We develop a new notion of security against timing attacks where the attacker is able to simultaneously observe the execution time of a program and the probability of the values of low variables. We then show how to measure the security of a program with respect to this notion via a computable estimate of the timing leakage and use this estimate for cost optimisation.

Quantifying Timing Leaks and Cost Optimisation

DI PIERRO, ALESSANDRA;
2008-01-01

Abstract

We develop a new notion of security against timing attacks where the attacker is able to simultaneously observe the execution time of a program and the probability of the values of low variables. We then show how to measure the security of a program with respect to this notion via a computable estimate of the timing leakage and use this estimate for cost optimisation.
2008
Timing attacks; probabilistic analysis; cost optimisation
File in questo prodotto:
Non ci sono file associati a questo prodotto.

I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.

Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11562/321326
Citazioni
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.pmc??? ND
  • Scopus 17
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.isi??? 14
social impact