We prove that for generic plurality games with positive cost of voting, the number of Nash equilibria is finite. Furthermore all the equilibria are regular, hence stable sets as singletons....................................................................................................................................................................................................................

On the generic strategic stability of Nash equilibria if voting is costly

DE SINOPOLI, FRANCESCO;
2005-01-01

Abstract

We prove that for generic plurality games with positive cost of voting, the number of Nash equilibria is finite. Furthermore all the equilibria are regular, hence stable sets as singletons....................................................................................................................................................................................................................
2005
Costly voting; Regular equilibria; Stable sets.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11562/324686
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