The citizen-candidate approach, proposed to study the performance of representative democracies, builds on a multi-stage game where the same agents are asked whether or not to become a candidate and, successively, to vote. Consistently, the solution concept adopted in Besley and Coate (Quart. J. Econ. 112 (1997) 85-114) conforms to backward induction rationality. In this note we remark that it does not conform to forward induction rationality.
A note on forward induction in a model of representative democracy
DE SINOPOLI, FRANCESCO
2004-01-01
Abstract
The citizen-candidate approach, proposed to study the performance of representative democracies, builds on a multi-stage game where the same agents are asked whether or not to become a candidate and, successively, to vote. Consistently, the solution concept adopted in Besley and Coate (Quart. J. Econ. 112 (1997) 85-114) conforms to backward induction rationality. In this note we remark that it does not conform to forward induction rationality.
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