and education, especially given the ongoing war and the sufferings caused by the speakers of the language in the previous decades (repressions, genocide, etc). The possible spread of Russian influence is seen as menacing to the state, culture, and language, and

²⁷³ We had such programs at KPI, I don't know if they are called Erasmus, but [...] the lectures are in English, they [=foreign students] understand it completely. I think it is easy to find teachers who can lecture in English.

thus should be prevented, according to the informants. This is not surprising, especially given the ongoing war and its historical context.

They strongly support the development and wider implementation of Ukrainian in the educational sphere and see it as connected to national security. Another language that is strongly favoured by the informants is English. This language is associated with a great level of professionalism and is seen as a bridge between Ukraine and the West. The vast majority of informants believe that some form of teaching in English should be present in Ukrainian academia. Simultaneously, they are aware of the potential obstacles to implementing these ideas due to the country's low levels of English proficiency.

The informants' attitudes towards the languages of Ukraine's indigenous peoples and those of national minorities remain unclear since the issue is ignored by many. On the one hand, the informants who mentioned them are supporting their use in academia. On the other hand, for many, it is merely one of the EU's obligatory requirements. In addition, there are those who consider these languages unimportant (e.g. Interviewee 1 saying that the number of those people is not crucial to be considered).

To sum up, the question of whether the legislative framework governing the use of languages in academia in Ukraine requires modifications or not was triggered. However, all of them are still aimed at staying in line with the current framework or enforcing it, not the opposite. Sometimes this was emotional, and sometimes it was just a consequence of obeying the law. There is a general tendency towards the exclusion of Russian from formal (and sometimes informal) academic domains.

The issue of multilingualism is seen as irrelevant at the moment. The vast majority of the interviewees agree that the role of English should be elevated due to pragmatic reasons. They are generally positive towards knowledge of foreign languages, but do not see that as a priority at the moment. Regarding the languages of indigenous peoples and national minorities, most interviewees strive to strike a balance between language preservation and the integration of these minorities into society when asked about this issue. However, they do not refer to it themselves.

Thus, current views on the future language situation foresee an increase in the prestige of Ukrainian and English, a more inclusive attitude toward language varieties (such as Surzhyk) and minority languages, and a sharp decline in tolerance for Russian. Here it is important to keep in mind that the traditional (post) Soviet language ideology was based on a purist approach. The acceptance of Surzhyk in the academic environment is definitely a step away from this ideology. While the acceptance of minority languages does not necessarily indicate this.

Anyway, our research shows that Ukraine (both at the state and societal levels) has certain tendencies to language purism, which is largely defined by (1) historical influences of the Empirical and Soviet policies, (2) fragile stance of the state language. The existence of state programmes supporting indigenous languages is a positive sign of shifting away from it. However, the [lack of] real evidence of shifting from a purist approach might be clearly seen only after the state language acquires a stronger position in contrast to Russian.

4.6. Language Choice and Factors for Its Change

This sub-chapter focuses on the analysis of empirical data that allows us to answer RQ4 – “What are the factors motivating people to change their language choice?”. To achieve this goal, we analysed information obtained from respondents through questionnaires, as well as materials collected during semi-structured interviews with selected study participants.

The questionnaire data (in particular, the answers to questions Q.3.3., Q.5.1., Q.6.2. and Q.6.4.) are aimed at identifying the factors that determine the language choice and those causing language shifts in the academic environment in both formal and informal domains. The interview materials, on the other hand, offer a broader perspective and enable us to consider changes in language choice within a more general social context. This approach enables the comprehensive integration of quantitative and qualitative dimensions of analysis, tracing both individual and structural factors of language shifts, and gaining a deeper understanding of the mechanisms underlying new language practices.

4.6.1. Questionnaire

Question Q.3.3. was aimed at getting respondents to analyse their own language choices in an academic environment during their studies. Question Q.5.1. focused on current language choices, i.e. the situation at the time of completing the questionnaire. Questions Q.6.2. and Q.6.4., on the other hand, asked respondents to reflect on changes in language practices in connection with key events in Ukraine's recent history: the Revolution on Granite (1991), the Orange Revolution (2004), the Revolution of Dignity (2014) and the full-scale Russian invasion (2022).

Since all questions were open-ended, the partial absence of comments is to be expected, as respondents had the option to skip questions. At the same time, the high level of participant engagement was revealing: 198 out of 230 respondents left comments. This fact reflects the significant personal involvement of the respondents in the topic of language attitudes change, as well as the high relevance of the issues raised for representatives of the academic community. To be more precise, Table 8 was prepared.

Questionnaire item	Number of informants	Average word content
Q.3.3. What influenced your language choice when you were a student?	185	6
Q.5.1. What internal or external factors influence your language choice in academic communications now [2023]?	173	9
Q.6.2. If yes, why? [regarding "Q.6.1. Has your language choice changed in academic communication in formal situations after (1) 1991, (2) 2004, (3) 2014, (4) 2022?"]	100	7
Q.6.4. If yes, why? [regarding "Q.6.3. Has your language choice changed in academic communication in informal situations after (1) 1991, (2) 2004, (3) 2014, (4) 2022?"]	87	4

Table 8. Selected questions on Language Choice and its Change

We can observe a gradual decrease in the number of respondents who provided detailed answers to the open-ended questions as the questionnaire progressed. One possible explanation is that the participants may have perceived certain questions as similar because they were not familiar with our RQs and therefore did not notice the

conceptual differences in wording. This trend is typical for online questionnaires, where the level of participant engagement often decreases towards the end of the questionnaire, which can affect both the volume and depth of responses provided.

Therefore, since the purpose of this section is to identify key trends in the language practices of respondents in different contexts: during their studies, in the current academic environment, and in connection with socio-political changes in Ukraine, we prepared the answers and comments to Q.3.3., Q.5.1., Q.6.2., and Q.6.4 for analysis. Thematic analysis, accompanied by manual coding of responses in the MAXQDA environment, was employed to interpret the collected material. In the first stage, the texts were read to identify recurring patterns of meaning. The responses were then grouped into broader thematic categories reflecting common approaches to language choice, motives for changes in language practices, and their interpretation by respondents.

4.6.1.1. Language Choice Motivation as a Student (Q.3.3.)

Here, it is important to remember that we are investigating what influenced the language choice of the informant, not what language they were choosing. Since MAXQDA is not the perfect instrument for automatic coding when the data is in Ukrainian, we did the coding manually, outlining the recurring themes, e.g. ‘sense of belonging to the community’, ‘accommodating to the society’, ‘re-discovering one’s origin’, ‘family history’, etc. This allowed us to unify them under the umbrella themes, which are presented in Table 9:

Thematic Code (number of coded segments)	Explanation	Examples
Legal / institutional requirement (12)	The segments included here express the motivation for language choice as an obligation to the Laws of Ukraine or local institutional rules	‘вимоги уряду’ ²⁷⁴ informant 223
Identity, convictions, belonging (42)	The informants express that their language choice is motivated by (1) a sense of belonging to the nation,	(1) “Я українець.” ²⁷⁵ informant 148

²⁷⁴ Requirements of the government

²⁷⁵ I am Ukrainian.

	(2) individual principles, (3) national or linguistic identity, (4) love for Ukraine in the segments included under this thematic code.	(2) “Власна позиція ²⁷⁶ ” informant 156 (3) “Моя національність, я українка, тому користуюся власною мовою; інші мови використовую для розширення досвіду у своєму життєвому просторі ²⁷⁷ ” informant 209 (4) “Любов до всього українського ²⁷⁸ ” informant 191
Russian war against Ukraine (19)	The informants motivated their language choice as (1) act of resistance, (2) rejection of the ‘enemy’s language’, (3) respect for those who were killed by Russia, (4) the act of war itself.	(1) “супротив агресії ²⁷⁹ ” informant 219 (2) “Не хочу розмовляти на мові окупанта ²⁸⁰ ” informant 100 (3) “Усвідомлення, що багато людей померло за те, щоб я спілкувалася українською ²⁸¹ ” informant 130 (4) “війна ²⁸² ” informant 11
Accommodational multilingualism (44)	The informants report adapting to the language choice of the interlocutor or to the domain of the communicative situation.	(1) “Мова співрозмовника ²⁸³ ” informant 159 (2) “В сім’ї українською. В соціумі російською бо всі розмовляли ²⁸⁴ ” informant 99
Formative contexts (48)	The informants declared that their language choice is motivated by (1) family language, (2) early childhood social contacts, (3) upbringing.	(1) “Мова спілкування в сім’ї ²⁸⁵ ” informant 35 (2) “Рождение в определенной среде ²⁸⁶ ” informant 134 (3) “Я змалку знаходжуся в україномовному середовищі. Це мова, якою розмовляє моя родина, друзі. ²⁸⁷ ” informant 214 (4) “Виховання ²⁸⁸ ” informant 6

Table 9. Thematic codes for answer to Q.3.3.

Since the high number of comments does not allow for all examples to be included in this section, a map of thematic codes (Figure 14) by informant was created

²⁷⁶ Personal standpoint

²⁷⁷ My nationality is Ukrainian, so I use my own language; I use other languages to expand my experience in my life space.

²⁷⁸ Love for everything Ukrainian

²⁷⁹ resistance to aggression

²⁸⁰ [I] don’t want to speak the language of the occupier

²⁸¹ Realization that many people died so that I could communicate in Ukrainian

²⁸² war

²⁸³ The language of the interlocutor

²⁸⁴ In the family, Ukrainian. In society, Russian, because everyone spoke it.

²⁸⁵ Language of communication in the family [written in Russian]

²⁸⁶ [the comment is written in Russian]: Birth in a specific environment

²⁸⁷ I have been in a Ukrainian-speaking environment since childhood. This is the language spoken by my family and friends.

²⁸⁸ Upbringing

to more clearly reflect the distribution of thematic mentions among respondents. It is important to state that MAXQDA does not allow regrouping the data by weight, so the coloured dots are sorted by the order of the informants here. White spaces indicate either the absence of a comment from the respondent or cases where their response was not coded into any of the given categories. All other categories are colour-coded according to the legend.




Figure 14. Coded Data Map Q.3.3.

This map enables not only the systematisation of various individual statements but also the tracing of broader sociolinguistic trends relevant to the academic environment.

We can confidently say that the environment, i.e. the conditions in which a person lives or operates, is the determining factor in language choice. Among all coded segments, “Formative contexts”, i.e. the influence of experience in a particular social or academic environment, accounts for the largest share (29.09%). The second most common factor is “Accommodative multilingualism”, which reflects the direct adaptation of language practices to the environment (26.67%). It is also worth noting that “Legal/institutional requirements” are an external factor, the compliance with which is also determined to a certain extent by environmental influence. As can be seen

from Figure 14, these three categories are evident in almost every block of respondent answers, indicating the structural role of the environment as a cross-cutting factor in language choice.

Furthermore, the code “Russian war against Ukraine” accounts for 11.52%. We know that Russian aggression against Ukraine boosted the language shift in academia (as can be seen from the results in Chapter 4.4.3. Social and Political Influences) and in private life (as evidenced in Chapter 4.5.2. Individual Interviews). For some, the result might seem low, but this result for Q.3.3. can be explained by several factors: (1) the academic environment is often seen as official and, thus, Ukrainian-speaking; (2) when selecting the sole reason, many people prefer to put positive reasons rather than negative (i.e. highlight their love for their country instead of the threat to it); (3) some people prefer not to unveil their reasons and legal requirement is a perfect masking for them.

Topics related to personal beliefs and self-identification, although they constitute a significant share (25.45%), are more localised, i.e., they appear in fragments and less often cover large sections of text. This observation may be linked to the fact that people tend to distinguish external motivations more readily than reflect on internal ones, especially in Ukraine, as proved by Evans (2015) and Chebykin (2023).

4.6.1.2. Language Choice Motivation in Academia, 2023 (Q.5.1)

As mentioned in Table 8, the answers to this question were more detailed than the others. The maximum word count equals 68. Due to increased detail and accuracy of the statements on the factors that influence language choice in academic communication (as of 2023), the code system was expanded during data coding. The total number of coded segments is 234. The complete coding scheme, along with illustrative examples, is presented in Table 10, and comments on it follow the Table.

Thematic Code (# of coded segments)	Sub-codes (number of coded segments)	Examples

Legal / institutional requirement (29)	*This code didn't have any sub-codes since its meaning is quite straightforward	(1) 'Крім навчального плану (мова викладання предмету) не впливає прямо ніщо. ²⁸⁹ ' informant 59 (2) 'вимоги уряду' ²⁹⁰ informant 223
Identity, convictions, belonging (0)	Personal / family history (2)	"Внутрішні трансформації в першу чергу через війну та загибель старшого брата на фронті навесні 2022 року ²⁹¹ " informant 139
	Perceived prestige (3)	"Я свідомо перейшла на українську мову, бо мова єднає, особливо зараз, + <u>розмовляти російською 'не модно' тепер</u> ²⁹² " informant 96
	Moral/ethical stance (14)	(1) "під час війни я не вважаю правильним говорити мовою ворога ²⁹³ " informant 106 (2) "Совість" ²⁹⁴ informant 10
	Patriotism, loyalty, active citizenship (21)	"бажання спілкуватися рідною мовою завжди" ²⁹⁵ informant 102
	National & civic identity through language (30)	(1) "Зараз я не уявляю, що б я розмовляв російською мовою. Для мене це б означало, що моя країна програла росії битву за ідентичність. Мова – щит і зброя. Мова – як один із показників політичної нації, до якої я належу. Я не росіянин." ²⁹⁶ informant 118 (2) "дуже сильна мотивація продовжувати усю комунікацію українською задля зміцнення нашої колективної ідентичності" ²⁹⁷ informant 61
Russian war against Ukraine (0)	War as motivator for language change (28)	(1) "війна" ²⁹⁸ informants 12, 16, 22, 100, 110, 119, 228
	Opposition to Russian propaganda (4)	"бажання захистити таким чином себе від ворожого впливу" ²⁹⁹ informant 112
	Commemoration and respect for the defenders (3)	"З поваги до військових, які нас захищають, я не можу дозволити собі розмовляти російською як під час пар, так і під час спілкування з одногрупниками" ³⁰⁰ informant 126
	Distancing from Russian language and culture (13)	(1) "бажання відрізнятись від агресора щонайменше за ознакою мови" ³⁰¹ informant 32 (2) "це допомагає самоідентифікації. Це підкреслює що українці - окремий самостійний народ" ³⁰² informant 167

²⁸⁹ Apart from the curriculum (the language of teaching the subject), nothing directly influences it.

²⁹⁰ Requirements of the government

²⁹¹ Internal transformations primarily due to the war and the death of an older brother at the front in the spring of 2022

²⁹² I consciously switched to Ukrainian because language unites, especially now, + speaking Russian is "unfashionable" now

²⁹³ during war, I do not consider it right to speak the enemy's language.

²⁹⁴ Conscience

²⁹⁵ desire to always communicate in my native language

²⁹⁶ Now I can't imagine speaking Russian. For me, it would mean that my country lost the battle for identity to Russia. Language is a shield and a weapon. Language is one of the indicators of the political nation to which I belong. I am not Russian.

²⁹⁷ very strong motivation to continue all communication in Ukrainian in order to strengthen our collective identity

²⁹⁸ war

²⁹⁹ the desire to protect oneself from hostile influence in this way

³⁰⁰ Out of respect for the military who protect us, I cannot afford to speak Russian either during lectures or when communicating with my classmates.

³⁰¹ desire to differ from the aggressor at least in terms of language

³⁰² This helps self-identification. This emphasises that Ukrainians are a distinct, independent nation.

	Emotional reactions: disgust, trauma, grief, anger (6)	(1) “внутрішня огида до всього російського” ³⁰³ informant 22 (2) “сором за використання російської раніше” ³⁰⁴ informant 27
Multilingual accommodation (0)	Accommodational multilingualism (5)	“Мова співрозмовника, мова аудиторії” ³⁰⁵ 227
	English as international academic standard (14)	“Для академічного середовища важливі мови українська (як державна мова), <u>англійська (як мова міжнародного академічного спілкування)</u> - це <u>мінімум</u> .” ³⁰⁶ informant 188
	Geographical factor (14)	“Місце перебування (в іншій країні вбір мови адаптується відносно співрозмовника та відносно власного рівня знань тої чи іншої мови)” ³⁰⁷ informant 58
	Non-accommodational bilingualism (4)	“Коли до мене говорять російською я також можу перейти на цю ворожу мову, але коли я говорю до когось українською а людина російською то не перехожу на російську” ³⁰⁸ informant 4
	Domains: levels of formality (12)	(1) “Завжди спілкуватись з викладачами і тд. українською, а з друзями російською” ³⁰⁹ informant 153 (2) “ступінь мого контролю над вживанням суржику визначається ступенем формальності обстановки” ³¹⁰ informant 7
Formative contexts (3)	Habit, convenience, linguistic competence (9)	(1) “Я завжди в академічних комунікаціях користувався українською і про інший варіант <u>не замислювався</u> ” ³¹¹ informant 57 (2) “В повсякденному житті я розмовляю російською, тому що моя сім’я <u>завжди</u> говорила російською, але в університеті, чи з людьми, які розмовляють українською, я розмовляю українською, тому що ми живемо в Україні і це зрозуміло, що у місцях типу університету розмовлятимуть українською” ³¹² informant 132
	Ukrainian as a mother tongue (21)	“Я українка, і це моя рідна мова.” ³¹³ informant 205

Table 10. Thematic codes for answer to Q.5.1.

³⁰³ internal disgust for everything Russian

³⁰⁴ [feeling of] shame for using Russian earlier

³⁰⁵ The language of the interlocutor, the language of the audience

³⁰⁶ For the academic environment, the following languages are important: Ukrainian (as the state language) and English (as the language of international academic communication) - this is a minimum.

³⁰⁷ Location (in another country, the choice of language is adapted to the interlocutor and to one’s own level of knowledge of a particular language)

³⁰⁸ When I am spoken to in Russian, I can also switch to this hostile language, but when I speak to someone in Ukrainian and the person speaks in Russian, I don’t switch to Russian.

³⁰⁹ Always communicate with teachers, etc. in Ukrainian, and with friends in Russian.

³¹⁰ The degree of my control over the use of Surzhyk is determined by the degree of formality of the situation

³¹¹ I have always used Ukrainian in academic communications and have never considered another option.

³¹² In everyday life I speak Russian because my family has always spoken Russian, but at the university, or with people who speak Ukrainian, I speak Ukrainian because we live in Ukraine and it is understandable that in places like the university they will speak Ukrainian.

³¹³ I am Ukrainian, and this is my native language.

The data presented reflect the multilayered structure of language choice factors. It also illustrates how the context of war influences the concept of identity, institutional regulations, and everyday language practices in the respondents' language behaviour.

The most represented thematic clusters here are "Identity, convictions, belonging" (29.79%) and "Russian war against Ukraine" (22.98%), together accounting for more than half of the coded segments. This is not surprising, as a closer examination of the respondents' answers reveals that Russian aggression, in one way or another, triggers internal reflections, prompting individuals to reconsider their language choices.

In fact, the sub-code "National and civic identity through language" is the largest sub-theme. This only confirms that internal reflections are often based on ideological principles such as 'language is the foundation of the nation', 'language is a cultural frontier', 'language is a shield and a weapon', and personal language choices often depend on collective language ideology in wartime. In such circumstances, language is often conceptualised as an intangible border and, at the same time, a means of mobilising civil society.

Similarly, the sub-theme "War as motivator for language change" dominates the thematic cluster "Russian war against Ukraine", not only because it is perhaps the most general sub-theme among those that exist, but also because many respondents did not reflect internally on what exactly the war did that it began to influence their language choices. In fact, we can see that some informants use only this noun to explain their language choice. The presence of more profound ideas about the impact of war (such as "Commemoration and respect for the defenders" or "Opposition to Russian propaganda") only confirms that external, geopolitical events act as strong triggers for personal linguistic shifts, often described in emotive, moral, or defensive terms. The sub-theme "Distancing from Russian language and culture" reveals the interaction between affective and ideological factors in language choice. On the one hand, strategic distancing from the aggressor is a perfectly logical step, but on the other hand, it often occurs as a result of trauma, an outburst of anger, or a fit of fear. Such emotional dimensions of language choice only emphasise the role of moral weight in language choice during periods of war.

These interconnections between categories are evident in the data map presented in Figure 15, where white circles represent non-coded segments or the absence of an answer from the informant. The coloured dots are ordered the way they are located in the data corpora.




Figure 15 Coded Data Map Q.5.1.

The thematic cluster “Legal/institutional requirements” contains only 12.34% of the coded segments and results in the smallest category. Moreover, it is not further sub-categorised, which suggests a shared and unambiguous understanding of the institutional role of LP. The references are often externalised, creating a sharp contrast with deeply personal and value-laden statements in the identity and war-related clusters. This difference emphasises the connection between the top-down and bottom-up language regulation. Even though the legal framework seems to provide a rigid framework for linguistic practices, war and identity are the primary factors of language choice.

The “Multilingual accommodation” (20.85%) cluster reflects the linguistic situation not only in academia, but in Ukraine in general, as the comments often extend the academic discourse. The sub-categories presented in this thematic cluster indicate the complex linguistic repertoires of the informants as well as high pragmatic

orientation. The subcodes dealing with domains, geographical factors, and English illustrate the context-dependent view on language practices.

The dual orientation, i.e., language as a tool of communication and language as a marker of national identity and resistance, suggests that the aforementioned language ideologies are not accepted irrationally, but rather are sometimes revered for their role in integration within a globalised academic environment. This also shows the informants' readiness for evolution and aspiration for growth in the academic world.

The thematic cluster "Formative context" is represented mostly by those who do not change their language practices. Some of them still reflect on why they stick to the language they used to speak, while others take it for granted. The relatively high coding of segments with 'Ukrainian as a mother tongue' illustrates the relationship between identity-based language choices and the current socio-political situation.

This distribution of data shows that language practices are simultaneously a symbolic means of resistance, a manifestation of ethical behaviour, and a practical tool for communication. This data also allows us to examine the connections between grassroots initiatives and those imposed from above, as well as how these connections influence the construction of identity in the context of transnational linguistic repertoires.

4.6.1.3. Social and Political Factors for Language Choice Change (Q.6.2. and Q.6.4.)

Before presenting the data obtained from open comments to the questions in this block, it is worth noting that they were contextualised. The content of the response in the comment directly depended on the options selected by the respondent in the preceding grid question. These questions were formulated as follows: "Q.6.1. Has your language choice changed in academic communication in formal situations after (1) Ukraine gained Independence (1991), (2) the Orange Revolution (2004), (3) the Revolution of Dignity (2014), (4) the full-scale Russian invasion (2022)?", "Q.6.2. If yes, why?", "Q.6.3. Has your language choice changed in academic communication in informal situations after (1) Ukraine gained Independence (1991), (2) the Orange Revolution (2004), (3) the Revolution of Dignity (2014), (4) the full-scale Russian

invasion (2022)?”, “Q.6.4. If yes, why?”. In fact, since people commented not only on the change in language choice, but also on its absence, in this block, we did not investigate how exactly the respondents’ language choice changed but focused exclusively on what factors influenced language choice – regardless of whether changes occurred or not.

A separate Excel file was created to process the data, which contained the individual number of the informant, their age, place of study, and answers to Q.6.2. and Q.6.4. We then applied the same coding system that was used to analyse the data in the previous two sections. The coding was done manually, which allowed us to refine and improve the structure of thematic clusters and subcodes. The final version of the coding system is presented in Table 11.

Thematic Code (# of coded segments)	Sub-codes (number of coded segments) if any	Examples
Legal / institutional requirement (14)		“Офіційна мова є офіційна мова ³¹⁴ ” informant 54
Identity, convictions, belonging (63)		(1) “Рефлексія ³¹⁵ ” informant 99 (2) “Тому що це є проявом моєї громадянської позиції ³¹⁶ ” informant 112 (3) “Став більш свідомим ³¹⁷ ” informant 143 (4) “Бо підтримую незалежність та європейський вибір ³¹⁸ ” informant 159 (5) “Повага до держави, яка народилася ³¹⁹ ” informant 195
Conflicts with Russia (political, military) (0)	War as motivator for language change (42)	(1) “окупація Криму і інших регіонів України ³²⁰ ” informant 2 (2) “Через війну ³²¹ ” informant 11 (3) “Війна 2014 р. ³²² ” informant 100 (4) “Бо я бачила ці жахи, і в 2014 році, і в 2022. ³²³ ” informant 170
	Distancing from Russian language and culture (31)	(1) “Це важливо вийти з російськомовного середовища на користь адекватної міжнародної академічної спільноти ³²⁴ ” informant 52

³¹⁴ The official language is the official language.

³¹⁵ Reflection

³¹⁶ Because it is a manifestation of my civic position

³¹⁷ Became more conscious

³¹⁸ Because I support independence and the European choice

³¹⁹ Respect for the state that was born

³²⁰ occupation of Crimea and other regions of Ukraine

³²¹ Because of the war

³²² War of year 2014

³²³ Because I saw these horrors, both in 2014 and in 2022.

³²⁴ It is important to leave the Russian-speaking environment in favor of an adequate international academic community.

		(2) “Бажання відсікти все російське, що було в мені. Росія – це мільйони закатованих та вбитих людей, моїх родичів зокрема. Росія – це середньовічна імперія, а їхня мова – інструмент для завоювання нових територій. ³²⁵ ” informant 118
	Revolution experiences (15)	(1) “Якщо я намагалася вчити мову з 1991 року, то ніякі інші чинники не могли сильно впливати, я один раз обрала та все³²⁶” informant 157 (2) “І так, і ні. Адже в академічному середовищі я завжди послуговувалась виключно українською мовою. Проте, на 2004 рік припали роки мого становлення як особистості, тоді ж вперше прийшла думка про важливість мови, хоча я продовжувала в неформальних обставинах використовувати російську мову. Після Революції Гідності я перестала використовувати російську у напів формальних та буденних ситуаціях та у публічних місцях, лише у особистому спілкуванні з окремими знайомими чи друзями. Після повномасштабного вторгнення я перестала використовувати російську принципово. Спілкуюсь лише українською та/або англійською мовами.³²⁷” informant 79 (3) “Була учасницею революції гідності та пробула на майдані з першого до останнього дня, там і утвердилась в рішенні перейти у всіх комунікаціях на українську мову³²⁸” informant 230
Multilingual accommodation (0)	Accommodational bilingualism (18)	(1) “В 2014 році я переїхала навчатись до Києва [...] Мені хотілося навчитися розмовляти російською без акценту, тому що всі нові класні компанії були російськомовними. Не хотілося виділятися.³²⁹” informant 36 (2) “Більше колег використовують українську в неформальному спілкуванні, і я завжди обираю мову співрозмовника³³⁰” informant 167
	Domains (7)	“У формальних ситуація все життя спілкувалась українською ³³¹ ” informant 166

³²⁵ The desire to cut off everything Russian that was in me. Russia is millions of tortured and murdered people, my relatives in particular. Russia is a medieval empire, and their language is a tool for conquering new territories.

³²⁶ If I’ve been trying to learn a language since 1991, then no other factors could have had much of an impact, I chose it once and that’s it.

³²⁷ Yes and no. After all, in the academic environment I always used exclusively Ukrainian. However, 2004 was the year of my formation as a person, when I first thought about the importance of language, although I continued to use Russian in informal situations. After the Revolution of Dignity, I stopped using Russian in semi-formal and everyday situations and in public places, only in personal communication with individual acquaintances or friends. After the full-scale invasion, I stopped using Russian in principle. I communicate only in Ukrainian and/or English.

³²⁸ [I] was a participant in the Revolution of Dignity and was on the Maidan from the first to the last day, where [I] confirmed the decision to switch to the Ukrainian language in all communications.

³²⁹ In 2014, I moved to Kyiv to study [...] I wanted to learn to speak Russian without an accent, because all the new cool companies were Russian-speaking. I didn’t want to stand out.

³³⁰ more colleagues use Ukrainian in informal communication, and I always choose the language of the interlocutor

³³¹ In formal situations, I have communicated in Ukrainian all my life.

Formative contexts (3)	Habit, convenience, family (30)	(1) “За звичкою певним часом користувався російською ³³² ” informant 168 (2) “Стабільне мовне середовище ³³³ ” informant 228
	Relocation (3)	“переїзд до м.Києва ³³⁴ ” informant 2

Table 11. Thematic codes for answer to Q.6.2. and Q.6.4.

We observe that the total number of segments in which respondents justified their language choice with legal requirements is only 14 (6.19%). This is a relatively low figure, especially considering that the sphere of academic communication is clearly regulated by language legislation. This result confirms that (1) the regulatory framework does influence actual language practices, but the main driver of change remains the will and initiative of the direct participants in communication; (2) the language situation is transformed primarily through grassroots initiatives, which are subsequently supported by legislation, rather than the other way around. The chronological aspect is also revealing: most of the respondents who changed their language of communication did so after 2014, while the Law of Ukraine ‘On Ensuring the Functioning of the Ukrainian Language as the State Language’ was only adopted in 2019.

The cluster “Identity, convictions, belonging” accounts for a significantly larger share – 63 segments (27.88%). This category encompasses a wide range of motivations – from the perception of a language’s prestige to a conscious ethical choice and self-identification through language. Informants often motivate their language choice with love or respect for their country of origin, a desire to protect and preserve its language and culture. In this case, a clear link exists between language and national consciousness. The high percentage of respondents who consider language choice to be a component of identity can be interpreted as the result of many years of public discussion and political debate on the language issue in Ukraine.

The largest percentage of segments – 88 units (38.94%) – was coded in the cluster “Conflicts with Russia (political, military)”. This block is divided into several sub-themes: “War as a motivator for language change” (42 segments), “Distancing

³³² Out of habit, [I] used Russian for a while.

³³³ Stable language environment

³³⁴ moving to Kyiv

from Russian language and culture” (31 segments), and “Revolution experience” (15 segments).

The sub-theme “Revolution experience” brings together the responses of respondents who cited revolutionary experience as a key factor in language transition (in this case, always to Ukrainian). This refers to the peaceful protests of the Revolution on Granite (1991) and the Orange Revolution (2004–2005), as well as the Revolution of Dignity (2014), which resulted in the loss of over a hundred lives (the so-called Heavenly Hundred). The responses often emphasised not only the cost of the revolutionary events, but also the importance of awareness of shared values and unity, where language began to be perceived as an integral element of this community.

The sub-theme “Distancing from Russian language and culture” brings together comments from respondents who directly indicated their unwillingness to have any associations with the ‘aggressor country’ or ‘language of the enemy.’ This motivation is often intertwined with arguments belonging to the code “Identity, convictions, belonging”, reflecting the process of restoring one’s identity through the rejection of Russian-language practices.

The sub-theme “War as a motivator for language change” covers segments in which respondents directly link their change in language choice to the start of full-scale war. For example, informant 170 indicates that it was the experience of the war’s horrors that became the decisive stimulus for switching to the Ukrainian language.

The cluster “Multilingual accommodation” is less numerous – 25 segments (11.06%). The subcategory “Accommodational bilingualism” (18 segments) covers cases where the choice of language was determined solely by the communicative convenience for the interlocutor. On the one hand, these are respondents for whom the language of communication was secondary, and they easily adapted to others. On the other hand, there were those who sought to integrate into a specific communicative environment. Interestingly, this applied to both Ukrainian and Russian, which indicates a change in sociolinguistic dynamics: unlike in previous periods (see Pavlenko, 2008, 2010; Bilaniuk, 2010; Rabanus, 2023), Ukrainian is increasingly becoming the language to which people adapt. The subcategory “Domains” encompasses comments in which respondents indicated that they switched between Ukrainian, Russian,

Surzhyk or other languages depending on the formality of the situation. At the same time, no segments coded as “Non-accommodational bilingualism” were recorded. This is because those who did not change the language of communication usually did not justify this as ‘creating inconvenience for the interlocutor’, but referred to factors such as language habit, comfort, national consciousness, or language competence.

The last thematic cluster, “Formative contexts”, covers 36 segments (15.93%). It consists of two subcategories. The first, “Habit, convenience, family”, reflects the influence of primary socialisation contexts, such as family, childhood, and immediate social circle. The second, “Relocation”, concerns contexts where linguistic behaviour changed as a result of relocation. In most cases, this refers not to moving abroad after the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion, but rather to internal migration, such as relocating from a Ukrainian-speaking village to a Russian-speaking city to pursue higher education.

Thus, the results show that respondents’ language choices are influenced by a complex set of factors, among which identification and political motives dominate, while the influence of legislation is indirect and less pronounced.

As mentioned earlier (see Table 8), question Q.6.2 received more comments than Q.6.4. Therefore, the task was to analyse whether there were differences in the factors influencing respondents’ language choice in the context of formal and informal communication situations. The summarised results can be seen in Table 12:

Code System		Q.6.2	Q.6.4	SUM
Legal/institutional requirement		13	1	14
Identity, convictions, belonging		31	32	63
Conflicts with Russia (political, military)	Distancing from Russian language and culture	17	14	31
	War as motivator for language change	23	19	42
	Revolution Experiences (1991, 2004, 2014)	10	5	15
Multilingualism Accommodation	Domains	6	1	7
	Accommodational bilingualism	9	9	18
Formative contexts	Relocation	1	2	3
	Habit, convenience, family	13	17	30
TOTAL		123	100	223

Table 12. Coded segments distribution for answer to Q.6.2. and Q.6.4.

Based on the data obtained, several clear trends can be traced. First, the code “Legal/institutional requirement” was applied to comments on informal communication only once, while all other cases of this code refer to the formal domain. This result is quite expected, since the language legislation of Ukraine regulates primarily public communication, without limiting the language choice in private life. A similar dynamic is demonstrated by the subcategory “Domains”, since informal communication on university grounds usually remains an informal domain, even within the institutional space (in the physical sense).

As for the other codes, there is no significant difference between the number of comments regarding the formal and informal domains. This may indicate that factors such as “Identity, convictions, belonging” and “Conflicts with Russia (political, military)” influence the language choices of respondents not only within the academic environment, but also in a broader life context. In other words, these factors are deep drivers of language behaviour that manifest themselves regardless of the type of communicative situation.

In the case of “Accommodational bilingualism”, the number of comments is equally distributed between the formal and informal domains, which may indicate the flexibility of the respondents’ language practices and their desire for communicative comfort regardless of the context of the situation.

As for the code “Formative contexts”, it is also present in the answers to both questions with a slight predominance in the informal domain. This is quite logical, because habits formed in the family, childhood or within a close circle of communication are more often manifested in informal speech. At the same time, the presence of a significant proportion of such comments in the context of the formal domain indicates the stability of language practices established in the formative environment. We can also assume that most of these segments belong to the comments of people whose L1 is already Ukrainian.

Conclusion and Comments

Analysis of empirical data from the questionnaire (in particular Q.3.3., Q.5.1., Q.6.2. and Q.6.4.) reveals the multifaceted nature of the factors influencing language

choice in the academic sphere in Ukraine. Our results confirm that language practices are shaped by both internal and external factors, and the salience of these factors changes in response to socio-political upheavals in Ukraine.

Identity-related (internal) and conflict-related (external) factors play a dominant role among the drivers of language choice and its change. In this context, language ideology, which becomes part of the social narrative, takes on particular importance: language is often conceptualised as an ‘invisible barrier’, a ‘shield’, or a ‘weapon’. The study participants regularly use the verbs “preserve” and “protect,” which indicates the dual status of language as both an object and a means of action. Language serves as a barrier that enables one to “preserve oneself” from “hostile” influences. Such motivation is often reinforced by personal experiences of trauma (loss of loved ones, surviving a bombing, etc.). This is natural, since language becomes one of the key means of mobilising society in times of conflict and instability (Pavlenko, 2023). Factors of identity and external threat reinforce each other, and their interaction forms stable principles and beliefs regarding language choice, which are extremely difficult to undermine.

Our data also show that the role of the environment in shaping language choice should not be underestimated. A significant proportion of respondents indicated that their circle of friends, family, and cultural context of upbringing determined the language used in their everyday communication. At the same time, some participants noted that they adapt to the language of their interlocutor, which, in turn, is also a consequence of the influence of the external environment. Despite the possible controversy of combining these motivations into one category, such variability is indicative of the current language dynamics in Ukraine.

Language policy, on the other hand, is more of a supporting factor. For example, one informant expressed her intention to switch to Ukrainian, but only did so after the relevant law came into force. Although the academic sphere is formally defined by language policy, its actual application often diverges from official standards. It is telling that only 12.34% of respondents in 2023 cited LP as the main factor in their language choice, and even fewer – 6.19% – cited it as an incentive to change their language of communication. This indicates the secondary role of LP in

the linguistic life of society. Moreover, it allows us to argue that language policy in Ukraine is often the result of grassroots initiatives and internal shifts in citizens' language choices. The chronology confirms this trend: most language shifts took place after 2014, while legislative changes were only adopted in 2019.

It is also worth considering the practical orientation of language practices. The category of “Multilingual Accommodation” indicates that for many informants, the primary driver of language choice is ensuring effective communication with their environment, i.e., adapting their language repertoires to the situation. This trend is not new in general (see Pavlenko, 2008, 2010; Bilaniuk, 2010; Hentschel & Palinska, 2022), but what is new is that Ukrainian is increasingly becoming the language to which participants in the communication process adapt. In this context, Surzhyk acts as a kind of bridge: despite its low prestige, it is seen as an additional option for communication in informal situations or as an emotionally charged register in formal ones.

In conclusion, the internal and external factors of language choice and change in academia in Ukraine do not act independently. National identity, political consciousness, and the trauma of war have become the strongest catalysts for shifts in language choice. The intensification of these factors is directly related to the political and military conflict with Russia. The formative context, despite its instability, serves as a basis for change, while the framework is set by LP. Under such conditions, the Ukrainian language acquires symbolic meaning – it becomes a means of resistance and a marker of ethical behaviour towards fellow citizens and defenders of the country.

4.6.2. Individual Interviews

As previously noted, in order to address RQ4 – “What are the factors motivating people to change their language choice?” – it was essential to collect more in-depth information regarding individual motivations for language shift. For this purpose, an additional section was incorporated into the interview protocol. This section is based on the method of linguistic biography, and the present part of the study

relies on data obtained through semi-structured interviews, especially the part centred around linguistic autobiography.

The linguistic biography method is a qualitative approach to narrative analysis used in linguistics and related humanities to study the language experience of an individual, with particular attention to the relationship between language, identity, and social context (Krumm, 2013; Franceschini, 2022; Tsar, 2023). At the centre of this approach is the interviewee, their narratives about language attitudes, language choices, and the consequences of such choices for their personal life. The researcher within this method works with the unique language experience of the interviewee, taking into account both objective conditions and the subjective interpretation of the interviewee's own language trajectory. The social context and external factors influencing language behaviour are key analytical guidelines.

In our study, this method was employed to investigate language attitudes and ideologies, as well as to explore identity construction through language.

In the classical sense, as Krumm (2013) notes, linguistic biography functions as a tool for studying language choice and its connection with identity in the context of migrant communities. This approach allows us to trace the dynamics of language practices, identities and affiliations of individuals who are outside their primary linguocultural environment. At the same time, modern practice demonstrates the flexibility of this method. In particular, Tsar (2023) applied it to analyse the motivations, challenges and goals of the linguistic transformation of Ukrainian youth. We share this approach, seeing in it the potential for analysing internal linguistic mobility, and not only cross-border migration.

In our research, the method of linguistic biography was adapted to the multilingual and socially and ethnically stratified space of contemporary Ukraine. Such adaptation allowed us to shift the emphasis from physical migration to the migration of identities and language strategies in the context of socio-political transformations. We consider language experience as a dynamic process that is formed within complex cultural and regional configurations. This stage of the research was entirely qualitative in nature. As noted earlier, the data consist of six interviews, the participants of which come from regions where the level of multilingualism has increased significantly in

recent years due to internal displacement of people. Such a purposeful selection allowed us to capture regional variations in language trajectories while maintaining the analytical depth of each individual case. Linguistic biography was included in the overall interview structure as a separate thematic block.

The final transcripts were obtained using the Notta.ai service and edited manually due to the challenges described in 4.3.2. The analysis was carried out in the MAXQDA software environment using the thematic coding method.

Thematic coding was guided by the need to capture both internal and external dimensions of language choice, as well as the situational and emotional contexts in which these decisions occur. The initial set of codes was developed inductively during the pilot stage and subsequently refined through iterative close reading of the transcripts. Three major categories were identified:

1. Internal factors – reflecting the respondent’s personal and subjective positioning in relation to language. These include:
 - Self-identification (how language aligns with personal or group identity),
 - Cultural heritage (perceived connection to ancestral or national culture),
 - Personal beliefs and attitudes (ideological views on language, loyalty, authenticity),
 - Language preference (aesthetic or practical affinity for a specific language).
2. External factors – encompassing sociopolitical and institutional influences that shape or constrain individual language choices. These include:
 - Social pressure (peer, family, or professional expectations),
 - Institutional requirements (language norms in academic or work environments),
 - Legal/political context (implementation of language laws and policy),
 - Regional context (linguistic environment specific to the respondent’s location),
 - Bilingual accommodation (strategic use of multiple languages for interaction),

- Russian invasion of Ukraine (as a critical sociopolitical turning point that reconfigured linguistic affiliations and choices).
3. Domains and additional aspects – focusing on where and how languages are used, and on emotional responses tied to these practices. These include:
- Public domain (language use in institutional and social settings),
 - Private domain (language use in the family and intimate interactions),
 - Language shift (transitions in dominant language over time),
 - Emotional expressions (affective responses associated with language use or change). (see summary in the Table 4.6.2.A)

THEMATIC CODES	Internal factors	External factors	Domains/Extra
SUB-CODES	• Self-identification • Cultural heritage • Personal beliefs and attitudes • Language preference	• Social pressure • Institutional requirements • Legal/political context • Regional context • Bilingual Accommodation • Russian Invasion of Ukraine	• Public Domain • Private Domain • Language Shift • Emotional Expressions

Table 13. Thematic Codes

The choice of these codes was driven by the theoretical framing of the study, which views language choice as a dynamic process shaped by individual agency and structural conditions. The coding scheme reflects both narrative elements of linguistic biography and the specific sociopolitical set of linguistic repertoires of contemporary Ukraine. It should be noted that, despite expectations, the integrated AI assistant in MAXQDA was not that effective with the material in Ukrainian (at least at the moment of analysis completion). Therefore, all coding was carried out manually, and the results that we received show that the external factors outweigh the internal ones:

Thematic codes (internal)	Segments
Self-identification	19
Cultural heritage	15
Personal beliefs and attitudes	12
Language preference	10
Total	56

Table 14. Internal Factors

Thematic codes (external)	Segments
Social pressure	26
Regional context	16
Russian Invasion of Ukraine	12
Legal/political context	11
Institutional requirements	11
Bilingual Accommodation	5
Total	81

Table 15. External Factors

Thematic code (extra)	Segments
Language shift	8
Public domain	5
Emotional expressions	3
Private domain	1
Total	17

Table 16. Extra

As we can see, the number of external factors outweighs the number of internal factors, or at least the interviewees tended to speak about them more. To address RQ4 of our research (“What are the factors motivating people to change their language choice?”), we developed a set of sub-questions. They focus on the outcomes of the interviews on language biography:

SQ1: How do external social factors (e.g., war, official policies, societal expectations) influence the language choices of Ukrainians in public and private domains?

To answer this question, we should consider the periodisation of social changes that had a significant impact on the language situation in Ukraine. Within the framework of our study, the following reference points are: the declaration of independence of Ukraine, the Orange Revolution, the Revolution of Dignity and the beginning of the Russian aggression, the full-scale invasion of the Russian Federation.

Since some of our interviewees (in particular, students) were born after 2004, the main attention was focused on the events of 2014 and 2022 as key factors of language shifts. These events mark significant shifts in both individual and societal attitudes towards language.

Interview data suggest that war functions not only as a trigger for changes in language practices but also as a factor transforming both external and internal motivations. Between 2014 and 2022, participants reported increased personal reflection on language choice, a revision of linguistic identity, and gradual adjustments in language strategies. As Interviewee 3 reflects on the changing linguistic environment in Odesa:

І всі любий, хто висувався на мери чи депутати, вони мали мати якісь розмови такі проросійські наративи, інакше ніяких результатів б не було. І це завжди нас дратувало

[...] Але після Помараневчої Релюції змінилися, потім після 14 року змінилися, і після 22го року це, в принципі, фактично остаточно змінилася ситуація³³⁵

Interviewee 3: a teacher, age: 45-54; L1: Russian, Odesa

He highlights the regional specificity of language use in the public domain: although there was a tendency towards pro-Russian narratives, there was always a segment of the Odesa population that resisted this (as indicated by the use of the word “*дратувало/annoyed*”). Importantly, he outlines the gradual nature of these changes, from the Orange Revolution to the full-scale invasion. However, he also points out that language choices in the private domain are shaped differently, often by pragmatic adaptation to the interlocutor:

як правило, це як до тебе звертаються, так і я відповідаю³³⁶

Interviewee 3 (a teacher, age: 45-54; L1: Russian, Odesa).

Similarly, Interviewee 2 reflected on language adaptation during his relocation to Kyiv:

я приїхав навчатися до Києва. І за фактом малих років, ну, і за дещо браком національної свідомості і впливом оточення я перейшов на російську. І вже говорив так двома мовами: українською, російською, коли як адаптувався під мову співрозмовника³³⁷

Interviewee 2 (a student, age: 18-24; L1: Surzhyk & Ukrainian; Kyiv).

In hindsight, he frames this linguistic accommodation as a negative experience, underlining the role of external pressure over internal conviction. The words he uses express negative emotions after the reflection: “a lack of national consciousness and the influence of my surroundings”. These findings align with Hentschel and Palinska (2022), who argue that linguistic accommodation occurs situationally and pragmatically but is neither universal nor unidirectional. Rather, multiple factors influence how speakers adjust their language use to their interlocutors. Taking into account the fact that their research was completed before the full-scale invasion, we

³³⁵ “And everyone, whoever ran for mayor or deputy, they had to have some conversations, some pro-Russian narratives, otherwise there would have been no results. And that always annoyed us [...] But after the Orange Revolution things changed, then after 2014 they changed again, and after 2022, basically, the situation finally changed completely.”

³³⁶ “As a rule, it depends on how someone addresses me – that’s how I respond.”

³³⁷ “I came to study in Kyiv. And due to my young age, and to some extent a lack of national consciousness and the influence of my surroundings, I switched to Russian. And then I spoke both languages: Ukrainian and Russian, depending – I adapted to the language of the person I was speaking with.”

can say that our data support this claim, as interviewees describe both strategic adaptation and moments of resistance (but mostly in the public domain before 2022, and this tendency grows for the private domain after 2022).

Finally, these reflections also illustrate how the full-scale invasion of 2022 has activated the institutional dimension of change in language attitudes. Unlike the period between 2014 and 2022, when shifts were largely driven by personal experiences, post-2022 developments have been shaped by public demand for a Ukrainian-speaking space. This demand now influences state LP, rather than being shaped by it. While still emotionally charged and influenced by the wider socio-political context, this shift is increasingly framed by rational considerations rooted in collective experiences of trauma and resistance.

SQ2: What role does internal self-identification (e.g., personal beliefs, cultural heritage, identity shifts) play in shaping individual language choices?

Language choice is not solely shaped by external factors such as official policies or war but is deeply rooted in personal beliefs, cultural heritage, and evolving processes of self-identification. For many interviewees, particularly those who grew up and socialised in predominantly Russian-speaking environments, the process of reorienting their linguistic repertoire towards Ukrainian was intertwined with complex experiences of doubt, inner conflict, and even feelings of guilt. Respondents often framed this linguistic shift not merely as a matter of language, but as an act of personal and ideological maturation.

The war became a catalyst for both individual and collective reflection in the context of collective and transgenerational historical trauma: the Holodomor, Soviet-era repressions, and forced displacements (both by Russian and Polish governments). Language shift in such a context is often accompanied by a symbolic reassessment of one's own identity. And in this sense, language acts not only as a means of communication, but also as a symbolic instrument of historical memory, self-identification, and resistance. The Ukrainian language, in this context, acts as a marker

of a new phase of life, resistance, emotional closeness and social solidarity. This idea can be clearly traced in the following quote:

а потім вже повномасштабне вторнення, це я вважаю як Last Call для всіх тих, хто вагався. Це вже остаточно розставило на місця, хто нормальний, а хто ненормальний, хто бажає лишатися ненормальним, і не бажає якось повернутися до сторони світла, так би мовити, так і так далі.³³⁸

Interviewee 1: a teacher; age: 25-34; L1: Russian; Kyiv

At the same time, the individual experience of such a transformation remains complex and multidimensional, as it combines cultural inertia, emotional background, social pressure and the desire for self-realisation. This is evidenced by the following statement:

в мене усюди була російська. Потім почалось це повнемасштабне вторнення. У мене не відразу це клянуло, у мене 2-3 місяці якось по трошку все це було. Якусь ми потім з подругою сіли, поговорили взагалі на всю цю тему і вирішили спробувати розмовляти лише українською. Спочатку це почалось чисто з переписок³³⁹

Interviewee 4: a student, age: 18-24; L1: Surzhyk; Odesa

It can be seen that interviewee 4 highlights the gradual and reflective nature of her language shift. For this interviewee, the adoption of Ukrainian was not an immediate response to the invasion (even though, according to our questionnaire data, for some people it was), but the outcome of deliberate discussions and small linguistic practices (starting from written communication and moving to oral). She also highlights that the transformation of everyday linguistic habits was a progressive process. The general process of transition is described positively even though it is not always the case. For example, interviewee 6 describes the moments of shame and disidentification as catalysts of reflection that lately led to the language shift:

влітку ми їздили в Рим. І говорили там російською, і зіткнулися двічі з групою дуже неадекватних москалів³⁴⁰, які просто поводити себе, ну, так, як в тих всіх приколах про Тагіл, от, чисто так само. Просто це все було, це відбувалося в Ватикані. І це було дуже соромно, тому що я зрозуміла, що я якби з ними ідентифікую себе, бо я говорю

³³⁸ and then a full-scale invasion, I consider this the Last Call for all those who hesitated. This has finally put in place who is normal and who is abnormal, who wants to remain abnormal and who doesn't want to somehow turn to the light side, so to speak, and so on.

³³⁹ "I used Russian in all areas of my life. Then the full-scale invasion began. It didn't click for me right away – it took two or three months for things to gradually start changing. At some point, my friend and I sat down and had a conversation about all of it, and we decided to try speaking only Ukrainian. At first, it started just with texting."

³⁴⁰ 'Moskali' is a historical Ukrainian ethnonym originally referring to subjects of the Muscovite state and later to Russians in general. In contemporary usage, it often carries a derogatory or pejorative connotation, especially in contexts related to Russian imperialism and the war against Ukraine. It is therefore used primarily in historical, cultural, or rhetorical contexts rather than as a neutral term.

російською мовою, ходячи по Риму, і що люди, типу дивляться на мене, і думають, що я така сама навіжена, який ці люди³⁴¹

Interviewee 6: a student, age: 25-34; L1: Russian; Lviv.

Here, Russian is associated with an undesired social identity, leading to active reflection. Having experienced the feelings of discomfort and shame “було дуже соромно / [it] was deeply embarrassing” and “люди [...] думають, що я така сама навіжена, який ці люди / people [...] think that I was just as crazy as those individuals [=Russians]”, interviewee 6 reframed her language choice as a matter of symbolic alignment with social values. A further example provided by interviewee 6 underscores the connection between language and historical rupture:

потім, що там ще було в січні, а 16-го закони, 16-го січня, це які були мовні, теж закони. І, ну, останню краплею, вже в той час, ще я говорила російською, то точно, то ще не стало для мене якимось. А вже коли після 21 січня так сталося, що я поїхала в Францію, і конкретно в час, коли були перші смерті на Майдані, мене не було в Україні, але був мій тато на Майдані, на Грушевського. Він там був проїздом випадково. І я пам'ятаю, що я ходила по Ліону, ми були в Ліоні. І, тобто, в мене вже помирали люди. Ну, тобто, вже лежать посеред площі люди, а я хожу по Франції і думаю, ви не розумієте, що нас вбивають? Ну, в центрі міста вбили людей. Ну, і це було дуже образливо. І в день, коли ми виїжджали, вилетіли з Ліона в Катовіце, в цей день вони почали вперше бити палками по ... цей звук, коли казали, що закриють кордони, що ведуть надзвичайний стан. І це було по всіх каналах, в цьому аеропорту. [...] і ти розумів, що ти можеш не вернутися. Ну, що зараз закриють кордон. І я в тому сранному Катовіце. І я не зможу бути, ну, типу, в себе вдома. І тоді було дуже страшно. [...] І після того, через три дні було віче на Майдані. [...] це було перше віче, коли кричучи “Героям Слава!”, ти вже бачив, ну, типу, ти вже знав, про кого ти це кричиш. І з того моменту я вже, мені здається, перейшла на українську. І в побуті старалась переходити. Тобто це вже спрацювало. Це було для мене вже таким... Дуже екзистенційне враження на мене це все справило³⁴²

Interviewee 6: a student, age: 25-34; L1: Russian; Lviv.

³⁴¹ “In the summer, we went to Rome. We were speaking Russian there, and we encountered, on two occasions, a group of extremely inappropriate “moskali”³⁴⁰ who behaved exactly like in all those stereotypes and jokes about Tagil – just like that. The thing is, it all happened in the Vatican. And it was deeply embarrassing, because I realised that I somehow identified myself with them, since I was also speaking Russian while walking around Rome. And I felt like people were looking at me and thinking I was just as crazy as those individuals.”

³⁴² “Then, what else was in January, of the Laws of 16th, on Jan 16 there were language laws as well. And, well, at that time, I was still speaking Russian, so it has really become the final straw when after January 21st, it happened that I went to France, exactly at the time when the first deaths on Maidan took place. I wasn't in Ukraine, but my father was on Maidan, on Hrushevskoho Street. He was there by chance, just passing through. I remember walking around Lyon, we were in Lyon. People had already died. There were people lying in the middle of the square, and I was walking around France thinking, “Don't you understand that we are being killed? In the city center, people were killed.” It was very upsetting. And on the day we left, flying from Lyon to Katowice, that day they started hitting people with batons... that sound, when they said they would close the borders, impose a state of emergency. It was on all the channels, in that airport. [...] And you realized that you might not return. That now they would close the border. And there I was, in that crappy Katowice. And I wouldn't be able to be at home. And it was very scary. [...] And after that, three days later there was a rally on Maidan. [...] It was the first rally when shouting “Glory to the heroes!” you had already seen well, you already knew who you were shouting for. And from that moment, I think, I switched to Ukrainian. And I tried to use it more in everyday life. That worked. It was already for me... A very existential impression this all made on me.”

This narrative demonstrates how political violence and existential threat catalyse linguistic shifts as acts of solidarity, resistance, and belonging. The respondent links language choice to a deeply personal and affective experience of national trauma, where Ukrainian becomes not only a symbol of resistance but of personal authenticity and historical continuity.

Again, these testimonies reflect the profound intertwining of language choice with processes of identity construction. Language here functions as a performative resource, enabling speakers to align themselves with community, reject unwanted affiliations, and reframe their own positions within shifting social language repertoires. Such shifts are not immediate; they often unfold through reflective processes triggered by specific experiences of rupture, shame, or solidarity.

Furthermore, the meanings of Russian and Ukrainian are rethought through these experiences. Russian, in some narratives, becomes an index of unwanted associations with imperial aggression or cultural shame, while Ukrainian emerges as a resource for constructing a renewed, ethically meaningful self. However, the transition is neither linear nor uniform: it intersects with personal biographies, emotional attachments, and evolving understandings of national history.

SQ3: How do internal and external factors interact in the process of language decision-making in Ukraine?

Despite the fact that war as an external factor is a key trigger for language shift, the transition to Ukrainian itself is not an automatic reaction to a threat. The change in linguistic behaviour occurs through individual reflection, critical understanding of one's own identity, and conscious decision-making. In this sense, language choice is not a blind act of adaptation, but rather an expression of active positioning – an act that combines both rational and emotional components. Thus, internal and external factors do not simply coexist, but mutually reinforce each other. External pressure (threat, social expectation, political context) triggers internal processes of rethinking, which, in turn, affect the depth and sustainability of language shift. It is in this interaction that the space opens up for the transformation not only of linguistic practices, but also of

sociocultural identity in a broader sense. Interviewee 1 explicitly observes this interaction of personal reflection and political events in narrating his linguistic trajectory:

Потім час іде, іде, і відбувається Євромайдан. І я дуже пам'ятаю, як мене вразило, що коли розігнали вперше протестувальників тоді 1 грудня у 2013 році, що саме храми київського патріархату розкрили двері і прихистили тих, кого Беркут розігнав. В той час як церкви і собори московського патріархату і монастирі поводити себе геть іншим чином. А потім це як по експоненті почалося. Євромайдан тривав майже безмін весь грудень січень, але коли в лютому бачиш як розстрілюють людей, і власне ти вимушений іти з пар, іти через усе місто пішки, тому що найкоротший шлях якраз пролягає через урядовий квартал Маріїнський парк. І ти йдеш додому і роззираєшся і не біжить там Беркут слідом, і потім бачиш далі, що відбувається. І потім бачиш, як Росія поводить і по суті здійснює вторгнення до Криму і так далі. І бачиш, як росіяни висвітлювали навіть до вторгнення у Крим, Майдан, у медіа, це ще викликало дуже сильний когнітивний дисонанс, тому що ти бачиш, що відбувається на власні очі, і розумієш, до чого це, про що це. І бачиш, що вони просто якусь просто нісенітницю по телебаченню розповідають, і це зовсім ніяк не пов'язано з реальністю. то тоді власне і певно відбулася остаточна зміна. Тобто я почав вважати себе християнином, але без вже якоїсь там конфесії, не належачи до якоїсь із них і саме в 15-му році я став більше активно переходити на українську³⁴³

Interviewee 1: a teacher; age: 25-34; L1: Russian; Kyiv

As well as the previous interviewees, Interviewee 1 highlights that his language shift was a longitudinal process. In this process, emotional responses to state violence, religious institutions' moral positioning:

I vividly remember being struck by the fact that when the protesters were first dispersed on December 1, 2013, it was the Kyiv Patriarchate churches that opened their doors and sheltered those whom the Berkut had driven away. Meanwhile, the churches, cathedrals, and monasteries of the Moscow Patriarchate behaved in a completely different way.

and media disinformation (“[you] see that they [Russians] were telling utter nonsense on television that had nothing to do with reality”) shaped both political consciousness and personal linguistic practices. These reflections show us that the

³⁴³ “Then time passed, and the Euromaidan happened. I vividly remember being struck by the fact that when the protesters were first dispersed on December 1, 2013, it was the Kyiv Patriarchate churches that opened their doors and sheltered those whom the Berkut had driven away. Meanwhile, the churches, cathedrals, and monasteries of the Moscow Patriarchate behaved in a completely different way. After that, everything escalated exponentially. Euromaidan lasted almost uninterrupted through December and January, but in February, when you saw people being shot, and you were forced to skip classes and walk across the city on foot – because the shortest route passed right through the government quarter, Mariinsky Park – you’d go home glancing around whether Berkut is not chasing you, and then witness what was happening next. Then you saw how Russia behaved, essentially invading Crimea, and how Russian media portrayed the Maidan even before the Crimean invasion. This caused a strong cognitive dissonance because you saw the reality with your own eyes and understood what it was really about, while on television they were telling utter nonsense that had nothing to do with reality. That was when the final change happened for me. I began to consider myself a Christian, but without belonging to any particular denomination, and in [20]15 I started actively switching more to Ukrainian.”

decision to adopt Ukrainian evolves over time since it is catalysed by disillusionment, ethical realignment, and an increasing sense of symbolic disconnect between personal values and the representations of Russian-language media.

This comment illustrates how language decision-making unfolds as a cumulative, experiential process. The respondent does not describe a single turning point, but rather a series of external shocks (e.g., state violence, religious responses, media narratives) that prompted internal reassessments – of truth, legitimacy, and ethical affiliation. All these reflections led to changes in identity, but also in linguistic behaviour. For us, they explain that the language shift is far from being instrumental or policy-driven, but reveals the agentive, situated nature of linguistic change. What is more, the language choice is seen as a form of resistance through the lens of personal ethics, emotional dissonance, political clarity. It also supports Hentschel and Palinska's (2022) conclusion that language shifts in Ukraine are rarely one-directional or top-down but emerge from dynamic interactions between sociopolitical conditions and the speaker's evolving identity.

SQ4: To what extent has the full-scale Russian invasion affected interviewees' perceptions of language and linguistic loyalty?

The data indicate that Interviewees are clearly aware of the symbolic weight of language as a marker of stability, solidarity and resistance. At the same time, they do not absolutise the language issue, not considering the use of the Ukrainian language as the only or sufficient indicator of national awareness. A significant part of the interviewees draws a distinction between private language practice and public position, emphasising that the language issue is a consequence of colonial legacy, and not the root cause of internal social contradictions.

The interviewees pay special attention to intergenerational language practices. On the one hand, there is increasing public criticism of raising children exclusively in Russian as a form of reproducing language dependence. On the other hand, the majority of interviewees demonstrate empathy for the older generation of Russian speakers, recognising the historical conditioning of their language habits and the limited possibility for radical language transformation. In this context, language loyalty

(permanently sticking to the assumed native language as opposed to language accommodation) is interpreted not as a rigid adherence to one language norm, but as a process of gradual reorientation within historical, family and social circumstances.

Interviewees also recognise the long-term nature of language shift, as it is the result of a long historical process that includes both political and socio-cultural factors. The war only heightened public sensitivity to issues of language identity and so-called language loyalty (understood as ideological alignment rather than pragmatic accommodation), while at the same time actualising the need for a more flexible and contextual approach to LP.

Thus, the full-scale invasion of the Russian Federation became a catalyst for a rethinking of language as a political resource and as an instrument of personal position. Language behaviour appears not as a reaction to external pressure, but as the result of a multi-layered internal dialogue between experience, identity and expectations of society. This ambivalent position is well reflected in the following quote by the interviewee 1:

в [20]15-му році я став більше активно переходити на українську [...] зрозумів, що українська мова дуже важлива. Із тих пір я намагався вже у... Просто, наприклад, я замовляю каву або десь у магазині, і я беру і відповідаю українською або заговорою із людьми українською, хоча я не змінював там мову спілкування там з мамою, з бабусею або з якимись старими дуже друзями. [...] Ну, 22-го рік поставив всьому цьому дуже жирну крапку, а жирніше вже нема куди. [...] Тому [у] мене російська мова лише лишається з мати, бабусею, двоюрідним братом, якого я знаю з дитинства, троюрідним братом, якого я теж знаю з дитинства, і може там один чи два знайомих все. Решта це суто україномовне середовище. [...] за три роки повномасштабні не можуть зникнути, як і наслідки в рабства в Америці [...] такі травми соціальні, вони не загоються швидко [...] це вже відповідальність кожного, коли вони започатковуватимуть сім'ї, коли спілкуватимуться з дітьми, щоб російської в цьому не було³⁴⁴

Interviewee 1: a teacher; age: 25-34; L1: Russian; Kyiv

³⁴⁴ “In 2015, I started switching to Ukrainian more actively [...] I realised that the Ukrainian language is really important. Since then, I’ve been trying to... Well, for example, when I order coffee or go to a shop, I make a point of responding in Ukrainian or starting a conversation in Ukrainian. Though I didn’t change the language I use with my mum, my grandma, or with some very old friends. [...] Well, 2022 marked a turning point – a bold full stop, with no room left for doubt. So for me, Russian remains only for communicating with my mother, my grandmother, my cousin whom I’ve known since childhood, another cousin I’ve also known since I was little – and maybe one or two acquaintances, that’s all. The rest is an entirely Ukrainian-speaking environment. [...] In three years of full-scale war, these things can’t just disappear – just like the consequences of slavery in America haven’t vanished. [...] These are social traumas, and they won’t heal quickly. [...] It’s now the responsibility of each individual – when they start families, when they speak with their children – to make sure Russian has no place in that.”

The respondent demonstrates an awareness of the symbolic and emotional boundaries between public and private spheres, maintaining Russian in intimate family contexts (“I didn’t change the language I use with my mum, my grandma, or with some very old friends”) while aligning public practices increasingly with Ukrainian. This narrative highlights the gradual and selective nature of linguistic reorientation. However, the full-scale invasion is framed as a definitive turning point (“year [20]22 marked a turning point – a bold full stop”).

This quotation gives us the example of how linguistic loyalty is perceived as dynamic and context-dependent rather than absolute or monolithic. The respondent acknowledges the temporal dimension of change of language attitudes, likening it to other long-term social processes shaped by historical trauma (“In three years of full-scale war, these things can’t just disappear – just like the consequences of slavery in America haven’t vanished”). Linguistic transition is framed as both a personal responsibility and a societal project, tied to future generations and collective memory (“It’s now the responsibility of each individual – when they start families, when they speak with their children – to make sure Russian has no place in that.”).

These findings reinforce the statement that language behaviour functions as a performative expression of ideological and emotional alignment, especially in post-colonial contexts marked by war and trauma (and Ukraine is a perfect example of both). Language becomes a site of negotiation between inherited linguistic repertoires and contemporary ethical, political, and cultural imperatives, which resonates with sociolinguistic work on language, trauma, and identity by Pavlenko (2023).

Conclusion and Comments

As a result of the analysis of in-depth interviews, it was revealed that external factors, in particular the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, play a decisive role in shaping the linguistic behaviour of respondents. The war appears not only as a catalyst for changing linguistic practices, but also as a powerful stimulus for internal reflection, rethinking of cultural heritage, (re)identification and reassessment of linguistic preferences. External pressure, in particular the threat to the existence of the state, causes not an automatic, but a conscious reaction – the transition to the Ukrainian

language as a symbol of resistance, unity and moral responsibility. We can see this by looking at the connections between thematic codes in the text made with the software MAXQDA (Figure 16). This figure presents a network map of the factors influencing language choice in Ukraine, as identified through the analysis of interview data. The nodes represent thematic categories, while the connecting lines indicate observed relationships and intersections between these categories within participants' narratives. The thickness of the connecting lines indicates the strength or frequency of co-occurrence between themes within participants' narratives. That is the factors mentioned by the same informant in segments close to each other (here by close I mean the neighbouring sentences within the same retort). The colour coding reflects the broader thematic groupings: (1) green nodes represent external factors; (2) blue nodes represent internal factors; (3) orange nodes extra factors.




Figure 16. Interconnection of Factors

The network visualises these factors as a dynamic and interrelated system. Notably, self-identification and personal beliefs and attitudes emerge as central

mediating nodes, connecting both external factors (e.g., social pressure, political context) and internal factors (e.g., cultural heritage, language preference). Similarly, language shift and bilingual accommodation appear as outcomes shaped by the interplay of institutional, emotional, and contextual variables. The interaction between the external and the internal factors occurs in the form of a sequential increase: external circumstances initiate the change, but its implementation occurs at the level of individual comprehension and adaptation. For example, regional context and institutional requirements influence public language practices more instantly than personal attitudes and preferences. In turn, individual orientations feed into broader patterns of language shift and reconfiguration of linguistic loyalty, particularly in response to recent political events. This visualisation supports the analytical argument that language choice in Ukraine is the result of multi-layered, interconnected processes involving both external and internal (agentive) factors.

It is also worth paying attention to the age dynamics in the perception of language attitudes. This figure presents a detailed visualisation of the key factors influencing language choice as they emerge from the interview data. The size of each node reflects the relative volume of speech dedicated to a particular thematic category within an individual's interview measured by the coded segments. The interviewees are arranged from younger to older participants.




Figure 17. Factors of Language Behaviour

This visualisation illustrates how the salience of specific factors (such as cultural heritage, self-identification, or institutional requirements) varies across informants' generations. Larger nodes indicate themes that were more central or more extensively discussed by a given interviewee, offering insight into both generational differences and individual priorities in language-related reflections. Such a difference is probably due to varying levels of emotional openness and the traumatic Soviet legacy, which still affects forms of speech and self-awareness (see more Evans, 2015; Chebykin, 2023). Younger respondents (under 35 years old) more often emphasised internal motives and personal experience that prompted the change in language behaviour. Representatives of the older generation mostly described broader social processes, avoiding deep emotional reflection (Figure 17).

In general, the study's results indicate the complex, multi-level nature of language choice in modern Ukraine, where individual decisions unfold in close connection with historical context, social transformations, and personal experiences.

CHAPTER V. ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS

RQ1. What are the historical factors contributing to the development of LP in Ukraine?

The historical development of LP in Ukraine is determined by political, social and cultural processes that have shaped the linguistic landscape in the territories of modern Ukraine from the end of the 17th century to the present day. Analysis of archive documents and previous studies indicates the uneven development of LP. The reasons for this include:

(1) The influence of imperial regimes.

Firstly, the Russian Empire's denial of the existence of the Ukrainian language, its marginalisation and a series of deliberate bans on the Ukrainian language in education starting from the 1760s. Secondly, Austria-Hungary's attempts to prevent the development of Ukrainian movements in order to avoid hypothetical separatist sentiments in favour of uniting with the Left Bank Ukraine. However, it is worth noting that during the imperial era, important institutions such as 'Prosvita' and the 'Shevchenko Scientific Society' were established.

(2) Short periods of independence

Due to the events of 1917-1920, various governments operated in Ukraine, three of which were pro-Ukrainian (the Central Rada, the Second Hetmanate, and the Directory). All of them worked in their own way to create space for the development of the Ukrainian language. The most important events of that time, which laid the foundations for the development of the Ukrainian language, were the establishment of the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, the Law "On Compulsory Teaching of the Ukrainian Language and Literature, as well as the History and Geography of Ukraine in Secondary Schools" (1918), the official recognition of the Ukrainian language, and the active expansion of the network of schools with Ukrainian as the language of instruction.

(3) Soviet Union

In the early period of the Soviet Union, a policy of *korenizatsia* (indigenisation) was pursued, which allowed the policy of the Directory to continue for several years,

but by the end of the 1920s, these reforms began to be rolled back. The most important achievement of this period was the creation of a common spelling standard for the Ukrainian language (language standardisation) under the leadership of Skrypnyk and Ohiyenko. However, by 1928, ukrainisation was recognised as a nationalist deviation, and most of its active participants were repressed. For ordinary citizens (and the population at that time was predominantly rural), a policy of collectivisation was introduced, leading to the *Holodomor* causing the death of 4-10 million people according to various estimates. The Soviet Union's subsequent policy shaped the perception of Russian as the only prestigious language and introduced it as a mandatory element of education and public life. Additionally, Russians were settled in the places of the murdered Ukrainians in order to change the linguistic composition of the population. It was these policies that laid the foundation for mass Russian-Ukrainian bilingualism and the emergence of the so-called Russophone population.

(4) Post-soviet independence.

Since 1991, language policy has been one of the key areas of state building. Russian remained the most widespread L1/L2 in Ukraine (after Ukrainian itself), and the level of bilingualism was very high. The unstable economic situation and the lack of established ties with countries outside the former Soviet Union contributed to the LP's liberal attitude towards the Russian language. Some political forces tried in every way to expand the status of Russian to a regional or even a second state language, e.g., the Law on the Principles of State Language Policy (2012) (see Zakon Ukrainy "Pro zasady derzhavnoi movnoi polityky" No. 5029-VI vid 3 lypnia 2012 roku, Verkhovna Rada Ukrainy, 2012).

Since 2014, the language has taken on symbolic significance, becoming (a) an instrument of cultural resistance to Russian aggression, (b) a marker of political and cultural identity, and (c) an element of the state's security strategy. The Russian aggression of 2022 only reinforced these trends. In 2023, the Cabinet of Ministers declared the Ukrainian language among the key attributes of national identity and statehood, thereby ensuring the unity and stability of the country (see Postanova № 1322, Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, 2023). All this together not only shaped the

status of the Ukrainian language but also determined the conditions for the emergence and evolution of modern LP in education.

RQ2. Which LPs are related to the sphere of education?

An analysis of the regulatory and legal documents governing language policy in Ukraine can be classified as follows (based on the legislation in force as of 2025):

(1) Constitutional and legal basis for LP in education (macro level).

This includes the Constitution of Ukraine (1996), the Law on Higher Education (2014), and the Law on Education (2017).

The Constitution (1996) lays the foundation for the use of Ukrainian in all types of educational institutions (including higher education). The document emphasises that this constitutional principle is the key starting point for the further development of language legislation in education.

The Law on Higher Education (2014) and the Law on Education (2017) regulate the use of languages in educational institutions, defining Ukrainian as the language of instruction. At the same time, the use of minority languages is permitted in accordance with special conditions and/or the creation of special educational programmes.

Both the Constitution and the Laws of 2014 and 2017 define the rights of national minorities to receive education in their native language at the preschool and primary education levels in state educational institutions.

(2) Special laws regulating the application of language policy (macro level)

This category includes the Law on Ensuring the Functioning of the Ukrainian Language as the State Language (2019) and the Law on the Use of the English Language in Ukraine (2023).

The 2019 law not only defines the mandatory use of the Ukrainian language in the educational process at all levels, but also introduces, for the first time, institutional mechanisms for monitoring compliance with language policy, including requirements for documents, reporting and public communication by universities.

The 2023 law defines English as a tool for integration into the EU and changes its status in Ukrainian education. From now on, all civil servants (including teachers)

must have a certain level of English proficiency (based on CERF). This provides for the possibility of expanding English-language programmes in HEIs and also increases the role of English in internal and external academic communications.

(3) Institutional LPs of universities (mesolevel)

LPs at the level of educational institutions are determined by statutes, internal regulations, institutional development strategies, etc. In the dissertation, we analyse such documents from eight universities in Kyiv, Kharkiv, Odesa, and Lviv. All documents are drafted in accordance with current legislation, which recognises Ukrainian as the primary language of instruction. However, most universities have state-accredited English-language or bilingual programmes and provide for the possibility of creating groups with a different language of instruction under certain conditions. With the exception of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, HEIs avoid the issue of the Russian language in documents issued after 2014. Kyiv-Mohyla Academy prohibits the use of Russian on university premises regardless of the domain of communication (see Kraliuk, 2023).

Therefore, the above list of documents defines the current LP of Ukraine, each on a particular level of influence.

RQ3. What is the reality of the implementation of LP in academia?

The reality of LP implementation in Ukrainian academia reflects a complex combination of regulatory requirements, a certain degree of autonomy regarding language issues in HEIs, diverse language practices, and individual language choices of students and teachers. Empirical data indicate that the actual situation differs from the declared one.

Firstly, the language choice in student education often depends on the region, generation and specific educational context. For example, Lviv (the region that was least affected by russification) demonstrates consistent compliance with language norms at a level of between 68.85 and 86.89%, depending on the domain of the communicative situation. As a result, the level of bi-/multilingualism in this region is quite low. As for Kyiv, although Ukrainian is undoubtedly dominant, the number of people who use only Ukrainian ranges from 25.71 to 71.43%, depending on the domain

of the linguistic situation. Interestingly, the level of exclusive Russian usage is no more than 10%, and in the formal domain, no more than 2.86%. The rest is taken up by mixed language practices that combine Ukrainian, Russian and English. The situation is different in Kharkiv, where the level of exclusive use of Ukrainian varies from 31.82 to 63.64%, while the share of Russian varies from 4.55 to 18.18%. Also, in this region, the share of bilingual practices ranges from 18.18 to 31.82%. Looking at Odesa, we found that the use of Ukrainian ranges from 35.14 to 67.57%, Russian from 2.7 to 22.97%, and bilingual practices from 20.27 to 22.97%. It is also worth noting that in Odesa, the use of Surzhyk is often declared, but primarily in conjunction with the use of other languages. However, it is often mentioned in combination with the use of other languages (Ukrainian, Russian, Surzhyk). The use of English exclusively in the Kharkiv and Odesa regions is significantly less common than in Lviv or Kyiv.

Secondly, according to our data, the use of Russian instead of Ukrainian is mostly initiated by representatives of the older generation of teachers, as their education was influenced by the Soviet academic experience and the language practices of that time. On the other hand, our research on the category of ‘teachers’ showed that the vast majority of teachers give answers that do not contradict the LP of Ukraine (100% chose Ukrainian as the language of communication in Kyiv and Odesa, in Lviv this figure reaches 93.75%, and in Kharkiv – 85.71%) when the question concerns the formal domain. When the question concerns the informal domain, the situation changes in almost all regions. Only in Lviv does the total dominance of the Ukrainian language (more than 2/3) remain in informal communications. In Kyiv, the share of bilingual practices is 16.67% (Ukrainian and Russian) and 8.33% (Ukrainian and English). In Odesa, the picture has changed even more dramatically, with only 41.67% choosing Ukrainian in the informal domain, 33.33% using Russian, and 16.67% using bilingual language practices. In Kharkiv, the situation is even more skewed towards the use of Russian: 28.57% use only Russian, 42.86% combine Ukrainian and Russian, and only 28.57% use only Ukrainian in informal domains.

In summary, empirical data proves that Ukrainian dominates in formal domains in all cities without exception. Mixed practices are common in all regions except Lviv.

Trends towards a certain preservation of the Russian language use can be observed in Kharkiv and Odesa.

The interviews also showed that absolutely all participants agree to the need for broader ukrainisation of educational processes, although the reasons for this belief may differ. Also, all interviewees noted that they sometimes deviate from LP due to the context of the language situation or personal habit. Teachers noted that they feel pressure from themselves, students, or colleagues regarding the choice of one language or another.

Thus, a nominally monolingual policy in education in practice turns into a context-dependent multilingual environment. The lack of institutional control methods only exacerbates this gap, as linguistic institutional practices are *de facto* determined by the personal linguistic beliefs of those involved in the educational process, individual habits, and informal academic traditions. These results are consistent with Spolsky's theory (2004).

Summarising the data obtained, we can note that the Ukrainian educational space is characterised by formal Ukrainian language use with actual regional variability. The state is also gradually trying to implement language policies aimed at promoting the use of English, but the real results of these policies can only be assessed over time. To sum up, the gap between theory and reality is due to both historical factors and current socio-political circumstances, including war and the country's integration into the European educational space.

RQ4. What are the factors motivating people to change their language choice?

The issue of language choice is complex and depends on several factors. Empirical data from both the questionnaire and interview materials indicate that shifts in language choice result from an interaction between internal (primarily psychological) and external (social and political) factors. According to the results of the study, it was the socio-political transformations in Ukraine that became the driving force for rethinking (both internal and external) factors of language choice for many people. According to the coded segments of the questionnaire (questions Q.3.3., Q.5.1.,

Q.6.2. and Q.6.4.) and interview data, the number of segments based on external factors exceeds those based on internal factors by 26.32%.

The study showed that the most powerful motivator are factors related in one way or another to Russia's military aggression against Ukraine. Key subtopics include:

(1) “War as a motivator for language change” meaning both a change in political and civic stance (e.g. honouring fallen defenders by rejecting Russian) and traumatic disorders (e.g. panic attacks when hearing Russian or certain variations of it).

(2) “Distancing oneself from the enemy culture”, of which language is a component. People try to avoid being associated with the enemy and therefore avoid the Russian language or culture as much as possible.

(3) “Revolution experience”, which primarily refers to participation in one of the Ukrainian revolutions, each of which was anti-Russian and pro-European in nature. Of particular importance here is the Revolution of Dignity (2014), during which the first human casualties occurred and during which the Russians invaded Ukraine for the first time (not counting the provocations on Tuzla Island in 2003 when Russia tried to build a dam in Ukrainian territories without permission from Ukraine).

Interview extracts (especially from interviewees 1, 4, and 6) also confirm that war and political crises serve as catalysts for reflection, rethinking linguistic identity, and switching to Ukrainian. Thus, the interview and questionnaire data indicate that personal experiences of war, loss, occupation, or bombardment are a strong additional motivator for language change.

In such cases, language acquires moral significance, becoming a resource for self-defence and solidarity with fellow citizens and the military.

The second largest group of factors relates to internal motivations, namely “Identity, convictions, belonging”. In this group, self-identification as Ukrainian and active citizenship are key factors. In fact, they are the basis for more specific factors, such as the desire to ‘*preserve*’ or ‘*protect*’ one’s native language, ethical considerations and a sense of moral duty. Informants often use military metaphors, referring to language as a ‘*barrier*’, ‘*shield*’, or ‘*weapon*’ against hostile influence. This is consistent with the interpretation of language as a means of symbolic resistance,

which gained particular strength after 2014 and 2022. Moreover, we observe that what is actually happening here is a reevaluation of internal motivations in response to the influence of external triggers.

Another important group is “Formative contexts”, i.e. all the factors that shape a child into a mature personality (family language, the influence of the immediate circle of communication, even migration or relocation). Typically, stable models of linguistic behaviour are formed by the family during childhood, and only extraordinary events, such as moving or a radical change of environment, can shake these stable models. In fact, the interviewees noted that their environment did indeed influence their linguistic repertoire, as different social contacts often required different language practices. Such linguistic accommodation stands in opposition to non-accommodational bilingualism. For example, interviewees 1 (L1: Russian), 5 (L1: Ukrainian), and 6 (L1: Russian) stated that they rarely switched to the language of the interlocutor, with a few exceptions. Meanwhile, interviewees 2 (L1: Surzhyk + Ukrainian), 3 (L1: Russian), and 4 (L1: Surzhyk) noted that they adhered to the principle of *‘responding in the language in which you are addressed.’* After 2014/2022, these views changed, and speakers now pay more attention to the communicative context when deciding to change their language behaviour.

It is important to note that our data also includes the topic of “multilingual accommodation”, and (non)accommodational bilingualism actually falls into this category. However, pragmatic motives do not always involve the interchangeable use of Ukrainian and Russian depending on the communicative situation. Sometimes, informants noted that their language behaviour is guided by the desire to ensure effective communication (for example, when communicating with foreign colleagues from Europe, they switch to English, while with colleagues from the former Soviet Union, they can communicate in Russian). Also, for many, linguistic behaviour is a marker of the formality of the situation (this is especially noticeable in responses from Odesa). Interviewee 4 notes that educational institutions were associated with communication in Ukrainian, friends or entertainment events with Russian, and communication with family with Surzhyk. In this context, Surzhyk can serve as a *‘bridge’* in mixed communication environments, despite its rather low prestige. The

existence of this category confirms that a change in language choice is not always ideologically motivated; often, it depends only on communicative convenience.

The last category mentioned here is ‘Legal and institutional requirements’. We have already seen that actual language practices differ from the declared ones. This is confirmed by the fact that this category has the smallest number of coded segments. Moreover, this answer is often just a way to respond ‘*correctly*’ and avoid expressing one’s own position.

To sum up, we can draw the following conclusions about language behaviour change in Ukraine: (1) legislation follows social changes rather than determining them, (2) language behaviour change is a bottom-up initiative that becomes institutionalised only over time or against the backdrop of driving changes in society, (3) in private and informal communication, legal mechanisms play almost no role, which is actually a positive sign of the development of a democratic society, although it undermines certain protective mechanisms of statehood in the Ukrainian context. It is important to give credit to the fact that, for certain individuals, compliance with language norms remains a valid motive for changing their language behaviour. The data collected show that language choice in modern Ukraine is simultaneously a political, ethical, and pragmatic act, where individual decisions are closely intertwined with the military context, historical events, and social transformations.

CONCLUSION

This study presents a comprehensive analysis of language policy and its application in the field of higher education in Ukraine. The issue is examined from sociolinguistic, historical, and political-legal perspectives. We were able to carry out a multidimensional interpretation of the processes of formation, transformation and implementation of language policy in the field of higher education in Ukraine based on analysed data (historical sources, regulatory and legal acts, analysis of the experience of language management in other countries), as well as empirical experience (data from an online questionnaire and semi-structured individual interviews). The study combines an analysis of the historical context, official documentation, and empirical data obtained from a questionnaire (230 respondents) and in-depth interviews (6 interviewees). All participants received higher education in one of four regions (Kyiv, Kharkiv, Odesa, Lviv). These cities are the largest in their respective geographical regions of Ukraine, and their universities are among the top-ranked universities in Ukraine. We also integrated the framework of linguistic autobiography to trace identity-related transformations behind language shifts.

Thus, the study made it possible to (1) reconstruct the dynamics of language policy practices in Ukraine from a diachronic perspective, (2) analyse the current legislative mechanisms and strategies of individual institutions regarding language policies in education in modern Ukraine, (3) trace the differences between the declared norms and approaches and actual academic practices in different regional contexts, (4) identify the main factors that determine the language choice of students and teachers in situations with varying degrees of formality, (5) outline directions for optimising language policies in Ukrainian universities, taking into account the course of European integration, the challenges of wartime and the needs of society at the present moment.

This study found that Ukrainian serves as the academic *lingua franca*, although its dominance varies depending on historical experience, regional characteristics, and the communicative domain. Ukrainian plays the most significant role in Lviv, which is to be expected, as it is the least russified region. Kyiv comes next. As for Odesa and

Kharkiv, the share of Ukrainian language use there is lower in both formal and informal domains. Mixed practices are also more common in these two regions.

Our research shows that language policy in Ukraine has historically been characterised by conflicts, forced assimilation practices by oppressive nations, and only periodic, short-lived attempts of ukrainisation. The key stages in the formation of language policies in Ukraine from the 18th century to the present day have been (1) the imperial practices of the Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires, (2) attempts of state self-determination during the Ukrainian revolutions of 1917-1920, including language, and (3) the language policies of the Soviet Union. The Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires addressed the language issue in different ways; however, neither of these policies promoted the development of the Ukrainian language. While in Austria-Hungary such a policy was driven more by pragmatic tolerance towards the languages of the empire's nations, with a certain emphasis on balancing the different ethnic groups depending on their influence, in the Russian Empire, bans on any manifestations of the Ukrainian language prevailed, especially in academic circles. They were characterised by the elevation of the Russian language, and the denial of the existence of the Ukrainian language.

The period of Ukrainian revolutions was not politically successful, but it laid the foundation for the institutionalisation of the Ukrainian language. It was during this period that schools with Ukrainian as the language of instruction were opened *en masse* throughout Ukraine, corpus planning was developing, and science was partially ukrainised.

In fact, the Soviet Union based its policy of indigenisation on this. However, the policy of the Soviet Union itself, dictated by the Kremlin, consisted of massive aggressive russification, including in the field of education, and the marginalisation of the Ukrainian language. It was the consequences of this policy that had the greatest impact on the formation of language practices and attitudes at the beginning of Ukraine's independence. The analysed literature and our data show that the state policy of independent Ukraine and the actual language practices of the population have been contradictory for a long period of time. This defines the key problem addressed by this dissertation, namely: the gap between declared language policies and their

implementation in the academic environment. A long-term retrospective review of language policies in the field of education in modern Ukraine has revealed the continuity of the russification policy and its consequences for both LP and language practices.

The dynamics of language policies in Ukraine are reflected in the analysis of Ukraine's legislative framework (1991-2025) in Chapter III. This concerns the evolution of the status of the Ukrainian language from a purely declarative one to a certain incorporation into institutional practices in the spheres of education, public administration and public communications. We consider the most important documents in this area to be:

(1) Article 10 of the Constitution of Ukraine, which defines Ukrainian as the state language;

(2) The Laws "On Education" (2017) and "On Higher Education" (2014), which directly require Ukrainian to be the main language of instruction. Other languages are possible, but only under certain circumstances.

(3) The Law "On Ensuring the Functioning of the Ukrainian Language as the State Language" (2019), which introduces mechanisms to monitor compliance with Ukraine's LP and creates the institution of a language ombudsman (for the first time since independence in 1991, although the language issue has always been acute).

(4) The Law "On the Use of the English Language in Ukraine" (2023), which has clearly raised the prestige of the English language among the academic community and has also contributed to bringing Ukrainian science closer to the European context.

It is essential to note that universities have greater autonomy in decisions regarding the implementation of language policy compared to schools. The language policy of each university is regulated by its charter, strategic development plans, internal regulations, and other relevant documents. The results of our study indicate that institutional control of universities is weaker than state control and is often merely declaratory. The state does not yet have the tools to control all educational institutions (and cannot really have them in a democratic setting). This is precisely why official language policies and actual language practices among members of the academic community diverge.

Questionnaires and interviews that we conducted among representatives of academic communities in Kyiv, Kharkiv, Odesa, and Lviv demonstrate the heterogeneity of language practices in higher education institutions. First, the implementation of language practices in universities is not uniform. Our research shows that certain fields (namely the humanities) demonstrate greater compliance with state norms than natural sciences or technical majors. There is also a significant difference depending on the degree of formality, specifically in the language of instruction, the language used for communication between teachers and students outside of lectures or seminars, and the language used for communication between peers (i.e., students with students, teachers with teachers). The proportion of English-language components in academic disciplines remains uneven across regions. We observe that English is replacing Russian, particularly in the capital (Kyiv), where there are more international initiatives, collaborations, and so on. We also observe the increasing presence of English in Lviv, the closest city to the European border among those studied. Kharkiv and Odesa do not exhibit such a pronounced trend, which is partly due to their larger Russian-speaking populations (i.e., as of 1991).

Secondly, non-accommodational bilingualism is quite common in Ukraine, a phenomenon considered typical of post-colonial societies. University communities might interact in similar ways. For example, a student responds in Russian, and a teacher asks questions in Ukrainian; this situation does not cause discomfort to either of the interlocutors. Although this practice reduces communicative discomfort, it increases linguistic segmentation within the community. This is a direct legacy of Soviet bilingualism. Despite respondents emphasising a sharp decline in Russian language use, especially after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, this phenomenon has not disappeared, at least in informal communication (e.g., during breaks).

Thirdly, everyone has their own language attitude, which is determined by many factors, both conscious and subconscious. Our research demonstrates many such factors and their relationships (as described in detail in Chapter IV). Summarising these factors, we can divide them into three groups:

(1) *External factors*, especially those related to events of national significance. These include the Revolution on Granite (1991), the Orange Revolution (2004), the

Revolution of Dignity and the Russian invasion of Crimea, Donetsk, and Luhansk (2014), and the full-scale invasion by the Russian Federation (2022). The last two events played a particularly important role. The research indicates that external factors also prompted a re-evaluation of internal motivations for language choice and attitudes.

(2) *Internal factors*, mainly psycholinguistic and socio-psychological factors. Among the factors related to this category, respondents mentioned a sense of linguistic security, a review of self-determination and the acquisition of new categories of identity, a review of values, the acquisition of new knowledge about the history of their own origins, as well as purely pragmatic considerations such as the availability of sources and the up-to-datedness of information (i.e. English-language sources contain much more scientifically sound and up-to-date information than Ukrainian- or Russian-language sources).

(3) *Additional factors*, such as state or university policy, conditions for academic mobility, formal requirements for study or scientific activity (e.g. the dominance of English in the world of scientific publications).

It is important to note that this work does not consider Ukraine's experience in isolation from the rest of the world. We also review the experiences of countries such as Latvia and Canada. Latvia is an example of a contextually similar country that began the decolonisation process in 1991 under conditions very similar to those in Ukraine. However, Latvia reacted much more quickly to current issues of language security and the need to protect the state language (the 1999 law in Latvia compared to 2019 in Ukraine). Canada is ideologically and contextually distinct from Ukraine; yet, its experience demonstrates the importance of institutional control in preserving multilingualism under conditions of academic autonomy, with special attention to the needs of Indigenous peoples.

In our work, we also consider a certain dilemma facing the state of Ukraine. On the one hand, the current context necessitates a policy of protectionism towards the Ukrainian language, which plays a crucial role in state-building and societal identification. On the other hand, Ukraine's European course requires the expansion of the rights of national minorities (numerical minorities) in accordance with EU legislation. Finally, English is becoming increasingly important in research-oriented

environments. Therefore, the Ukrainian authorities are compelled to seek a balance between ensuring the survival of their own cultural identity and complying with the norms of the community to which they aspire for value, economic and security reasons.

The role of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine deserves separate consideration. For many respondents, this stage of the Russian-Ukrainian war became a "point of no return" in terms of LP and language practices. Empirical data indicate that the sharp increase in Ukrainian-language communication among both students and teachers occurred in two stages: after 2014 and after 2022. However, 2022 still contributed to this step being taken by a larger number of people. The invasion also reinforced the labelling of Russian-language communication as negative, hostile, or threatening. More people began to consciously try to conduct their (un)official communication in Ukrainian. The prestige of the Russian language has declined sharply for the first time since the pre-Soviet era. However, the Ukrainian language has not completely taken its place but shares it with English. English is considered prestigious because of its educational, value, and reputational functions. This change in language attitudes has become part of the cultural resistance against Russian aggression.

The study also revealed several challenges and unresolved issues in the implementation of language policies in higher education institutions. In our opinion, it is these challenges and issues that hinder the full implementation of language policies in academia.

(1) Insufficient internal control within institutions

None of the universities studied (we analysed internal documents of eight universities) conducts internal audits of the language situation. Accordingly, control over teachers' violations in terms of language use can be ensured only by students, which goes beyond the usual teacher-student hierarchy.

(2) Lack of clear communication from institutions

Certain language norms exist within university statutes or other regulatory documents, but there is usually no active communication on this issue.

(3) Lack of practical support

There is still a generation of teachers who received their education in Russian during the Soviet Union. Additionally, there is the issue of imbalance in the availability of materials in Russian and Ukrainian, particularly in STEM disciplines. Often, Russian is replaced by English, and the Ukrainian terminology base is either missing or not updated. Therefore, teachers have to manoeuvre between two linguistic poles: Ukrainian/Russian in teaching and English in scientific productivity. Moreover, the level of Ukrainian language proficiency among older teachers is often low.

(4) National minorities

The presence of a significant number of different ethnic groups in Ukraine creates a situation where the state must balance a clear, transparent, and non-discriminatory language policy towards them with ensuring the functioning of the state language at all levels of the state. This is happening against the backdrop of close attention from European countries to the language issue, the Russian-Ukrainian war, and internal disagreements among civil society.

Thus, after analysing this data, we could propose several areas of activity for state language policy to address the above-mentioned challenges. At the state level, first, it is necessary to create a single platform of methodological resources in Ukrainian (and English) to introduce a unified Ukrainian terminology (developed by linguists) and correlate it with international variants. In the future, it would be beneficial to conduct similar work with the languages of Ukraine's indigenous peoples. Secondly, the Ministry of Education should create professional development programmes, in particular for STEM teachers, where they will be trained to teach in Ukrainian and English. Thirdly, following the previous steps, although there is a procedure for introducing national minority languages into the educational process at the request of students, it should be supplemented by an obligation for HEIs to provide access to teaching materials in the relevant languages. After all, it is almost impossible to gather the necessary group from one national minority on one course in one faculty. Therefore, students must be given the opportunity to acquire this knowledge through independent study.

At the institutional level, the most important step is the actual implementation of mechanisms for monitoring compliance with language legislation in universities.

Although there is no single solution to this problem, periodic checks with appropriate sanctions are the only way to exert influence at the local level. To this end, institutions should cooperate with the state and with each other, organise LP training for administrators and teachers, and communicate clearly with students, familiarising them with their language rights and obligations.

It will not be possible (nor necessary) to solve the problem of the ‘capture’ of the educational space by the English language. It is more important to work on strengthening the prestige of the Ukrainian language in society as a whole and in the educational environment in particular. It is essential that the methods employed to achieve this are environmentally friendly and do not replicate invasive colonial practices, such as those of the Soviet Union. In addition, the creation of more bilingual (Ukrainian and English) educational programmes that correspond to the models of the European educational space will contribute to improving the perception of ‘partnership’ between these languages in the field of education.

To sum up, this study confirms Spolsky’s (2004) theory about the importance of the interaction of three components of language policy (language ideology + language management + language practice). The study of the documentary part confirms that the current “language ideology” of the Ukrainian state is aimed at strengthening the role of the state language in education. Institutional practices show that language management is not functioning at an adequate level. And the reality reflected in language practices sometimes does not coincide with the declared ideology at all.

We also propose adapting the methodology of linguistic autobiography (Krumm, 2013; Francheschini, 2022) to the conditions of ‘identity migration’ (continuing the innovation of Tsar, 2024), i.e. the study of internal shifts in the perception of linguistic belonging under the influence of external factors and the traumatic experience of war. Thus, this approach is used to study internal sociolinguistic transformations.

The results of the study reveal that language policy in Ukraine is often reactive (i.e., it responds to existing language shifts but does not cause them). On the one hand,

the fact that authorities respond to social impulses is a sign of a functioning democracy. On the other hand, it indicates a lack of strategic vision on the part of lawmakers.

The most significant conclusion of this study is that language policy in the field of higher education in Ukraine is undergoing a profound transformation, driven by a combination of historical heritage, political challenges, war, and aspirations for European integration. Contemporary Ukrainian academia is a physical and metaphorical space in which (1) a new language norm is being formed in parallel with the process of decolonisation practices in society, (2) the different linguistic identities of participants in the educational process are intertwined, creating a new linguistic reality, (3) each language performs a specific function: Ukrainian – state-building, cultural, security, and English – integration. Moreover, modern language policy is becoming an instrument for modernising the educational environment. Thus, LP in higher education in Ukraine today is not only a set of laws and university regulations, but a complex mechanism that reflects the choices of society, historical experience, political priorities, and aspirations for the future in the European community.

As for the limitations of this research,

(1) The study covers universities in the four largest cities of Ukraine, but does not include educational institutions in smaller administrative units or occupied territories. It is likely that language dynamics could differ there (for example, in Transcarpathia, the Hungarian language may play a greater role, and in smaller towns, mixed language practices, such as Surzhyk, could be more prevalent).

(2) The archival analysis did not include the policies of the Ottoman Empire, the occupation regimes of the Third Reich and the Second Polish Republic, which could broaden the historical perspective of language policies, at least at the regional level.

(3) No analysis was conducted of the secondary education system, which is a key factor in the formation of language competences (after language support outside formal institutions, see Fishman, 1991). Such an analysis could help highlight the impact of LEP on youth and, thus, future societal views in centralised Ukrainian educational systems (see Shohamy, 2006).

Thus, future research should focus on expanding the geographical scope of data, studying the transformation of language policies in secondary education, and investigating the impact of internal population displacement on language dynamics within the academic environment. Another avenue for research could be comparing the effectiveness of language policy implementation in private and public educational institutions. Additionally, the research has strong potential for continued development within the framework of postcolonial or decolonial studies. In fact, the data of the research can be used to show how the colonial legacy represents itself in the military and political context of modern Ukraine.

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Appendix A. Key Legal Acts and State Regulations in Terms of LP and Education

The table is created on the basis of the document corpora. It includes the selected list of Laws, legislative acts or governmental decisions linked to LP and education in the territories of modern Ukraine and covers the period from late 17th century to 2025.

Pre-imperial period (Moscow Tsardom, before 1721)		
Since the Left Bank retained its relative autonomy, the level of russification was relatively low, and interference in the LP was mainly in a religious context. Many printing houses also relocated from Ukraine to Muscovy.		
1.	1677	The order to remove text that does not coincide with the texts of the Moscow Patriarch
2.	1693	The prohibition on printing books in Ukrainian in Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra
3.	1709	The order to reduce the number of students at Kyiv-Mohyla Academy from 2,000 to 161.
4.	1720	The prohibition for Kyiv and Chernihiv publishing houses to print anything, except for canonical church books.
Imperial period (Russian Empire)		
This period is characterized by (1) ideological discrediting of the Ukrainian language (and, de facto, linguistic discrimination against the Ukrainian language, whose very existence is denied), (2) mass russification of the systems of government and education.		
5.	1721-1731	A set of decrees aimed at censorship of books printed in the territories of Ukraine, removing the books in the Ukrainian language, and replacing them with the books in Russian.
6.	1764	Abolishment of the Hetmanate system on the Left Bank, which meant losing the Magdeburg rights to most cities, as well as russification of administration and education.
7.	1769	Veto on printing the primers for the local population in Ukrainian.
8.	1775	Abolishment of the Zaporozhian Host with the same consequences as for the Left Bank.
9.	1782	Russification of Kyiv Mohyla Academy, e.g. teaching students within a puristic approach to mimic the ‘correct’ Russian pronunciation.
10.	1787	The Ukrainian language is officially described as a dialect in scientific books.
11.	1804	The foundation of Kharkiv University.
12.	1817	The closure of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy.
13.	1832	Russian was declared the only language allowed in schools.
14.	1834	The foundation of Kyiv University with teachers brought from Russia.
15.	1847	Uvarov’s order to prioritise the Russian language, literature, and history in the educational process of Kyiv University.
16.	circa 1853	Strong censorship or falsification of historical documents, e.g. Hrabianka’s chronicle. Prohibition of publications of sermons in the Ukrainian language.
17.	1856	The introduction of Ukrainian spelling rules by Kulish (and their subsequent ban).
18.	1863	The Valuev’s Circular denying the existence of the Ukrainian language and banning new books written in Ukrainian from publication with the exception for ‘unserious’ literature.
19.	1865	The foundation of Imperial Novorossiysk University in Odesa.

20.	1869	Issue of the decree guaranteeing additional payments for ‘success in russification’.
21.	1876	The adoption of the Ems decree, which was an extension of Valuev Circular and banned not only books of all genres, but also translations, second publications from printing. The import of books in Ukrainian has also become illegal.
22.	1881	Amendments to the Ems Decree were added, allowing performances to be staged in Ukrainian.
23.	1895	The Main Directorate for Press Affairs issues the Decree banning the publication of children’s books in the Ukrainian language.
24.	circa 1905	Weakening censorship, as seen in Stolypin’s reforms, for example, allowed the printing of newspapers and magazines in Ukrainian.
25.	1914	New prohibition to print newspapers and magazines in Ukrainian. Prohibition of teaching in Ukrainian in the newly occupied territories – Galicia.
Imperial period (Austro-Hungarian Empire) This period is characterised by (1) the marginalisation of the Ukrainian language in favour of the imperial and other regional languages, (2) periodic improvements in the status of the Ukrainian language with the aim of creating a balance of cultural forces in the region (as opposed to the Poles in Galicia and the Romanians in Bukovyna).		
26.	1774-1784	Work of a general seminary for Ukrainians from Galicia and Transcarpathia at St. Barbara’s Church in Vienna (thus, called “Barbareum”)
27.	1776-1783	School reform in Galicia (as a result, many schools were open, but the language of instruction was predominantly Polish).
28.	1784	Reopening of Lviv University (that was functioning and then closed before the formation of Austro-Hungarian Empire).
29.	1787-1809	Operation of “Studium Ruthenum” at Lviv University
30.	1792	Opening of a Greek-Catholic seminary in Uzhhorod
31.	1805	Abolishment of Lviv University. An order to transfer direct supervision of education from the state to Latin consistories, which enabled catholic (mostly Polish) clergy control Ukrainian schooling.
32.	1806	Issue of a decree “Ratio educationis” that prohibited any discrimination on a national or political ground in sub-Hungarian part of Ukraine.
33.	1809	A Decree on an obligation of every seminarian to pass an exam in the Ukrainian language.
34.	1813	An order that limited the language of instruction of the village schooling to German only.
35.	1817	New reopening of Lviv University.
36.	1818	The decree saying that (1) in schools where 100% students are Greek-Catholic, the language of instruction should be Ukrainian. Polish, however, should be taught as a subject within the curriculum; (2) should the schools be mixed, all the subjects, except for religion, should be conducted in Polish.
37.	1837	The attempt to codify Ukrainian language by Shashkevych, Holovatskyi, and Vahylevych.
38.	1847	The decision of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Austrian Empire to print all laws and announcements in the eastern Galician counties in the Ukrainian language alongside national and other regional languages.
39.	1848	The opening of a pedagogical course in Chernivtsi, where Ukrainian was taught alongside German and Romanian.

40.	1840s	The order of the Austrian Minister of Education to make the study of the Ukrainian language compulsory in all secondary schools in Eastern Galicia
41.	1867	The law that ordered to define the language of instruction depending on those financing the school.
42.	1895	The development of phonetic spelling system by Fedkovych and Smal-Stotsky at Chernivtsi University.
Ukrainian Revolutions During this period, governments attempted to develop Ukrainian education and science in the Ukrainian language, although this was difficult due to economic and political difficulties. However, it was precisely thanks to the mass opening of Ukrainian schools during this period that the policy of ukrainisation was able to take effect in the following, Soviet period.		
43.	1918	Reopening of Kyiv and Kamianets-Podilskyi Ukrainian universities.
44.		Establishment of All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences and the Central Scientific Library. Law of the Ukrainian State On Compulsory Teaching of the Ukrainian Language and Literature, as well as the History and Geography of Ukraine in Secondary Schools.
45.	1919	The Ministry of National Education adopted the main rules of Ukrainian spelling for school use throughout Ukraine. Law On the Establishment of Ukrainian Language Courses in All Higher Education Institutions of the Ukrainian People's Republic. Law On the Use of Language in Internal and External Administration by Authorities and Governments, Public Institutions, and State-Owned Enterprises in the Western Region of the Ukrainian People's Republic
Soviet Union This period is characterised by formal bilingualism, but actual dominance of the Russian language, especially in education and science. Ideological control, personnel policy and resification contributed to the decline in the prestige of the Ukrainian language during this period, despite a brief period of ukrainisation at the beginning of the formation of the Ukrainian SSR.		
46.	1922	Abolishment of 'Prosvita'.
47.	1920s	Transfer of 69 languages into the Latin alphabet, including Crimean Tatar. Compulsory study of the Ukrainian language, history and geography in schools in terms of the Code of Laws on Public Education in the Ukrainian SSR. Compulsory teaching of the Ukrainian language to clergy and future teachers in terms of the same Law.
48.	1927-1937	Different varieties of the spelling rules were developed. Final version differed from that by Ohiyenko and Skrypnyk.
49.	1930s	Mass terror and extermination of Ukrainian intelligentsia, both pro-national and pro-communist.
50.	1933	Reopening of universities in Kyiv, Kharkiv, Odesa, and Dnipropetrovsk.
51.	1935	The resolution On the organisation of educational work and internal regulations in primary, secondary and high schools that unified schooling throughout Soviet Union.
52.	1937	The adoption of the new Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR.
53.	1938	The resolution On the compulsory study of the Russian language in schools of national republics
54.	1944	Massive deportation of Crimean Tatar from Crimea, thus change of the language situation on the peninsula.
55.	1945	A new edition of the Ukrainian spelling rules was published.

56.	1959	The Law on Strengthening the Connection between School and Life and on the Further Development of the Public Education System in the Ukrainian SSR.
57.	1961	The Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR on improving foreign language learning.
58.	1962	The Resolution makes an exam in English, German, French, Spanish, or Italian obligatory for postgraduate students.
59.	1967	Resolution on Measures for the Further Improvement of the Work of Secondary General Education Schools in the Ukrainian SSR.
60.	1973	Law On the Approval of the Fundamentals of the Legislation of the USSR and the Union Republics on Public Education.
61.	1978	The Resolution On Measures for Further Improvement of the Study and Teaching of the Russian Language in the Ukrainian SSR. Adoption of the new Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR.
62.	1983	The Resolution On additional Measures for improving the study of the Russian language in general education schools and pedagogical institutions of the Ukrainian SSR.
63.	1989	Adoption of the new Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR. The Law on languages in the Ukrainian SSR.
Independence Period This period is characterised by fluctuations between pro-Ukrainian and pro-Russian language policies, instability, and the politicisation of the language issue. The pro-Ukrainian LP adopted before 2014 were often declarative rather than functional.		
64.	1996	Constitution of Ukraine
65.	2003	The adoption of the State Program for the Development and Functioning of the Ukrainian Language for 2004-2010
66.	2010	The adoption of the Concept of National Language Policy.
67.	2012	Law of Ukraine On the Basics of State Language Policy.
68.	2014	Law on Higher Education
69.	2017	Law On Education
70.	2019	Law On Ensuring the Functioning of the Ukrainian Language as the State Language
71.	2023	Law On the Use of the English Language in Ukraine

Table 17. Key Legal Acts and State Regulations in Terms of LP and Education

Appendix B. The Maps Shaping Changes of Political Borders

In this Appendix, one can find the maps that can help to visualise the territorial changes and better understand Chapter II. It is worth noting that the spelling on the maps from Magocsi (1997) and Subtelny (2009) is presented in a russified version.



Map 1. Ukrainian ethnolinguistic territory (Magocsi, 1997, p.7)



Map 2. Kyivan Rus, circa 1054 (Magocsi, 1997, p.74)




Map 3. Kyivan Rus, circa 1240 (Magocsi, 1997, p.81)



Map 4. Galicia-Volhynia Principality, circa 1250 (Magocsi, 1997, p.116)



Map 5. The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, circa 1570 (Magocsi, 1997, p.135)



Map 6. The Crimean Khanate and southern Ukraine, circa 1600 (Magocsi, 1997, p.174)




Map 7. The Cossack State, 1651 (Magocsi, 1997, p.232)



Map 8. Ukrainian lands after 1667 (Magocsi, 1997, p.226)



Map 9. Ukraine, circa 1740 (Magocsi, 1997, p.264)



Map 10. Sloboda Ukraine (Magocsi, 1997, p.266)



Map 11. Zaporozhian Host and 'New Russia' (Magocsi, 1997, p.268)



Map 12. The Right Bank and western Ukraine, 1750 (Magocsi, 1997, p.291)



Map 13. Ukraine, circa 1850 (Magocsi, 1997, p.306)



Map 14. The peoples of Ukraine, circa 1900 (Magocsi, 1997, p.333)




Map 15. Ukrainian lands in the Austrian Empire, 1772-1815 (Magocsi, 1997, p.386)





Map 18. Ukraine, 1919-1920 (Magocsi, 1997, p.496)



Map 19. The West Ukrainian National Republic (also ZUNR), 1918-1919 (Magocsi, 1997, p.514)



Map 20. Ukrainian lands, 1923 (Magocsi, 1997, p.524)



Map 21. The Great Famine/Holodomor (Magocsi, 1997, p.562)



Map 22. Soviet Ukraine, 1932 (Magocsi, 1997, p.552)



Map 23. Carpatho-Ukraine, 1938-1939 (Magocsi, 1997, p.615)






Map 25. Ukraine, 1941-1944 (Magocsi, 1997, p.623)



Map 26. Ukraine, 1945 (Magocsi, 1997, p.640)



Map 27. Russian Speakers in Soviet Ukraine, 1970 (Subtelny, 2009, p.522)



Map 28. Results of the Referendum on Ukrainian Independence, 1 December, 1991 (Subtelny, 2009, p.584)



Map 29. Situation in the eastern regions of Ukraine, 2014 (Embassy of Ukraine in Malaysia, 2014)



Map 30. Russia-Ukraine War, frontlines after three years of war (Ray, 2023)

Appendix C. The Ems Decree

Version in Russian is cited from Savchenko, 1930b, p.381-383

18 мая в г. Эмс

В видах пресечения опасной, в государственном отношении, деятельности украинофилов, полагалось бы соответственным принять впредь до усмотрения, следующие меры:

а) ПО МИНИСТЕРСТВУ ВНУТРЕННИХ ДЕЛ

1. Не допускать ввоза в пределы Империи, без особого на то разрешения Главного Управления по делам печати, каких бы то ни было книг, издаваемых за границею на малорусском наречии.
2. Воспретить в Империи печатание, на том же наречии каких бы то ни было оригинальных произведений или переводов, за исключением исторических памятников, но с тем, чтобы и эти последние, если принадлежат к устной народной словесности (каковы песни, сказки, пословицы), издаваемы были без отступления от общерусской орфографии (т. Е. Не печатались так называемой “кулишовкою”).
 - Примечание I. Мера эта была бы не более, как расширение Высочайшего повеления от 8 июля 1863 года, коим разрешено было допускать к печати на малорусском наречии только произведения, принадлежащие к области изящной литературы, пропуски же книг на том же наречии, как духовного содержания, так учебных и вообще назначаемых для первоначального чтения, поведено было приостановить.
 - Примечание II. Сохраняя силу означенного выше Высочайшего повеления, можно было бы разрешить к печатанию на малорусском наречии, кроме исторических памятников, и произведений изящной словесности, но с тем, чтобы соблюдалась в них общерусская орфография, и чтобы разрешение давалось не иначе, как по рассмотрении рукописей Главным управлением по делам печати.
3. Воспретить равномерно всякие на том же наречии сценические представления, тексты к нотам и публичные чтения (как имеющие в настоящее время характер украинофильских манифестаций).
4. Поддерживать издающуюся в Галичине, в направлении враждебном украинофильскому газету «Слово», назначив ей хотя бы небольшую, но постоянную субсидию [*Скраю дописано: «1000 р. Из сумм III жанд. В текст заключения не вводить, а только иметь в соображении»*], без которой она не может продолжать существование и должна будет прекратиться, (украинофильский орган в Галиции, газета «Правда», враждебная вообще русским интересам, издается при значительном пособии от поляков).
5. Запретить газету «Киевский Телеграф» [*Скраю дописано: «В соображении вредное влияние газеты».*] на том основании, что номинальный ее редактор Снежко-Блоцкий слеп на оба глаза и не может принимать никакого участия в редакции, которой заведуют постоянно и произвольно лица, приглашаемые к тому издательницею Гогоцкою из кружка людей, принадлежащих к самому неблагонамеренному направлению.

б) ПО МИНИСТЕРСТВУ НАРОДНОГО ПРОСВЕЩЕНИЯ

6. Усилить надзор со стороны местного учебного начальства. Чтобы не допускать в первоначальных училищах. Преподавания каких бы то ни было предметов на малорусском наречии.

7. Очистить библиотеки всех низких и средних училищ в малороссийских губерниях от книг и книжек, встречаемых 2-м параграфом настоящего проекта.
8. Обратить серьезное внимание на личный состав преподавателей в учебных округах Харьковском, Киевском и Одесском, потребовав от попечителей сих округов именного списка преподавателей с отметкою о благонадежности каждого по отношению к украинофильским тенденциям и отмеченных неблагонадежными или сомнительными перевести в великорусские губернии, заменив уроженцами этих последних.
9. На будущее время выбор лиц на преподавательские места в означенных округах возложить, по отношению к благонадежности сих лиц. На строгую ответственность представляющих о их назначении, с тем, чтобы ответственность, о которой говорится, существовала не только на бумаге, но и на деле.
 - Примечание I. Существуют два Высочайшие повеления покойного Государя Николая Павловича, не отмененные Верховной Властью, а потом сохраняющие и в настоящее время силу закона, которыми возлагалось на строжайшую ответственность Попечителей Округов и вообще учебного начальства, не терпеть в учебных заведениях лиц с неблагонадежным образом мыслей, не только между преподавателями, но и между учащимися. Полезно было бы напомнить о них.
 - Примечание II. Признавалось бы полезным принять за общее правило, чтобы в учебные заведения округов: Харьковского. Киевского и Одесского назначать преподавателей преимущественно великоруссов, а малоруссов распределить по учебным заведениям С.-Петербургского, Казанского и Оренбургского округов.
10. Закрыть на неопределенный срок Киевский Отдел Императорского Географического Общества (подобно тому. Как в 1860-х годах закрыт в этом последнем Политико-экономический Комитет, возникший в среде Статистического Отделения), и допустить затем открытие его вновь, с предоставлением местному Генерал-Губернатору права ходатайствовать о его открытии, но с устранением навсегда тех лиц. Которые сколько-нибудь сомнительны в своем чисто-русском направлении [*Скраю дописано: «Предоставить МВД войти в надёж. Сношения с кем следует относительно изыскания мер к дал. Направлению этого дела »*].

В) ПО ОТДЕЛЕНИЮ СОБСТВЕННОЙ ЕГО ИМПЕРАТОРСКОГО ВЕЛИЧЕСТВА КАНЦЕЛЯРИИ

11. Немедленно выслать из края Драгоманова и Чубинского, как неисправимых и положительно опасных в крае агитаторов [*Скраю дописано: «Выслать из края с запрещением въезда в Южн. Губ. И столицы, под секретное наблюдение»*].

Appendix D. Questionnaire Layout

Шановний респонденте, Вашій увазі пропонується анкета, метою якої є дослідити мовну ситуацію в академічному середовищі України в історичній перспективі. Результати опитування будуть використані дослідницькою групою науковців (Штефан Рабанус, Даніеле Артоні та Христиною Йордан) як узагальнені дані в дисертаційному дослідженні на базі університету Верони (Італія).

Метою анкети не є оцінка особистих суджень респондента. Анкетування повністю анонімне.

Приблизний час заповнення опитувальника – 12 хв.

Ви можете обрати більше, ніж один варіант відповіді в цьому розділі.

Розділ 1.

1.1. Яка Ваша рідна мова?

Українська	угорська	гагаузька
російська	болгарська	англійська
білоруська	польська	суржик
румунська (молдовська)	кримськотатарська	інше

1.2. Яку мову /Які мови Ви найчастіше використовуєте в побуті?

Українська	угорська	гагаузька
російська	болгарська	англійська
білоруська	польська	суржик
румунська (молдовська)	кримськотатарська	інше

Розділ 2.

Інформація з цього розділу потрібна для інтерпретації отриманих даних, проте вона залишиться абсолютно анонімною

Ви можете обрати лише один варіант відповіді в цьому розділі.

У третьому питанні можете використовувати повзунок, щоб побачити більше варіантів.

2.1. До якої вікової категорії Ви належите?

18-24 роки	35-44 роки	55-64 роки
25-34 роки	45-54 роки	Понад 65 років

2.2. Вкажіть Вашу стать:

жіноча	чоловіча	небінарна особа

2.3. Вкажіть місце, де Ви

1.	адміністративно-територіальний поділ України	народились?	Отримали шкільну освіту?	Постійно проживали до повномасштабного вторгнення?	Проживаєте зараз
2.	м. Київ				
3.	м. Севастополь				
4.	АР Крим				
5.	Вінницька область				
6.	Волинська область				
7.	Дніпропетровська область				
8.	Дніпропетровська область				
9.	Донецька область				
10.	Житомирська область				
11.	Закарпатська область				
12.	Запорізька область				
13.	Івано-Франківська область				
14.	Київська область				
15.	Кіровоградська область				

16.	Львівська область				
17.	Миколаївська область				
18.	Одеська область				
19.	Полтавська область				
20.	Рівненська область				
21.	Сумська область				
22.	Харківська область				
23.	Херсонська область				
24.	Хмельницька область				
25.	Черкаська область				
26.	Чернівецька область				
27.	Чернігівська область				
28.	Інше				

2.3. Вкажіть здобутий освітній рівень:

повна середня освіта
бакалавр (повна вища освіта)

спеціаліст/магістр
кандидат наук

доктор наук

2.4. Вкажіть Ваш освітній напрям:

гуманітарні науки
технічні науки

природничі науки
медицина

інше

Розділ 3. Студентський досвід

Питання цього розділу стосуються вашого досвіду як здобувача освіти. Ваші відповіді повинні базуватись на вашому власному студентському досвіді.

У цьому розділі Ви можете обрати більше, ніж один варіант відповіді.

Відповіді на відкриті питання заохочуються, проте не є обов'язковими.

3.1. Яку/Які мови використовували Ваші викладачі під час занять?

Українська
російська
білоруська
румунська (молдовська)
угорська

болгарська
польська
кримськотатарська
гагаузька
англійська

суржик
не пригадую
інше

3.2. Яку мову/Які мови Ви використовували для спілкування

	українська	російська	білоруська	румунська (молдовська)	угорська	болгарська	польська	кримськотатарська	гагаузька	англійська	суржик	не пригадую
з однокурсниками, іншими студентами?												
З викладачами, працівниками університету?												

3.3. Що впливало на Ваш мовний вибір?

3.4. Вкажіть вищий(і) навчальний(і) заклад(и), де Ви навчались/навчаєтесь:

3.5. Чи маєте ви досвід роботи викладачем у вищому навчальному закладі?

Так
Ні

Розділ 4. Викладацький досвід

Наступні питання стосуються Вашого досвіду як викладача. Ваші відповіді повинні базуватись на вашому власному викладацькому досвіді.

Ви можете обрати більше, ніж один варіант відповіді в цьому розділі.

4.1. Якими мовами/Якою мовою ви користуєтесь під час лекцій, семінарів, практичних, тощо?

українська	кримськотатарська
російська	гагаузька
білоруська	англійська
румунська (молдовська)	суржик
угорська)	не пригадую
польська	інше

4.2. Якими мовами/Якою мовою ви користуєтесь для спілкування

	українська	російська	білоруська	румунська (молдовська)	угорська	болгарська	польська	кримськотатарська	гагаузька	англійська	суржик	не пригадую
з колегами у формальних ситуаціях, напр. на засіданнях кафедри??												
З колегами в неформальних ситуаціях, напр. корпоративах??												
Зі студентами під час особистого спілкування, напр. під час спільної роботи над науковими дослідженнями?												

4.3. Вкажіть вищий навчальний заклад, у якому Ви викладаєте:

Розділ 5. Причини мовного вибору в академічній комунікації

Метою наступного розділу є визначити мовні пріоритети в академічному середовищі, дізнатись про бачення ситуації зсередини та виявити тенденції, що можуть стати поштовхом до змін.

Відповідаючи на питання цього розділу, опишіть, будь ласка, свої думки, почуття та мотивацію щодо вибору мови в академічному середовищі.

5.1. Які внутрішні або зовнішні фактори впливають на Ваш мовний вибір в академічних комунікаціях зараз?

5.2. Якими мовами, на Вашу думку, повинен відбуватись навчальний процес в Україні у майбутньому? Чому?

Розділ 6. Вплив соціально-політичних/історичних подій на мовний вибір

Метою цього розділу є дослідити вплив соціально-політичних чинників на вибір мовця, простежити зміни у мовному виборі викладачів та студентів.

6.1. Чи змінився Ваш мовний вибір у спілкуванні в академічному середовищі у **формальних ситуаціях** після:

	Так	Ні	не пригадую
повномасштабного вторгнення (2022)			
Революції гідності (2014)			
Помаранчевої революції (2004)			
здобуття Україною незалежності (1991)			

6.2. Якщо так, то чому?

6.3. Чи змінився Ваш мовний вибір у спілкуванні в академічному середовищі в **неформальних ситуаціях** після:

	Так	Скоріше так	Скоріше ні	Ні	не пригадую
повномасштабного вторгнення (2022)					
Революції гідності (2014)					
Помаранчевої революції (2004)					
здобуття Україною незалежності (1991)					

6.4. Якщо так, то чому?

Розділ 7. Захист персональних даних

Щиро дякуємо за Ваш час та відвертість. Це опитування надзвичайно важливе для групи дослідників, і саме тому Ваша участь у цьому дослідженні є надзвичайно цінною для нашого проєкту.

Нагадуємо, що це опитування є анонімним і Ваші особисті дані будуть захищені, проте, за законами України та Італії для аналізу відповідей необхідна згода на обробку особистих даних.

(art. 13 reg. EU n. 2016/679 (GDPR))

7.1. Натискаючи «Так», я даю згоду на обробку моїх персональних даних відповідно до Закону України «Про захист персональних даних». Я розумію, що мої персональні дані

Так

Розділ 8. Майбутнє нашого дослідження

8.1. Наступним кроком буде проведення фокус-груп та інтерв'ю. Якщо Ви маєте можливість допомогти у подальшому дослідженні, то будемо раді співпрацювати з Вами знову.

Так, можете контактувати зі мною.

Ні

8.2. Якщо попередня відповідь так, для подальшого спілкування надайте, будь ласка, адресу електронної пошти, номер телефону, нік у месенджері, тощо:

Appendix E. Geographical Distribution of the Informants




Figure 18. Informants' city of birth




Figure 19. Location of received secondary education




Figure 20. Informants' permanent residence before 2022




Figure 21. Informants' permanent residence after 2022

Appendix F. Background Characteristics of Informants

Informant ID	Q.1.1. What is your native language?	Age	Gender	Received Education Location	Teaching Location
1	Surzhyk	25-34	female	edu: Kyiv	teach: none
2	Crimean Tatar	25-34	female	edu: Kyiv	teach: none
3	Ukrainian, Russian	18-24	non-binary	edu: Kyiv	teach: none
4	Surzhyk	18-24	female	edu: Kyiv	teach: none
5	Ukrainian, Surzhyk	18-24	female	edu: Kyiv	teach: none
6	Ukrainian	18-24	female	edu: Kyiv	teach: none
7	Surzhyk	18-24	female	edu: Kyiv	teach: none
8	Ukrainian	25-34	female	edu: Kyiv	teach: none
9	Ukrainian, Russian	18-24	male	edu: Kyiv	teach: none
10	Ukrainian	18-24	female	edu: Kyiv	teach: none
11	Surzhyk	18-24	male	edu: Kyiv	teach: none
12	Ukrainian	18-24	female	edu: Kyiv	teach: none
13	Ukrainian, Russian	18-24	male	edu: Kyiv	teach: none
14	Ukrainian	18-24	male	edu: Kyiv	teach: none
15	Ukrainian	18-24	male	edu: Lviv	teach: none
16	Ukrainian, Russian	18-24	female	edu: Kyiv	teach: none
17	Ukrainian, Russian	25-34	male	edu: Kharkiv	teach: none
18	Ukrainian	18-24	female	edu: Kyiv	teach: none
19	Ukrainian, Surzhyk	18-24	female	edu: Kyiv	teach: none
20	Ukrainian, Surzhyk	18-24	female	edu: Kyiv	teach: none
21	Ukrainian	18-24	female	edu: Kyiv	teach: none
22	Ukrainian	18-24	female	edu: Kyiv	teach: none
23	Ukrainian, Surzhyk	18-24	female	edu: Kyiv	teach: none
24	Ukrainian, Surzhyk	18-24	female	edu: Kyiv	teach: none
25	Ukrainian	18-24	female	edu: Kyiv	teach: none
26	Ukrainian	25-34	female	edu: Kyiv	teach: Kyiv
27	Ukrainian, Surzhyk	18-24	male	edu: Kyiv	teach: none
28	Ukrainian	18-24	male	edu: Kyiv	teach: none
29	Ukrainian	25-34	female	edu: Kyiv	teach: none
30	Ukrainian	18-24	female	edu: Lviv	teach: none
31	Ukrainian	25-34	male	edu: Kyiv	teach: none
32	Ukrainian	18-24	male	edu: Kyiv	teach: none
33	Ukrainian	18-24	female	edu: Kyiv	teach: none
34	Russian	25-34	male	edu: Kyiv	teach: Kyiv
35	Russian	25-34	male	edu: Kyiv	teach: none
36	Ukrainian	25-34	female	edu: Kyiv	teach: Kyiv
37	Ukrainian	25-34	male	edu: Kyiv	teach: none
38	Ukrainian	25-34	female	edu: Kyiv	teach: none
39	Ukrainian	35-44	female	edu: Lviv	teach: none
40	Ukrainian, Russian	18-24	male	edu: Kyiv	teach: none
41	Ukrainian	35-44	female	edu: Kyiv	teach: Kyiv
42	Ukrainian, Russian	25-34	female	edu: Kyiv	teach: none
43	Ukrainian, Russian	35-44	female	edu: Kyiv	teach: Kyiv

44	Ukrainian	55-64	female	edu: Lviv	teach: none
45	Ukrainian	25-34	female	edu: Lviv	teach: none
46	Turcoman	25-34	female	edu: Kyiv	teach: none
47	Russian	35-44	female	edu: Kyiv	teach: Kyiv
48	Ukrainian, Russian	25-34	female	edu: Kyiv	teach: none
49	Ukrainian	45-54	female	edu: Lviv	teach: Kyiv
50	Ukrainian	25-34	female	edu: Kyiv	teach: none
51	Ukrainian	25-34	male	edu: Kyiv	teach: none
52	Ukrainian, Russian	25-34	female	edu: Kyiv	teach: other
53	Ukrainian, Russian	45-54	male	edu: Kyiv	teach: none
54	Ukrainian	25-34	male	edu: Kyiv	teach: none
55	Ukrainian	18-24	female	edu: Kyiv	teach: none
56	Ukrainian	18-24	male	edu: Lviv	teach: none
57	Ukrainian	18-24	male	edu: Kyiv	teach: none
58	Ukrainian	25-34	female	edu: Kyiv	teach: none
59	Ukrainian	25-34	female	edu: Kyiv	teach: Kyiv
60	Ukrainian	25-34	female	edu: Kyiv	teach: none
61	Ukrainian, Surzhyk	25-34	female	edu: Kyiv	teach: Kyiv
62	Russian	25-34	male	edu: Kyiv	teach: none
63	Ukrainian	25-34	female	edu: Kyiv	teach: none
64	Ukrainian	25-34	female	edu: Kyiv	teach: none
65	Ukrainian	18-24	female	edu: Kyiv	teach: none
66	Ukrainian, Russian	25-34	female	edu: Kyiv	teach: none
67	Ukrainian	45-54	female	edu: Lviv	teach: none
68	Ukrainian	45-54	female	edu: Kyiv	teach: Kyiv
69	Ukrainian	18-24	female	edu: Lviv	teach: none
70	Ukrainian	18-24	female	edu: Lviv	teach: none
71	Ukrainian	35-44	male	edu: Kharkiv	teach: none
72	Ukrainian	25-34	male	edu: Lviv	teach: none
73	Ukrainian	35-44	female	edu: Lviv	teach: none
74	Ukrainian, Russian	45-54	female	edu: Kharkiv	teach: none
75	Ukrainian	35-44	male	edu: Lviv	teach: Lviv
76	Ukrainian	45-54	female	edu: Lviv	teach: none
77	Ukrainian	45-54	female	edu: other	teach: none
78	Ukrainian	25-34	male	edu: Lviv	teach: Lviv
79	Ukrainian, Russian	25-34	female	edu: Kyiv	teach: Kyiv
80	Ukrainian	35-44	female	edu: Lviv	teach: none
81	Ukrainian	18-24	female	edu: Lviv	teach: none
82	Ukrainian	25-34	female	edu: Kyiv	teach: none
83	Ukrainian	18-24	male	edu: Kyiv	teach: none
84	Ukrainian	18-24	female	edu: Kyiv	teach: Kyiv
85	Ukrainian	18-24	female	edu: Kyiv	teach: none
86	Ukrainian	25-34	male	edu: other	teach: none
87	Ukrainian, Russian	18-24	female	edu: Kharkiv	teach: none
88	Ukrainian	18-24	female	edu: Kharkiv	teach: none
89	Ukrainian, Russian, Surzhyk	18-24	female	edu: Kharkiv	teach: none
90	Ukrainian	18-24	female	edu: Kharkiv	teach: none
91	Ukrainian	18-24	female	edu: Kharkiv	teach: none

92	Ukrainian	18-24	female	edu: Kharkiv	teach: none
93	Ukrainian, Russian	18-24	female	edu: Kharkiv	teach: none
94	Ukrainian	18-24	female	edu: Kharkiv	teach: none
95	Ukrainian, Surzhyk	18-24	male	edu: Kharkiv	teach: none
96	Russian	18-24	female	edu: Kharkiv	teach: none
97	Ukrainian, Russian, Surzhyk	18-24	male	edu: Kharkiv	teach: none
98	Ukrainian	18-24	male	edu: Kharkiv	teach: none
99	Ukrainian	18-24	female	edu: Odesa	teach: none
100	Russian	45-54	female	edu: Odesa	teach: Odesa
101	Ukrainian, Surzhyk	18-24	female	edu: Odesa	teach: none
102	Ukrainian, Surzhyk	18-24	female	edu: Odesa	teach: none
103	Ukrainian	18-24	female	edu: Odesa	teach: none
104	Ukrainian, Surzhyk	18-24	female	edu: Odesa	teach: none
105	Ukrainian, Russian	18-24	female	edu: Odesa	teach: none
106	Ukrainian	18-24	female	edu: Odesa	teach: none
107	Ukrainian	35-44	female	edu: Odesa	teach: Odesa
108	Ukrainian	18-24	female	edu: Odesa	teach: none
109	Ukrainian, Russian	18-24	female	edu: Odesa	teach: none
110	Ukrainian	18-24	female	edu: Odesa	teach: none
111	Ukrainian	18-24	female	edu: Odesa	teach: none
112	Ukrainian	18-24	female	edu: Odesa	teach: none
113	Gagauz	18-24	female	edu: Odesa	teach: none
114	Ukrainian	18-24	female	edu: Odesa	teach: none
115	Ukrainian	25-34	female	edu: Lviv	teach: none
116	Ukrainian	18-24	female	edu: Odesa	teach: none
117	Ukrainian	18-24	female	edu: Odesa	teach: none
118	Ukrainian	18-24	male	edu: Odesa	teach: none
119	Ukrainian	18-24	female	edu: Odesa	teach: none
120	Ukrainian, Russian	18-24	female	edu: Odesa	teach: none
121	Ukrainian, Russian	18-24	female	edu: Odesa	teach: none
122	Ukrainian	18-24	male	edu: Odesa	teach: none
123	Ukrainian, Surzhyk	18-24	female	edu: Odesa	teach: none
124	Russian	18-24	female	edu: Odesa	teach: none
125	Ukrainian, Russian	18-24	female	edu: Odesa	teach: none
126	Ukrainian	18-24	female	edu: Odesa	teach: none
127	Ukrainian	18-24	female	edu: Odesa	teach: none
128	Ukrainian, Russian, Hebrew	18-24	male	edu: Odesa	teach: none
129	Ukrainian, Russian	18-24	female	edu: Odesa	teach: none
130	Ukrainian	18-24	female	edu: Odesa	teach: none
131	Ukrainian, Russian, Surzhyk	18-24	female	edu: Odesa	teach: none
132	Ukrainian, Russian	18-24	female	edu: Odesa	teach: none
133	Ukrainian, Russian	18-24	female	edu: Odesa	teach: none
134	Russian	18-24	male	edu: Odesa	teach: none
135	Ukrainian, Russian	35-44	male	edu: Odesa	teach: Odesa
136	Ukrainian, Russian	18-24	female	edu: Odesa	teach: none
137	Russian	18-24	male	edu: Odesa	teach: none
138	Ukrainian	18-24	female	edu: Odesa	teach: none
139	Ukrainian	18-24	female	edu: Odesa	teach: none

140	Ukrainian, Russian	18-24	female	edu: Odesa	teach: none
141	Ukrainian	18-24	female	edu: Odesa	teach: none
142	Ukrainian, Russian	18-24	male	edu: Odesa	teach: none
143	Ukrainian	18-24	male	edu: Odesa	teach: none
144	Ukrainian	18-24	female	edu: Odesa	teach: none
145	Ukrainian	18-24	female	edu: Odesa	teach: none
146	Ukrainian, Russian	35-44	female	edu: Odesa	teach: Odesa
147	Ukrainian	18-24	female	edu: Odesa	teach: none
148	Ukrainian	35-44	male	edu: Odesa	teach: Odesa
149	Russian	45-54	female	edu: Odesa	teach: Odesa
150	Ukrainian, Russian	18-24	male	edu: Odesa	teach: none
151	Ukrainian	45-54	female	edu: Odesa	teach: Odesa
152	Ukrainian	18-24	female	edu: Odesa	teach: none
153	Ukrainian, Russian	18-24	female	edu: Odesa	teach: none
154	Ukrainian	18-24	female	edu: Odesa	teach: none
155	Russian	18-24	male	edu: Odesa	teach: none
156	Ukrainian, Russian	18-24	female	edu: Odesa	teach: none
157	Bulgarian	65+	female	edu: Odesa	teach: Odesa
158	Ukrainian, Russian	18-24	male	edu: Odesa	teach: none
159	Russian	45-54	male	edu: Odesa	teach: Odesa
160	Ukrainian, Russian	18-24	male	edu: Kyiv	teach: none
161	Ukrainian, Surzhyk	18-24	male	edu: Kyiv	teach: none
162	Ukrainian, Russian	18-24	male	edu: Kyiv	teach: none
163	Ukrainian	18-24	female	edu: Kyiv	teach: none
164	Ukrainian, Surzhyk	18-24	female	edu: Kyiv	teach: none
165	Ukrainian	45-54	female	edu: Odesa	teach: Odesa
166	Ukrainian, Surzhyk	18-24	female	edu: Kyiv	teach: none
167	Russian	45-54	female	edu: Kharkiv	teach: Kharkiv
168	Ukrainian	45-54	male	edu: Kharkiv	teach: Kharkiv
169	Russian	45-54	female	edu: Kharkiv	teach: Kharkiv
170	Ukrainian	18-24	female	edu: Odesa	teach: none
171	Ukrainian	18-24	female	edu: Odesa	teach: none
172	Ukrainian	18-24	male	edu: Odesa	teach: none
173	Ukrainian	18-24	non-binary	edu: Odesa	teach: none
174	Ukrainian, Russian	18-24	male	edu: Odesa	teach: none
175	Ukrainian	18-24	male	edu: Odesa	teach: none
176	Russian, Georgian	18-24	female	edu: Odesa	teach: none
177	Ukrainian	35-44	female	edu: Kharkiv	teach: Kharkiv
178	Ukrainian, Russian	55-64	female	edu: Odesa	teach: Odesa
179	Ukrainian	45-54	female	edu: Lviv	teach: Lviv
180	Ukrainian	45-54	female	edu: Lviv	teach: Lviv
181	Ukrainian	18-24	female	edu: Lviv	teach: none
182	Ukrainian	25-34	female	edu: Lviv	teach: Lviv
183	Ukrainian	18-24	female	edu: Lviv	teach: none
184	Ukrainian	55-64	female	edu: Lviv	teach: Lviv
185	Ukrainian	35-44	female	edu: Lviv	teach: Lviv
186	Ukrainian	55-64	male	edu: Lviv	teach: Lviv
187	Ukrainian	35-44	male	edu: Lviv	teach: Lviv

188	Ukrainian	45-54	female	edu: Lviv	teach: Lviv
189	Ukrainian	55-64	male	edu: Lviv	teach: Lviv
190	Ukrainian	45-54	female	edu: Lviv	teach: Lviv
191	Ukrainian	35-44	female	edu: Lviv	teach: other
192	Ukrainian	18-24	female	edu: Lviv	teach: none
193	Russian	65+	female	edu: Kharkiv	teach: Kharkiv
194	Ukrainian	55-64	male	edu: Lviv	teach: Lviv
195	Ukrainian	55-64	male	edu: Lviv	teach: other
196	Ukrainian	65+	male	edu: Lviv	teach: Lviv
197	Ukrainian	55-64	female	edu: Lviv	teach: Lviv
198	Ukrainian	55-64	female	edu: other	teach: Lviv
199	Ukrainian	25-34	female	edu: Lviv	teach: Lviv
200	Ukrainian	45-54	female	edu: Lviv	teach: Lviv
201	Ukrainian	45-54	female	edu: Lviv	teach: Lviv
202	Ukrainian, Russian	18-24	female	edu: Odesa	teach: none
203	Ukrainian	35-44	female	edu: Lviv	teach: Lviv
204	Ukrainian	35-44	female	edu: Lviv	teach: Lviv
205	Ukrainian	55-64	female	edu: Lviv	teach: Lviv
206	Ukrainian	55-64	male	edu: Lviv	teach: Lviv
207	Ukrainian	45-54	female	edu: Lviv	teach: Lviv
208	Ukrainian	45-54	male	edu: Lviv	teach: Lviv
209	Ukrainian	35-44	female	edu: Lviv	teach: Lviv
210	Ukrainian	18-24	male	edu: Lviv	teach: none
211	Ukrainian	18-24	non-binary	edu: Lviv	teach: none
212	Ukrainian	18-24	male	edu: Lviv	teach: none
213	Ukrainian	18-24	female	edu: Lviv	teach: none
214	Ukrainian	18-24	female	edu: Lviv	teach: none
215	Ukrainian	18-24	female	edu: Lviv	teach: none
216	Ukrainian	18-24	female	edu: Lviv	teach: none
217	Ukrainian	18-24	female	edu: Lviv	teach: none
218	Ukrainian	35-44	female	edu: Lviv	teach: Lviv
219	Russian	45-54	female	edu: Odesa	teach: Odesa
220	Ukrainian	45-54	female	edu: Lviv	teach: Lviv
221	Ukrainian	18-24	male	edu: Odesa	teach: none
222	Ukrainian	55-64	male	edu: Lviv	teach: Lviv
223	Russian	55-64	male	edu: Kharkiv	teach: Kharkiv
224	Ukrainian, Russian	18-24	female	edu: Odesa	teach: none
225	Ukrainian, Russian	18-24	male	edu: Odesa	teach: none
226	Ukrainian	45-54	male	edu: Lviv	teach: Lviv
227	Ukrainian	35-44	male	edu: Lviv	teach: Lviv
228	Ukrainian	35-44	male	edu: Lviv	teach: Lviv
229	Russian	35-44	male	edu: Kharkiv	teach: Kharkiv
230	Ukrainian	25-34	female	edu: Lviv	teach: none

Table 18. Background Characteristics of Interviewees

Appendix G. Language Choice at the Background of Socio-Political Upheavals

CATEGORY		LANGUAGE CHOICE CHANGE IN FORMAL DOMAIN IN ACADEMIA			TOTAL BY EVERYDAY LANGUAGE
Everyday Language	Year	Yes	Do not remember	No	
Ukrainian	1991	9	26	84	119
	2004	7	16	96	
	2014	23	4	92	
	2022	33	2	84	
Ukrainian, Surzhyk	1991	0	10	14	24
	2004	0	8	16	
	2014	2	4	18	
	2022	7	0	17	
Ukrainian, Russian, Surzhyk	1991	0	3	4	7
	2004	0	3	4	
	2014	4	0	3	
	2022	4	0	3	
Ukrainian, Russian	1991	1	10	27	38
	2004	2	5	31	
	2014	14	2	22	
	2022	22	0	16	
Russian, Surzhyk	1991	0	0	1	1
	2004	0	0	1	
	2014	0	0	1	
	2022	0	0	1	
Surzhyk	1991	0	4	5	9
	2004	0	4	5	
	2014	1	2	6	
	2022	3	0	6	
Russian	1991	2	10	20	32
	2004	1	7	24	
	2014	8	1	23	
	2022	18	0	14	

Table 19. Language Choice in Academia (formal domain: 1991, 2004, 2014, 2022) by Everyday Language.

CATEGORY		LANGUAGE CHOICE CHANGE IN FORMAL DOMAIN IN ACADEMIA					TOTAL BY EVERYDAY LANGUAGE
Everyday Language	Year	Yes	Rather Yes	Do not remember	Rather No	No	
Ukrainian	1991	6	8	23	17	65	119
	2004	5	7	15	19	73	
	2014	16	10	4	16	73	
	2022	31	6	2	6	74	
Ukrainian, Surzhyk	1991	0	1	10	1	12	24
	2004	0	1	8	1	14	
	2014	0	4	4	5	11	
	2022	13	2	0	1	8	
Ukrainian, Russian, Surzhyk	1991	0	0	2	0	5	7
	2004	0	0	2	0	5	
	2014	1	1	1	1	3	
	2022	4	1	0	2	0	
Ukrainian, Russian	1991	1	3	12	5	17	38
	2004	1	4	7	5	21	
	2014	2	11	4	6	15	
	2022	16	12	1	2	7	
Russian, Surzhyk	1991	0	0	0	1	0	1
	2004	0	0	0	1	0	
	2014	0	0	0	1	0	
	2022	0	0	0	1	0	
Surzhyk	1991	0	0	4	1	4	9
	2004	0	0	4	1	4	
	2014	1	1	1	2	4	
	2022	3	0	0	2	4	
Russian	1991	0	1	7	5	19	32
	2004	0	0	6	9	17	
	2014	1	3	1	11	16	
	2022	7	9	0	7	9	

Table 20. Language Choice in Academia (informal domain: 1991, 2004, 2014, 2022) by Everyday Language.

Appendix H. Change in Language Choice in Academia across Selected Regions




Figure 22. Change in Language Choice in Academia (formal domain, 1991: Kyiv, Kharkiv, Odesa, Lviv) by Everyday Language




Figure 23. Change in Language Choice in Academia (formal domain, 2004: Kyiv, Kharkiv, Odesa, Lviv) by Everyday Language




Figure 24. Change in Language Choice in Academia (formal domain, 2014: Kyiv, Kharkiv, Odesa, Lviv) by Everyday Language




Figure 25. Change in Language Choice in Academia (formal domain, 2022: Kyiv, Kharkiv, Odesa, Lviv) by Everyday Language




Figure 26. Change in Language Choice in Academia (informal domain, 1991: Kyiv, Kharkiv, Odesa, Lviv) by Everyday Language




Figure 27. Change in Language Choice in Academia (informal domain, 2004: Kyiv, Kharkiv, Odesa, Lviv) by Everyday Language




Figure 28. Change in Language Choice in Academia (informal domain, 2014: Kyiv, Kharkiv, Odesa, Lviv) by Everyday Language




Figure 29. Change in Language Choice in Academia (informal domain, 2022: Kyiv, Kharkiv, Odesa, Lviv) by Everyday Language